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While privacy and security concerns dominate public cloud services, Homomorphic
Encryption (HE) is seen as an emerging solution that ensures secure processing of
sensitive data via untrusted networks in the public cloud or by third-party cloud
vendors. It relies on the fact that some encryption algorithms display the property
of homomorphism, which allows them to manipulate data meaningfully while still
in encrypted form; although there are major stumbling blocks to overcome before
the technology is considered mature for production cloud environments. Such a
framework would find particular relevance in Clinical Decision Support (CDS)
applications deployed in the public cloud. CDS applications have an important
computational and analytical role over confidential healthcare information with
the aim of supporting decision-making in clinical practice. Machine Learning
(ML) is employed in CDS applications that typically learn and can personalise
actions based on individual behaviour.
A relatively simple-to-implement, common and consistent framework is sought
that can overcome most limitations of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) in
order to o↵er an expanded and flexible set of HE capabilities. In the absence of
a significant breakthrough in FHE e ciency and practical use, it would appear
that a solution relying on client interactions is the best known entity for meeting
the requirements of private CDS-based computation, so long as security is not
significantly compromised. A hybrid solution is introduced, that intersperses
limited two-party interactions amongst the main homomorphic computations,
allowing exchange of both numerical and logical cryptographic contexts in addition
to resolving other major FHE limitations. Interactions involve the use of client-
based ciphertext decryptions blinded by data obfuscation techniques, to maintain
privacy.
Three successive software application phases are explored from lower to higher
technical levels, to progressively build towards a practical approach for reducing
the risk of sensitive data exposure in the context of CDS-relevant tasks. The
most e↵ective privacy-preserving strategy is considered at each phase, from basic
parallel primitive HE computations to higher-level private network interactions.
Performance assessment of the solution at each phase occurs through testing of
specific relevant arbitrary computations to various complex ML tasks. There
appears to be little existing literature that examines these developed techniques
as a means of broadening HE processing capabilities and practical application
over the cloud.
This thesis explores the middle ground whereby HE schemes can provide
improved and e cient arbitrary computational functionality over a significantly
reduced two-party network interaction model involving data obfuscation techniques.
This compromise allows for the powerful capabilities of HE to be leveraged,
xiv
providing a more uniform, flexible and general approach to privacy-preserving
system integration, which is suitable for cloud deployment. The proposed platform
is uniquely designed to make HE more practical for mainstream clinical application
use, equipped with a rich set of capabilities and potentially very complex depth
of HE operations. Such a solution would be suitable for the long-term privacy-
preserving processing requirements of a cloud-based CDS system, which would
typically require complex combinatorial logic, workflow and ML capabilities.
xv
Preface
As a result of the thesis work, there have been one journal paper and two conference
papers produced which relate to Chapters 2-4. My contribution to all three papers
and innovation is ⇡ 90%.
The works and Chapters they relate to are as follows:
1. Basilakis J, & Javadi B. (2019) A general framework for privacy-preserving
computation on cloud environments. Proceedings of the 12th IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing, Auckland, New
Zealand, 2-5 December 2019 (pp. 123-132). https://doi.org/10.1145/
3344341.3368815 [4]
2. Basilakis J, & Javadi B. (2019) E cient parallel binary operations on
homomorphic encrypted real numbers. IEEE Transactions on Emerging
Topics in Computing. https://doi.org/10.1109/TETC.2019.2906047 [Chapter
3]
3. Basilakis J, Javadi B, & Maeder A. (2015) The potential for machine learning
analysis over encrypted data in cloud-based clinical decision support. Pro-
ceedings of the 8th Australasian Workshop on Health Informatics and Knowl-
edge Management (HIKM 2015), Sydney, Australia, 27-30 January 2015.
https://crpit.scem.westernsydney.edu.au/abstracts/CRPITV164Basilakis.html
[Chapter 2]
In addition, two significant pieces of software have been developed as a direct
result of the thesis.
1. Sage (Python-like) code available in Appendix B, was developed to assist
understanding of basic homomorphic cryptographic concepts. It is the first
known Sage implementation of the Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan
(BGV) scheme and contains methods adapted from HElib to support more
complex HE capabilities, such as slot operations and automorphisms.
2. C++ code developed for HE application testing relevant to binary circuit
operations, HEB interactions and ML code, including the NN training
module will be made available as open-source software, once there is an




In Australia and worldwide, there is a growing impetus for adoption of Electronic
Health Records (EHRs) and Personal Health Records (PHRs) for use in every
aspect of clinical care. The availability of this type of information in healthcare
has already acted as a major driver for much needed Information Technology
(IT) reform in the sector, as well as opening up major opportunities for CDS
(Rothman, Leonard, & Vigoda, 2012). My Health Record (MyHR) is an example
of a recent Australian initiative to promote patient information sharing across
caregivers and healthcare provider institutions nationally where CDS systems
can potentially have a significant impact on healthcare at an individual patient
or population-based level (Digital Health Agency, 2020). Against the backdrop
of proposed large scale health IT infrastructure changes, there has been a rapid
uptake of cloud computing services by organisations that want to flexibly outsource
their computational requirements according to individual demand (Buyya, Yeo,
Venugopal, Broberg, & Brandic, 2009). Privacy and security concerns however
dominate public cloud use in healthcare and constructing a CDS system to
operate within this environment has considerable challenges both technically and
socio-politically (Amazon Web Services, 2016).
Cloud uptake and healthcare
Attempts at outsourcing computing or analytical processing to third parties or
using cloud-based repositories for data storage encounter significant challenges.
Nevertheless, cloud-based solutions are rapidly and relentlessly being taken up by
the Australian Government. In fact, the Digital Transformation Agency (2017) in
their ‘Secure Cloud Strategy’ report outline building blocks enabling agencies to
adopt cloud-based services. The stated general principles of the agency include
‘Use public cloud services as the default’ and ‘Use as much of the cloud as possible’.
In March 2020, the requirement for selecting cloud services from the Certified
Cloud Services List (CCSL) Certification maintained by the Australian Signals
Directorate (ASD), was removed (and updates made to the Australian Government
Information Security Manual (ISM)), in order to open up the cloud market to
home-grown Australian providers (Australian Signals Directorate, 2020a, 2020b).
Commonwealth entities are now able to self-assess cloud services according to
the Secure Cloud Strategy report with guidance from the ISM and ASD cloud
security guidelines (Australian Signals Directorate, 2020c). These policies apply
to third-parties such as health software companies using cloud services to connect
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with MyHR, Medicare, Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) and National
Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) under Services Australia, demonstrating
Commonwealth acceptance and support of health institutions embracing e-Health
services.
A report by GlobalData (2018) predicts that the global healthcare cloud
computing market will achieve an annual growth rate of around 20% to US$35
billion in 2022, although data security, privacy concerns and regulatory compliance
worries are some factors cited as challenges to be overcome. There are multiple
examples of partnerships being forged between large technology companies together
with health-related institutions, including Amazon Web Services (AWS) and
Cerner1; Google and Ascension in ‘Project Nightingale’2; Microsoft and Allscripts3;
IBM Watson and Medtronics4 just to name a very few. These companies are all
touting cloud-based ML and Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies to provide
CDS with predictive capabilities in a variety of ways, while gaining access to an
enormous amount of patient data in the process. This has sparked security and
privacy concerns in some cases, resulting in calls for improved ethical oversight
processes (Schneble, Elger, & Shaw, 2020).
Healthcare is no longer viewed as the ‘basket-case’ forever confined to keeping
its sensitive data within the confines of institutional silos, and is evidently willing
to take advantage of untapped opportunities and benefits of combined cloud-based
CDS technologies, rather than risk being left behind. However, ever-expanding
cloud computing paradigms are evolving with more innovative ways of analysing
aggregated big datasets from multiple sources. Cloud technologies including
containers (eg. Docker, Kubernetes), serverless computing (eg. AWS lambda,
Google Cloud Functions), fog, edge and multi-cloud platforms are now even
challenging the traditional cloud’s (eg. Software, Platform and Infrastructure-
as-a-Service, respectively SaaS, PaaS and IaaS) more relaxed view of perimeter
security (see Section 2.3). These technologies will further test the limits of sensitive
data access, and increasingly complicate regulatory, governance and jurisdictional
directives, which feature very prominently in healthcare.
Privacy Enhancing Technologies
A group of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) have been gaining increasing
attention since they disrupt the traditional view of tipping scales to either side
of a balance between privacy/security or utility, when computing on sensitive
data. Despite an extensive taxonomy of PETs (Heurix, Zimmermann, Neubauer,
& Fenz, 2015), the area is very unstructured and inconsistent. One type of PET
is captured by the definition: ‘A coherent system of ICT measures that protects
privacy by eliminating or reducing personal data or by preventing unnecessary
and/or undesired processing of personal data; all without losing the functionality
of the data system’ (Demiris, 2004). These techniques are complimentary to
the more traditional security approaches of encryption, authentication etc.. The







cloud-based CDS scenarios include Di↵erential Privacy (DP), Secure Multi-party
Computation (SMC), Homomorphic Encryption (HE), Federated Leanring (FL)
and Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP). They appear not to be included in the
definition of PETs in any literature except on the most recent online reports where
they are being lauded as the next set of PETs to watch for in data analysis security
(Future of Privacy Forum, 2020; The Royal Society, 2019). Reports qualify these
technologies to be at the proof-of-concept/research level with the overall area
being too complex and unstructured for the average user, and requiring specialised
knowledge for highly use-case dependent application. The area is characterised by
an over-representation of lab-prototypes or micro-benchmarks with limited trials
or practical experience (O ce of the Privacy Comissioner of Canada, 2017).
In reality, the industry is rapidly evolving and since 2018 there has been a
surge of such technologies being applied to the problem of Privacy-Preserving
Machine Learning (PPML) (Hesamifard, Takabi, Ghasemi, & Wright, 2018). This
is evidenced by the emergence a significant number of relevant frameworks or
platforms utilising these specific technologies. Some notable examples include the
SMC-based TF Encrypted5 and CrypTen6 for secure Deep Learning (DL) over
TensorFlow and PyTorch respectively; TF Federated7, TF Privacy8, TF SEAL9
for ML using FL, DL and HE respectively; and OpenMined10 that combines FL,
DP, SMC and HE for private DL over PyTorch and TensorFlow. It would be
reasonable to conclude, in general, that the basic underlying PETs are currently
in the late stage research, early commercialisation phases, as some companies are
applying these technologies to useful specific problems such as securing the US
2020 Census data11 and electronic voting12. The technologies however are not yet
embedded within broad application areas and there is still the perception amongst
experts of an existing gap between theory and practice of PPML (Mancuso, 2020).
As yet, there appears to be no silver bullet emerging amongst the set of PETs
to facilitate the broad demands of a CDS. Each is beset by certain limitations and
their scalable adoption is di cult in industry, although significant developments
are continually and rapidly being made. The area of Homomorphic Encryption
(HE) is no exception, which is defined as an encryption scheme that allows specific
computations to occur over encrypted data, without the need for decryption
(Chow et al., 2009). The particular variations, FHE and Somewhat Homomorphic
Encryption (SWHE) have limitations that include being computationally expensive,
exhibiting large encryptions sizes relative to the corresponding plaintext data, and
having computations limited to operations over finite field polynomials.
Existing specific intractable problems in HE include an ine cient procedure
to reset noise in encryptions which accumulates during HE operations, known as
recryption (see Section 2.5.4). As a result, recryption contributes to an inordinate











operations are di cult to combine due to their very di↵erent algebras. As a result,
either logical or numerical computations alone are respectively favoured, and very
ine cient workarounds are necessary to achieve a full scope of basic operations.
Finally, integer-based operations result in encodings that accumulate indefinitely
with no ability to reduce back to baseline, resulting in an upper computational
bound, beyond which decryption can no longer occur. These limitations have
implications on e ciency, bandwidth and practical applicability to be discussed
in subsequent chapters, together with the extensive research being performed to
overcome some of these hurdles.
HE is typically the last to be considered amongst the group of PETs for cases
requiring e cient and practical solutions, due to the mathematical complexity
and computational ‘trickery’ used to overcome their limitations over time, but for
the present may appear insurmountable. HE however, demonstrates an advantage
of greater consistency over varying sets of computational tasks (including across
multiple HE implementation variations), that separates it from the patchwork
of other PETs that typically solve di↵erent sets of problems in highly use-case
dependent ways. Consistency is a result of FHE lying at one end of a continuum
where the single cryptographic solution contains all necessary operations for
carrying out data analysis or computational tasks on a single server. Although
several combinations of operations can be accomplished on a single FHE instance,
there are still limitations on certain important functions in practice. On the other
end of the spectrum are sophisticated SMC protocols that split operations over
several cryptographic technologies for functional coverage. These solutions often
involve multiple rounds of interactions that require complex cryptographic secure
function evaluation, which can be di cult for companies to scale and maintain
(Cheu, Smith, Ullman, Zeber, & Zhilyaev, 2019; Daniely & Feldman, 2019).
Proposed research
This thesis explores the possibility of extending HE cryptographic techniques by
relaxing the requirement for whole server homomorphic processing. By adding two-
party interactions (server-client) involving specific secure data transfer protocols
and data perturbation methods, key limitations in existing HE encryption schemes
can be overcome. Data perturbation methods used in specific limited functions
provide statistically weaker privacy protection, but allow the overall system
to be more e cient and less resource demanding, particularly on large data
sets. The interactions involved are much fewer, more limited in scope and
more consistent across operational tasks than those associated with multi-party
computation protocols. They are employed for the specific purpose of overcoming
FHE limitations rather than being tailored to any particular computational
or analytical task. By employing a combination of cryptographic and data
perturbation techniques, a practical compromise between e ciency and privacy
can be achieved. It is hoped that a framework of basic components interacting
consistently across the Internet could be assembled into a privacy-preserving




The key research objectives of the thesis are to:
1. Overcome key limitations of FHE schemes by complementary data obfus-
cation techniques over a limited two-party interactive network, in order
to achieve more flexible privacy-preserving arbitrary computation over en-
crypted data.
2. Develop a set of building blocks that when assembled, provide a consistent
framework to support private ML and CDS-related tasks, which are suitable
for deployment on the cloud.
Healthcare is an ideal setting to focus on secure data management due to
the critical importance of data sharing and collaboration; it is an area of high
sensitivity to privacy; and is vulnerable to data leakage from attacks or human
error which occur with relatively high frequency. The choice of healthcare also
allows narrowing of the overall model of trust to a particular industry of interest
when examining security issues. However, there is no real reason why any of the
techniques discussed in the thesis cannot be applied to other key industries.
The ML area is selected in order to demonstrate complexity of private arbitrary
computation concepts, and due to its rapidly increasing relevance to CDS. But
dealing with ML on its own emphasises a fairly limited span of tasks, therefore we
keep in mind the ability to continue computation beyond any particular ML task.
CDS is the lead focus rather than focusing entirely on AI or ML technologies alone
since the former area better encompasses the overall evidence-based management
challenges encountered in healthcare. Although AI or ML areas need to be
supported in terms of privacy-preserving complexity, the longer term outlook is
to support a variety of private CDS task expressions. Examples include directly
interacting with health record information rather than processing raw data alone.
Also, delegating activities amongst di↵erent people and applications to support
a coordinated workflow of CDS-based actions, such as gathering input data and
providing output alert notifications or recommendations. The overall challenge
is to develop a consistent privacy-preserving framework that can support CDS-
related activities suitable for cloud deployment, within a background context of
PETs which are typically applied in highly unstructured and use-case dependent
ways.
Some additional common research sub-themes throughout the thesis include:
1. Applying parallel approaches to improve e ciency of HE operations ranging
from low-level circuits to more generally over the cloud.
2. Considering how to best divide and co-ordinate a range of PPML algorithms
into general common fundamental operations to facilitate data analysis and
computation.
The thesis is very much about establishing early research on the topic of extend-
ing HE technologies for improved application, focusing on low-level architectural
development. Areas which are out of scope for this research include:
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• Extensive mapping of CDS-related tasks or healthcare security issues to
ensure adequate privacy-preserving coverage of all potentially associated
operations.
• Text mining or Natural Language Processing (NLP) HE approaches.
• Advanced deployment or trial of a privacy-preserving solution demonstrating
actual direct practical application to healthcare.
• Cloud deployment or scalability capabilities beyond two-party interactions
over the Internet.
‘Practical application’ is more loosely defined in terms of delivering improved
HE component flexibility and e ciency compared to existing FHE schemes. It is
also assumed consistent interactions between primitive HE components within an
overall framework has a better chance of integrating privacy-preserving features
within untrusted cloud-based CDS systems.
The claim is that the overall approach developed is unique and innovative
within existing literature as there is no similar solution where distributed data
perturbation methods (Kargupta, Datta, Wang, & Sivakumar, 2003) complement
HE-based interactions, and which are applied in the particular way as described
in the thesis. Despite introducing certain weakened privacy protection guarantees
in limited interaction circumstances, the framework design and associated analysis
of attacks should reassure privacy concerns within the context of healthcare.
The compromise to cryptographic security is necessary for ‘practical application’
purposes. The final thesis chapter will provide further discussion towards improved
practical application, scalability and privacy, which are identified as areas of future
work.
1.1.1 Contribution to Knowledge
The thesis demonstrate early steps towards o↵ering a potential solution to rigorous
and transparent security of identifiable healthcare information while enabling ease
of data access for collaboration, analysis or computation purposes.
It is hoped that greater knowledge of the following areas will be achieved by
thesis completion:
1. Use of HE techniques and protocols in healthcare.
2. Relevance of HE schemes to the cloud environment.
3. Consistency in component HE operations for scalable development.
4. Parallelisation opportunities in privacy-preserving ML operations.
5. Application of basic HE operations that have wider implications for CDS
outside of ML.
6. Healthcare security issues surrounding outsourcing of healthcare data analy-
sis tasks to third parties.
7. Opportunities for collaborating on healthcare data and knowledge bases
between multiple parties in a privacy-preserving way.
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1.1.2 Thesis Structure
The overall thesis is organised into six chapters which are arranged as follows:
1. Introduction - The current chapter introduces the thesis subject matter
and motivation; outlines research objectives; and provides discussion on
research scope and contribution to knowledge.
2. Literature Review - Contains background material on topics including
digital threats; CDS; Cloud technologies; and HE theory such as formal
concepts, encoding, plaintext message spaces, parallelisation and basic
circuitry. Various general HE applications and those specific to healthcare
are discussed, together with identifying common privacy-preserving use-cases
and interaction scenarios in healthcare. A full literature review is provided
in the area of HE and ML, later focusing on NNs. A brief exploration of
various miscellaneous topics conclude the chapter, including discussion on
data perturbation and attack methods; a comparison on types of multiparty
interactions; and general vs. tailored HE approaches.
The subsequent three chapters each reflect a separate software application
phase which are explored progressively from lower to higher technical levels, with
each building successively from previous levels. The term ‘application phase’
reflects the significant degree of background theory, software development and
evaluation of a final application, replicated within each of the subsequent three
chapters. Each phase or chapter stands as an individual (stand-alone) body of
work, that together make up the total innovation claimed for the thesis:
3. Binary Circuit Design - The first application phase examines accelerating
binary operations on real numbers suitable for HE, which contributes to key
foundational work relevant to subsequent application phases. This includes
determining an approach for encoding real numbers in binary; computing
numerical and logical operations such as comparisons; and implementing
more complex algorithms e ciently such as min-max and real number
sorting. A key innovation is the ability to perform mixed binary (addition,
subtraction and comparison-based) homomorphic operations in parallel using
Packed Primitive Circuits (PPCs), which are critical for accelerating binary
operations on packed ciphertexts. The result is a low-level general solution
for combining su ciently expressive logical and numerical circuits, enabling
binary primitives that are more e cient and practical for privacy-preserving
purposes. This result also maximises computational e ciency, memory
space usage and minimises multiplicative circuit depth. General application
and performance of these accelerated binary primitives are demonstrated
in a number of case studies. The binary acceleration impact of PPCs
is demonstrated by a 33-fold increase in homomorphic sorting of 16 real
numbers compared to a reference implementation that sorts an equivalent
number of integers.
4. Homomorphic Encryption Bus - A second application phase examines
the proposed technology platform known as the HEB, that leverages HE
with data obfuscation methods over a minimal two-party network interaction
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model. This enables a uniform, flexible and general approach to cloud-based
privacy-preserving system integration. The platform is uniquely designed
to overcome barriers limiting the mainstream application of existing HE
schemes, and ensures sustainable privacy-preserving computation. A client-
server interaction model involving ciphertext decryption on the client end
is necessary to achieve resetting of ‘noisy’ ciphertexts in place of a much
more ine cient (server only) recryption procedure. Data perturbation tech-
niques are used to obfuscate intermediate data decrypted on the client-side
of ciphertext interactions, in a way that is unintelligible to the client. In
addition to e cient noise resetting, interactions involving data perturbations
are also able to interchange between binary and integer-based plaintext mes-
sage spaces, and convert accumulated integer-based encodings to a reduced
embedded binary form. Design and performance of five di↵erent interaction
types are examined within the two-party client-server context. Interaction
performance is examined in terms of timing and multiplicative circuit depth
costs, through a simple equation evaluation and against standard recryption.
It is shown that all five interaction types demonstrate practical timing and
multiplicative depth costs. Where relevant, these costs are significantly
improved compared to their recryption counterparts.
5. Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning - With the HEB and its founda-
tional work in place, performance of the platform is demonstrated in potential
ML application areas within a third application phase. Examples of privacy-
preserving decision-tree and multiple linear regression classification are given,
demonstrating how binary and integer-based plaintext messages respectively
can be utilised in di↵erent classification tasks. The major development task
for this phase implements privacy-preserving NN training, which enables
stress-testing of the HEB platform in order to highlight implementation
considerations, including strengths and limitations, while comparing to
similar applications in the literature. Techniques such as mixing binary
and integer-based operations, noise resetting requirements and performing
accelerated HE matrix computations e ciently are demonstrated. The NN
training example demonstrates a significant e ciency advantage o↵ered by
the HEB platform when compared against the high cost of achieving full
security using a completely FHE-based reference implementation. The latter
implementation demonstrates performance using toy security parameters
only, in contrast to the HEB-based version which employs standard security
parameters. Equivalence in performance is also demonstrated compared to
less secure HE-based implementations, where decrypted intermediate results
are visible to the client. The techniques involved are applicable to other
privacy-preserving ML areas, in addition to arbitrary computational tasks,
typically involving only a fraction of the computation in comparison to NN
training.
6. Discussion, Future Work and Conclusion - Significance of the devel-
oped technology for potential CDS tasks in healthcare is discussed in the
final chapter. Limitations of the HEB identified from earlier ML demonstra-
tions are examined in detail and consideration is given to future work where




2.1 Background on Digital Threats
The threat
Healthcare data security breaches have the highest prevalence compared to any
other organisation type. According to the Australian Government’s ‘Notifiable
Data Breaches Report’ (Australian Information Commissioner, 2020) since com-
mencement of the scheme in 2018 (eight quarterly reports), the health sector
has reported the most data breaches compared to other industry sectors. In the
latest report (Jul-Dec 2019), 117 notifications were received compared to 77 in
finance, which was the next highest sector. Health service providers reported
the highest number of both malicious/criminal attacks and those resulting from
human error compared to other sectors, accounting for 54% and 43% respectively
of the total proportion of data breaches within healthcare. Cyber incidents were
the largest source of malicious/criminal attacks with phishing, ransomware and
malware featuring prominently in this sector. Other prominent causes of malicious
attacks includes theft of paperwork or data storage device, and rogue employee
or insider threat. The most common type of personal information involved in
breaches (77%) across all sectors was ‘contact information’, such as home address
or email, while identity and health information were involved in 30% and 23% of
data breaches (Australian Information Commissioner, 2020).
US data reflects the Australian experience although on a much larger scale.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates the frequency of notifiable breaches across di↵erent sectors,
according to a large aggregated database of US privacy breaches collected between
2005 to 2019 (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2020). The ‘Healthcare, Medical
Providers and Medical Insurance Services’ sectors have experienced the most data
breaches by far, compared to all other sectors. The type of US data breaches
encountered can also be ascertained from the same database during the same period
as summarised in Fig. 2.2. This profile is not too dissimilar to the proportion of
breach types encountered in the Australian ‘Notifiable Data Breaches Report’.
For a closer look at the types of cyber incidents encountered in the US, Fig.
2.3 illustrates the top security vulnerabilities recorded between 1999-2019 from the
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database, which employs an open
community standard to classify publicly known information security vulnerabilities
from the The Mitre Corporation (2020). In general, a high proportion of attacks
can be attributed to vulnerabilities in Web and application software that can be
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Figure 2.1: Frequency of notifiable security data breaches in the US across
di↵erent industry sectors (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2020).
exploited by malicious agents (65.8% of all types of attacks, by excluding the
categories of ‘Denial of Service’, ‘Bypass Something’, ‘Gain Information and Gain
Privilege’). These software vulnerabilities that allow malicious attacks to occur
include backdoor programs, viruses, malware, and trojans, potentially causing
leakage of sensitive information or disruption to services. Attacks of this nature
emphasize the concept of ‘software confidentiality’ and reflect on how well an
application such as a CDS can be trusted to handle personal data securely (Zissis &
Lekkas, 2012). Specific approaches to mitigate these types of risks include software
certification processes and software techniques that trace software vulnerabilities
by asserting application data flows (Lam, Martin, Livshits, & Whaley, 2008;
Livshits & Lam, 2005; Yip, Wang, Zeldovich, & Kaashoek, 2009).
Awareness of specific security breaches collected on open databases such as
the CVE give an organisation the opportunity to develop mitigation strategies
against these specific attacks. Malicious users however have access to a similar
suite of sophisticated resources and therefore maintaining software security is a
relentless process of staying ahead of hackers and other adversaries while never
completely eliminating the risk to privacy and security. Collectively, the number
of uncovered information security vulnerabilities have been increasing over time,
as reported on the CVE database and illustrated in Fig. 2.4.
Covid-19 and cyberattacks
During the recent Covid-19 outbreak, a report by Australian Cyber Security
Centre (2020a) was released warning of increased attacks by advanced persistent
threat actors targetting health care facilities and medical research sectors seek-
ing intellectual property on vaccine development, treatments and responses to
the novel coronavirus. Malicious cyber incidents include brute-force password
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Figure 2.2: Frequency of notifiable security data breaches in the US based on
type of breach (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2020).
attacks, phishing emails for distributing ransomware, gaining access to a targetted
organisation or exploitation of remote desktop protocols. The healthcare sector
is viewed as a lucrative target for cyber attacks due to the obvious global value
of the information, and contains sensitive or personal data. It is also considered
valuable for ransomware attacks due to the critical nature of the information for
maintaining healthcare operations and patient care. The report details mitigation
strategies for protecting against these attacks which vary widely, ranging from
using sophisticated high-end means to rudimentary phishing attacks. The report
states:
‘There is a booming underground marketplace o↵ering cybercrime-as-a-service,
or access to high-end hacking tools that were once only available to nation states.
Consequently, the lines between state-sponsored actors and cyber criminals are
becoming increasingly blurred and the bar for entry is lower than ever.’ (Australian
Cyber Security Centre, 2020a)
In general, Australians have recently experienced an increase in cyber scams,
online frauds and phishing campaigns from carefully crafted Covid-19 themed
attacks designed to exploit community fears/concerns about the pandemic, tricking
the recipient to download malicious content (Australian Cyber Security Centre,
2020b).
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Figure 2.3: Security Vulnerabilities by Type (The Mitre Corporation, 2020).
Law and Regulation
Any services containing sensitive health-related information are required to follow
legislated provisions enforcing security protections surrounding access to patient
and healthcare provider data (Australian Information Commissioner, 2019). There
are severe penalties in cost, patient safety, and provider reputation should any
malicious or unintended security breeches occur. In Australia since March 2014,
the Privacy Amendment Act (2012) brought large changes to the Australian
Privacy Act (1988) with expansion of the Information Commissioner’s powers
to audit and prosecute breaches of personal privacy in early 2018. New civil
penalties have also been introduced where serious breaches can reach a maximum
of $420,000 for individuals (serious or repeated) and $2.1 million for corporate
entities (Australian Information Commissioner, 2018).
In the US, civil and criminal penalties for security breaches can also prove
very costly, where mandatory reporting and well-defined costings per breach were
introduced after changes to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) mandated by the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, which came into e↵ect in February 2009.
HIPAA penalties are a minimum of US$100-$50,000 per violation (or per record)
depending on four tiers reflecting the level of culpability, to a maximum annual
penalty of US$1.5 million for violations of an identical provision (adjusted for
inflation yearly) (US Department of Health & Human Services, 2020a). Violations
can also result in jail time if there is wilful neglect. One only has to look at the
51 publicly listed penalties resulting from resolution agreements averaging US$1.8
million per institution (record fine of US$16 million in October 2018) between
2015-2020 (US Department of Health & Human Services, 2020b). Organisations
13
Figure 2.4: Total Security Vulnerabilities over Time (The Mitre Corporation,
2020).
simply cannot a↵ord security breaches in their IT systems.
Cybersecurity
One natural response to securing applications against malicious attacks involves
creating boundaries between those systems that need to be protected from external
untrustworthy sources (Zissis & Lekkas, 2012). Confining an IT system to operate
solely within a private network environment, thereby limiting access to external
networks such as the Internet, is a common means of ensuring system security.
Private networks however may not satisfy the processing power and economies of
scale a↵orded to consumers using public cloud services. Network isolation also
limits information sharing across a variety of healthcare institutions, which goes
against the sector’s patient safety and continuity of care agenda. Information
sharing promotes adoption of multidisciplinary and community-based (beyond
hospital-based) modes of care within expanding preventative, self-care and chronic
disease management programs. It is unlikely that any one healthcare group would
ever be able to wholly contain an individual’s lifetime clinical history within the
security of its own private IT network, thereby limiting opportunities for enriching
decision-making in healthcare for wholistic and personalised clinical care.
Even within private IT networks, attacks can occur as a result of ‘insider
threats’, which are an often-underestimated risk to an organisation’s informa-
tion security. These threats include accidental disclosures, insider curiosity and
data breach by insider (Appari & Johnson, 2010; Rindfleisch, 1997; Theoharidou,
Kokolakis, Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 2005). Insider threats constitute about 12%
of malicious attacks across all industries in Australia (Australian Information
Commissioner, 2020) and 24% in the US. (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2020).
According to the Data Breach Investigations Report (Verizon Enterprise Solutions,
2019), healthcare stands out as having the majority of overall breaches associated
with internal actors (59%). Violations correlated with partner associations (4%)
include third-party cloud vendors entrusted with outsourced provider data. Insider
threats have been one of the more di cult security aspects to control using tech-
nological means and usually depend on controlling both technical and behavioural
characteristics (Williams, 2008). Although techniques such as education, alerts,
authentication, rights management tools, audit trails, organisational security
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policies, and other deterrence measures have been used to manage insider threats
(Rindfleisch, 1997), ultimately there is an element of trust attached to an employee
or contractor within an organisation when managing sensitive information.
Approaches for securing publicly accessible IT systems that reside outside
private networks make use of increasingly sophisticated digital encryption and
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technologies to provide a virtual boundary to
protect an organisation’s IT assets and users from outside interference. Such
techniques are critical for securing services such as the public cloud, disrupting
the traditional concept of perimeter security defined by an organisation’s private
network (Zissis & Lekkas, 2012). Despite these protections, public cloud security
concerns are considerable and rely on the fact that computing resources are exposed
within a dynamic, distributed and shared environment, with consumers having
little control in how data is accessed, proliferated or destroyed. As virtualisation
enables hardware resources to be shared across di↵erent users, this introduces
relatively newer system vulnerabilities such as cross-Virtual Machine (VM) side-
channel attacks that can result in extraction of secret keys and other confidential
information from cloud instances by adversaries (Ristenpart, Tromer, Shacham,
& Savage, 2009).
Often there is lack of transparency and accountability when cases of privacy
breaches occur in the cloud (Pearson & Benameur, 2010). Additionally, there are
significant opportunities available for accidental or intentional leakage of personal
information; in addition to opportunistic, impersonation or social engineering
attacks on vulnerable IT systems accessed from publicly shareable computing
infrastructures. In fact, the recommendation is to either avoid the public cloud
model altogether for sensitive information or avoid exposing unencrypted data
to cloud providers (Pearson & Benameur, 2010; Puttaswamy, Kruegel, & Zhao,
2011).
2.2 Background on Clinical Decision Support
Definition
The term CDS applies to any application that supports clinical decision-making
and ‘provides clinicians or patients with clinical knowledge and patient-related
information, intelligently filtered or presented at appropriate times to enhance
patient care’ (J. A. Oshero↵ et al., 2007). Although a few studies have demon-
strated performance of these systems comparable to domain experts in specific
diagnostic-related tasks, for now ‘support’ provided by these systems should be
considered in terms of augmenting rather than replacing clinician decision-making
(Sutton et al., 2020). The general aim of a CDS is to make data easier to assess,
foster optimal problem-solving by the clinician, or assist in the automation of
manual processes (Greenes, 2011). These aims have implications for improved




Since being introduced in the early 1960s (Ten Teije, Miksch, & Lucas, 2008), there
has been slow progress to date towards adopting CDS systems into mainstream
clinical care beyond simple reference information display and basic alerting systems
(Beilby, Duszynski, Wilson, & Turnbull, 2005; Greenes, 2011). This is partly
accounted for by the sector’s earlier dominance by paper-based information systems
where CDS systems have only limited impact, although substantial gains have
recently been made in this regard. In Australia, CDS’s have been introduced
as a result of medical record computerisation in clinical practice, although their
application overall has been poorly defined, ad hoc, and with varying quality
(Trevena, McCa↵ery, & Salkeld, 2014). With improvements in computational
power and AI technologies, the last few years has seen a rapid increase in data
analysis and expert system research on EHRs, which are linking more widely to
other sources of data such as pathology laboratories and pharmacies (Lysaght,
Lim, Xafis, & Ngiam, 2019).
While earlier focus on practical CDS application has mostly been on information
handling, with the emergence of national EHR and PHR systems, the requirement
will be to apply increasingly sophisticated analytical and health information
management tools to support more complex clinical decision-making, in addition
to process improvement within healthcare practice (Australian Health Information
Council, 2009). This trend was being actively enforced in the US through the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s ‘meaningful use’ criteria. As part of
the criteria, CDS rule-based interventions operating on EHRs were systematically
being mandated together with financial incentives, with 40.2% of US hospitals
reporting advanced CDS capability (providing patient-specific recommendations)
in 2017 (Sutton et al., 2020). The meaningful use program has since been
replaced by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) ‘Promoting
Interoperability Program’ in 2018.
Impact
CDS systems assist in the adherence of evidence-based medicine (Sim et al., 2001),
which is significant due to the considerable gap found between clinical evidence and
practice amongst healthcare providers across the US and UK (McGlynn et al., 2003;
Willis et al., 2017). Traditional clinical guidelines have shown low adoption rates
amongst healthcare providers due to di culties in their practical implementation
(Sutton et al., 2020). Against this trend, CDS systems have demonstrated benefits
to clinical care. In a systematic review of 71 randomised controlled trials, 68%
showed that CDS improved clinical practice with the following four features
strongly associated with the improvement (94% improvement if all four features
present): decision support is provided automatically as part of the clinician
workflow (75% success alone); decision support is delivered at the time and
location of the decision-making; actionable recommendations are provided; and
the system is computer-based (Kawamoto, Houlihan, Balas, & Lobach, 2005).
Similar findings were shown in a more recent study of 66 head-to-head (comparison
with existing systems) CDS-based trials, where a moderate-strong adherence to
recommended practice was associated with the following independent factors: using
automated, on-screen and patient-specific CDS systems compared to on-demand,
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paper-based and less-patient specific ones (Van de Velde et al., 2018).
CDS types and scope
The types and scope of CDS interventions is vast and a number of resources
attempt to categorise these into an appropriate taxonomy, which varies widely
depending on stakeholder view (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2020;
J. Oshero↵ et al., 2012; Sutton et al., 2020; Wasylewicz & Scheepers-Hoeks, 2018).
Although there is considerable overlap in items within each group, a distilled form
of relevant CDS areas and separate intervention types are listed in the grey-box
areas below:
CDS application areas (and benefits):
1. Patient Safety (including alarm systems)
2. Clinical management (patient decision support, disease management)
3. Cost containment
4. Administrative function/automation (financial, department data man-
agement)
5. Diagnostics support (including imaging, laboratory, pathology, and
prescription)




2. Relevant data presentations (patient data reports)
3. Order/prescription creation facilitators
4. Protocol/pathway support (computerised guidelines, clinical workflow
tools)
5. Reference information and guidance
6. Alerts and reminders (typically unsolicited by patient or clinician
recipient)
Commonly, CDS systems are broadly classified into knowledge-based or non-
knowledge-based types according to their underlying decision-making process. A
knowledge-based CDS consists of a set of pre-compiled clinical facts (eg. if-then
rules) which interacts with patient data, with the result of performing some action
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(Greenes, 2011). The knowledge base relies on direct human expert input and is
typically underpinned by guidelines on clinical best practice gained from scientific
method. According to a literature survey on knowledge-based approaches (Montani
& Striani, 2019), knowledge is represented as symbols using rule-based (including
fuzzy logic), temporal and case-based reasoning; in addition to ontologies, semantic
and probabilistic (Bayesian) models. These expert systems are often based on
problem-specific binary decisions or decision-tree models which are still the most
prominent methods used in clinical practice to date (Wasylewicz & Scheepers-
Hoeks, 2018). Knowledge is represented in the form of logical steps based on
conventional medical guidelines or clinical rules that are readily understood by
clinicians.
Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence
Non-knowledge-based CDS types do not rely on a human expert to input knowledge
into the system directly and instead use data-driven approaches (Berner, 2007).
Techniques used in this case rely on mathematical and statistical inferences, and
with increasing sophistication and computational power, include more complex
models such as ML and AI methods. Based on the same literature survey
mentioned earlier, recent studies in CDS show a prevalence of data-driven AI with
increasingly predictive and personalised precision-based qualities (as classification
or regression tasks) to determine the best course of action (Montani & Striani,
2019). ML methods used include decision trees (plus random forest), logistic
regression, Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Bayesian models; with the key
adopted technique being NNs (Montani & Striani, 2019). ML techniques overall
can either be trained on pre-classified sets of data (supervised learning) or make
inferences from patterns within the data (unsupervised learning) to obtain desired
results.
A number of companies are at the forefront of applying DL techniques to
complex problems in healthcare, such as Google (diagnostic screening of diabetic
retinopathy and kidney disease; tumour detection to assist pathologists; precision
genomics1) and IBM Watson (individualised cancer treatment, drug discovery2),
Microsoft3 and Intel4, just to name a few. Relevant DL application streams include
NLP for information extraction and codifying/annotation of medical record texts;
digital image processing eg. radiological images and retinal scans; expert clinical
advice eg. practice guidelines and medication recommendations; genomics and
cancer diagnosis; physiological and vital signs monitoring eg. telehealth and
wearable technologies; and in public health (Mittal & Hasija, 2020; Sloane & Silva,
2020).
As data-driven AI approaches reach prominence, CDS systems become even
more relevant in aiding clinical decision-making amongst healthcare professionals,
which are required to prove their clinical safety. Data-driven approaches however
lack transparency and explainability which is recognised as one of the biggest
current challenges in both AI and medical informatics research (Montani & Stri-






approaches in so called hybrid systems, domain knowledge can be incorporated
together with data-driven methods, so that clinical users can evaluate for them-
selves the underlying basis of any advice, or logic in reaching a particular clinical
outcome. An example of this by Zihni et al. (2020) demonstrates explainable ML
methods used in tree boosting and NNs for stroke outcome prediction.
Privacy and other challenges
Ethical and privacy issues surrounding access to large sensitive healthcare datasets
present significant challenges to the development and application of both data-
driven and knowledge-based CDS approaches, and in their acceptance into standard
clinical practice (Bartoletti, 2019). In the UK, an important precedent was set
against the rising tide of wanton EHR harvesting (albeit de-identified) in the
interests of developing evermore intelligent CDS applications. It was ruled that the
Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust did not comply with four of the Data
Protection Act 1998’s principles when it shared the details of 1.6 million patients
with Google’s AI company, DeepMind (Kobie, 2017). This ruling has important
consequences as it demonstrates very clearly that the healthcare industry is not
willing to compromise on privacy in the same way other areas have in their use
of disruptive technologies such as Facebook. This is in spite of the life-saving
potential o↵ered by these CDS technologies, which can significantly improve
patient care. As a result, technology industries have been researching more
diligently for solutions to better capture informed consent and ensure data access
transparency in healthcare (eg. DeepMind’s blockchain-based Verifiable Data
Audit (VDA)5). At the same time, these industries are investing in developing
privacy-preserving solutions that can ease privacy concerns while still retaining
data usability.
It is likely that a combination of solutions that includes PETs and explainable
CDS systems, where both clinical benefits and privacy protections can be both seen
and understood, will subsequently compel providers and patients to participate in
intelligent healthcare application development.
Important CDS functions
It would be fair to say, due to the large amount of CDS variations and intervention
types, that to scope for relevant key basic privacy-preserving solutions would be
an actual exercise in enabling arbitrary private computation. However, there are
a number of important themes that feature prominently in this section’s previous
description of knowledge and non-knowledge-based CDS techniques. These themes
would be important to develop initially from a privacy-preserving perspective, and
includes private computation on:
• Binary and conditional logic.
• Decision trees and workflows.
• Text mining and NLP.
• Various statistical and ML algorithms.
5deepmind.com/blog/article/trust-confidence-verifiable-data-audit
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As the bottom-most techniques prove to be the most challenging, the focus of
this thesis is to achieve private computation at a ML-level of technical complexity,
although the operational scope of CDS is much broader. Dealing with a higher
complexity of HE computation should help cover the remaining more basic private
operations in the above list, although explicit research on these basic techniques will
be made throughout thesis development. Since the scope is limited to investigating
only numerical approaches, we ignore any requirement for text manipulation or
NLP, however the basic framework for supporting private computation on text is
discussed in the final Chapter 6 and with a view to future development.
2.3 Background on Cloud Technologies
Definition and Types
Adoption of cloud computing in healthcare would allow relevant CDS applications
to have a much-needed broadening of their processing and analytical capabilities
applied across a wider range of shareable healthcare resources (Armbrust et al.,
2010). Cloud computing is viewed as a ‘style of computing in which dynamically
scalable virtualised resources are provided as a service over the Internet’ (Dhar,
2012).
At a more fundamental level, cloud-based technologies rely on computing
resources performing parallel processing. This broad concept refers to the ‘simulta-
neous use of multiple compute resources to solve a computational problem’ (Bader,
Hart, & Phillips, 2005). These can be based on a multi-processor computer or
consist of multiple computers connected over a network. The two most important
factors in parallel processing classification are the level of coupling of the compute
resources and distribution of memory (Bader et al., 2005). Parallel processing
falls into two major, but sometimes overlapping, categories: parallel computing
and distributed computing. In the former case compute resources tend to be physi-
cally co-located, have shared memory and communicate over fast communication
networks.
In distributed computing, nodes are distributed sometimes geographically,
access their own private memory and have slower inter-process communication
over a network (Bader et al., 2005). Two well-known types include grid and cloud
computing systems. Grid systems are designed for collaborative sharing of loosely
coupled resources relying on an administrative domain to farm out multiple sub-
tasks, in order to reach a common goal. Resources in grid systems are generally
pre-reserved and designed for operating on batch processing of computationally
intensive tasks (Foster, Zhao, Raicu, & Lu, 2008).
Cloud computing on the other hand is designed to respond flexibly across
changing business requirements and represent a fundamental change in the way
consumers and organisations utilise computing resources. The transition is away
from owning the system to one where IT systems are accessed as a service when
required (Soman, 2011). This service utilisation is typically shared, on-demand,
‘elastic’ and platform independent. The payment model is often based on the level
of utilisation, which is not pre-determined (‘pay-as-you-go’). Resource usage is
measurable, therefore it can be transparently controlled and reported (Dillon, Wu,
& Chang, 2010). Cloud computing is increasingly attractive to business entities
20
that wish to take advantage of cost sharing, and on demand provisioning of large
scale computing resources, compared to the ‘total cost of adoption’ model for
IT business infrastructure. Additionally, the ease of use, platform-independence
and decentralised nature of cloud computing allows services to be shared across
multiple entities and are more suitable for group collaboration (Soman, 2011).
Virtualisation (or more specifically hypervisor technology) is central to the
resource optimisation and elasticity that characterise cloud-computing services.
The technology sits between the computer hardware and the operating system and
performs allocation of resources between them (Xing & Zhan, 2012). Virtualisation
provides the abstraction of logical resources from the physical hardware, and
converts the physical process to a form that is more suitable for subscriber
services.
Traditional service and deployment models
As per Dillon et al. (2010), some of the more traditional service models of cloud
computing include:
• Software as a Service (SaaS) - Cloud model that releases ready to use software
applications, which do not require installation and are readily accessed from
a browser. Examples include Google docs, ZOHO o ce, Salesforce, and
Gmail.
• Platform as a Service (PaaS) - Shared developer platform supporting full
‘Software Life-cycle’ application development on the cloud. Can be restricted
to a certain programming environment with support for tools, configuration
management and pre-built components for building higher-level applications.
Examples include Google App Engine (Python, Java), Microsoft Azure
(.Net).
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) - Consumers can access computer customis-
able activity of flexible capacity (CPU, storage, network). Independent VMs
can be set up ‘elastically’ to meet growing or shrinking resource demands.
Examples include Amazon EC2, Rackspace, and GoGrid. Data storage as a
Service (DaaS) or virtualised storage on demand is considered part of this
group. Examples include Amazon S3, Google BigTable, Nirvanix SDN, and
Apache HBase.
There are also di↵erent cloud computing deployment models that are orthogonal
to these service models. A private cloud is able to better isolate computer systems
to within a single organisation’s private network and away from unsolicited public
access, while still retaining the benefits of an abstracted IT infrastructure o↵ered by
a cloud-based architecture (Zissis & Lekkas, 2012). The private cloud however may
not satisfy the processing power and economies of scale a↵orded to consumers using
the far more dominant public cloud services, due to the relatively lower numbers of
software, computing and database resources that are typically available within a
private network. In this case, the hybrid cloud can provide the ability to combine
core activities in the private cloud while deploying more peripheral and resource
demanding activities to the public cloud. About 63% of organisations are thought
to have adopted this approach (Varghese & Buyya, 2018). Community cloud
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services share a common cloud infrastructure across a limited set of organisations
from a specific community with shared concerns (Dillon et al., 2010).
Next generation cloud architectures
The traditional view of the cloud has since evolved considerably into next genera-
tion cloud architectures, characterised by heterogeneous multi-provider resources
that are decentralised away from large single provider data centres. Heterogeneity
can be considered from a high level multi-cloud point-of-view, where applications
are increasingly making use of resources (hypervisors and software) from mul-
tiple providers. The heterogeneous cloud can also be viewed from a low-level
perspective combining multiple di↵erent processor-types across heterogeneous
architectures, where development of VM-based deployments present significant
challenges (Varghese & Buyya, 2018). A number of these architectures are de-
veloped to support the Internet of Things (IoT) defined as everyday devices or
physical objects that are able to intercommunicate over the Internet. The emerging
cloud landscape can appear confusing and inconsistent, however a summarised
version of the classifications discussed by Varghese and Buyya (2018), Yousefpour
et al. (2019) based on literature surveys, is shown in Table 2.1. From Yousefpour
et al. (2019), the network arrangement of these various cloud architectures are
represented schematically in Fig. 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Comparison of network arrangement for fog and related computing
architectures (Yousefpour et al., 2019).
Serverless and containerised platforms
The notion of paying for idle allocated cloud VM resources, that are required to
constantly be available for anticipated service requests, is also fast becoming an
antiquated one. Serverless platforms represent a move towards cloud architectures
that charge on an ‘as-used’ basis, rather than for allocated resources that may
not even be used (Varghese & Buyya, 2018). Serverless computing (also known
22
Table 2.1: Classification of emerging heterogeneous cloud infrastructures.





The set of (specifically) network devices that enable computing,
storage, networking and data management along the path
between cloud and end devices. Consisting of small servers,
mobile base stations, routers, switches, gateways, set-top boxes
or access points arranged hierarchically and seamlessly. Can




Located at the network edge beyond FC, for intelligent pro-
cessing of IoT data. Could be arranged hierarchically and can
function independent of Internet.
Edge Data
Centres
Third-party facilities that are smaller than the centralised
cloud, processing data and services close to the end-user, to





Provides compute and storage resources near mobile devices.
Extension of mobile computing through edge computing. Sub-
set of EC. Can function with no Internet. Previously referred
to as ‘mobile edge computing’ but has since expanded beyond
mobile device tasks.
Cloudlet
Small trusted VM-based computer or cluster representing a
small data center, typically one hop away from mobile devices
to o✏oad computation. Strong connection to the Internet.
Subset of EC and can overlap with MEC.
Microcloud
Equivalent to cloudlet but used in the context of user devices








Computing performed on mobile, portable devices ie. laptops,
tablets or mobile phones. Subset of mist.
Cloud of
things (CoT)
IoT devices form a virtualised cloud infrastructure (extreme




Mobile devices relying on cloud for operating high-computation
services. Intersection of mobile computing and cloud comput-





Uses spare resources of smaller mobile devices that can form
clouds. It is a subset of MCC.
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as Function as a Service (FaaS) or event-based programming) still requires use
of physical servers despite the name, but developers are typically unaware of
the underlying infrastructure for provisioning and scaling the service, which are
not always running. In addition to the lower cost, serverless computing o↵ers
flexibility, a reduction in development time, and are highly available. There is
still an issue with vendor lock-in as code modification is required across providers
and there is also some latency involved in cold application requests (Chan, 2018).
Examples of FaaS typically include AWS Lambda6, IBM Cloud Functions7 and
Google Cloud Functions8.
Container as a Service (CaaS) is a prominent OS-level (rather than hardware-
level) virtualisation technology that could be used to deploy serverless computing
functions. A container is ‘a lightweight, standalone, executable package of software
that includes everything needed to run: an application: code, runtime, system
tools, system libraries and settings’ (Docker, 2020). Containers are persisting (no
memory or time limitations), allow full application control, and are portable across
vendors due to isolation from their operating environment. They could be used,
for instance, to implement a ML framework, for which a serverless paradigm alone
could not support. However, containers require more work to set up and manage.
Additionally, they still require a long-running host, therefore are typically more
expensive to run compared to FaaS (Chan, 2018). Examples include Docker
Engine9 and Google Kubernetes10.
The use of serverless and container cloud techniques becomes very relevant
in the more resource-constrained context of fog and edge computing. The de-
velopment of new modular platforms consisting of highly available cloud-native,
event-based services are required to accommodate the dynamic, ad hoc nature,
and sheer volume of widely geographically dispersed heterogeneous nodes. These
should ideally operate under a uniform view of distributed/federated cloud infras-
tructure together with the edge (Nastic & Dustdar, 2018). Compute nodes that
need to scale vertically range from cloud-centric IoT or edge applications with
low-end processing capabilities; to Telco/business owned commodity infrastruc-
ture such as base-stations and switches; in addition to data centres. Challenges
include the fine-grained provisioning and monitoring of resources across multiple
cloud providers that can be rapidly deployed at low cost (ie. idle-less). Their
operation along the entire fog infrastructure should occur seamlessly without
involving significant programming e↵ort. Cloud Service Level Agreements (SLAs)
would need to include third party service nodes and their risk properly articulated.
The current cloud/fog environment however is better characterised by bespoke
solutions rather than adopting a particular generic platform (Varghese & Buyya,
2018).
Service Orientated Architecture vs. microservices
Enterprise application architectures have recently shifted to microservices that







integration of distributed cloud and edge devices (Shadija, Rezai, & Hill, 2017).
Microservices have evolved from more established Service Orientated Architectures
(SOA), with the idea that light-weight autonomous services can work together
(choreographed) to support a bigger business function. This is in contrast to
the reliance on heavier-weight middleware for orchestrating services, of which an
example is the Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) (Shadija et al., 2017). The core
principle of an ESB is that di↵erent applications can be integrated by talking
to a communication ‘bus’. Various applications connect to the bus via a suite
of available gateway adaptors that can transform each connection to a format
consistent with the uniform internal messaging bus framework.
The fact is that both ESB and microservice-based architectural styles can be
complimentary when supporting the spectrum of services required to cover the
entire cloud/fog ecosystem. The advantage of an ESB is improved centralised
application integration under a unified data model, more applicable to proximal
cloud services. Microservices may be better suited to supporting a ‘deviceless’
edge platform that can elastically provision, in a su ciently cohesive way, very
large numbers of distributed edge components that are more resource limited,
volatile, and would have greater di culty accessing enterprise systems (Shadija
et al., 2017).
Edge devices and Internet of Things
There are growing opportunities for containers, microservices and the cloud/-
fog computing environment to support ML. Distributed Deep Neural Networks
(DDNN) and Edge Analytics as a Service (EAaaS) models could reserve heavier
analytical computation in the cloud, whereas a scalable, lightweight, low-latency
and low-bandwidth analytics service model would be more appropriate for inter-
facing with IoT devices at the edge (Ishakian, Muthusamy, & Slominski, 2018;
Yousefpour et al., 2019). An example is the IBM Watson IoT analytics platform11.
Edge ML nodes would make use of less resource-intensive libraries or use hardware
acceleration such as Graphical Processing Units (GPUs), FPGAs, Application-
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) (such as Tensor Processing Units (TPUs))
packaged into an Acceleration as a Service (AaaS) o↵ering (Varghese & Buyya,
2018; Yousefpour et al., 2019). Computing resources could be vertically arranged
so that more central (heavier) ML training procedures occur on the cloud followed
by localised inferencing of the learned model at the edge (Yousefpour et al., 2019).
Alternatively, distributed (+/ mobile) edge nodes could be part of an ‘In-Edge
AI’ federated learning framework (S. Wang et al., 2019; X. Wang et al., 2019).
Cloud and healthcare
In combining cloud, fog, IoT in addition to Big Data, innovative solutions can
be constructed and deployed to alleviate long-standing healthcare issues (Aceto,
Persico, & Pescapé, 2020). This includes providing clinical care to the rapidly
increasing ageing population and associated increase in morbidity. The traditional
acute health services model focussed around expensive hospital-based management,
that is typically reactive to episodic clinical problems, is currently placed under
11www.ibm.com/au-en/internet-of-things/solutions/iot-platform/watson-iot-platform
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unsustainable stress (Primary Health Care Advisory Group, 2015; World Health
Organization, 2018). There is an urgent need to adapt to expanding long-term
disease management programs that provide more continuous, multidisciplinary
and community-based care. This includes supporting increased demand for
preventative strategies, self-management and real-time (tele)health monitoring
infrastructure.
By adopting a Healthcare as a Service (HaaS) mindset, powerful cost-e↵ective
solutions that are fully outsourced to the cloud are able to provide new capabilities,
communicate to more people and connect to new type of healthcare information.
A competitive environment of services o↵ering best-of-breed cloud-based digital
healthcare solutions, can be selected according to fit-for-purpose, cost, cloud
capability and capacity to deal with regulatory concerns. Provisioned computing
resources that are highly scalable, flexible and robust could support a wide range
of healthcare application scenarios including high-end clinical information systems,
intelligent diagnostic services, and pervasive IoT medical devices (Aceto et al.,
2020; Dang, Piran, Han, Min, Moon, et al., 2019; Darwish, Hassanien, Elhoseny,
Sangaiah, & Muhammad, 2019; Dash, Biswas, Banerjee, & Rahman, 2019). Service
o↵erings would potentially be easier to configure and monitor, provide fast AI
processing capability, and have large storage capacity for knowledge capture and
back up. Achieving increased equitable access to cloud services would promote
much-needed information sharing, collaboration and mobility in healthcare.
Cybersecurity challenges
With increased opportunities however, there is added and new risk. The elephant
in the room is how to address the significant security and privacy challenges that
accompany the emerging fog (and related) computing paradigms. All above liter-
ature surveying the array of cloud-based applied healthcare research, cite privacy
and security as the primary stakeholder concern. There are significant security
risks associated with handling sensitive data across multi-cloud environments, and
even more concern when such a wide range of weakly isolated fog/edge nodes
and IoT devices are accessible to many users, which can be subjected to various
attacks. Integrating end-to-end network security and facilitating event-based
authentication protocols across these platforms/devices/sensors, together with
defining SLAs that implicitly deal with security, can address some concerns about
o✏oading sensitive information to these nodes (Nastic & Dustdar, 2018; Varghese
& Buyya, 2018; Yousefpour et al., 2019). In the case of edge-based ML previously
mentioned, privacy concerns relating to analysing large volumes of sensitive data
could be managed by first performing local processing of private raw (eg. video,
audio or sensor) data before subsequently passing on a reduced set of less invasive
essential features to the cloud.
While robust security mechanisms across newer generation cloud infrastructures
are lagging, HE is an area that aims to ensure consistency of security across
heterogeneous nodes from the cloud to IoT devices. Significant research has gone
into developing bespoke solutions across a range of PETs, providing security to
IoT devices used in healthcare and other industries (see Section 2.7). However,
similar to the emerging cloud situation, there is no unified ecosystem addressing
interoperable and application independence amongst PETs to easily handle security
within diverse cloud/fog infrastructures.
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In this regard, we look towards developing a security framework that can take
into account the future of cloud/fog computing, and take guidance from SOA
principles to ensure consistent interoperability of basic security components. While
attempting to develop a general secure platform, we first pay attention to support-
ing a rich centralised computational environment based on more heavyweight but
uniform set of privacy-preserving operations, such as those provided within a FHE
scheme. At the same time we ensure that this platform can link further down
to more distal (resource-deprived and distributed) cloud infrastructures, utilising
lightweight disparate privacy-preserving components that are less resource hungry,
such as those represented by the remaining PETs. This collaboration between
interconnecting heavy and light-weight PETs somewhat parallels the relationship
between complementary ESB and microservices, which are used to deploy services
across cloud and edge devices.
2.4 Alternative Privacy Enhancing Technologies
This section briefly outlines three major alternative classes of PETs that show
the most promise in balancing security and e ciency, before turning focus onto
the main background topic of HE in the next section.
2.4.1 Secure Multi-party Computation
SMC (or Multiparty Computation (MPC)) allows parties to securely execute
distributed computing tasks using secure data transfer protocols and involve
rigorous cryptographic proofs (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009). These secure protocols
include oblivious transfer, and generic constructions like garbled (ie. encrypted)
circuits first described by Yao (1982), which in principle can compute any polyno-
mial function but in reality are very costly and ine cient to deploy due to high
communication and computational complexity, even in a two-party scenario (Bost,
Popa, Tu, & Goldwasser, 2014; T. Chen & Zhong, 2009; Du, Gustafson, Huang,
& Peterson, 2017; Lindell & Pinkas, 2009). Other more specialised multi-party
protocol constructions including secure sum, set union, set intersection, scalar
product and homomorphic encryption are much more e cient and are increasingly
finding practical application, for instance in distributed privacy-preserving ML
(Barni, Orlandi, & Piva, 2006; Mendes & Vilela, 2017). There has been a recent
resurgence of interest in SMC due to the increased prevalence of technologies such
as the cloud, mobile computing and IoT. For further details on the protocols and
practical aspects of SMC, refer to the survey by Zhao et al. (2019). More than
twenty SMC protocols are implemented and benchmarked in Python by Keller
(2020) from CSIRO’s Data61 agency 12.
2.4.2 Di↵erential Privacy
DP provides formal mathematical guarantees around protecting privacy loss in
data analysis by demonstrating that no single data item will change the overall
output, as invented by Dwork (2008). Techniques such as adding random noise
12github.com/data61/MP-SPDZ
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can be used in either an interactive (eg. adaptive SQL queries) or non-interactive
(eg. sanitised databases) mode, to balance the tension between privacy loss vs.
data utility and allow meaningful information to be extracted from a dataset,
whilst preventing identity disclosure.
DP can protect against a wide range of attacks including di↵erencing attacks
(querying in such a way as to isolate a single record) and similar attacks that
use auxiliary information, such as linkage and reconstruction attacks. Some
well-known examples of breaches on supposedly ‘anonymous’ data released to the
public, including Netflix and AOL (Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2008) are illustrative
of such attacks. The intuition behind DP relates to ‘calibrating’ the amount of
noise added to a database depending on an individual’s contribution to the results
of a database (ie its sensitivity), in order to produce an equivalent level of privacy
(Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, & Smith, 2006).
The mathematical definition of ✏-di↵erential privacy is as follows:
Pr[A(D1) 2 S] 6 e✏ ⇥ Pr[A(D2) 2 S]
A randomised algorithm A provides ✏-DP if the above equation is true for
datasets D1 and D2 that di↵er on the data of one person. ✏ (the natural log of e✏)
is a composable and robust quantifiable measure of privacy (loss). It describes
a multiplicative bound, which roughly corresponds to the bits of information
that can be gained from a single record. Smaller values of ✏ result in better
privacy protection as noise drawn from a distribution of certain width has a lower
threshold for revealing di↵erences between D1 and D2. The Laplace distribution is
a specific (data-dependent and computationally simple) randomisation mechanism
for adding noise reflecting properties of the dataset. Since it essentially resembles
an exponential distribution function, the Laplace mechanism acts to preserve
✏-DP.
A major limitation of DP is the ability to estimate sensitive information given
enough queries despite using di↵erentially-private data, due to the cumulative
property of privacy loss. This can be controlled by limiting the amount of queries
that can be made or returning much noisier results, so as not to exceed a maximum
privacy loss threshold or privacy budget (Bkakria et al., 2018).
DP techniques have allowed the public release of de-identified datasets such
as Opal Card transport usage data from NSW (Asghar, Tyler, & Kaafar, 2017;
Culnane, Rubinstein, & Teague, 2017), and will be used to protect privacy of 2020
US Census data within legislative requirements (Abowd, 2018). Both Apple and
Google are adopting DP methods to legally gather anonymous usage information
in iOS and Chrome respectively, and to protect privacy in DL training (Apple,
Inc., 2017; Erlingsson, Pihur, & Korolova, 2014). Google has released open-source
DP libraries13 and its privacy-preserving TensorFlow toolkit14 for ML training
with DP.
2.4.3 Federated Analysis
Promising approaches to privacy-preserving ML training are based on recently




a computing node where the sensitive data originates. Each node forms part
of a federated group of nodes communicating securely to a central party, which
manages overall model aggregation using privacy-preserving techniques.
Individual data security can be preserved in the aggregated collective model,
however, below a certain privacy threshold, it requires HE, SMC, DP, k-anonymity,
or even block-chain techniques to secure intermediate model parameters that risk
identity exposure (Geyer, Klein, & Nabi, 2017; Hardy et al., 2017; Yang, Liu,
Chen, & Tong, 2019). For instance, locally trained weight updates for a NN model
can be encrypted using the partially additive Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem
(see Section 2.5.2), and sent back to the model owner where all gradients are
privately accumulated by addition into a single model (Trask, 2019). There are
di↵erent architectures performing private federated learning. Additionally, there
are certain vulnerabilities to be aware of such as model-poisoning attacks for
inserting hidden back doors (Bagdasaryan, Veit, Hua, Estrin, & Shmatikov, 2018).
Secure federated learning has been implemented by NVIDIA researchers and
King’s College London using 285 annotated MRI brain scans from a Multimodal
Brain Tumor Segmentation (BraTS) challenge (W. Li et al., 2019; Zhu et al.,
2019). There are also modern deep learning toolkits implementing private federated
frameworks including Google’s Tensorflow federated15, PySyft16 on top of the
PyTorch framework by the OpenMined group17 and other open-source projects
such as the Federated AI Technology Enabler (FATE) 18.
2.4.4 Trusted Execution Environments
Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) are a secure hardware-isolated area of a
processor that runs (a smaller secure OS) in parallel with an operating system,
protecting both its runtime states and stored assets with a high level of trust. It is
also able to remotely attest its trustworthiness to third parties (Sabt, Achemlal, &
Bouabdallah, 2015). Examples include the Arm TrustZone for the ARM Cortex-
based processor systems (Winter, 2008) and Intel’s Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) technology (Anati, Gueron, Johnson, & Scarlata, 2013; Costan & Devadas,
2016). Vulnerabilities however have been discovered in the latter case using side-
channel and several other attacks exposing sensitive data including passwords and
cryptographic keys (Lindell, 2018; van Schaik, Kwong, Genkin, & Yarom, 2020).
2.5 Background Homomorphic Encryption
The following section presents relevant background information and properties of
HE technologies required to understand subsequent thesis work. Some general
fundamental cryptography concepts including formal security definitions and
cryptographic proofs are provided as supplementary reading material in Appendix







2.5.1 Introduction to Homomorphic Encryption
In an e↵ort to reduce the risk of sensitive data exposure in untrusted networks
such as the public cloud, increasing attention has been given to encryption
schemes that allow specific computations to occur over encrypted data, without
the need for decryption (Chow et al., 2009). This relies on the fact that some
encryption algorithms display the property of homomorphism, which allows them
to manipulate data meaningfully while still in encrypted form. In this situation,
secret keys need never be exposed outside a trusted network. If an attacker were
able to extract this data within the public network, it would be meaningless
while encrypted, and confidentiality would be maintained even while performing
analytical processing or computations. In contrast, standard encryption techniques
typically prevent further interpretation or manipulation of data, requiring the
ciphertext to be first decrypted before computational analysis could be performed
on the plaintext.
HE is seen as an important technology for overcoming some of the privacy
and data control issues when outsourcing computing and analytical processing to
the public cloud. This technology would greatly facilitate mainstream utilisation
of public cloud resources for sensitive data analysis with a significantly reduced
chance of information leakage should any system breach occur. If ML analysis
could be performed entirely on encrypted data, a cloud-based CDS application
could potentially ensure the privacy of healthcare data while supporting analysis
over healthcare information. Having the option to outsource computation to
third-party cloud vendors securely would make the role of a CDS more relevant
through wider access to healthcare information across clinical facilities than is
currently available. A secure outsourced cloud-based CDS service for data analysis
may be better responsive to the changing analysis requirements of healthcare
institutions (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
FHE schemes, which support both addition and multiplication operations on
the same ciphertext, have only recently come about starting from the work on
ideal lattices by Craig Gentry in 2009 (Craig Gentry, 2009). Although the original
scheme was highly ine cient, newer generation FHE schemes have since rapidly
evolved that are several orders more e cient. There is still more work required
however, before these particular encryption schemes are considered practical
enough for mainstream application use (D. W. Archer, Bogdanov, Pinkas, &
Pullonen, 2015).
SWHE schemes remove the requirement of bootstrapping or recryption which
typically takes up a very significant amount of the total FHE execution time.
The removal of bootstrapping however places a limit on the number of combined
operations that can be performed on the ‘noisy’ ciphertexts before successful
decryption is no longer possible. Considerable research has been dedicated so
far to developing various optimisations and batching techniques to improve the
e ciency of SWHE schemes and to maximise the depth of the circuits that can
be evaluated without bootstrapping. A number of newer generation schemes were
developed based on the more e cient and simple Learning with Error (LWE)
problem introduced by Regev in 2009 (Regev, 2009) (and its later ring variant)
rather than on lattices, although the hardness problems are related (Brakerski,
Gentry, & Vaikuntanathan, 2012). Optimisation techniques such as key-switching
and modulus-switching resulted in significant performance advances for the existing
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SWHE scheme variants, to be discussed in later within this background section.
Despite the aforementioned optimisations, there are still significant (space and
time) demands on computational resources and network bandwidth to overcome.
The fact is that SWHE schemes are obliged to have either a massive ciphertext
expansion or an ‘ugly’ algebraic structure in order to maintain their security
(Gjøsteen & Strand, 2016). Ciphertext expansion ratios are typically in the order
of GBs in size for only a relatively small amount of plaintext input, resulting in high
computational and communication costs (Togan, Lupascu, & Plesca, 2015). In
response, ciphertext packing techniques such as homomorphic Single Instruction
Multiple Data (SIMD) proposed originally by Smart and Vercauteren (2014),
are used to maximise memory space usage and achieve parallelism of repeated
operations by enabling the combination of multiple smaller ciphertexts into a
single larger ciphertext. Existing SWHE implementations also include additional
implementation-specific optimisations to improve e ciency of processing large
ciphertexts.
Much research e↵ort has also been dedicated around circuit design to support
various HE application areas. The main aim is to optimise use of the SWHE
tools as much as possible by designing algorithms in a way that reduces both the
consecutive and total number of multiplications. The former minimises circuit
depth to avoid bootstrapping while the latter reduces overall computational cost.
SIMD techniques can be used to reduce the occurrence of both multiplication
instances, in addition to maximising memory space usage.
SWHE tools overall are often applied in highly tailored ways against the
particular application scenarios, in order to deal with narrow parameter and
computational e ciency constraints. Tightly coupling HE methods in this way
limits their generalisability. The extent to which a HE solution can support
general computing functions across a wide scope of application areas depends
on the availability of su ciently expressive composable cryptographic primitives
designed to work e ciently within a HE context.
Developing even the most basic primitives such as simple numeric and logical
operations require non-trivial choices, including whether to perform evaluations
over binary or arithmetic circuits (or polynomial rings), as well as the choice of
data encoding. These factors have a significant bearing on low-level primitive
circuit performance, which have a further flow-on e↵ect on the performance of
higher-level algorithms (eg., min-max and sorting methods), which are more
directly relevant to practical use cases (Jäschke & Armknecht, 2016). For example,
binary circuits, which rely on encoding data at the bit-level before encrypting
(ie., use a plaintext message space of Z2) naturally support boolean comparison
operations, whereas they are very slow in performing arithmetic (Çetin, Doröz,
Sunar, & Martin, 2016; Cheon, Kim, & Kim, 2015). Integer-based encoding
(ie., encrypting as elements of a plaintext modulus of p or a Zp message space)
or more recently, representing real numbers naturally over a complex number
plaintext space (with limited precision) (Cheon, Kim, Kim, & Song, 2017), allow
for simpler and more e cient ciphertext multiplication and addition that are
easily parallelised; this is however at the cost of more complex comparison and
thresholding operations. The approach used to represent real numbers can have a
significant impact on the e ciency of numeric and/or logical operations which are
fundamental to many of the HE application areas (Çetin et al., 2016; Jäschke &
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Armknecht, 2016).
Basic HE cryptography concepts will be further explored within the back-
ground section. Characteristics of partial and full homomorphism will be initially
examined, including exploring a variety of existing lattice-based homomorphic
cryptosystems, followed by a description of formal HE concepts. Approaches to
encoding real numbers and basic properties of plaintext message spaces will be
further discussed. Overall, knowledge of these fundamental concepts will provide
a better understanding of the significant technical challenges common to all HE
research, aiming towards making arbitrary computation over encrypted data a
practical reality.
2.5.2 Partial Homomorphism
HE schemes allow meaningful manipulations on encrypted data without knowing
the secret key (Craig Gentry, 2010). HE schemes that allow simple operations
on encrypted data have been known for some time. One of the first algorithms
proposed to have multiplicative homomorphic properties was the RSA public-key
encryption algorithm (Rivest, Adleman, & Dertouzos, 1978). The mathematical
properties of the algorithm are such that the public-key encrypted form of two
integers m1 and m2, denoted as Epk(m1) and Epk(m2), when multiplied together
would result in the encrypted form of the product of the two integers, namely
Epk(m1 ·m2). Decrypting this product can reveal the correct solution to the actual
(plaintext) product of two integers. The same public key is used in encryption of
the two integers while the corresponding private key is used in decryption of the
ciphertext product.
This can be proven mathematically by considering that in RSA, the encryption
algorithm is given by:
Epk(m) = m
e mod n
. . . where the public key is modulus n and exponent e. The homomorphic property
therefore is then:






mod n = (m1 ·m2)
e mod n = Epk(m1 ·m2)
Since RSA is deterministic in its original form, it is not semantically secure. Any
attempts to making it probabilistic breaks its homomorphic properties (Fontaine
& Galand, 2007). Additionally, it leaks some information including the fact that
integers 0 and 1 have the same value in both plaintext and ciphertext form.
The first semantically secure HE scheme was described by Goldwasser and
Micali (1984), and since then a number of additively and multiplicatively HE
schemes have been described (Fontaine & Galand, 2007; Vaikuntanathan, 2011).
Of particular note are the e cient and semantically secure HE schemes by Paillier
(1999) and ElGamal (1984) (including their variants), which are additive and
multiplicative respectively. These schemes display partial homomorphism because
they do not support both addition and multiplication operations at the same time.
A list of the most common schemes are presented in Table 2.2 from Hesse and
Matthies (2014).
Partial HE, which underpins the majority of known practical HE schemes (see
Section 2.7), are predominantly group homomorphic as their computations rely
entirely on group operations and group homomorphisms between the plaintext
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and ciphertext spaces (Armknecht, Katzenbeisser, & Peter, 2012, 2013). These are
a type of algebraically homomorphic schemes. A group is a fundamental algebraic
structure consisting of a set of elements and a binary operation combining element
pairs, while obeying the axioms of closure, associativity, identity and invertibility
(refer to a textbook on abstract algebra). A group homomorphism forms a mapping
between two groups that preserves the group operations (this property, for instance,
is the reason why mathematical operations are ‘retained’ between plaintext and
cipertext in HE).
Table 2.2: List of common partial Homomorphic Encryption schemes (m refers to
a message, k to a key parameter, c to any constant) (Hesse & Matthies, 2014)
Cryptosystem Plaintext Operation Cipher Operation
RSA ⇥ ⇥
Paillier +,  , m⇥ k, mk ⇥, ÷, ck, c⇥ gk
ElGamal +, m⇥ k, mk ⇥, ck, c⇥ gk
Glowasser-Micali   ⇥
Benaloh +,   ⇥, ÷
Naccache-Stern +,  , m⇥ k ⇥, ÷, ck
Sander-Young-Yung ⇥ +
Okamoto-Uchiyama +,  , m⇥ k, m+ k ⇥, ÷, ck, c+ e(k)
Boneh-Goh-Nissim
+,  , m⇥ k, m+ k,
⇥(once)
⇥, ÷, ck, c⇥ gk,
bilinear pairing
2.5.3 Full Homomorphism
It was only until 2009 when a FHE scheme, which enables arbitrary computation
over encrypted data, was demonstrated by Craig Gentry (2009) using ideal lattices
in his PhD thesis. In general, these schemes are based on the intractable mathe-
matical problems associated with lattices. The lattice points outline ‘tilings’ of the
space of real numbers in n dimensions (Rn). A lattice is constructed by combining
n linearly independent vectors which form the basis of the lattice, denoted by
V =< v1, ...vn >. Integral coe cients (ai) associated with the basis are used to




aivi : ai 2 Z for all i
Two of the most common (conjectured) computational problems in lattices
include the Closest Vector Problem (CVP) and Shortest Vector Problem (SVP).
In CVP, the problem relates to finding the lattice vector closest to a given target
vector not on the lattice, while SVP is concerned with finding the shortest (non-
zero) vector in the lattice (Goldreich, Micciancio, Safra, & Seifert, 1999). Both
problems are known to be NP-hard to solve and grow proportionally (at least)
to the dimension of the lattice (Becker, Gama, & Joux, 2013). An illustration of
the shortest and closest vectors in a R2 lattice is shown in Figure 2.6. In forming
a public encryption scheme, a one-way computation function is required to be
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Figure 2.6: An illustration of lattices: (A) An R2 lattice; (B) The Shortest Vector
Problem and Closest Vector Problem (closest to y) (Safra, 2003)
constructed, which for the CVP could mean adding a small error vector to a point
on the lattice (the lattice point would have been initially mapped to a message).
The advantage of lattices over the Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) and
ElGamal encryption schemes are their reduced computation time for encryption
and decryption, which are of the order of O(k2) for some security parameter k,
since they are based only on simple polynomial multiplication. In comparison,
the time complexity of RSA and ElGamal systems are of the order of O(k3). The
disadvantage of lattice-based encryption schemes is in their public key size, which
is O(k2) compared to O(k) (Goldreich et al., 1997).
Ideal lattices of the type employed by Craig Gentry in the development of
FHE schemes, are lattices with some additional algebraic structure, such as cyclic
rotation of the vector set within the lattice basis. This allows for a more succinct
representation of the n-dimensional lattice (using 1 vector) and can be processed
more e ciently (Lyubashevsky, 2008). Homomorphic operations are performed
by the addition or multiplication of lattice points. As there is noise associated
with generation of the ciphertext, the noise is roughly doubled and squared with
the addition and multiplication operations respectively. This limits the combined
amount of operations that can occur because at some point successful decryption
will no longer possible due to the large amount of accumulated noise. This scheme
is known as a SWHE Scheme (Ö. Kocabaş & Soyata, 2014).
The truly revolutionary idea of Gentry was to convert the SWHE scheme
into a FHE scheme using a bootstrapping method that repeatedly decrypts the
ciphertext in a self-referential way (ie. recryption) as a means of resetting the
ciphertext noise. Each recryption operation step also allows only one arithmetic
operation to be performed before the noise becomes too large and a recryption
step is required before the next operation. A squashing process is necessary to
transform the decryption scheme to one that is homomorphically equivalent but
is simplified to allow bootstrapping. The repeated cycle of bootstrapping with
an additional single arithmetic operation allows for the computation of arbitrary
functions indefinitely (Craig Gentry, 2010). By handling all possible arithmetic
functions, this scheme satisfies the criteria of homomorphism, although there is an
additional requirement of compactness for it to be considered FHE. This means
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that the size of the ciphertext (and the time needed to decrypt it) does not grow
with the complexity of the function being evaluated, but rather is dependent
on (polynomial in) the security parameter (Craig Gentry, 2010). Even though
Gentry’s scheme demonstrated that FHE was possible, it was too ine cient to be
considered practical both in terms of computation and storage. Estimates showed
an 800,000 times storage expansion ratio was required for encrypting just one
bit, and 99.9% of the total execution time was spent on the recryption operation
(Kocabas et al., 2013).
There have since been a number of recent improvements to the original Gentry
scheme making it more e cient and practical to use. In 2011, Craig Gentry and
Halevi (2011) removed the requirement for the squashing process but FHE was
still based on ideal lattices. Concurrently (Brakerski & Vaikuntanathan, 2011a)
also removed squashing by exploiting Gentry’s scheme but based it on the much
more simple and e cient LWE problem. This was shown to be equivalent to the
hardness of solving the SVP problem on any lattices.
The LWE problem introduced by Regev (2009) states that a polynomial
number of ‘noisy’ random linear combinations of coe cients of a secret vector s
of n dimensions (modulo q) is hard to solve for s. A shortened example directly
from Regev (2010) illustrating this problem shows that the inputs could be:
14s1 + 15s2 + 5s3 + 2s4 ⇡ 8 (mod 17)
13s1 + 14s2 + 14s3 + 6s4 ⇡ 16 (mod 17)...
. . . and so on where each equation has a small additive error of say ±1. The
answer for s is purported to be hard to recover due to the presence of the errors (the
answer s = [0, 13, 9, 11]). A slight variation of this scheme, the ring-LWE problem
imposes some structure to the linear equations making them more compactly
represented (using smaller keys), more e cient to compute, and can still be shown
to be hard to solve on ideal lattices in the worst case (Regev, 2010).
The new generation schemes developed using (±ring) LWE by Brakerski
and Vaikuntanathan (2011a) with later refinements from Brakerski et al. (2012)
removed the requirement for squashing and bootstrapping. While the scheme could
perform additions homomorphically within the bounds of noise, a re-linearisation
technique was used that required a di↵erent secret key to perform each level of
multiplication under a new encryption. In this way up to L levels of multiplications
could be performed using a pre-determined chain of L di↵erent keys as additional
input. This new scheme became known as levelled FHE (ie. functions can only be
computed of a finite predetermined depth) (Togan & Pleşca, 2014). Brakerski et al.
(2012) also introduced a noise management technique called modulus switching
(or scaling) that relied on switching a ciphertext to one with a smaller modulus.
This resulted in a concomitant decrease in the magnitude of the noise without
involving a secret key and allowed an exponential increase in the number of
multiplications that could occur (n levels instead of log n) before bootstrapping
would be required (Vaikuntanathan, 2011). This particular scheme became known
as the BGV implementation of levelled FHE after its authors (see section 2.5.4).
There are other existing FHE scheme types. Van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi, and
Vaikuntanathan (2010) introduced the DGHV scheme (after its authors) which
is conceptually simpler compared to lattice-based schemes as it relies only on
simple integer operations rather than depending on single bit manipulations over
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plaintext. The scheme was based on the hardness of solving the approximate
Greatest Common Divisor (GCD) problem. The assumption here is that it is
normally simple to solve for the GCD of two integers using Euclid’s theorem, but
this is not the case when small errors are associated with each integer (Craig
Gentry, 2010). The initial DGHV scheme was still impractical as it involved the
use of very large public keys. There have since been a number of improvements to
the scheme including reduction of the public key size (Coron, Mandal, Naccache,
& Tibouchi, 2011) and batch processing of a vector of plaintext bits as a single
ciphertext (Cheon et al., 2013). Cryptosystems that rely on the approximate
GCD problem however appear to be less e cient (security-wise) compared to
equivalent lattice-based schemes (Craig Gentry, 2010).
In an e↵ort to improve on the performance of FHE schemes, a relatively recent
group of noise-free HE schemes (symmetric and asymmetric) have appeared as
reviewed by El-Yahyaoui and Elkettani (2016). These schemes rely on a variety of
hardness assumptions, including factoring and discrete logarithms; although the
majority have been broken (Vizár & Vaudenay, 2015; El-Yahyaoui & Elkettani,
2016).
Other SWHE scheme variants include the Brakerski-based scale-invariant BFV
scheme by Fan and Vercauteren (2012) and the CKKS scheme by Cheon et al.
(2017), which both rely on the RLWE assumption. The NTRU-based LTV scheme
by Lopez-Alt, Tromer, and Vaikuntanathan (2013) and subsequent BLLN scheme
by J. W. Bos, Lauter, Loftus, and Naehrig (2013) (‘YASHE’19) relied on the
NTRU small polynomial ratios assumption and o↵ered support for multi-key
homomorphism but were both found to be insecure since they are subject to a
subfield lattice attack (M. Albrecht, Bai, & Ducas, 2016).
The Brakerski, Fan and Vercauteren (BFV) scheme is very similar to BGV,
but there are di↵erences in the plaintext encoding (pt of low norm |pt| ⌧ q -
where q is the ciphertext modulus) hidden within the scalar product between
ciphertext and secret key ([hsk, cti]q - where []q is the reduction modulo q), also
known as the phase. Essentially for BGV pt is located in the Least Significant Bits
(LSBs) requiring a reduction of the scalar product by modulo p to remove the error
term (phase: µ+ pe - see Section 2.5.4); while for BFV (phase: (q/p)µ+ e) the
plaintext is hidden in the Most Significant Bits (MSBs) and decryption requires
multiplication by p/q, rounding the result and reduction by modulo p (A and
C in Fig. 2.7). Scale invariance of the BFV scheme comes from the fact that
modulus switching is not required to manage noise within bounds especially
during multiplication (although this can be done for optimisation purposes due
to a resulting decrease in precision). This is in contrast to BGV schemes which
are sensitive to the error magnitude during multiplication, requiring the modulus-
switching procedure. However for BFV, a more complex rounding operation is
required during multiplication (Ana Costache & Smart, 2016). BGV requires less
scaling operations which makes it faster than BFV (Ana Costache & Smart, 2016;
Miran Kim & Lauter, 2015), although its implementation and optimal use can
be more di cult. BFV appears to have much more flexibility in choice of the
coe cient modulus p and simpler parameter selection relating to performance
(Aguilar Melchor, Kilijian, Lefebvre, & Ricosset, 2019; H. Chen, Laine, & Player,
2017). There have been improvements and increased complexity to the modern
19‘Yet Another Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme’
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implementation of the BFV scheme particularly in relation to the speed-up of
modular arithmetic operations in the Residual Number System (RNS)-variant
(Halevi, Polyakov, & Shoup, 2018). BFV scheme performance now approaches
close to that of BGV (Anamaria Costache, Laine, & Player, 2019a; X. Jiang &
Tang, 2020), albeit with a concomitant decrease in simplicity of parameter selection
for optimal use (Chialva & Dooms, 2018). Indeed, deciding which scheme is best
remains an open question since there are many optimisations and architectural
choices that can be made depending on the application scenario, making direct
comparison di cult (Aguilar Melchor et al., 2019; M. Albrecht et al., 2018; H.
Chen et al., 2017).
In the Cheon, Kim, Kim, Song (CKKS) scheme, a di↵erent interpretation of
the plaintext encoding pt allows for a significant change in the plaintext algebra
although the homomorphic operations are almost identical to BGV. For CKKS,
the noise is placed at the LSBs while mixing with the message bits, which are
located in the higher-order bits of [hsk, cti]q (phase: µ+e, is an approximate value
of the plaintext). The plaintext encoding in CKKS becomes e+  · pt, where  
is a scaling factor large enough to reduce the error bits mixed with the message
and ensuring |e| <  . e can be considered as part of the approximation error.
Decryption requires scaling down [hsk, cti]q by   and rounding (Bergamaschi,
Halevi, Halevi, & Hunt, 2019; Iliashenko, 2019). While BGV and BFV deal
with exact numbers, the CKKS scheme deals with plaintext elements that are
complex numbers with limited precision. In mathematical terms, a new error is
added after each operation equivalent to one bit loss of precision (Boura, Gama,
& Georgieva, 2018). Inputs and outputs should be scaled with a large-enough
  to ensure that the noise does not a↵ect output precision (Dathathri et al.,
2019). In CKKS for a power-of-two integer n, a single ciphertext can encrypt a
n/2 complex vector that maps to a n real vector (there is a ring isomorphism
between Cn/2 and R[X]/(Xn + 1)). Therefore, the SIMD width in CKKS is n/2,
or half that achievable under BGV or BFV for the same parameters. Under this
scheme, real numbers can be represented in their natural state over R which can
be implicitly and e ciently rounded during its rescaling procedure (ie. native
fixed-point approximate arithmetic). Di↵erences in the decryption structure of
the RLWE-based FHE schemes BGV, BFV and CKKS, are illustrated in Fig. 2.7.
Third generation FHE schemes are characterised by a new Gentry, Sahai and
Waters (GSW) scheme (2013), based on the ‘approximate eigenvector method’,
which is similar to the Regev (LWE) encryption scheme and still based on lattices,
but manages to avoid relinearisation during homomorphic multiplication. The ring
variants to this basic scheme includes Fastest Homomomorphic Encryption in the
West (FHEW)20, later superseded by Fully Homomorphic Encryption on the Torus
(TFHE)21, which demonstrate bootstrapping in less than 0.1 second, although this
has to be applied after every gate operation (Bourse, Minelli, Minihold, & Paillier,
2018; Chillotti, Gama, Georgieva, & Izabachene, 2016; Chillotti, Gama, Georgieva,
& Izabachène, 2020; Ducas & Micciancio, 2015). The basic GSW scheme has
a high ciphertext expansion ratio by encrypting only a single bit and its noise
depends on the plaintext size after homomorphic multiplication. There has since




Figure 2.7: Decryption structure of [hsk, cti]q for RLWE-based schemes (slightly
modified from Iliashenko (2019))
scheme by packing multiple plaintext bits (using matrix operations) in every
ciphertext, although not to the extent seen in ‘second generation’ FHE schemes
that use the Smart and Vercauteren batching technique, based on the algebra
structure of rings (L. Chen, Zhang, & Wang, 2017; Halevi, 2017). Currently the
most e cient schemes are those belonging to the latter-most group that allow
SIMD operations, such as BGV, BFV and CKKS, since TFHE is not capable of
amortising large parallel operations to the same extend as SIMD (Bourse et al.,
2018).
There are a number of open-source implementations of existing HE schemes,
most of which are listed in Table 2.3 by Wood, Najarian, and Kahrobaei (2019).
This is based on information from the Homomorphic Standardisation website22,
which is a site that reflects recently increased standardisation activity from the
community, government, industry and academia to advance secure computation.
A more complete list of HE libraries and resources is regularly updated online
in the Awesome Homomorphic Encryption List23. The most prominent second
generations schemes include HElib24 based on BGV by IBM; Microsoft’s SEAL25
based on BFV; and most recently, HEAAN26, which implements the CKKS scheme.
Both HElib and SEAL include their own CKKS implementations, while HElib
and HEAAN support bootstrapping. HElib, the chosen FHE library for executing
algorithms developed for this thesis, is further discussed in Section 2.5.4.
General HE Security Attributes
FHE schemes have greater flexiblity in evaluating any circuit over encrypted data
without requiring decryption, compared to group homomorphic encryption which







Table 2.3: Fully homomorphic encryption libraries and software (Wood, Najarian,
& Kahrobaei, 2019)
Product Creator Language Licence Summary
SEAL Microsoft C++ MIT
Widely-used FHE library
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their security levels are also assessed di↵erently. Note that all homomorphic
schemes depend on the property of malleability, which enables their ciphertexts
to be transformed so that they form corresponding plaintexts that are related.
Consequently, it is impossible for these schemes to achieve Chosen Ciphertext
Attack Adaptive (IND-CCA2) security (please refer to Appendix A for a description
of the adversarial attack models) as it would be trivial for an adversary to correctly
guess a transformed ciphertext, which can now be accepted by the decryption oracle
in the corresponding security game, to recover the original message from the related
plaintext (Maimut, Patrascu, & Simion, 2012). Establishing Chosen Ciphertext
Attack Non-adaptive (IND-CCA1) security (where the adversary no longer has
access to the decryption oracle after obtaining the challenge ciphertext) is more
varied depending on the particular encryption type. In group homomorphism,
the security level varies from IND-CCA1 to Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA)
depending on the scheme (Armknecht et al., 2013; Hemenway & Ostrovsky, 2012).
In FHE schemes, it appears most are IND-CPA secure only (Chenal & Tang,
2014).
Overall, ‘non-group’ HE schemes can only imply a highest security guarantee
equivalent to the basic notion of semantic security for public key encryption, which
is modelled on honest-but-curious behaviour. As such, a basic HE scheme may not
o↵er protection against a malicious attacker (or compromised honest party) who
has the required system access to inject valid messages into a network and also
see how they are decrypted. In other words, one must ensure that any practical
HE application does not have access to a decryption oracle (or decrypted results
can leak to adversaries) which would break the IND-CPA security model. An
example of such an attack is the well-known key recovery method requiring only a
single decryption query (Peng, 2019). In reaction key recovery attack examples on
SWHE schemes, a malicious server can observe the e↵ect of a client’s behaviour
after manipulating messages in order to recover the SWHE private key (Chenal &
Tang, 2015).
Lattice-based cryptography has the additional attribute of being (so far) resis-
tant to quantum-based attacks, as the hard problems on which these schemes are
based are not susceptible to Shor’s algorithm (Armknecht, Gagliardoni, Katzen-
beisser, & Peter, 2014). In contrast, most existing cryptography schemes in
use today that are typically based on the hardness of large integer factorisation
or solving (± elliptic-curve) discrete logarithms, would be susceptible to Shor’s
algorithm in a post-quantum world. Susceptibility to quantum adversaries would
also apply to all group homomorphic encryption schemes (including those yet to
be discovered) (Armknecht et al., 2014).
In the race to develop cryptographic schemes that are quantum-resistant,
a number of key exchange protocols based on the (ring)-LWE problem have
been proposed including NewHope (Alkim, Ducas, Pöppelmann, & Schwabe,
2015; J. W. Bos, Costello, Naehrig, & Stebila, 2015) and Frodo (J. Bos et
al., 2016). Both have been formulated into prototype libraries and integrated
into OpenSSL forks for potentially securing the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol (behind HTTPS), as well as other cryptographic functions, against
quantum attacks. The Open Quantum Safe project (Mosca & Steblia, 2017) is
a platform for investigating prototypes of various quantum-resistant algorithms,
and their integrations into protocols and applications (Stebila & Mosca, 2016).
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Google are also experimenting with the NewHope algorithm to connect to Google’s
servers on top of the existing (elliptic-curve) key-exchange algorithm within their
bleeding-edge version of Chrome called Chrome Canary (Google, 2017).
2.5.4 Formal Concepts
This section discusses relevant formal algorithms characterising the BGV scheme
and their specialisation in the HElib cryptosystem. In order to obtain a more
complete understanding of the algorithms presented, Appendix B contains corre-
sponding implementations of the listed BGV operations, coded in SageMath27.
The code demonstrates homomorphic addition and multiplication using plaintext
slots and fixed encoding of real numbers developed by the thesis’ author (and
based a lot on HElib code). Unencrypted slot manipulation operations discussed
below are also demonstrated and based on the examples found in (Craig Gentry,
Halevi, & Smart, 2012). Relevant SageMath method names in Section B.1 corre-
sponding to specific algorithms mentioned below are indicated in square brackets
and teletype font eg. [Function()].
Preliminaries
Any HE scheme consists of four probabilistic polynomial time algorithms Keygen,
Enc, Dec, Eval. In this case, all algorithms implicitly take in a number of
parameters as input including dimension n, modulus q and error distributions,
according to RLWE constructions:
• Key generation (pk, sk  Keygen(1 )): takes in security parameter   as
input and outputs a public encryption key pk and a secret decryption key
sk.
• Encryption (c Enc(pk, µ)): takes pk and a plaintext µ in a message space
M defined by some ring RM. The output is a ciphertext c in space C (and
ring RC).
• Decryption (µ  Dec(sk, c)): decrypts c back to µ using the secret key sk.
• Evaluation (cf  Eval(pk, f, c)): characterises a HE scheme, taking as
input the public key pk, a function f : RlM! RM and a tuple of l ciphertexts
c1, ..., cl, to output a ciphertext cf .
The BGV SWHE Scheme
The RLWE variant of the BGV scheme can be represented as follows (Brakerski
et al., 2012; Halevi & Shoup, 2013):
With   as the security parameter (ie., all known valid attacks taking ⌦(2 ) bit
operations) and an integer m = ⌦( ) that defines the m-th cyclotomic polynomial




The underlying lattice dimension roughly corresponds to m, which determines
the size of computation and hence represents e ciency of the encryption scheme.
The plaintext message space is set to:
Ap := A/pA = Z[X]/( m(X), p) for p > 2
The ciphertext space is set to Aq := A/qA for an odd integer modulus q with
a degree up to  (m)  1. Ciphertexts are 2-element vectors defined over Aqi (or
ring Rqi), which is Aq at any particular level i, ie., ~c = (c0, c1) 2 R2qi .
In the modulus-switching procedure, by switching to a ciphertext with a smaller
modulus (from qi to qi 1), an increase in the number of multiplications could occur
from logL to L levels before bootstrapping is required and without involving a
secret key (Brakerski et al., 2012; Vaikuntanathan, 2011). At each ciphertext level
(L, ...1, 0), the modulus decreases with every application of modulus-switching
to reduce the noise during homomorphic evaluation. For correctness, we need
qi = qi 1 = 1 mod p, and qi 1|qi when moving down the chain of moduli. No
further noise reduction is possible in level 0, requiring bootstrapping to enable
further computation.
As there are a few variations to the RLWE assumptions involved in encryption,
we use that proposed by Lyubashevsky, Peikert, Regev (LPR) as a practical
approach to describing BGV (Lyubashevsky, Peikert, & Regev, 2010). In set-up of
the scheme, a (discrete Gaussian) noise distribution   is defined over the set of all
ring elements Aq with a small norm bounded by some B. The basic probabilistic
polynomial time algorithms applied to the BGV scheme are as follows:
• Keygen(1 ): Sample s    and e   . Generate a1  RqL uniformly at
random and calculate a0 = [ (a1s+pe)]qL . Output the secret key sk = s and
the public key pk = (a0, a1). [sampleGaussian() and LPR PubKeyGen()]
• Enc(pk, µ): To encrypt a plaintext polynomial m 2 Ap (or Rp), sample
u, e1, e2    and compute the ciphertext which is initially in level L:
~c = (c0, c1) = (µ+ a0u+ pe1, a1u+ pe2) mod qL
[LPR Encrypt()]
• Dec(sk,~c): Let s = sk. At any level i over A, ciphertext ~c satisfies:
[[hsk,~ci]qi ]p = [[c0 + c1s]qi ]p = [µ+ pe]p = µ.
[LPR Decrypt()]
The term [c0 + sc1]qi is the ‘noise’ in the ciphertext that grows with each
homomorphic evaluation. The ciphertext is valid as long as this noise does
not wrap around modulo qi, which gives bound on the norm of the noise to
be always below B. Under the RLWE assumption, the encryption scheme is
semantically secure (ie., against honest-but-curious adversary behaviour) if the
public key (a0 =  (a1s+ pe), a1) 2 R2q , and by extension the ciphertext (c0, c1),
are computationally indistinguishable from uniform in R2q .
Demonstrating the homomorphic properties of this scheme requires defining
further operations (Anamaria Costache, Laine, & Player, 2019b):
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• EvaluationKeyGen(sk, w): Let s = sk. For i 2 {0, ..., l}, sample a(i)
1
 Rqi
and ei   . The noise of the added vector is at most 2B.
















• Add(c0, c1): Homomorphic addition involves simply adding two ciphertext
vectors under the same key s over Aqi .
Output:
~c = ([c0[0] + c1[0]]qi , [c0[1] + c1[1]]qi)
[LPR HE Frac Slot Disp Fixed(f=‘add’)]
• Multiply(c0, c1): Homomorphic multiplication involves a tensor product
over Aqi resulting in squaring of both ciphertext and (new self-tensored)
secret key dimensions. While the current modulus remains unchanged, the
noise of the product ciphertext is bounded by B2.
Output ~c = (c0, c1, c2), where:
c0 = [c0[0]c1[0]]qi ,
c1 = [c0[0]c1[1] + c0[1]c1[0]]qi ,
c2 = [c0[1]c1[1]]qi
[LPR HE Frac Slot Disp Fixed(f=‘multi’)]
• Relinearise(~c, evk): (or key-switching) technique is required to reduce the
dimension of tensored secret key and ciphertexts back to original dimensions.
At each multiplication level, the tensored secret key would be encrypted
under a di↵erent secret key as a hint to facilitate conversion to the new
valid encryption (ie. an encryption of s2 under s) under the same modulus
q. This transformation can achieved using a couple of di↵erent approaches
(Brakerski et al., 2012; Gentry, Halevi, & Smart, 2015), although below
demonstrates working with the bit encoding of c2. The aim is to get longer
(higher-dimensional) vectors of c and s to ensure that new ciphertext c0
norm is su ciently low so as not to cause wrap around q. A single rather
than di↵erent secret key can be used for all levels if it can be assumed
safe to encrypt the secret key under its own public key (circular security
assumption) (Brakerski et al., 2012).














































• ModSwitch(~c, qi 1): This is the modulus-switching operation described
earlier:
Fix  i such that  i =  ci mod
qi
qi 1

























SIMD makes use of the fact that smaller plaintext spaces could collectively be
considered a vector of independent plaintext slots (for performing component-
wise addition or multiplication) when encrypted into much larger ciphertext
spaces by virtue of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). Since the plaintext
space is over Ap,  m(X) factors modulo p into s irreducible factors, Fi(X) (ie.,
 m(X) =
Qs
i=1 Fi(X)). Each factor corresponds to a ‘plaintext slot’ of degree
d, which is the smallest integer such that pd = 1 mod m, and thus the number
of slots, s =  (m)/d. The plaintext polynomial a 2 Ap therefore can be viewed
as a vector of s di↵erent small polynomials, (a mod Fi)si=1. The slot values can
represent elements of the extension field Fpd (or embedded elements of the sub-field
Fpn where n divides d), rather than individual bits (Craig Gentry et al., 2012).
Implementing linear rotations and shifts to move data across plaintext slots can
be achieved with an automorphism operation without any increase in ciphertext
noise (Halevi & Shoup, 2013). The automorphism is represented by the transform,
a 7! a
(i) where a(i)(X) = a(X i) mod  m(X) for a(X) 2 A and some i 2 Z⇤m.
Often a combination of automorphism operations with selective slots masked
out is necessary to achieve arbitrary permutations on packed ciphertexts. Key-
switching is also required to transform a ciphertext involved in an automorphism
into another valid ciphertext that is decryptable with respect to the original secret
key. In this case, secret key and ciphertext dimensions remain unchanged. Note,
there is a computational cost involved in combining automorphisms followed by
key switching to achieve permutations on plaintext slots. For further details, refer
to (Craig Gentry et al., 2012). [Slot Encoder AutoMorph()]
HElib
HElib includes many optimisations over the basic BGV scheme, including support
for recryption and SIMD. The encryption method involved in HElib varies slightly
compared to the aforementioned LPR method: It uses a native plaintext space of
Rpr for a prime power pr. The secret key, ~s is the 2-vector (1, s) 2 R2, where s
is chosen randomly from {0,±1} (m) with a recommended Hamming-weight (ie.,
number of non-zero coe cients) of 64.
HElib achieves its improved e ciency by switching the cryptosystem between
evaluation and coe cient ring polynomials representations: The former repre-
sentation is a vector of the primitive m’th roots of unity evaluations generated
using the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). The evaluation format allows point-wise
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addition and multiplication of elements in Aqi in linear time, so that operations
such as modular multiplications and additions of integer polynomials and auto-
morphism operations are performed more e ciently. Variations of key-switching
and modulus switching are implemented that allow ciphertexts to be kept mostly
in evaluation representation, but can be converted to a (smaller noise) coe cient
form (ie. a listing of all polynomial coe cients) only when required to improve
e ciency of either switching operations. There are other optimisations to reduce
the number of required switching operations.
In the specialised key-switching procedure, each qi is a product of smaller set of
primes pj , (ie., qi =
Qi
j=0 pj). As a result, ciphertext elements of the ring Aqi are
represented with respect to both polynomial vectors modulo each small prime and
primitive roots, producing the so-called DoubleCRT format. The key switching
variant also reduces the public-key size which includes the key-switching matrices.
Optimisation of the modulus switching variant involves performing the equivalent
transformation in evaluation representation (Gentry et al., 2015; Halevi & Shoup,
2013).
For correctness, if Qct is the product of all ciphertext primes, initially generate
c1  AQct uniformly at random and e   where   2 AQct , and set c0 = [pre c1s].
Then at any level i, the ciphertext ~c = (c0, c1) satisfies [h~s,~ci]qi = [c0 + c1s]qi =
m+ pre in R where m 2 Rpr is the message plaintext and pre is the error term,
which has a small norm relative to qi.
Details of the full set of operations for HElib as a BGV variant are represented
in simplified form quoted directly (apart from some di↵erences in notation for
consistency) from Melchor, Kilijian, Lefebvre, and Ricosset (2018) in the grey box
below.
HElib Algorithms (Melchor et al., 2018)
• HElib.Keygen:
sk Sample a random secret key sk = s RqL with coe cients in
{ 1, 0, 1}, where exactly h of them are non-zero.
pk Generate a public key pk = (b, a) 2 R2qL , with a  RqL drawn
uniformly at random, and b = pe   as, where e  RqL follows
DZn, .
evk Generate a relinearisation key in R2⇥lqL·q0 . q
0 indicates the product
of another set of special primes used to limit the error introduced
in relinearisation. Split q in l evenly-sized factors B1, . . . , Bl.
Define evki = (ai, bi)t 2 R2qL·q0 , with ai  RqL·q0 drawn uniformly
and bi = (
Qi 1
j=0 Bj)s
2 + pei  ais, where e RqL·q0 follows DZn, .
Output evk = (evk1, . . . , evkl).
• HElib.Enc(pk, µ): Generate a fresh ciphertext ~c 2 R2qL from a plain-
text µ 2 Rp, encrypted using the public key pk = (b, a) 2 R2qL , We
have ~c = (c0, c1) with c0 = ub+ pe0 + [qLµ]p and c1 = ua+ pe1 where
u RqL is drawn uniformly in { 1, 0, 1}
n and e0, e1 follow DZn, .
• HElib.Add(c0, c1): Add two ciphertexts c0 = (c00, c01 2 R2qi) and c1 =
(c10, c11) 2 R2qi into ciphertext ~c+ = (c0, c1) 2 R
2
qi with c0 = c00 + c10
and c1 = c01 + c11.




qi) and c1 = (c10, c11) 2 R
2
qi into ciphertext ~c⇥ = (c0, c1, c2) 2 R
3
qi ,
with c0 = [q
 1
i ]pc00c10, c1 = [q
 1
i ]p(c00c11+ c01c10) and c2 = [q
 1
i ]pc01c11.
• HElib.ModSwitch(~c, qi 1): Remove primes from the current modulus
to obtain a new target modulus qi 1 and scale the ciphertext ~c down
by a factor of   (equal to the current modulus divided by the target
modulus) using the following optimized procedure:
1. Reduce the coe cients of ~c to obtain ~c
0
= ~c mod  ,
2. Add or subtract multiples of   from each coe cient in ~c
0
until
it is divisible by p,
3. Set ~c ⇤ = ~c  ~c
0
, // ~c ⇤ divisible by  , and ~c ⇤ ⌘ ~c (mod p)
4. Output ~c ⇤/ .
• HElib.Relinearise(~c, evk): Relinearise a ciphertext ~c⇥ = (c0, c1, c2) 2
R
3
qi into a ciphertext ~c⇥ 2 R
2
qi using the relinearising key evk = W 2
R
2⇥l





1. d1  c2
2. For i 1, . . . , l:
3. c(i)
2
 di mod Bi




We then reduce the relinearisation key matrix modulo qiq0, and add


















Finally, using the modulus switching function defined above, we output
~c⇥ =HElib.ModSwitch(~c⇥, qi 1) 2 R2qi 1 .
• HElib.Dec(sk,~c): Decrypt a ciphertext ~c = (c0, c1) 2 R2qi into a
plaintext µ = [[q 1i ]p[c0 + c1s]qi ]p 2 Rp.
Recryption
HElib also provides support for a recryption (or bootstrapping) procedure, which
is the method used to convert from a SWHE to FHE scheme, by periodically
allowing ciphertext noise reduction in either packed or non-packed form. In order
to overcome noise accumulation in encryptions as a result of HE computation,
recryption is required for the computations to continue. Ciphertext decryption
is typically used to remove noise when recovering a plaintext message. Recryp-
tion can be considered as the equivalent of a decryption procedure performed
homomorphically on a ciphertext, resulting in a new ciphertext with a reduced
amount of noise. Throughout the entire process, the underlying plaintext remains
unaltered and also is never available in the clear. Unfortunately, recryption is
computationally expensive, and for second generation HE schemes, takes up a
considerable amount of the overall computation time.
Briefly, as described in Halevi and Shoup (2015), recryption produces another
ciphertext that has a much larger modulus and smaller relative noise, although
the plaintext message and secret key remain the same. For a new ciphertext ct0
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and larger modulus Q  q, [hsk, ct0i]Q ⌘ m (mod pr) can still be recovered with
much less relative noise.






relative to the special modulus q̃ = pe + 1 from q (for some integer e). In
the case of p = 2, it has been shown that the ‘homomorphic decryption’ (ie.
recryption) of m [[hsk, ct0i]q̃]2 roughly equates to u [hsk, ct0i]2e+1 , and then
m  uhei   uhei. In other words, extracting and XOR the top and bottom






(mod 2e+1) homomorphically requires generating a ciphertext c̃t via
a public key that is augmented with an encryption of the secret key s, relative
to a (much) larger modulus Q   q̃ and larger plaintext space 2e+1. In other
words, [hsk, c̃ti]Q = s (mod 2e+1). By evaluating c̃t
0
in Eq. 2.1, it can be seen that
the desired encryption of u can be computed (given [hsk, c̃ti]Q = s (mod 2e+1) is











































The bit-extraction procedure on encrypted coe cients of u is the most expen-
sive part and normally follows three steps: linear transformation, bit extraction,
and inverse linear transformation. For an initial arbitrary prime power plaintext
space (pr > 2), the recryption procedure is a generalised version of the p = 2 case.
Please refer to Halevi and Shoup (2015) for full details.
2.5.5 Encoding Real Numbers
Ease of implementation and e ciency of HE operations relies on the specific
encoding method used to represent real numbers. A fixed point representation
is the simplest one for demonstrating circuit operations, compared to a floating
point scheme. The fixed point encoding can be applied to the polynomial plaintext
ring, Rp whose coe cients represent either bits or integers in a sequence. Two
methods proposed by Dowlin et al. (2015) use scaled-to-integer and fractional
encoding representations of fixed point real numbers, which are demonstrated by
Anamaria Costache, Smart, Vivek, and Waller (2016) to be isomorphic under the
same power of two cyclotomic ring. Fractional encoding can only be applied over
an integer-based message space whereas the scaled-to-integer approach is relevant
over both binary or arithmetic circuits. It is worthwhile considering both fixed
point representations as researchers have previously sought to avoid costly bit
operations by turning to the plaintext space, Rp (Anamaria Costache et al., 2016).
Finally, mention will also be made to the representation of real numbers naturally
over R through the CKKS scheme.
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Binary Message Space
Binary encoding is the only option for representing a real number over a binary
message space (GF (2)). A scaled-to-integer approach generates a binary rep-
resentation of a real number by scaling it to some power of 10 and rounding
o↵ to an integer, according to some fixed digit precision. In this case, if a real
number has k bits of precision, then it can be encoded to an integer by a scaling
factor of 10k. The problem arises when two real numbers encoded in this way
are multiplied, then the output has 2k bits of precision. An unencrypted result
normally is rounded or truncated to k bits of precision, although in encrypted
form, the correct result is normally achieved by dividing the decrypted output
by 102k. There is criticism in the literature about the requirement for complex
book-keeping when using this encoding technique in order to ensure ciphertexts are
correctly scaled in homomorphic multiplication operations, which could potentially
leak data or computation information to an adversary (Anamaria Costache et al.,
2016; Dowlin et al., 2015).
An alternative approach suggested by Jäschke and Armknecht (2016) multiplies
a real number instead by a power of two according to k bits of precision. In this
case, the output of each homomorphic multiplication between two real numbers
should be truncated by deleting the last k bits (equivalent to dividing by 2k), to
bring the product back to the required precision. Under this approach, there is
no requirement to keep track of scaled products involved in computations before
final conversion to the decrypted output.
Options exist for encoding negative numbers, using either a sign-magnitude or
two’s complement approach. The sign-magnitude encoding typically uses the most
significant bit in representing the sign. There is a problem in having two encodings
of 0 (-0 and 0) with this scheme. A two’s complement encoding of a negative
real number is computed by inverting the scaled binary encoding of the positive
real number and adding one. Jäschke and Armknecht (2016) discusses some
advantages and disadvantages of each encoding in binary arithmetic performance
involving signed numbers. In general, a two’s complement encoding performs
better except in multiplication. Jäschke and Armknecht (2016) propose a hybrid
encoding approach for binary HE operations.
Integer-based Message Space
In an integer-based encoding, real numbers are represented using elements from a
Zp (or Z2t) message space rather than a binary field. This particular encoding
technique appears to be first suggested by Naehrig, Lauter, and Vaikuntanathan
(2011). In an integer domain, both addition and multiplication are e cient natural
homomorphic operations that are also trivial to perform in parallel using SIMD,
although it comes at the expense of more complex comparison-type evaluations
(see next Section 2.5.6 below).
Addition does not contribute significantly to ciphertext noise and, in contrast
to binary encoding, there is no interaction of carry operations across individual
integer-based elements (see Section 3.1.2). In the latter case, processing carry
operations are typically deferred only until after decryption, during decoding of
the numeric output (termed lazy carrying). One however needs to ensure that
the plaintext modulus p is su ciently large to prevent overflow of accumulating
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integer-based elements during addition over Zp. Similarly, e cient binary mul-
tiplication techniques, such as those based on the Wallace tree (Wallace, 1964),
are relatively slow and have a much higher circuit depth compared to integer-
based multiplication, which only has a single-level circuit depth. Overflow and
lazy carrying considerations mentioned for addition, also apply in the case of
integer-based multiplication.
A larger plaintext modulus, p increases an integer-based encoding scheme’s
capacity to handle a greater number of computations before overflow occurs. A
larger plaintext message space however requires an increase in size of the coe cient
q in the ciphertext space, Aq. Consequently, there is an increase in the ciphertext
noise growth and rate at which a ciphertext level is consumed, making the overall
scheme less e cient (Çetin et al., 2016; Cheon et al., 2015).
There are a number of ways real numbers could be represented under an
integer-based message space. A scalar encoding approach uses the constant term
of a plaintext polynomial to encode an integer (representing a real number in a
scaled-to-integer transform). The approach is impractical given ine cient use
of polynomial coe cients which remain unused, and the requirement for a large
plaintext modulus, p to represent real numbers of even modest precision (numbers
must remain between {d (p  1)/2e, ..., bp/2c}).
Real numbers can also be represented using a binary encoding plus scaled-to-
integer approach over Zp, similar to that described for a binary message space
above. Addition and multiplication will increase coe cient sizes, albeit at a much
slower rate than scalar encoding, therefore overflow over p is more di cult to
reach. Higher bases than base-2 can also be selected over Zp. An odd base forms
a balanced set of encodings modulo p, as coe cients are symmetrical about zero.
In particular, coe cients from a balanced based-3 representation are chosen from
the set { 1, 0, 1}, making overflow over p even more di cult to achieve given
non-zeroes can have di↵erent signs. Larger bases can be used for encoding larger
numbers, keeping polynomials shorter. In an integer based message space, negative
numbers are represented by swapping coe cient signs (Dowlin et al., 2015).
In general, a scaled-to-integer encoding is relevant to both binary and integer-
based message spaces, where any base b > 3 applies in the latter case. Decoding
involves evaluating a polynomial to the relevant base value, p(b). Addition and
multiplication work as expected over Zp, whilst binary circuits are explicitly
used to facilitate operations over Z2. Normally, a scaled-to-integer encoding is
implemented over the ring R = Zp[X]/ m(X), or Zp[X]/hFi(X)i in the case of
SIMD. One must be careful to avoid wrapping around the polynomial encoding
modulo  m(X) or Fi(X) (in addition to modulo p), which would otherwise yield
unexpected results. This limitation places a lower bound on the ring degree of
polynomials involved in operations.
Fractional encoding is a specialised scheme implemented over the cyclotomic
ring R = Z[X]/(Xd + 1) where d is a power of two. It requires a slightly modified
arrangement of coe cients compared to a scaled-to-integer encoding and no scaling
is required to represent a real number. The integer portion to the left of a decimal
point can be represented as a base-2 or greater encoding as usual, while the
fractional part of a real number to the right of a decimal point is represented by
the highest polynomial coe cients. The latter are designated  Xd ib i, where i is
the bit position to the right of the decimal point. Intuitively, due to the modulus
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of R, Xd =  1 and so the highest coe cients can also be represented as X ib i,
which is as desired. Under this scheme, a number of coe cients are set aside for the
fractional part of the encoded polynomial, p 2 R. The advantage of a fractional
over scaled-to-integer encoding is that it can handle wrap-around modulo Xd + 1
with operations involving p, although with too many multiplications, coe cients
reserved for the fractional and integral parts quickly grow towards each other
to yield unexpected results when the two parts coalesce. Under p, addition and
multiplication work as expected and p(b) decodes to the original real number
(Anamaria Costache et al., 2016; Dowlin et al., 2015).
Very large numbers that exceed integer or bit limits of individually encoded
polynomials, can be broken down by applying them first across a set of co-prime
plaintext moduli (whose product equals the modulus p). Each individual sub-
encoding can have the same operations performed, although they can be worked
on separately. Subsequently, the sub-encodings can be reconstituted using CRT
to the final correct output. Further details on number encoding relevant to HE
can be found in Dowlin et al. (2015).
Real Number Message Space
Earlier mention has already been made of the real number message support
provided by the CKKS scheme, which has only relatively recently been developed
by Cheon et al. (2017). HE schemes such as BGV and BFV deal with fixed-
point real number encodings over finite fields with fixed precisions that require
correction after multiplication. In contrast, CKKS can support operations over
real numbers natively with implicit rounding (during rescaling) of fixed-point
approximate arithmetic. Batch processing using SIMD can also be performed by
CKKS. Similar to integer-based encoding methods, binary logic such as comparison
operations, are not supported in the CKKS scheme (Sathya, Vepakomma, Raskar,
Ramachandra, & Bhattacharya, 2018). It is considered a popular data scientist-
friendly scheme for privacy-preserving ML and data analysis tasks, and would
appear an ideal choice for supporting applications requiring computation over
natural numbers.
Despite its advantages, a major open problem however of the CKKS scheme
is that it o↵ers only limited precision due to its approximate nature, and su↵ers
from compounded arithmetic error for deeper circuits. This accumulated error
cannot be corrected by Gentry-based bootstrapping or even by performing a
decryption-encryption procedure, thereby limiting its use in applications requiring
ongoing computation or data analysis tasks beyond training of simple ML models
28. For this reason, the approach of working with approximate real numbers
based upon the CKKS scheme is not considered further here in detail, except in
later discussion of potential hybrid schemes where its useful characteristics may
compliment future technical solution development.
2.5.6 Swapping Binary and Integer-based Plaintext Spaces
Swapping between binary and integer-based plaintext message spaces and vice
versa would be a very useful capability. This would allow one for instance, to
28github.com/microsoft/SEAL/issues/125
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perform e cient numerical (addition, multiplication) operations over an integer-
based message space and swapping to a binary one in order to perform comparison
operations or test for equality. It also would allow greater scope to natively compute
important non-linear functions, such as determining thresholds or min-max values
over a binary space, without resorting to higher-degree non-linear polynomial
approximations over an integer-based message space, with a concomitant increase
in processing complexity and costs.
Previous research has examined performing most operation types over an
integer-based message domain, without ever having to switch to a F2 plaintext
space. This involves finding e cient integer-wise algorithms for performing equal-
ity, thresholding and comparison functions. There are exact algebraic methods for
computing these operations that take advantage of Fermat’s Little Theorem over
finite extension fields (Çetin et al., 2016; Cheon, Kim, & Kim, 2016; Myungsun
Kim, Lee, Ling, & Wang, 2016). The Theorem states:
a
p 1
  1 ⌘ 0 (mod p),
where p is a prime and p does not divide a. To compute an equality test over
Fpl , for example:
equal(x, y) =
(
1 if x = y
0 otherwise
⌘p 1  (x  y)
pl 1
The algorithm has a multiplicative depth of dlog(pl  1)e ⇡ dl log pe which can
be reduced to dlog p  1e+ dlog le using SIMD (Myungsun Kim et al., 2016). This
algorithm is therefore slow unless p is small (see Cheon, Kim, and Kim (2016),
Table III for a run-time comparison of selected operations over the two message
domains). Additionally, this equation and other exact algebraic expressions
derived from Fermat’s Little Theorem work only on integers expressed as constant
polynomial terms. These expressions can be computed over real numbers using
scalar encodings of polynomial constants based on convergence and approximation
methods, which can be adjusted to variable precision levels. Çetin et al. (2016)
illustrates performing an equality check using Newton’s root finding algorithm,
and a comparison operation using a Square Wave approximation. These methods
demonstrate run-time latencies of 6 and 10 minutes respectively, with reduced
amortised run-times for multiple packed data (see Section 2.6.1 below for a
comparison of terms ‘latency’ and ‘throughput’ in SIMD). Other operations
discussed that can be performed over an integer-based domain include inversions,
constant divisions, and finding an approximation to the square root of a number.
In general, all these methods su↵er from e ciency bottlenecks as a result of
performing ring operations involving high degree polynomials within a limited
characteristic (ie. p value). Inputs from a larger characteristic could be handled
through parallel evaluations over smaller p values, later combined using CRT
(similar to approach discussed at the end of Section 2.5.5).
The prospect of interchanging message domains natively within the FHE
cryptosystem appears very di cult to achieve. There is brief mention of this
technique being used as a strategy for improving primitive circuit performance
in homomorphic query evaluations in the work of Cheon, Kim, and Kim (2016),
although there are no further technical details on how this is achieved. Mathe-
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matically the algebras over these two domains act very di↵erently. HElib indeed
contains separate variables for handling GF(2) and p > 2 message domains which
are set up with di↵erent cryptographic contexts at the outset and are subsequently
managed internally through separate code structures.
An enquiry was made by this author to the co-creator of HElib, Shai Halevi29
(through the GitHub repository), who is a well-regarded cryptographer and
principal researcher at the IBM T.J. Watson Research Centre, in regard to
whether it was possible to exchange between p = 2 and p > 2 plaintext message
spaces without involving decryption. He made the following response in June
201730:
“No, this is not possible, except perhaps in the narrow case where the
larger plaintext space is mod-2ˆr for some r.
In theory it should be doable to switch between di↵erent plaintext spaces
using bootstrapping. But actually implementing it will take a lot more
research. One issue is that the algebra of mod-2 and mod-p plaintext
spaces is quite di↵erent, so things like the number of plaintext slots
will change.
For the special case of switching from mod-2 to mod-2ˆr, in principle
all you need is to square your ciphertexts, and then it will maintain its
value but enlarge the plaintext space from 2ˆe to 2ˆ{e+1}. However (a)
I am not sure that HElib now has the interface for actually recognizing
the larger plaintext space (I will check this soon), and (b) you will need
to use the larger plaintext space when creating key-switching matrices
during key generation. (Specifically, you will need to initialize the
FHEcontext object with the larger ’r’ parameter.)”
In fact, Shai Halevi subsequently uses his suggested technique of employing
some recryption features in HElib to vary plaintext spaces of the form 2e in
Crawford, Gentry, Halevi, Platt, and Shoup (2018). The authors in describing a
method for statistical analysis based on logistic regression, use a mod-211 plaintext
space for correlation computations requiring linear operations, while remaining
operations, including addition and multiplication, are processed in a binary space.
A subsequent posting by another user on the same GitHub thread as indicated
above in November 2018 (several months after publication of the Crawford et al.
(2018) paper), summarises some issues with this technique:
“I have asked myself the same question: can I do calculations in binary
and use the results (which are ciphertexts representing encryptions
of 0 or 1) in multiplications with Integers (encrypted numbers with
plaintext 2ˆ32).
I do not understand the proposed solution where squaring lifts 2ˆ1 to
2ˆr. First, if I had to initialize my Context with higher r (r=32), then
I would lose all the benefits of staying in binary (fast computations/s-
maller coe↵/mod-2-arithmetic are all gone). Second, won’t squaring




L needs to increase, which hurts performance. So it’s even worse than
just calculating all integer from the start.
Long story short: as I understand it, this is currently not e ciently
possible without decryption and re-encrypting using di↵erent context.”
The following response was posted by Shai Halevi on the same day:
“That’s a fair summary. Changing plaintext spaces can be useful
in special situations (e.g., it is used inside bootstrapping), but with
current techniques it is not something that has much of a
general-purpose applicability.”
The last comment certainly has an impact against further pursuing the tech-
nique at this stage, as a general solution for swapping message domains. The issue
of hurting performance due to operating solely over an integer-based plaintext
context, and as a result, e↵ectively losing major benefits of e cient binary-based
operations, is similarly an issue for the solutions described earlier in this section
of working entirely within a Fp plaintext space.
It turns out however that around the same time, a new technique emerged that
would allow switching between several HE schemes to occur, including bridging
together binary and integer-based message domains. The technique known as
scheme switching was implemented initially into an application called Chimera
(Boura, Gama, Georgieva, & Jetchev, 2018) and later into Glyph by another
group (Lou, Feng, Fox, & Jiang, 2019). Scheme switching and its consideration
for research surrounding this thesis is further discussed in Sections 2.7.5 and 2.10.
2.6 Homomorphic Encryption, Basic Circuits
2.6.1 Primitive Operations and Circuits
The following section describes related work on addition, equality and comparison
HE circuit operations including their respective encodings. There have been
various attempts at minimising circuit depth and cost of multiplication depending
on the type of logical/numerical algorithm and encoding method used, with
varying performance outcomes. The majority of works do not significantly employ
SIMD techniques to accelerate bit or integer-based operations, or minimise circuit
depth.
Some works examine di↵erent operations on binary integers. C. Xu, Chen,
Wu, and Feng (2016) support 64-bit addition/subtraction using a tree-based data
structure to implement an n-bit Carry Lookahead Adder (CLA) (see Section 3.1.2)
resulting in a multiplicative depth of O(log n). In this case, the first slot of multiple
ciphertexts (overall one ciphertext per bit) are used during integer calculation. As
the authors suggest, SIMD is able to support element-wise computation of integer
vectors by making use of the remaining slots. Note, this is a trivial use-case for
SIMD, where the computational procedures are identical whether one or more
integers are processed in parallel, up to the maximum number of slots. In this
case, latency of the network, which is the time taken to process a batch, remains
the same. In contrast, the throughput decreases, which is a function of the batch
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size. The trivial SIMD approach is computationally quite distinct from the goal
of using SIMD to accelerate processing of the binary circuits themselves, thereby
reducing network latency. Potentially one ciphertext only is required to process
multiple numbers (to a maximum of (#slots)/n), therefore is computationally
more e cient and less memory intensive, but may impact throughput capacity.
Togan, Lupascu, and Plesca (2015) use a similar (non-SIMD) tree-based CLA
approach for developing a 32-bit adder for integers of the same circuit depth used
in the homomorphic evaluation of a lightweight symmetric cipher. The same
authors (Togan, Morogan, & Plesca, 2015) develop a divide-and-conquer strategy
to recursively evaluate a polynomial relation that compares X > Y on integers
expressed in binary, used to find the min-max from a set of encrypted integers.
The scheme has a circuit depth of O(n) and n(1 + logn
2
) multiplications.
In computing the mean from a set of integers, Naehrig et al. (2011) avoids
expensive homomorphic carry operations over Z2 by encoding integers using the
constant term of a ring polynomial under Zp for a large enough p. A set of 100
integers of size 128-bits can be added in 20ms within a single ciphertext (where p
= 1024) with minimal change in circuit depth. The approach is impractical given
ine cient use of polynomial coe cients which remain unused, and the requirement
for a large plaintext modulus, p to represent integers of even modest size.
A number of existing schemes compute homomorphic operations over real
numbers and most use either no SIMD packing or only in a very limited way.
Examples of works dealing with floating point numbers operate on separate
components (sign, significand and exponent) underpinned by modified versions of
FHE schemes over integer-based plaintext spaces (Arita & Nakasato, 2016; Cheon,
Kim, Kim, & Song, 2016). In both cases, no comparison-based operations are
implemented for the higher level floating-point arithmetic.
Jäschke and Armknecht (2016) uses a scaled-to-integer approach (see Section
2.5.5) over Z2 to implement binary comparisons, addition and multiplication over
real numbers. All binary operations display high multiplication and circuit depth
costs as the use of parallel primitive algorithms and SIMD are not considered.
Other proof-of concept approaches for computing over real numbers include the
use of continued fractions (Chung & Kim, 2016) or adopt less established FHE
schemes operating over a real plaintext field, thus requiring no explicit encoding
of inputs (Gai, Qiu, Li, & Liu, 2017).
Of the works that make use of SIMD to accelerate binary circuit operations
(in a non-trivial sense), most operate over integers. Additionally, SIMD is typi-
cally used only to accelerate single-operand homomorphic binary operations. In
encrypted database queries, Cheon, Kim, and Kim (2016) illustrate the use of
SIMD optimisation techniques to accelerate single-operand homomorphic equality,
comparison and addition binary circuits over integers. High multiplication costs
are achieved for comparison and addition since standard equations, rather than
parallel primitive algorithms, are used to implement binary operations.
King (2016) examines the Ripple Carry Adder (RCA), and parallel CLA and
Kogge-Stone Adder (KSA) circuits (see Section 3.1.2) over integers, comparing
implementations with and without the use of SIMD. Performance is benchmarked
empirically rather than taking into consideration circuit parameters or memory
requirements. Primitives that perform addition on multi-operand packed binary
input and equality/comparison circuits are not considered.
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O. Kocabaş and Soyata (2015) implement a ‘greater-than’ comparator that
operates on packed integers in binary form to analyse cardiac monitoring data.
Comparison logic is provided by the primitive evaluated in Section 3.1.4. The
authors further provide an accumulator function for calculating the average heart
rate, which initially relies on a tree of Carry Save Adders (CSAs) that operate
on individual operands per ciphertext, rather than packed multi-operand binary
ciphertexts.
Finally, there are existing examples of higher level functions that work directly
on encrypted packed numbers represented in binary. In one example, a recursive
bitonic sort algorithm operates over a 2:1 binary ciphertext packing structure to
sort integers (P. Kim, Lee, & Yoon, 2016). However, these types of protocols are
tightly coupled to their specific application.
In summary, there are very limited examples of general homomorphic circuit
primitives that use packed operands in binary form. Such a general solution is
sought that flexibly combines equality, comparison, addition and subtraction binary
circuits, which can be computed in parallel over an encrypted set of packed real
numbers. The outcome of such a composite circuit, derived from these primitive
circuits, is to enable more e cient complex homomorphic operations. Two
candidate algorithms for demonstrating potential application of these primitives
including sorting and finding the minimum or maximum (min-max) from a group
of encrypted numbers. The background of these two application areas are discussed
next.
2.6.2 Higher-Level Functions
Some higher level functions, built from primitive operations are discussed as they
are relevant to illustrating primitive circuit utility and performance.
Sorting Numbers
The task of sorting encrypted numbers using FHE was first implemented in 2013 by
Aguilar-Melchor et al. (Aguilar-Melchor, Fau, Fontaine, Gogniat, & Sirdey, 2013)
using a Bubble sort, and by Chatterjee et al. (Chatterjee, Kaushal, & Sengupta,
2013) using a two-stage Bubble and Insertion sort. The hcrypt31 library, based
on the work of Smart and Verteceuran (Smart & Vercauteren, 2010) was used
in both cases, although the former also experimented with an early BGV-based
scheme. Chatterjee examined minimising the recryption operation and as was
able to achieve sorting of 40 (32-bit) integers in 1399 seconds. The hcrypt library
however does not take advantage of modern noise reduction or SIMD batching
techniques (Acar, Aksu, Uluagac, & Conti, 2017), which are factors both relevant
to additional improvements in sorting performance.
The seminal work by Çetin et al. (Çetin, Doröz, Sunar, & Savaş, 2015) in
2015 implemented two low-depth sorting algorithms both relying on a matrix
to perform all comparisons at the outset, and achieving a multiplicative circuit
depth of O(logN + log n), where N is the total number elements to be sorted,
and n is the number of bits encoding each element. Çetin also introduced the
concept of using SIMD to accelerate sorting performance, although it is used in
31github.com/hcrypt-project/libScarab
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this case to sort multiple lists rather than accelerate sorting of a single list. The
amortised running time per sort is reduced since it takes the same amount of time
to sort one list compared to multiple groups of similar-sized lists up to the total
number of available ciphertext slots, s. Sorting one list however ine ciently uses
one ciphertext per bit, therefore the implementation is computationally expensive.
Using an NTRU-based SWHE scheme, sorting 16 (32-bit) integers is inferred
to take about 45 mins. Dai & Sunar (Dai & Sunar, 2015) boosted the SWHE
scheme’s sorting performance using a GPU-accelerated library32 to achieve a
speed-up of 12-41 times (reportedly, 1 min 38 sec to sort 16 integers of size 32
bits).
Kim et al. (P. Kim et al., 2016), appears to be the first work to report
using SIMD batching to accelerate sorting performance within a single list. The
authors employ HElib to implement a bitonic sorting algorithm, which is a data
independent (ie. constant number of comparisons irrespective of input) sorting
algorithm, consisting of recursive sort and merge operations. Only half of the
available data slots are used to insert elements within its ciphertext packing
structure. The sorting network is made up of two bitonic (ie. increasing then
decreasing) sub-sequences, each initially with two elements for the base case.
The bitonic sort algorithm has a O(N log2 N) comparison complexity and a
multiplicative depth of O(log n · log2 N). Additional details can be found in
Emmadi, Gauravaram, Narumanchi, and Syed (2015), P. Kim et al. (2016). Whilst
benchmarking Çetin’s work, P. Kim et al. (2016) argues that the multiplicative
circuit width in addition to its depth are important in determining the number of
recryptions required for sorting large lists, which is the most dominant bottleneck
in all FHE operations. The sorting algorithm based on the comparison matrix
(having O(N2) comparators) was shown to have a large width, and ultimately
requiring more recryptions compared to the bitonic sort, despite the latter having
a larger multiplicative circuit depth. An improvement in the number of recryptions
was confirmed using real implementations of the sorting algorithms, although
performance statistics on smaller sorting sets was not shown.
Min-Max
Literature specifically looking at finding min-max on encrypted number sets
using FHE is limited. Kocabaş et al. (O. Kocabaş & Soyata, 2015) uses the
HElib library for min-max heart rate computation involving a logical comparison
circuit examined later in Section 3.1.4. A log
2
N stage binary tree is used to
repeatedly applying min-max on N ciphertexts packed with a vector of n-bit
integers, resulting in an overall circuit depth of (log
2
n+ 2) · dlog
2
Ne. It would
appear further processing is necessary (additional circuit depth of log
2
n) to extract
the final minimum or maximum value within the output ciphertext in a step not
apparently described; perhaps being recovered after decryption. The min-max
algorithm described by Togan et al. (Togan, Morogan, & Plesca, 2015) uses a
recursive strategy to combine, in the base case, a one bit integer ‘greater than’
comparison relation with a selection operator both expressed in polynomial form.
The overall circuit depth is similar to the approach by Kocabaş, although no
ciphertext packing is involved. A HElib-based implementation finds the maximum
32github.com/vernamlab/cuHE
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value from 16, 8-bit integers in 21 minutes. Set at a 140 bit security level, the
implementation is very memory intensive at 3.8 GB.
It is noteworthy that all literature reviewed only examines sorting and finding
min-max from sets of encrypted integers rather than real numbers, despite both
number types requiring an identical amount of processing time to sort when
correctly encoded, for a given bit size.
2.7 Homomorphic Encryption Application
2.7.1 General Applications
Performance of FHE schemes, have improved significantly from a few hours in
2010 to a few milliseconds by 2012 (Fau, Sirdey, Fontaine, Aguilar-Melchor, &
Gogniat, 2013) which has given much hope to the ultimate practically of these
schemes. A current area of intense research is the application of SWHE encryption
schemes, as they are more e cient and optimised compared to FHE schemes, at the
expense of reduced (but su cient) functionality (Naehrig et al., 2011; Sen, 2013).
Even before the discovery of FHE, partial HE schemes have been exploited for
their limited computational capabilities. Most HE schemes however (partial HE,
SWHE and FHE), so far have been predominantly focused on specialised functions
applied to well-known application areas. A list of some of these areas, include:
electronic voting/auctions/lotteries (Abe & Suzuki, 2002; Fouque, Poupard, &
Stern, 2000), private set intersection (Kerschbaum, 2012a), private information
retrieval (Sion & Carbunar, 2007), data aggregation in wireless networks (Acharya,
Girao, & Westho↵, 2005), watermark and fingerprint schemes (Kuribayashi &
Tanaka, 2005), and privacy-preserving recommender systems for advertising and
pricing (Armknecht & Strufe, 2011).
A key factor providing FHE protocols with the capability to solve real work
problems depends on the extent to which they can support general computing
functions of practical interest over encrypted data through su ciently expressive
composable primitives. These would allow for a much wider and more practical
implementation scope. A number of areas have been examined with respect to the
composable HE space including secret program execution, database queries and
ML algorithms. The case of using HE to support ML analysis will be explored in
detail separately in Section 2.8.
In secret program execution, at the processor level, primitives have been
contemplated that would allow arbitrary and dynamic program executions through
the combination of memory access logic, arithmetic and encrypted branching
operations (Brenner, Perl, & Smith, 2012; Brenner, Wiebelitz, Von Voigt, &
Smith, 2011). At an application level, primitives such as runtime data-dependent
program control (if-then-else expressions) and integer manipulations provide for
a more natural expression of high-level algorithms such as array summation,
bubble-sort and FFT calculations (Fau et al., 2013).
Supporting private database queries over encrypted data has received significant
attention due to the very large potential for secure storage and access of encrypted
data in the cloud without the requirement for decryption. The general types of
operations that are required to be supported include complex selection, range, join,
and aggregation operations, and FHE primitives have been shown to support these
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general database queries (Boneh, Gentry, Halevi, Wang, & Wu, 2013; Shiyuan
Wang, Agrawal, & El Abbadi, 2012).
A number of industries are thought to potentially benefit from the application
of HE technologies. The Homomorphic Standardisation website published a
whitepaper resulting from the Crypto Standardization Workshop (D. Archer et al.,
2017) containing a non-comprehensive list of potential applications for HE, in
Genomics, Health, National Security and Education. For some areas, it discusses
the relevant computation, challenges and generalisations requirements. A more
complete list from the same site briefly outlines potential HE application domains
and their business models (Homomorphic Encryption Standardisation Consortium,
2018), which is reproduced in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: HE application domains and business models. GWAS - Genomic-Wide
Association Study; FERPA - Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act; DoE -




































































The healthcare setting is commonly considered a strong candidate for HE, for
reasons mention in the Introduction (Chapter 1). Typically, the data rather than
the computations are considered sensitive or private, compared to other industries
such as the financial and advertising sectors (Naehrig et al., 2011). Currently the
implementation status of most health-based HE schemes has been at a conceptual
level only, or there may be prototypes developed for performance demonstra-
tion purposes. Many earlier systems are predominantly based on the additively
homomorphic and semantically secure Pallier cryptosystem. Katzenbeisser and
Petkovic (2008) for example, describe using the scheme to securely calculate
an inner product between an encrypted and plaintext vector to determine the
degree of correlation between them. This function could be used to privately
match a particular patient disease profile (mapped into some binary form) against
either a reference knowledge set of diseases, or specialist disease expertise or other
patients with similar disease profiles for a community (peer-to-peer) networking
application. Pallier-based HE schemes have also been described in the context
of privacy preserving statistical analysis of ubiquitous (wearable sensor) health
data (Drosatos & Efraimidis, 2011); ECG signal classification using private linear
branching programs (as a generalisation of decision trees) (Barni et al., 2009) and
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neural network techniques (Lagendijk, Erkin, & Barni, 2013); as well as private
genomic data mining for use in personalised medicine (Kantarcioglu, Jiang, Liu,
& Malin, 2008).
The application of second generation HE schemes have been examined in
the context of healthcare such as in the real-time privacy-preserving analysis of
medical data acquisition devices (eg. ECG monitors) over the cloud (Kocabas &
Soyata, 2020; Ö. Kocabaş & Soyata, 2014; Kocabas et al., 2013). It has also been
applied to privacy-preserving predictive analysis of medical data based on logistic
regression and the Cox proportional hazard model running in the (Microsoft’s
Windows Azure) cloud (J. W. Bos, Lauter, & Naehrig, 2014). FHE schemes have
also been explored at a conceptual level only in various aspects of integration with
EHRs (Ikuomola & Arowolo, 2014; Soubhagya, Venifa, & Jeya, 2013) including
the MyHR (Begum, Mamun, & Kaosar, 2013).
Bioinformatics has been a strong use case for HE, with some initial guidance on
homomorphic algorithmic tools and resources used in Genome Wide Association
Studies (GWAS) discussed by Lauter, López-Alt, and Naehrig (2014) and Dowlin
et al. (2015). These population-wide statistical tests computed homomorphically
include  2 and Pearson Goodness-of-Fit statistics; Hamming and edit distances
for sequence matching; and tests of associations between genotype and disease. A
number of practical solutions were developed as a result of two iDASH competitions
(iDASH Privacy and Security Workshop, 2015, 2018), that used libraries such as
YASHE and BGV (Miran Kim & Lauter, 2015), in addition to HEAAN (with
further later development) for the 2018 (shared) competition winner (Blatt, Gusev,
Polyakov, & Goldwasser, 2020).
There are instances where HE has been employed for secure cloud-based
medical diagnosis and computation in the cloud. SecureMed (Khedr & Gulak,
2017) uses a GPU-accelerated NTRU-based implementation of the GSW scheme to
privately compute a number of candidate applications, including classification of
a blood pressure range, estimating the cardiovascular risk, logistic regression tests
for predicting the presence of disease and statistical genomic tests. The authors
report significant performance and speed-up of these candidate applications in
relation to previous works. A solution is also presented by Carpov, Nguyen, Sirdey,
Constantino, and Martinelli (2016) of a cloud-based privacy preserving cardiac
risk factor assessment service using FHE.
In Perth, a medical record linkage protocol modified to include a HE step has
been reported to remove typical adversarial attacks, taking about 30 hours in
total to perform just over a million medical record comparisons (Randall, Brown,
Ferrante, Boyd, & Semmens, 2015). Finally, a practical Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) has been employed to perform homomorphic inference on grey
scale and colour retinal scans for abnormality detection of retinopathy related
to diabetes and neonatal prematurity (Chao et al., 2019). Using the BFV-based
Microsoft SEAL library, the authors were able to process a 5-layer CNN network,
taking less than 2 hours (in the most complex case) on single colour images with
around 73-93% accuracy.
A Swiss-based company MedCo33 is emerging to include HE technologies as
part of their business o↵ering for data protection in healthcare. It uses using a
combination of (partial) HE, SMC, DP and block-chain to securely share and
33medco.epfl.ch
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analyse distributed clinical and genomic data (Raisaro et al., 2017). Another
company in India34, states employing an unspecified FHE scheme (performing
better than SEAL) for supporting the secondary use of EHR data for research
purposes (Medhi, 2019).
2.7.3 Use Cases
There are a number of use cases in privacy-preserving computation that can be
supported using either a two-party or multi-party client-server interaction model.
In an overall application scenario example, patient medical profiles from a hospital
can be encrypted using the hospital’s public key and sent to a third-party cloud
vendor for ML analysis within a high-performance computing environment. The
analysed result would be returned while still in its encrypted form and could only
be revealed using the hospital’s private key. Such an approach may give both the
healthcare institution as well as the public cloud vendor the confidence required for
enabling processing of sensitive information outside of the hospital environment.
Such an approach could also be used to strengthen HIPAA compliance or other
national accreditation practices within a private cloud. A representation of this
scenario is depicted in Fig. 2.8.
Figure 2.8: Scenario for Machine Learning analysis over encrypted patient data in
the cloud
In another example, a statistical model generated from current patient medical
profiles from one hospital can be used to compare patient outcomes from another
hospital based on their medical profiles. Ideally this outcome would be achieved
using a protocol where neither party leaks any confidential patient details to the
other party.
We break down further use cases depending on whether two- or multi-party
interactions are involved and also if the central hospital managing the private
computation or analytical task can be trusted or not.
Individual, Two-Party Interaction
In a two-party scenario, depicted in Fig. 2.9, individuals are able to have their data
evaluated by a central organisation in a such way, where neither the individual’s
data nor evaluation outcome can be viewed by the organisation. In this case each
individual generates their own private key and sends the corresponding public key
34www.ziroh.com
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to the organisation which interacts with each individual separately. Note that
individuals additionally should not have access to an organisation’s intermediate
evaluation results despite being in a decrypted state, due to the data perturbation
methods proposed.
Under a two-party interaction arrangement, individuals would be able to
have their information (eg. health record or IoT data) individually analysed or
otherwise used to direct work-flow, provide recommendations or generate alarm
events by a central organisation, without either party having access to sensitive
details about the other party.
Typical application scenarios include:
1. GP practices provide sensitive patient details to a central healthcare organ-
isation in order to gauge relative practice performance. The organisation
cannot view any individual patient details nor the outcome of the perfor-
mance analysis. The GP practices may or may not be able to view any
of the organisation’s healthcare data – either option can be implemented.
Represented by Fig. 2.9.
2. Evidence-based patient care can be directed by an untrusted healthcare
institution’s policy-based workflow based on health record or IoT data.
Patients submit sensitive clinical details or IoT data to the institution and
are subsequently individually informed of clinical events such as referrals,
abnormal results, treatment recommendations etc. The institution cannot
view any individual patient details or healthcare process outputs.
Figure 2.9: Individual 2-party use-case. Public and private keys are indicated
with globe and stop signs respectively.
Trusted Broker, Two-Party Interaction
If an organisation is a trusted entity (or honest-broker) as shown in Fig. 2.10,
a two-party interaction is su cient for it to aggregate data from a number of
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individuals and have the combined data evaluated by any number of third parties
on behalf of the individuals. In this case, neither the data nor evaluation outcome
is accessible to third parties. The combined data however, is available to the
trusted organisation who owns the private key, and who sends the corresponding
public key to all other interacting groups.
In an application scenario, there is a requirement to develop a ML model
based on sensitive information from multiple patient histories using an untrusted
third-party data analysis service. Under a two-party interaction scheme, a joint
analytical model or combined computation task could be performed using aggre-
gated data from multiple individuals, where the trusted (honest-broker) healthcare
institution manages patient data and securely enlists the services of a third party.
Figure 2.10: Trusted institution use-case (2-party). Public and private keys are
indicated with globe and stop signs respectively.
Multi-Party Interaction
In order to jointly compute on aggregated data from multiple individuals through
an organisation who is untrusted, then a multi-party scenario is required, as
shown in Fig. 2.11. Multiple private keys can be split from a single original
secret key and shared amongst individuals through a secret-sharing scheme. The
corresponding public key is distributed to all untrusted entities (organisation and
third parties), and individuals interact in a joint decryption process to reveal the
final computation output.
In an application scenario, the healthcare institution is untrusted but can
develop a trained ML without patient data being revealed to either the institution
or an untrusted third party.
2.7.4 Multi-party HE
The thesis focus is on two-party interactions which would facilitate the ‘Individual’
and ‘Trusted Broker’ use case scenarios described above. For completeness however,
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Figure 2.11: Multi-party use-case. Public and private keys are indicated with
globe and stop signs respectively.
this section introduces the HE technology requirements for converting to multi-
party settings, in order to construct SMC protocols.
Essentially, a HE library is required to work with multiple keys or develop
Multi-Key Homomorphic Encryption (MKHE), so that one can aggregate or
compute on values encrypted with di↵erent keys. This is possible since HE
schemes are homomorphic over their keys. Some initial advice on this issue was
provided again by Shai Halevi (HElib co-creator) on the GitHub repository35.
A simple approach would be to have a single public key and secret-share the
corresponding private key to several parties via a trusted centre. According to
Halevi, this could be done in the following way:
“1. Have the centre generate a public-key/secret-key as usual.
2. If you want to split the key n ways, then choose n   1 random
elements modulo q, call them s1, s2, . . . , sn 1. Then compute
sn = secKey.sKeys[0] 
P
i si (mod q). Given si to the i’th party.
3. When you have a ciphertext (c0, c1) to decrypt (relative to keyID=0
, modulus q, and plaintext space modp), each party i computes
a share shi = c1 ⇤ si + p ⇤ ei (mod q) (for some small random
error ei) and broadcasts shi to everyone. The decrypted message
is computed as m = (c0 +
P
i shi mod q) mod p.
Security of this procedure depends on c1 being random (at least ‘random
enough’). If you let an adversary give you arbitrary c1’s then it can
recover the secret-key shares si’s.”
Relating to the advice, Halevi provides example code for HElib in Prog. 2.1.
35github.com/homenc/HElib/issues/209
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Program 2.1: C++ code to be added to HElib for implementing a secret-share
multi-key scheme.
In: FHESecKey::ImportSecKey(const DoubleCRT& sKey,...)(in FHE.cpp)
1 DoubleCRT accumulator ( context ) ; // i n i t a l i z e d to zero
2
3 f o r ( long i =0; i<n 1; i++) {
4 DoubleCRT s i ( context ) ;
5 s i . randomize ( ) ; // get a random element modulo q
6 accumulator  = s i ;
7 // . . . send s i to the i ’ th party
8 }
9 accumulator += sKey ; // compute the l a s t key
10 // . . send s i=accumulator to the l a s t party
The situation is more complicated when generating keys without a trusted
centre. The first notion of MKHE was introduced by Lopez-Alt et al. (2013), when
it was found that the Nth Degree Truncated Polynimal Ring Units (NTRU)-based
scheme also supported multiple keys. LWE-based MKHE constructions were later
developed using the GSW scheme that were single-hop (Clear & McGoldrick, 2015;
Mukherjee & Wichs, 2016). This refers to the fact that all the parties involved
are predetermined before the homomorphic computation. Multi-hop schemes were
later devised, where the ciphertext output after a homomorphic computation
that is encrypted under a set of keys, can further participate in homomorphic
computation under a di↵erent set of keys. A static multi-hop scheme by (Peikert
& Shiehian, 2016) required a pre-specified bound on user numbers to be entered
on setup, while a less e cient fully dynamic one was developed by Brakerski and
Perlman (2016). Both schemes were also based on GSW.
A static batched multi-hop MKHE scheme based on the more e cient BGV
(due to ciphertext packing) was described by L. Chen et al. (2017) and later
optimised by N. Li et al. (2019), T. Zhou, Li, Yang, Han, and Liu (2018).
Batched multi-key variants were developed for the BFV and CKKS schemes, and
incorporated in Microsoft SEAL version 3.2.0 (H. Chen, Dai, Kim, & Song, 2019).
This even more optimised scheme could also be applied to BGV. It was noted by
H. Chen, Dai, et al. (2019) that up until their work, all previous MKHE schemes
had no implementation given and were seldom used. The authors demonstrate
an application of their MKHE scheme by homomorphically performing image
classification via a CNN in SEAL.
The basic concept behind a typical MKHE scheme is that the phase for
ciphertexts related to k di↵erent parties is given by hc̄t, s̄ki = c0 +
Pi=1
k ci · · · si,
where c̄t = (c0, c1, . . . , ck) 2 Rk+1q and the concatenated secret key is s̄k =
(1, s1, . . . , sk). Similar to the single-key case, homomorphic multiplication returns
an extended ciphertext after performing the tensor product c̄t⌦ c̄t corresponding to
s̄k⌦ s̄k. The linearisation key encrypts si · · · sj of the tensored secret keys, which is
similar to encrypting s2 under sk in the single-key case (requiring key-switching),
except additional computations are required since si · · · sj are independently
generated by di↵erent parties (H. Chen, Dai, et al., 2019). There are di↵erences
in generating the relinearisation key for di↵erent MKHE schemes.
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Particularly relevant to the construction of SMC protocols for the proposed
technology of this thesis (as future work), is the solution provided by Choudhury,
Loftus, Orsini, Patra, and Smart (2013). The authors devised a distributed
decryption protocol enabling e cient multi-party ‘bootstrapping’ under the BGV
cryptosystem. Rather than performing actual recryption, the protocol relies on
interacting parties perform local decryption-encryption of ciphertexts that have
had their underlying plaintexts blinded by added random noise. The degree of
FHE vs. SMC participation in the protocol, determining the extent of computation
vs. communication overhead respectively, can be adjusted by varying the level L
of the basic SWHE scheme. Results of the work can relatively easily be extended
to support a MKHE scheme that can be combined into a ‘global’ FHE key for
distributed decryption capability. Refer to Choudhury et al. (2013) for further
details on the particular protocol.
2.7.5 General HE Frameworks
In this section we explore the concept of using a HE-based framework to improve
general application of a HE scheme (or combination of schemes). The idea can be
conceptualised into three categories, based on examples found in literature and
available HE libraries, as consisting of:
1. Front-end compiler or code abstraction: Improvement in the usability of a
cryptographic scheme or set of schemes by a common front-end, high-level
programming language or compiler, for ease of integration into privacy-
preserving applications by developers with no particular expertise in PETs.
2. Combined heterogeneous HE schemes Extending the range of available
complementary HE libraries or implementations, typically integrated as
back-end swappable HE components or tool sets, which may be combined
with other heterogeneous cryptographic methods. Client interactions and
SMC techniques are included within this group.
3. Scheme Switching : Switching between related HE representations or schemes
under a common framework, that together cover a broader set of crypto-
graphic contexts and set of capabilities for greater flexibility and performance
in privacy-preserving application.
Front-end compiler or code abstraction
In the first category, a consistent high-level programming interface or domain-
specific language is typically exposed for privacy-preserving application integration,
while details of the low-level HE execution environment and parameter config-
uration are transparent to the developer. An example of the first category is
Armadillo (Carpov, Dubrulle, & Sirdey, 2015), which is a compiler environment
for writing high-level programs in C++ that connects to a BFV scheme at end
of the tool-chain. Intermediate boolean circuits are generated from C++ that
are optimised (for multiplicative depth minimisation) into binaries that are exe-
cuted homomorphically within a parallel runtime environment (via OpenMP36).
36openmp.org
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Armadillo later became known as the open source project Cingulata37, which
additionally supports the TFHE library.
Alternative compiler approaches include Ramparts, which uses a modified Julia
compiler for connecting to the PALISADE HE library (D. W. Archer et al., 2019).
Marble38 is another high-level framework in C++ that makes easy expression of
FHE operations, equivalent to plaintext programming. It has a modular design
with a replaceable back-end that includes HElib and SEAL. Marble handles
parameter selection, cryptosystem setup and performs program benchmarks by
emulating binary arithmetic circuits to explore FHE applicability for a given
scenario (Viand & Shafagh, 2018). Pyfhel39 implements common functions of HE
libraries in Python. It is built on top of a C++ abstraction layer that servers
as a common API for SEAL, HElib and PALISADE back-ends. A homomorphic
encryption package is also made available in the high level language R40 based on
the BFV scheme, to target scientific users (Aslett, Esperança, & Holmes, 2015a,
2015b). VIFF (Damg̊ard, Geisler, Krøigaard, & Nielsen, 2009) and Sharemind
(Bogdanov, Jagomägis, & Laur, 2012; Bogdanov, Laur, & Willemson, 2008) are
frameworks built on top of the Python and SecreC languages respectively, for
enabling SMC. EzPC is a language framework generating e cient and scalable
two-party SMC protocols from high-level easy-to-write programs. EzPC provides
formal correctness and security guarantees to these protocols, which combine both
arithmetic and boolean circuits (N. Chandran, Gupta, Rastogi, Sharma, & Tripathi,
2019). Finally, CHET is domain-specific optimising compiler for integrating HE
operations within tensor networks used in NN inferencing (Dathathri et al., 2019).
The compiler generates e cient code linking high-level tensor operations to low-
level CKKS-based primitives from HEAAN and SEAL (although BFV and BGV
schemes could later be linked). The compiler supports noise growth rescaling of
CKKS ciphertexts to appropriately manage fixed-point number approximations.
Non-polynomial functions such as ReLU are approximated by polynomials before
circuit introduction to CHET.
Combined heterogeneous HE schemes
A number of frameworks that fall into the second category, typically do not have
front-end programming extensions of high level languages, but combine a number
of cryptographic primitive components or HE tools to better support a particular
application area eg. ML, or environment such as the cloud or IoT. SecureML
(Mohassel & Zhang, 2017) and the framework developed by Bost et al. (2014) are
typical examples, which enable generic ML classification and/or training using
SMC protocols to link a number of HE primitives. These and several other works
which adapt SMC to private ML are discussed in Section 2.8. Frameworks exist
to support privacy-preserving FL built over PyTorch (Ry↵el et al., 2018) and
Tensorflow (Dahl et al., 2018), which combine both SMC and DP methods.
General HE frameworks under the second category are also available to support
private computation in the cloud and IoT environments. LightCom protects
cloud-based TPUs from side-channel information leakage using the partially
37github.com/CEA-LIST/Cingulata




homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem combined with distributed key sharing for
secure data storage and processing across multiple TPUs (X. Liu, Deng, Wu,
& Yang, 2019). A combination of NTRU-based MKHE and DP methods are
used to guarantee data computation, input and output privacy in the untrusted
cloud via a general framework implemented by J. Li, Wei, Liu, and Hu (2017). A
BGV scheme is used in the work by Alabdulatif, Khalil, Yi, and Guizani (2019)
to implement a distributed secure IoT environment to analyse and aggregate
bio-signal data in real-time on edge cloud devices, before passing data to the
cloud. Clustering based techniques (such as K-means and fuzzy c-means) are
implemented to privately compute on data encoding floating-point values.
A framework for processing distributed IoT data relying on the combination
of a proxy re-ciphering service, threshold secret sharing scheme and the BGV
HElib library is discussed in Ramesh and Govindarasu (2020). Essentially, a
secret-sharing scheme is used to reconstruct a homomorphically encrypted AES
encryption key within distributed proxy re-ciphering servers, where subsequent
homomorphic AES decryption of AES-encrypted IoT device data is performed.
The latter technique of evaluating the AES homomorphically, which is suggested in
several previous works (Ö. Kocabaş & Soyata, 2014; Kocabas et al., 2013; Lepoint
& Naehrig, 2014; Naehrig et al., 2011), is a computationally intensive step that is
optimised and evaluated for performance by Ramesh and Govindarasu (2020) on
real-work tele-ECG records. The result is purely FHE-encrypted medical data
that can subsequently be used to compute application logic on the cloud, although
this part of the process was not demonstrated. As a side note, a more e cient
and flexible scheme for building a secure channel between a potentially lightweight
client device and cloud server (with the latter having HE-friendly encryptions for
ongoing homomorphic computation), is described by H. Chen, Dai, Kim, and Song
(2020). Rather than encrypting block or stream ciphers which are subsequently
evaluated homomorphically, the approach relies on using a symmetric LWE-based
method to encrypt data on the client, while packing them into RLWE ciphertexts
server-side.
Scheme Switching
The third category known as scheme switching, aims to unify the plaintext message
spaces of multiple HE schemes in order to homomorphically switch between them,
despite each being based on di↵erent mathematical structures. This technique has
relatively recently been demonstrated through an application known as Chimera
developed by Boura, Gama, Georgieva, and Jetchev (2018)41. The purpose of
scheme switching is to take advantage of the best of each solution to improve general
application and performance of the combined framework, which would otherwise
be beyond the capability of each individual scheme. The work homomorphically
combines the three RLWE schemes: TFHE, BFV (SEAL) and CKKS (HEAAN).
As stated by the authors, relevant scenarios that such a hybrid framework would
be useful include a banking system where long-term computation is required
on an encrypted database and decision needs to be taken on the result. While
41An initial open-source implementation with limited scheme conversion in the context of
IDash 2018 is available at github.com/DPPH/chimera-iDash2018, although a full version is
currently pending at github.com/tfhe/tfhe-chimera
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long-term computation (with a large multiplicative depth) on small computations
is best done in bootstrap mode using TFHE, the decisional part is also ideally
performed in TFHE. Operations on larger datasets perhaps requiring low-depth
multiple vectorial combinations can be performed using BFV, whilst floating-point
approximate computations can ideally use a CKKS scheme (Boura, Gama, &
Georgieva, 2018; Boura, Gama, Georgieva, & Jetchev, 2018).
All three HE schemes use nearly the same ciphertext space and all decryption
operations uses similar phase functions with minor di↵erences, however their
plaintext message spaces are based on di↵erent mathematical properties. Unifying
the latter relies on re-expressing all plaintext spaces as subsets over the Torus
(T = R/Z mod 1) and using the distance function to quantify a transformation
error (required to properly model noise distributions). All schemes can now use the
same ciphertext space (TN [X]2, where T[X] mod (XN + 1) mod 1 can be viewed
as the packing of N individual coe cients), key space (BN [X], which is the subset
of ZN [X] with binary coe cients) and phase function (b  sa). TFHE decryptions
of the plaintext message can be interpreted either as an approximation to the
phase (similar to CKKS) or recovered exactly by rounding the phase (similar to
BFV). Bridges are implemented to interconnect all three schemes and to enable
switching between them. Suggestions are made for preserving slots across schemes
due to existing morphisms between coe cient and slot packing. Additionally, an
approach for replacing bootstrapping with more e cient functional key-switching
operations is suggested, that relies on approximating the last rounding step
occurring in bootstrapping by using a homomorphic lookup table evaluation
(noting that SEAL does not currently support bootstrapping). Refer to Boura,
Gama, and Georgieva (2018), Boura, Gama, Georgieva, and Jetchev (2018) for the
exact details. Fig. 2.12 illustrates the unified plaintext spaces, corresponding slots
and bridges interconnecting the RLWE HE schemes, as per the aforementioned
work.
Unification of the schemes under a hybrid framework is not easy. Noise
management appears particularity challenging, due to significant di↵erences in
noise interpretation between these schemes, that may see a large propagation of
homomorphic noise under certain scenarios. The authors demonstrate scheme
switching in CNN predictions to model generated noise and analyse precision loss
resulting from computing homomorphic NN operations under the hybrid framework
(Boura, Gama, & Georgieva, 2018). This is achieved by adding Gaussian noise to
non-linear function outputs within the network, thereby simulating homomorphic
evaluations rather than actual computation over ciphertexts, where performance
could be evaluated. Results demonstrate that NNs are particularity robust to
large relative errors of at least 10% without any impact on the global accuracy and
can absorb relatively large errors between 10  20% after each Rectified Linear
Unit (ReLU), therefore a NN can theoretically be supported by scheme switching.
Actual demonstration of Deep Neural Network (DNN) training on encrypted
data was shown using a similar scheme-switching application called Glyph (Lou
et al., 2019), linking the TFHE and BGV cryptosystems. Switching between
BGV to TFHE transforms respectively N encrypted plaintext slots to K TFHE
ciphertexts (each encrypting plaintexts over T), which is an arbitrary subset of
TN [X] constrained by local stability of each operation (although the exact value
of K is unclear in the paper during experimentation). TFHE runs combinatorial
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Figure 2.12: Scheme switching between RLWE schemes: TFHE, BFV and CKKS
(HEAAN). A. Unified plaintext over T; B. Correspondence with user-space slots;
C. Bridges between schemes (Boura, Gama, Georgieva, & Jetchev, 2018).
operations on individual slots while BGV performs large vectorial arithmetic.
Both schemes implement bootstrapping operations in this work (Lou et al., 2019).
Benchmarking is performed relative to a reference homomorphic Multi-Layer
Perceptron (MLP) implementation, resulting in much faster activations using
TFHE and a reported reduction in mini-batch training latency by 97.4%, whilst
maintaining the same accuracy in comparison to the reference implementation.
A recent online paper on a Microsoft Research Private AI Bootcamp Project42,43




HE implementation of an Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), which is a type
of DL used for time series, prediction and language translation (Morrison &
Pal, 2020). The bootcamp was run as a competition and o↵ered training to top
PhD researchers in the field and developers of Microsoft SEAL, and specifically
examined the topic of ‘Private Outsourced Translation for Medical Data’. A
critique on Chimera and Glyph as a potential scheme switching solution for the
competition is described as follows:
“On a conceptual level, it seems straight-forward to switch from CKKS
to TFHE to eg. evaluate a non-linearity activation function after using
CKKS for matrix-vector multiplications. However, while Chimera also
introduces transitions from TFHE to CKKS, these transitions produce
very specific CKKS ciphertexts that contain not the original message
but an exponentiated form. It is not obvious to us at this point whether
or not it would be possible to ‘complete the circle’ and convert a TFHE
ciphertext back into a CKKS ciphertext that would be suitable for
continuing the evaluation of the network. Even if it is not possible to
switch back-and-forth in a straight-forward way, it might be possible to
rephrase the entire computation from scratch in a way that can take
advantage of the power of both schemes.”
The approach of using client interactions as an alternative solution is compared:
“Finally, the most simple solution is to send each individual unit’s
output back to the client, who will decrypt it, compute the required non-
linear functions including activation functions and argmax, and send
it back to the server. While this option introduces several additional
rounds of communication and significantly increases the communication
overhead, it is simple to implement and makes each individual unit a
very low-depth and e cient circuit.”
The comparison of scheme switching and client interactions as viable solutions
for RNN implementation demonstrates one view that at this stage, client interac-
tions are a better known entity in terms of development simplicity and general
application for the particular use-case (so long as security is not compromised).
This issue is further explored in the ‘Conclusion’ part of the Literature Review
(Section 2.10).
2.8 Homomorphic Encryption in Machine Learn-
ing
We turn our attention to focus in detail on the important area of HE use in ML
and related technologies.
Privacy-Preserving Data Mining
In the field of Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) (also known as statistical
disclosure control, inference control and private data analysis), many techniques
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have been used in the preservation of personal information for knowledge discovery,
which have been classified in various ways (Abbas & Khan, 2014; Aldeen, Salleh,
& Razzaque, 2015; Mendes & Vilela, 2017; Qi & Zong, 2012; Shah & Gulati,
2016; Verykios et al., 2004). Generally these techniques fall under two categories:
data perturbation and cryptographic methods (Abbas & Khan, 2014; Schlitter,
2008). In the former case, the purpose of data perturbation is to hide private
data, which can be applied at di↵erent stages of the data analysis process. At
a data publication level, k -anonymisation and related techniques can be used to
guarantee that a threshold of k equivalence classes are available in order to make
a sensitive attribute undistinguishable from other records (Sweeney, 2002). Other
anonymisation techniques include data generalisation, aggregation, suppression,
removal, permutations, sampling, use of quasi-identifiers etc. (Shah & Gulati,
2016). Closely related is the concept of DP (see Section 2.4.2) which provides formal
mathematical guarantees around protecting privacy loss in data analysis (Dwork,
2008). In general however, any of the aforementioned data perturbation methods
which approximate raw data are not useful in the classification of individual
records, where personally identifiable information would be fully exposed in the
process (Schlitter, 2008; Xie et al., 2014). Exact data perturbation methods
however have been used to support distributed cryptographic approaches relevant
to both ML training and classification, which are described later below.
HE techniques
Cryptographic approaches to ML and statistical methods include HE techniques.
The use of FHE has been described for calculating mean, variance and covariance
of datasets (Naehrig et al., 2011; Wu & Haven, 2012); typical statistics on genomic
data such as Chi-squared, Hamming distance and edit distance (Miran Kim &
Lauter, 2015); modelling simple binary classifiers (Arita & Nakasato, 2017); and in
classification using logistic regression (Naehrig et al., 2011) also together with the
Cox proportional hazard models (J. W. Bos et al., 2014; Dowlin et al., 2015). FHE
on its own has also been used in the classification and training of linear means and
Fisher’s linear discriminant binary classifiers (Graepel, Lauter, & Naehrig, 2012;
L. Jiang, Xu, Wang, & Lin, 2017); multiple linear regression (Esperança, Aslett, &
Holmes, 2017; Wu & Haven, 2012) also together with principal component analysis
(Lu, Kawasaki, & Sakuma, 2016; Rathee, Mishra, & Yasuda, 2018); binary logistic
regression (Bonte & Vercauteren, 2018; H. Chen et al., 2018; Crawford et al.,
2018; Miran Kim, Song, Wang, Xia, & Jiang, 2018); näıve Bayes and decision
trees models (Aslett et al., 2015b; Khedr, Gulak, & Vaikuntanathan, 2016); and
in the unsupervised ML technique of clustering (Jäschke & Armknecht, 2018).
All the aforementioned works are limited to working within practical HE
constraints. These include technical HE limitations previously mentioned such
as the finite field plaintext message space (most frequently used ML functions
are infinite and continuous); choice of number encodings; dealing with large
ciphertext sizes (increase computation and communication); accounting for cost
and depth of multiplications; and limitations on polynomial coe cient sizes
and degrees. In the latter-most case, after all ML computations are complete,
the resulting polynomials should be bounded by the modulus ( p/2, p/2] and
overall degree d of the plaintext message space (Graepel et al., 2012). Polynomial
functions also do not naturally support division between ciphertexts, square roots
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and comparison operations. Non-polynomial functions, such as trigonometric,
exponential and sigmoid functions, typically used in non-trivial ML analysis, can
be approximated as closely as required by polynomial functions. The challenge
is to obtain a su cient approximation of the overall complex non-linear system
using polynomials of bounded degree such that the ML accuracy requirements are
still met (Graepel et al., 2012; Xie et al., 2014).
To work within the constraints of HE, previous works have been limited to ML
algorithms of low complexity, using small or low dimension datasets or extract
only few features, (Graepel et al., 2012; Naehrig et al., 2011; Wu & Haven, 2012)
or are otherwise limited to classification of pre-trained models only. In most cases,
highly tailored algorithms specific to the particular ML method are used in order
to achieve practical application, including the use of specialised encoding schemes.
For example, Aslett et al. (2015b) makes use of a unique encoding for quantising
continuous, categorical or ordinal data, for training and prediction of random forest
and näıve Bayes algorithms, which would otherwise be impossible using standard
homomorphic versions of these algorithms. Examples of non-polynomial function
approximations include using a Taylor series expansion to represent sigmoid (Bonte
& Vercauteren, 2018; Bu, Ma, Chen, & Xu, 2015; Dowlin et al., 2015; Yuan & Yu,
2014) and exponentiation (J. W. Bos et al., 2014) functions in privacy-preserving
logistic regression and Cox proportional hazard models respectively. H. Chen
et al. (2018) uses a minmax approximation while Miran Kim et al. (2018) uses
the least squares approximation of the sigmoid function for logistic regression
analysis. A piecewise linear approximation to the sigmoid function has also been
used (Bansal, Chen, & Zhong, 2011; T. Chen & Zhong, 2009). Cramer’s rule
for low-dimension data (Wu & Haven, 2012) and iterative methods (Esperança
et al., 2017; Lu et al., 2016) have been employed to approximate the inverse of a
matrix. An improvement to the latter technique has been found by structuring the
plaintext slots into a 2-dimension hypercube rather than a single dimension linear
array arrangement (Rathee et al., 2018). Shortell (2018) approximates the natural
logarithm function using a Taylor series expansion. Certain works have also
been developed in the context of global competitions because of the HE technical
challenges posed. For example, the 2017 iDASH competition (Department of
Biomedical Informatics at UCSD and School of Informatics and Computing at
Indiana University, 2017) has resulted in a few solutions for HE based logistic
regression model learning (H. Chen et al., 2018; Crawford et al., 2018; Miran Kim
et al., 2018).
Secure Multi-party Computation
Multi-party methods are an alternative approach to wholly contained homomorphic
schemes that work within HE constraints. In the simplest two-party model, a
server performing HE computations may send back to the data owner separate
partial solutions requiring one final computation after decryption, in order to
overcome HE-incompatible operations, eg. division between a numerator and
denominator. This occurs for instance in calculation of the mean, requiring one
division of the sample number over the total sum of values after decryption
(Naehrig et al., 2011). More complex server-side calculations interposed with
regular HE-incompatible operations that are communicated to the client-side and
processed in decrypted form, will increase two-party communication costs and risk
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partial information leakage of less processed ciphertexts (Aslett et al., 2015a), or
indeed communication may be in an unencrypted form instead. Computation and
communication costs increase with higher security demands on the overall protocol.
On one extreme are SMC protocols (see Section 2.4.1) that have a high level of
communication complexity for executing private distributed computing tasks that
involve secure data transfer protocols and rigorous cryptographic proofs.
Privacy-Preserving Cooperative Computing
Privacy-Preserving Cooperative Computing (PPCC) (also known as privacy-
preserving distributed computing) is closely related to SMC where overall problem
insight is used to design optimised secure data transfer protocols implementing
specific functions. These schemes are usually more e cient and involve fewer
interactions by not resorting to sophisticated multi-party computation protocols
(Barni et al., 2006; Kerschbaum, 2012b; Mendes & Vilela, 2017; Orlandi, Piva,
& Barni, 2007). Security of data communication under these schemes generally
involve either data perturbation techniques or are cryptographic-based. The
former has more limited privacy guarantees whereas the latter is more resource
demanding particularly on large datasets (T. Chen & Zhong, 2009). Protocols
involving data perturbation may also leak some intermediate state of computation
to a collaborator in the protocol (Orlandi et al., 2007), requiring assumptions on
the model of trust to be made.
There are multiple PPCC solutions in the ML space, including classification
algorithms in decision trees, näıve Bayes, and SVM, with examples for both data
perturbation and cryptographic-based approaches. Similarly, there are privacy-
preserving training algorithms for decision trees, näıve Bayes, linear discriminant
classifiers, NN, SVM, belief networks and clustering. See (Bost et al., 2014; T.
Chen & Zhong, 2009; Orlandi et al., 2007) for further details and examples.
A seminal collaborative privacy-preserving classifier solution developed by
Bost et al. (2014), employs a set of secure interactive protocols to construct
a generic classifier securely. Their work combines two partially homomorphic
cryptosystems and a levelled FHE scheme. They make frequent use of interactive
protocols in an e↵ort to make the underlying primitives more e cient and flexible,
thereby supporting a wider scope of secure ML classifiers. The authors also ensure
that these protocols are provably semantically secure in the honest-but-curious
model and in such a way that maintains the privacy of both the client’s private
input and the server’s classifier model. The three encryption schemes used in this
approach are the Paillier, BGV and the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystems. The ML
primitives that are supported using this approach include a comparison protocol to
find the larger value of two encrypted inputs, and an argmax protocol to find the
index of the largest value from a list of encrypted integers; with the latter relying
on the former protocol. Both protocols require two-party interactions between a
client and server. Two other supported primitives include computation of a private
dot product, as well as a protocol for switching between encryption schemes. The
latter protocol is also interactive, allowing primitives to be securely combined in a
variety of ways to achieve the broad complement of ML algorithms. The authors
illustrate primitives being used to build hyperplane decision classifiers (which
covers perceptrons, least squares, Fisher linear discriminant and SVM), näıve
Bayes and decision trees. They also demonstrate using AdaBoost as a technique
73
for combining classifiers. The levelled FHE primitive is limited to enabling decision
tree analysis only. Despite the use of interactive protocols to construct three
classifiers, employing relatively e cient partial homomorphic encryption schemes
appears to make these algorithms classify datasets e ciently overall. A number of
medical datasets have been used to demonstrate system performance, achieving
classification times of milliseconds to seconds, with a predominant amount of time
being dedicated to communication during interactions.
An example of a multi-party PPCC platform that facilitates distributed ‘boot-
strapping’ of a SWHE scheme is demonstrated by Choudhury et al. (2013). In this
case, a distributed decryption protocol performs noise resetting of packed cipher-
texts over Fp where decrypted data is masked using added random noise. Fresh
ciphertexts are subsequently unmasked and unpacked for ongoing homomorphic
computation.
2.8.1 Privacy-Preserving Neural Network
The area of privacy-preserving NN provides many examples of collaborative
solutions in PPDM and its many forms, which will be considered in greater detail
within this section.
SMC NN classification
Barni et al. (2006) describes a NN classification algorithm in theory only that
combines SMC and HE, through a two-party protocol between a network owner
and data provider. The confidentiality of client input data is protected while
three levels of security are considered for the network service provider, protecting
respectively the weights, plus activation functions, plus the network topology.
Private scalar products on the weighted sum of inputs are computed by the network
owner using a homomorphic Paillier scheme (see Section 2.5.2), while the data
owner employs a secure protocol based on SMC to compute the activation functions
on the scalar products. Successive iterations between data and network owners
represents the neural layer interactions with weighted inputs of the fully connected
layer before it, until the final NN output is reached. Threshold-based activation
functions are secured using the protocol proposed by Yao (1982), whereas a SMC
protocol based on oblivious transfer (Naor & Pinkas, 1999) is used to privately
evaluate a low degree polynomial approximation to the sigmoid function. It is of
interest to note that data perturbation by randomly adding fake neurons to the
network, is the suggested approach for achieving confidentiality of the network
topology at the highest security level.
Orlandi et al. (2007) and similar work by Piva, Orlandi, Caini, Bianchi, and
Barni (2008) improved on the confidentiality of intermediate states and network
topology by making increased use of data perturbation methods instead of using
SMC interactions between the two parties in NN classification. A similar private
scalar product protocol to Barni et al. is used, except with the Damg̊ard and Jurik
(2001) modification to the Paillier cryptosystem. Scalar products are obfuscated
while encrypted before input into the activation functions, which are processed
by the data owner in decrypted form. For a threshold activation, the terms
of comparison (scalar product and threshold value) are multiplied by a random
non-zero positive value. The data owner is still able to compare the terms correctly
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while decrypted without discovering the real input values. The NN owner can
also change the random value sign with 0.5 probability to further obfuscate the
intermediate values, which would be flipped back once the activation output is
encrypted and returned to provide correct input to the next layer. Inputs to
the sigmoid activation function are similarly obfuscated by multiplication with
a random value and sign flipping with 0.5 probability. To limit attacks at the
multilayer node level and protect knowledge of the network topology, the authors
include two additional data perturbation measures: scrambling the neuron order
and randomly adding fake neurons to the hidden NN layers.
SMC NN training
In the case of classical NN training, SecureML (Mohassel & Zhang, 2017), uses SMC
techniques such as oblivious transfer, garbled circuits and secret sharing between
two servers for NN training. SecureML can also be used in linear and logistic
regression analysis, together with NN, which are all based on Stochastic Gradient
Descent (SGD) (an iterative method for finding the local minimum of a function
based on a random subset of a dataset). Schlitter (2008) developed a protocol for
the collaboration of three or more parties whose data is horizontally partitioned ie.
subsets of rows in a database that all share the same schema. Maintaining data
confidentiality between parties training on a common network relies on a secure
sum protocol, that determines the total sum of a distributed set of values which are
individually masked by a random share generated by each party. The secure sum
is used in computing the mean squared error term to measure di↵erences between
approximate and target outputs of the backpropagation training algorithm. The
same secure sum protocol is executed simultaneously along weight components in
a secure matrix addition, which is used in the weight adjustments.
T. Chen and Zhong (2009) proposed a two-party learning NN on vertically
partitioned data, where a database is split along columns so that each party
has a subset of features. In this case, the two parties jointly build one network
using their combined datasets without knowledge about the other party’s data.
The privacy-preserving protocol protects intermediate data and parameters using
a secure sum protocol through random shares similar to Schlitter (2008). The
scalar product computation involves the additive homomorphic ElGamal scheme
(see Section 2.5.2), and the latter is also involved in jointly computing a piece-
wise linear approximation of the sigmoid activation function. Using a similar
approach, Bansal et al. (2011) also performs NN training except on arbitrarily
partitioned data. Both schemes are described for a two-party scenario, which
would be impractical in a multi-party setting due to the significant communication
and computational costs required (Chabanne, de Wargny, Milgram, Morel, &
Prou↵, 2017). Backpropagation training on arbitrarily partitioned datasets was
extended to the multi-party setting by Yuan and Yu (2014) though a cloud-based
computation involving the homomorphic BGN cryptosystem (see Section 2.5.2)
and a Taylor series approximation of the sigmoid function. Since Boneh-Goh-
Nissim (BGN) supports only one multiplication, it is necessary to decrypt and
re-encrypt intermediate results sent back to the client after each multiplication. A
secure sharing algorithm is used to protect scalar products or sums, which would
otherwise be available in the clear to all parties.
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SMC Deep Learning
CNNs which are commonly used in DL models, have recently featured amongst
privacy preserving NN architectures. They demonstrate sparse connectivity in their
multi-layer neural networks compared to their fully connected MLP counterparts,
often taking into account spatial relationships within data. CNNs have widely
been used in image, speech and text recognition, and characteristically use a
set of common computations, essentially consisting of repeated mixes of matrix
multiplications and activation functions such as ReLU (f(u) = max(0, u)) and
max pool. A CNN has additional convolutional layers compared to the Fully
Connected (FC) layering of a DNN.
DeepSecure (Rouhani, Riazi, & Koushanfar, 2018) is a DL training framework
based on SMC methods. It has a two-server model for outsourcing multi-party
computation from distributed data owners, and the cryptographic protocols em-
ployed include oblivious transfer, garbled circuits (with the latest optimisations)
and secret sharing techniques during server interactions. Garbled circuit repre-
sentations of activations function are examined, including Tangent-hyperbolic
(Tanh) (f(u) = (e2u   1)(e2u + 1) 1), ReLU and softmax. A number of other
works use SMC techniques in privacy-preserving CNNs either selectively (Juvekar,
Vaikuntanathan, & Chandrakasan, 2018; J. Liu, Juuti, Lu, & Asokan, 2017; Riazi
et al., 2018) or as part of a general ML framework(N. Chandran et al., 2019;
Nishanth Chandran, Gupta, Rastogi, Sharma, & Tripathi, 2017). These works
all use combinations of garbled circuits, partial HE and secure sharing schemes.
Some works are compared in terms of e ciency, data transfer size and accuracy
in Riazi et al. (2018), (Table 6).
HE DL classification
Wholly SWHE-based approaches have been used in private CNN classification.
Consistent techniques have been employed in these works to contain multilayer
network operations with complex nested multiplications, using low-degree poly-
nomial node computations. CryptoNets (Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016) is a CNN
classification framework based on the BFV scheme as implemented in SEAL by
Microsoft. It has overall five layers in its simplified trained network, achieved by
approximating the sigmoid and ReLU activation functions to a square function
(f(u) = u2), which is the lowest degree non-linear polynomial. Scaled mean
pooling is used instead of max pooling since the latter is non-polynomial and
consecutive layers using only linear transformations (eg. weighted sum, mean
pooling) are collapsed to one layer. Since HE classification occurs within a single
server during analysis, unencrypted pre-trained weights can be used to reduce
overall multiplicative depth. The square activation function is unstable due to
its unbounded derivative, so its use is limited to a relatively small number of
non-linear layers (accuracy is low when greater than 2). The framework uses an
integer-based fractional encoding scheme and SIMD (in a trivial sense that does
not improve latency - see Section 2.6.1) to accelerate the throughput to 51730
predictions per hour, although it would take 570 seconds to classify one set of
data (ie. its latency).
CryptoDL (Hesamifard, Takabi, & Ghasemi, 2017) is an alternative BGV-
based DL platform achieving a high level of accuracy in classification tasks. It
76
employs an approximated ReLU function derivative and its integral is simulated
for use as an activation function. The platform is implemented in HElib and
uses SIMD to classify encrypted images in batches. CrytpoDL is stated to
outperform CryptoNets in accuracy, runtime and size of data transfer. The
latency is approximately half that stated for CrytoNets when tested on the same
server (Hesamifard et al., 2017).
A more optimised version of CryptoNets leverages sparse polynomial multi-
plications which are amenable to Fourier-like transforms, uses optimal quantized
quadratic polynomial approximations to activations, and executes pruning of
network layers in a BFV-based scheme called Faster CryptoNets (Chou et al.,
2018). The application demonstrates an improvement to single image CNN clas-
sification performance by a factor of 6.4 and 3.8 compared to CryptoNets and
CryptoDL respectively, while maintaining a similar level of test accuracy. The
framework is combined with DP techniques and transfer learning to demonstrate
training and inference in real-world image datasets. The work claims to be the
first implementation of HE on a real-world medical imaging dataset, by performing
retinal image analysis to predict a likelihood of diabetic retinopathy (albeit with
low accuracy of around 63  80% depending on technique).
CryptoNets has also been optimised by nGraph-HE (Boemer, Lao, Cammarota,
& Wierzynski, 2019) and soon after by nGraph-HE244 (Boemer, Costache, Cam-
marota, & Wierzynski, 2019) that make use of the open-source Intel nGraph graph
compiler (Cyphers et al., 2018), which supports HE integration with popular DL
frameworks such as TensorFlow and PyTorch. In nGraph-HE2, client interaction
is used to perform non-polynomial operations such as ReLU together with a
CKKS scheme through SEAL and several optimisations (complex packing, lazy
rescaling and depth aware encoding) to achieve a 98.95% classification accuracy at
a significantly reduced amortised and total runtime. Comparison of nGraph-HE
performance on CryptoNets against a number of common HE DL classification
frameworks can be viewed at Boemer, Costache, et al. (2019), Table 7.
Chabanne et al. (2017) use polynomial regression to approximate the ReLU
activation function. In addition, a batch normalisation layer is added before
each activation layer to restrict its normally distributed inputs to a small fixed
interval, where the polynomial approximation is known to be accurate. The e↵ect
is to permit a deeper NN to be developed for more accurate classification. A
BGV scheme is used and implemented in HElib. The authors report building
a deep CNN with 24 layers and 6 activation layers, and use some customised
tricks to improve accuracy; however there are no reported performance statistics
and the accuracy is slightly lower compared to CrytoDL in image classification
tasks. Batch normalisation is also the basis of a DL network during classification.
Ibarrondo and Önen (2018) detail integrating batch normalisation within either
the FC or convolutional layers to achieve linear operations thereby supporting
SWHE and reducing computations (12-14% performance boost over encrypted
data). Using a two degree polynomial Taylor series ReLU approximation and
a small DNN implementation in HElib, the authors achieve a 41.7 min single
encrypted image classification (compared to 5.5 min unencrypted) at an accuracy
of 98.8%.
In Bourse et al. (2018), a discretised private DL network (where weights, biases,
44github.com/IntelAI/he-transformer
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input and outputs of activations functions are discrete instead of real-values) called
FHE-DiNN was used for classification based on TFHE. The network achieved
image classification in 0.49   1.6 seconds per classification at an accuracy of
93.7  96.4% using small and simple (1 hidden layer) networks with no parallelism
involvement.
Xiaoqian Jiang, Kim, Lauter, and Song (2018) devised an e cient general ap-
proach to perform operations on encrypted matrices using HE-friendly techniques
on packed ciphertexts. The authors demonstrate encrypted matrix operations in
their E2DM framework which implements the CKKS-based HEAAN library to
support CNN classification of handwritten Modified National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (MNIST) images. While using a similar network topology
to CryptoNets with one convolutional and two FC layers, and a square activation
function, it took 1.69 seconds to classify 64 input images simultaneously, with
an amortized rate of 26 milliseconds per image. The approach of performing
operations on encrypted matrices including multiplication and transpositions, is
adopted within the proposed framework developed for the thesis, since it is also
useful in NN training. Additional details can be found in Section 5.2. H. Chen,
Dai, et al. (2019) implement a similar CNN topology and activation functions
to E2DM under a MKHE scheme with both CKKS and BFV variants together
with bootstrapping; achieving improved linearisation algorithm performance over
packed ciphertexts. The authors demonstrate classification of handwritten images
from the MNIST dataset, where the input data and model are encrypted under
di↵erent keys, and achieve a low end-to-end evaluation latency of 1.8 seconds for
single image classification.
The work on CHET by Dathathri et al. (2019) has been previously described
(Section 2.7.5) as an example of a front-end optimising compiler for integrating HE
operations within tensor networks used in NN classification. CNN classification
over a variety of image datasets is demonstrated, based on CKKS from HEAAN and
SEAL, while implementing average pooling and activation function approximations
such as ReLU. One aspect of the work demonstrates achieving better compiler-
based HE image classification performance compared to hand-coded HEAAN
implementations, since CHET can automatically explore and optimise di↵erent
data layouts that link high-level tensor operations to low-level HE primitives.
A study on CNN classification of high resolution medical image datasets
performed by Chao et al. (2019) is based on an implementation called CaRENets.
The BFV-based platform relies on SEAL and utilises a new compact packing
strategy to pack matrices and vectors into HE ciphertexts, leveraging SIMD
to facilitate matrix operations that integrate with CNN function. Encrypted
matrices are stored in four possible forms (row/column +/- column packing)
which are interchangeable depending on the most e cient form required for matrix
operations, and are accelerated using OpenMP at each layer. A simplified CNN
architecture consisting of two convolutional layers and a single FC is used together
with square activations to classify two di↵erent retinal image datasets, for the
presence or absence of Retinopathy of Prematurity and Diabetic Retinopathy. In
the former case, RGB images were converted to greyscale and downsized to 96⇥96,
achieving a comparable classification accuracy to supervised baselines of around
92%, and within 995 seconds. For Diabetic Retinopathy, RGB retinal images
were resized to 256⇥ 256, and achieved a comparable classification accuracy of
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73% in 6005 seconds. Security was > 80 in both cases. Benchmarking on MNIST
handwritten images was also performed, taking approximately 30 seconds for a
single image inference. In all cases, the compact packing scheme was shown to be
significantly more e cient in terms of runtime and memory usage compared to
interleaved packing used in CryptoNets.
SMC DL training
A number of SMC-based approaches have been developed in the area of CNN
training. A recent approach known as SecureNN (Wagh, Gupta, & Chandran,
2018), constructs three or four-party information-theoretic secure protocols for
training and classification of CNNs and DNNs. Expensive garbled circuits are
avoided for computing activation functions (ReLU, max pool and derivative) and
new protocols for Boolean computation are used instead. Matrix multiplication is
securely computed over shares including for convolutional layers. It reports for its
largest CNN network, a 99.13% training accuracy after 42.1 hours in the 3-server
case, compared to 2.11 hours in the plaintext case. A comparison with SecureML
demonstrates an overall improvement in training performance and accuracy, while
implementing a wider class of networks including CNNs (Wagh et al., 2018).
Additionally, the authors report better performance in CNN classification with
other recent SMC-based approaches, including MiniONN (combining additive
homomorphic encryption, secret sharing, and oblivious transfer) by J. Liu et al.
(2017); Chameleon (based upon additive secret sharing, and Garbled Circuits or
the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson protocol for non-linear operations) by Riazi et al.
(2018); and GAZELLE (which uses a combination of garbled circuits for non-linear
functions and the BFV-based PALISADE scheme for computing homomorphic
matrix-vector multiplications and convolutions) by Juvekar et al. (2018).
Shokri and Shmatikov (2015) use the SGD method in collaborative CNN
learning, where horizontally partitioned data owners can share a fraction (1-10%)
of their independently trained gradients to a central authority. This improves
learning accuracy beyond a data owner’s local network in a privacy/utility trade-
o↵, which is based on DP principles. A similar DL framework using SGD and DP
methods has been developed by Abadi et al. (2016). Phong, Aono, Hayashi, Wang,
and Moriai (2018) demonstrate that even a small portion of gradients shared
with a central server is enough to leak useful information from local data. They
enhance the previous DL framework by combining an additively homomorphic
system (either LWE-based or using Paillier encryption) with (gradients-encrypted
asynchronous) SGD, using a secret key known to all multi-parties except the cloud
server. Accuracy is retained but with an increase in communication costs during
interactions, by a factor of less than 3 (or a few milliseconds at each upload). A
MLP NN with 2 hidden layers and a ReLU activation function will train on a set of
50 images in 2.25 hours (less with multi-threading) to achieve an accuracy of 97%.
The system can be extended to the other SGD-based ML methods mentioned
earlier.
HE NN and DL training
There are only very few FHE-based examples when it comes to NN or CNN training.
Wholly SWHE encryption schemes are infeasible for NN training as consecutive
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multiplications are required proportional to the number of backpropagation steps
made, so that circuit depth increases rapidly with increasing number of iterations.
Adding recryptions and allowing backpropagation to complete, makes the overall
training process significantly slower.
Two papers reporting on similar studies (Bu et al., 2015; Q. Zhang, Yang, &
Chen, 2016) employ a BGV-based encryption scheme to perform backpropagation
training on image data using an autoencoder NN, which is a dimension reduction
technique for discovering structure in correlated data in DL models. Both studies
use a Taylor series expansion to find a 3 degree polynomial approximation to
the sigmoid function. Both works also utilise a client for decryption/encryption
of intermediate results for each iteration of privacy-preserving backpropagation
performed on the cloud. Intermediate results within the client are in the clear
without being subjected to data perturbation methods. Q. Zhang et al. (2016)
examine in addition: tra c and economic data analysis; the e↵ects on accuracy
of higher degree activation function polynomial approximations; and the speed-up
on learning with increasing cloud nodes performing parallel computations. The
specific BGV implementation used is unclear including the particular SIMD tech-
nique for batch processing. Training performance on image analysis is estimated
at 5 minutes per iteration (Bu et al., 2015) and 23 minutes per iteration on the
same dataset, and both report a 2-2.5 increase in execution time compared to the
conventional high-order back backpropagation algorithm. There is a significant
decrease in training time with increase in the number of cloud nodes. The reported
training accuracy for both studies (85%) is low in comparison to other state-of-art
approaches mentioned, which improves only slightly (approximately 1%) when
the number of Taylor series terms in the activation function approximation is
increased.
Hesamifard, Takabi, Ghasemi, and Wright (2018) have produced a comprehen-
sive analysis on FHE-based NN training, resulting in an extension to their original
CryptoDL classification platform mentioned earlier to include NN training. The
authors examine new methods to select the most accurate approximation to the
sigmoid activation function and implement a HElib-based solution to train the
network model using data from the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository45. To
deal with accumulating noise, the server sends ciphertexts to be decrypted and
encrypted by the client and sent back as fresh ciphertexts. No data perturbation
methods are employed during decryption at the client end, so that intermediate
results from weight and input calculations are available in the clear. This work
examines the e↵ects of variations in the number of hidden layers (1-5), SIMD
batch size, number of levels (for levelled HE L = 5, 10, 20) and network topology
on the overall execution time, in addition to the number and size of interactions.
It appears that a smaller value of L, results in a more e cient training time for a
given network topology, due to smaller ciphertext sizes and size of the network;
despite the increase in number of interactions (but smaller data transfer size).
Given a network with 2 hidden layers, the authors report a 0.68 second training
time and 0.1 second classification time per instance with 6 features and a batch
size of 576, without use of any parallelisation techniques except SIMD. Their
accuracy is reported to be high with sigmoid approximation (> 99% but varies
with type of dataset). The authors report CryptoDL outperforming other HE-
45archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/
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based and SMC-based approaches in e ciency and accuracy. Compared to SMC,
CryptoDL demonstrates fewer interactions thereby requiring lower bandwidth for
data transfer. The leakage of intermediate states during private network training
is definitely a disadvantage in the case of CryptoDL compared to SMC-based
approaches, although this aspect of risk to privacy is not examined in any detail
by the authors.
The first reported FHE-based implementation used in NN training without
involving any client interactions goes to Nandakumar, Ratha, Pankanti, and Halevi
(2019), who examine a full and reduced 3-layer FC NN model for training on
MNIST handwritten images. Homomorphic operations are conducted entirely
over a binary plaintext message space using HElib, and non-linear operations
include sigmoid activation implemented using table lookup and a (HE-friendly)
quadratic loss function during backpropagation. The work however is more
theoretical than practical as performance is based on toy security parameters only,
which is extrapolated to standard security levels and NN training is performed
stochastically on one mini-batched epoch. This seminal work however is used as a
reference implementation that this thesis also uses as a performance benchmark
(see Section 5.2.5).
Previous mention has already been made of scheme switching frameworks (see
Section 2.7.5) that unify plaintext spaces of common HE schemes, and have been
applied to CNN and DNN learning tasks. Chimera (Boura, Gama, & Georgieva,
2018), which unites TFHE, CKKS and BFV schemes, demonstrates max and
average pooling in addition to comparison of original and approximate (by low-
degree trigonometric polynomials) ReLU functions under this framework. Stability
of the network against perturbations is examined by modelling the noise and
HE operations for a variety of CNNs, rather than by direct HE implementation.
Glyph (Lou et al., 2019), by employing TFHE to implement non-linear functions
and BGV for multiply-accumulation operations, demonstrates both DNN and
CNN (with transfer learning) training on image datasets. Broad comparison is
made to the benchmarks of Glyph and our proposed solution through the same
reference MLP implementation from Nandakumar et al. (2019) mentioned directly
above.
2.9 Data Perturbation and Attack Methods
In this section a number of common data perturbation techniques and methods of
attack against them are briefly examined in order to understand the suitability
and limitation of various candidate obfuscation methods.
Additive perturbation
The addition of random noise as a data perturbation measure, is easily applied
at low cost and is the most common method of randomisation. Preserving data
distribution and covariance after random noise addition is useful for aggregate-
based data mining operations such as Näıve Bayes classifier, decision tree and
association rule learning. These relatively limited data mining options typically
would require algorithm modification or redesign to accommodate random noise
addition (Aggarwal & Philip, 2008; Kargupta et al., 2003).
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Correlations in the original data between di↵erent pairs of attributes identified
by their expected covariance can be exploited to reconstruct the aggregated
distributions in larger datasets. The correlations are una↵ected by the addition of
random noise which is added independently to each attribute, although there is a
change in variance of the attributes that can be estimated from public knowledge
of the noise distribution (Aggarwal & Philip, 2008). In additive perturbation,
only probability distributions in aggregate data rather than any record-specific
information can be estimated. However subject identification could potentially be
made using a maximum likelihood fit of the perturbed data to a public record
(Aggarwal & Philip, 2008).
Data correlations, which reflect redundancy in attribute information, are used
to filter o↵ random noise using (eigen-analysis) techniques such as Principal
Component Analysis (PCA), Spectral Filtering (SF) and Singular Value Decom-
position (SVD) filtering to recover the original data (Huang, Du, & Chen, 2005;
K. Liu, Giannella, & Kargupta, 2008). Also, by treating the distributions of each
attribute as independent rather than correlated, univariate distribution analysis
could construct the original data. This is based on calculating the expected value
of the original data’s posterior distribution after observing the hidden data in a
way that minimises the overall mean square error. The Bayes estimate extends
this principle over multiple attributes, employing maximum a posteriori estimation.
The technique incorporates properties of both correlation-based filtering and dis-
tribution analysis schemes, making it a more e↵ective data reconstruction method
(Huang et al., 2005). The Expectation Maximisation (EM) algorithm based on
maximum-likelihood estimation is a broad framework of related reconstruction
methods that provably converges to the true attribute distribution with very large
data observations (Aggarwal & Philip, 2008).
Multiplicative perturbation
In contrast to random noise addition, multiplicative perturbations in the literature
typically multiply records with random matrices rather than multiplying each
element by a randomly generated number (K. Liu et al., 2008). In general, matrix
multiplicative perturbation can preserve inter-record (Euclidean) distances, inner
products, hyperplanes and hyper-curved surfaces, which are reflected by the
fact that class or cluster members and decision boundaries correlate in terms
of distance, while individual values are perturbed. This applies to distance-
preserving perturbations performed by random rotation of orthonormal matrices,
and projection-based perturbations that project data points form a high to lower
dimensional space via a random projection matrix. Geometric perturbation
combines rotation, translation and addition of random noise, of which the latter-
most will not change cluster membership or class boundary if it is su ciently low in
intensity (K. Chen & Liu, 2005). Matrix multiplicative perturbation contains more
record-specific information and is amenable to a greater variety of (particularly
distance-intensive) data mining applications, with little loss in accuracy compared
to analysing the original data. This includes techniques such as clustering, linear
classification, k-nearest neighbours, perceptrons and kernel methods including
SVMs (Aggarwal & Philip, 2008; K. Chen & Liu, 2005).
In multiplicative perturbation, some degree of prior knowledge is required for
attacking privacy, which would make it vulnerable to known I/O, sample and
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Independent Component Analysis (ICA)-based attacks (K. Liu et al., 2008). For
some type of data like time-series, there may be auto-correlations and dependencies
along components of the data that can be used to reconstruct the data, although
it is still an open problem (K. Liu et al., 2008). There have been studies that
advocate a more dynamic randomisation approach, accounting for more complex
changing correlation patterns, in order to prevent data becoming exposed over
time (Aggarwal & Philip, 2008).
2.10 Conclusion
As can be seen beginning from Section 2.7, in terms of practical application,
the range of HE usage examples in the medical literature and industry are
not significantly extensive particularly for FHE. The maturity model of FHE
schemes has been reported to be at the ‘academic prototype’ level (D. W. Archer,
Bogdanov, Pinkas, & Pullonen, 2016), although the sector has advanced somewhat
with the emergence of numerous sophisticated tools and frameworks available
with increasing applicability, particularly since 2018. This is in stark contrast to
the potential areas (and use-cases) in healthcare that could benefit from privacy-
preserving computation over sensitive personal and clinical information, such as
in ML.
To achieve improved general HE application, we seek to overcome certain
fundamental HE limitations, including the limited availability of HE operations
split between binary and integer-based cryptographic contexts; slow recryption;
and short-term HE computation due to plaintext data-type overflow (over Fp) or
compounded arithmetic error (using CKKS).
Platforms based on SMC using mixed partial homomorphic encryption tech-
niques requiring high levels of (client-server) network interactions that are typically
tightly coupled to specific computational tasks, have challenges in realising general
privacy-preserving application scenarios in the cloud. A single comparison in ML
training and prediction, for instance, will require the exchange of several multiple
messages, thereby limiting its scalability (Chialva & Dooms, 2018).
There a number of recent emerging HE techniques that can potentially com-
bine both numerical and logical operations. This includes works such as Cheon,
Kim, Kim, Lee, and Lee (2019), which employs a CKKS scheme to implement
word-wise min/max and comparison operations using new iterative algorithms
rather than general polynomial approximation methods. However, implementing
combinatorial and logical operations on complex problems would encounter signifi-
cant challenges in fine-tuning multiple approximate comparisons, each requiring a
priori knowledge on di↵erences in input, scaling factors, and estimates on iteration
numbers. Comparisons on integers are only evaluated in this work, and basic BGV-
or BFV-based binary comparison operations typically demonstrate faster latency
on exact comparisons (requiring higher precision). The novel work by Chialva
and Dooms (2018) examines ‘implicit selection’ by weighting as an approach to
implementing conditionals in ML, although implementation within this context is
only theoretically described at this stage.
The work on scheme switching represented by applications such as Chimera and
Glyph described in Section 2.7.5, enables several RLWE schemes to be combined
under a unified framework taking best advantage of each HE solution. Indeed, the
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stated purpose of scheme switching appears to very closely align with the thesis
objectives of enabling private CDS-based computation, potentially achieved by
e ciently supporting a combination of long-term executions, decisional/combinato-
rial operations, and large vectorial arithmetic or repetitive tasks homomorphically.
Scheme switching however may potentially propagate large amounts of homo-
morphic noise in certain computations, hence the general HE setting may not
be optimal. Whilst NNs appear particularity stable against perturbations of
this nature, in other tasks, the entire computation may need to be rephrased in
order to accommodate noise propagation under the framework. Additionally, it
is unclear how other HE limitations such as plaintext data-type overflows and
compounded arithmetic errors are resolved under this framework. The issue of
long execution times with recryption (or even under functional key-switching)
still also remains. Finally, binary operations are not as e ciently parallelised
compared to SIMD-style plaintext slot operations in RLWE schemes such as BGV.
Nevertheless, we are following research developments in the scheme switching
space with keen interest. Broad comparison is made to the benchmarks of Glyph
and our proposed solution through the same reference MLP implementation in
Section 5.2.5.
While a diverse range of general application types are demonstrated across
three framework categories described in Section 2.7.5, we seek a relatively simple-to-
implement, common and consistent framework that can overcome most limitations
of FHE in order to o↵er an expanded and flexible set of HE capabilities. In the
absence of a significant breakthrough in FHE e ciency and practical use, it would
appear that a solution relying on client interactions is the best known entity for
meeting the requirements of private CDS-based computation, so long as security
is not significantly compromised.
The thesis explores a middle ground whereby SWHE schemes can provide
improved and e cient arbitrary computational functionality over a significantly
reduced (ie. compared to SMC) two-party network interaction model involving
data obfuscation techniques, albeit with weaker security guarantees. In this way
elements of both second and third categories from Section 2.7.5 are included
towards developing improved general HE application, since on one hand both
cryptographic contexts are combined under a common framework, while on the
other hand both contexts act like two di↵erent cryptographic schemes united
by SMC-like and data obfuscation techniques. This compromise allows for the
powerful capabilities of SWHE to be leveraged, providing a more uniform, flexible
and general approach to privacy-preserving system integration, which is suitable
for cloud deployment. The proposed platform is uniquely designed to make SWHE
more practical for mainstream clinical application use, equipped with a rich set of
capabilities and potentially very complex depth of HE operations. Such a solution
would be suitable for the long-term privacy-preserving processing requirements of
a cloud-based CDS system, which would typically require complex combinatorial
logic, workflow and ML capabilities.
A hybrid solution can be later further expanded by combining additional related
cryptographic contexts such as CKKS and TFHE (category three improvement
in general HE application), or linking to other SMC schemes (category two
improvement) providing further capabilities for expansion into areas such as
IoT. Indeed, low-level operations of the hybrid framework can later be optimised
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transparently by the use of a higher-level programming language and/or compiler,
under a category one improvement in general HE application.
Subsequent chapters proceed to describe the proposed technological solution
that can potentially meet the challenges described in this background section.
The next chapter examines the development of e cient parallel binary circuits,
and describes approaches for enabling accelerated logical, comparison and combi-





Research presented in this chapter represents the first of three application phases,
describing development and evaluation of the necessary primitive circuit designs
underpinning higher-level privacy-preserving constructions developed in subsequent
chapters. This chapter focuses on HE circuit performance operating on real
numbers over a binary message space. Proper implementation of homomorphic
arithmetic and comparison operations over a binary message space have had limited
attention in the literature, despite being mainly concerned with implementing
textbook routines (Crawford et al., 2018). Particularly lacking are techniques for
packing sets of numbers in binary form within one ciphertext to maximise parallel
computation using SIMD. In this chapter, techniques for combining primitive
logical functions together with binary addition and subtraction operations using
SIMD techniques are demonstrated. The result is to permit natural comparison
and thresholding operations using binary circuits while at the same time facilitating
an e cient amortised rate for addition and subtraction operations performed in
parallel. Such a technique would find use in particular implementation instances
across all HE applications areas where combinations of logical and numeric
operations are required.
The main contributions of this work include:
1. Analysing binary addition and comparison primitive circuit designs to
select e cient candidates that support HE operations over real numbers.
The factors used to compare performance include circuit depth, cost of
multiplication and memory space utilisation.
2. Illustrate a general solution for linking multiple binary circuit primitives
to facilitate SIMD operations on tightly packed ciphertexts. This allows
flexible combinations of both logical (=, <,>,6,>) and numerical (+, )
binary homomorphic encryption operations to be computed in parallel.
3. Demonstrate performance of the accelerated circuit designs and their general
application to more complex SWHE algorithm implementations based on a
number of case study applications.
Various primitive circuits will be described that can perform binary addition
and equality operations, with the aim of finding optimal parallel designs to
minimise the three resource parameters: memory usage, multiplicative depth and
total number of multiplications. Circuits will be described generally with focus
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being given to the final most competitive versions. Subsequently, the primitive
circuits will be used to enable accelerated logical, comparison and combinatorial
operations, in addition to implementing functions such as min/max and sorting.
3.1 Primitive Circuits
Primitive binary circuits for addition and equality are alone necessary to combine
a range of logical operations on fixed point real numbers under a binary plaintext
space. Finding e cient versions of these primitives has a flow-on e↵ect to more
complex homomorphic operations that are derived from these two basic circuits.
At a bit level, XOR ( ) and AND (·) logic gates are implemented slot-wise
over a binary plaintext space via corresponding homomorphic addition (+h) and
multiplication (⇥h) operations between ciphertexts respectively. All other logic
functions can be derived from these two logic gates. This includes an OR operation
which is implemented as the binary inverse (by adding 1 in binary) of an AND (ie.,
NAND) operation. When combining a number of AND operations, ciphertexts
are commonly arranged into a binary tree formation so that terms are multiplied
from base to root rather than sequentially (Ö. Kocabaş, 2016; Togan, Lupascu, &
Plesca, 2015; C. Xu et al., 2016). The e↵ect is to reduce the multiplication depth
of the circuit from n  1 to log n, and can be readily implemented using SIMD
operations.
All circuits described in the following sections assume a ciphertext struc-
ture that takes up one slot per plaintext bit to work correctly including SIMD
operations.
3.1.1 Real Number Binary Encoding
To work with binary circuits implemented over a GF (2) field, a fixed point scaled-
to-integer encoding is ideal for representing real numbers. In particular Jäschke’s
approach of scaling by a power of two, 2k removes any booking requirement to
ensure correctly scaled ciphertexts across computations (see Section 2.5.5). A slight
refinement to Jäschke’s approach is made which, despite having identical encoding
to the original method, is conceptuality simpler when applied computationally
and for descriptive purposes. After scaling a real number by 2k and encoding it in
binary, dedicate k of the lowest polynomial coe cients to encode the fractional
part of a real number with binary digits b 1b 2...b k, followed by the integral





For negative numbers, a two’s complement rather than a sign-magnitude en-
coding (see Section 2.5.5) is chosen since the former is more e cient in comparison
and addition operations (Jäschke & Armknecht, 2016), which have relevance to
the circuit primitives discussed in the following section. In this case, the ‘highest’
polynomial coe cient is reserved for encoding the negative value  2d k 1, and
sign extension is used to extend the bit length of the encoding to d. Using an
example, the real value -1.25 within a plaintext slot where d = 8 and 4 bits of
precision are required, can be two’s complement encoded as a ring polynomial
under extension field F28 whose coe cients represent the bit sequence 11101100.
The least four significant (rightmost) bits represent the fractional part while the
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MSB indicates the encoded value is negative (with two adjacent sign-extension
bits). The final result can be decoded as: p(2) =  23+22+21+2 1+2 2 =  1.25.
3.1.2 Addition Circuit
The most basic adder implementation is the n-bit RCA which employs n full
adders, with the carry bit output from one adder acting as input into the next
adder along a chain from least to most significant bits. This ‘rippling’ dependency
of carry bits means that the circuit is unsuitable for parallel operations. The logic
for a sum of two bits, ai, bi and carry-in bit, ci of the full adder is expressed as,
si = ai   bi   ci. Logic for the carry-out bit, ci+1 = ai · bi   ci · (ai   bi) can be
reduced to one AND gate per bit, ci+1 = (ai   ci) · (bi   ci)   ci (C. Xu et al.,
2016). The multiplicative depth of this adder hence is limited to n  1. There are
bit-wise and packed ciphertext RCA protocol implementations available (King,
2016). Despite the latter potentially making use of SIMD operations, there is no
real benefit conferred with respect to resource parameters used and circuit depth
(refer to Table 3.1).
A CLA aims to avoid the ‘rippling’ e↵ect by allowing the incoming carries
to be computed in parallel. The original carry-out logic can be reformulated as,
ci+1 = Gi   Pi · ci where Gi = ai · bi is called the generate term, and Pi = ai   bi,
is called the propagate term. According to the carry-out logic, if Gi is one (ai and
bi are both one), ci+1 is one; and if Pi is one (at least one of ai or bi is one), then
ci is propagated to ci+1. Since neither Gi nor Pi depend on the carry, they can be
determined beforehand and in parallel. A pattern emerges whereby for each carry
bit:
ci+1 = Gi   (Pi ·Gi 1)  (Pi · Pi 1 ·Gi 2) 
...  (Pi · ... · P2 · P1 ·G0)  (Pi · ... · P1 · P0 · cin) (3.1)
The final sum is computed as si = Pi   ci. A CLA has a lower multiplicative
depth but a higher computational cost compared to the RCA. By sub-dividing
n-bits into smaller equal m-bit sized blocks, this cost can be reduced. The smaller
m-bit adders can be arranged into a CLA between blocks while carries within a
block are rippled (or vice-versa) to realise Equation 3.1. In this case, the circuit
depth is ⇥(m + nm) and minimised when m = ⇥(
p
n) (King, 2016). Summary
statistics for a CLA with an m-bit block ripple adder design (King, 2016) are
presented in Table 3.1.
CLAs form the basis of another group of adders called Parallel Prefix Adders
(PPAs), which perform parallel group carry operations. These adders are known
to be amongst the most e cient of all digital binary addition circuits (Talsania
& John, 2013). The KSA is one of the fastest adders of this type where every
propagate and generate bit is computed in parallel. The circuit has a minimum
possible multiplication depth and scales logarithmically, although at the expense
of long wiring, more gates and a larger area requirement in digital hardware
implementations (Talsania & John, 2013). These disadvantages tend to be much
less significant in computing systems. In fact, the KSA appears particularly
amenable to homomorphic SIMD operations as the protocol entails applying
identical instructions uniformly across all plaintext slots, staged between shifting
88
slots relative to two interacting ciphertexts. An 8-bit KSA circuit is illustrated in
Fig. 3.1.
Figure 3.1: The Kogge-Stone Adder circuit (Tohoku University, 2018).
As shown, each circuit node combines P and G recursively from two ‘bit’
columns to form a new set, (G = G00   P 00 ·G0, P = P 00 · P 0). Starting at level 0,
column i is combined with column i+2k up to level k = d(log
2
n) 1e to eventually
realise Equation 3.1. There are bit-wise and packed ciphertext protocol versions of
the KSA (King, 2016). In the latter case, all bits from a set of slots encoded within
a base ciphertext can be combined in one step with another ciphertext whose set
of slots are shifted in each level by 2k towards the MSBs. To compute the final
sum in parallel, a single multiplication depth is required initially to compute all
g’s, and subsequently between all k level carry operations, resulting in an overall
multiplication depth of dlog
2
ne and a total cost of 2 · dlog
2
ne multiplications.
The KSA appears to be the most e cient binary addition circuit that minimises
all three main resource parameters (Table 3.1). These findings are reasonably
comparable with those by King (King, 2016) and Kocabaş et al. (Ö. Kocabaş,
2016) who employ the KSA. This adder appears to outperform various alternative
techniques used for binary addition outlined in (Cheon, Kim, & Kim, 2016; Jäschke
& Armknecht, 2016; Togan, Lupascu, & Plesca, 2015; C. Xu et al., 2016).
Binary addition can also be used to perform subtraction using the trick of
adding the first number with the two’s complement negative encoding of the
second number. This calculation can be incorporated into the adder algorithm by
inverting the second encoded real number in addition to setting the first carry-in
bit (cin in Equation 3.1), to 1. The circuit requires only one further addition
operation without any increase in its multiplicative depth.
3.1.3 Equality Circuit
A common binary equality circuit implementation with optimisation for packed
ciphertexts (albeit described for integers) is based on Çetin et al. (2015), Cheon,
Kim, and Kim (2016), Myungsun Kim et al. (2016). The equality test also holds
for a two’s complement scaled-to-integer encoding of a real number and is depicted
as: equal(~a,~b) =
Qn 1
i=0 (ai bi 1). The output is 1 if ~a and
~b are equal, otherwise
it is 0. In this case, n  1 multiplications are required which can be reduced to a
multiplicative depth of dlog
2
ne using a binary tree structure. The application of
SIMD involves accumulating products of a packed ciphertext containing initial
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Table 3.1: Comparison of addition and equality binary circuit parameter costs. n
- bit number input; m - bits per block. Algorithms (Alg.) shown: RCA - Ripple
Carry Adder; CLA - Carry Lookahead Adder; KSA - Kogge-Stone Adder; Eq -
Equality; and Comp - Comparison Logic; includes bit-wise (b) and packed (p)
ciphertext versions. Memory (Mem.) is the minimum number of ciphertexts
required to fulfil the protocol. lg n represents dlog
2
ne.
Alg. Add Shift Mult. Depth Mem.
RCA(b) 4n  2 0 n  1 n  1 2n+ 3
RCA(p) n n n  1 n  1 4
CLA m+ nm
lgm+
m+ nm   1
lgm+
m+ nm   1




n[2 lg n  1]
+3 lg n 3n
KSA(p) lg n+ 2 2 lg n 2 lg n lg n 4
Eq(p) 2 lg n lg n lg n 2
Comp(p) 2 lg n+ 3 2 lg n+ 1 lg n+ 2 lg n+ 1 4
bit-wise values of ai   bi   1. The slots are progressively shifted by 2k in each
level towards the MSBs and multiplied in parallel with the previous level’s result.
The MSB will contain the final output for the equal circuit after dlog
2
ne levels
(Cheon, Kim, & Kim, 2016). An alternative divide-and-conquer strategy for
determining integer equality with a similar multiplicative depth is described in
Togan, Morogan, and Plesca (2015), although n  1 homomorphic multiplications




A comparison circuit compares the magnitude between two real numbers, indi-
cating one number is larger or smaller compared to the other. Only one type of
comparison circuit is required in combination with the equal circuit, to derive all
other comparison relationships (ie., <,>,6,>; see below). To enable a less-than
comparison, there are two binary circuits of note (Çetin et al., 2015; O. Kocabaş &
Soyata, 2015). One determines the comparison logically while the other is derived
from the addition circuit.
The comparison logic can be depicted in the following way: comp(~a,~b) =Pn 1
i=0 [(ai < bi)
Q
i<j<n(aj = bj)], where (ai < bi) = (bi · (ai   1)) and (aj = bj) =
(aj   bj   1). An implementation of the circuit using SIMD involves progressively
shifting slots containing the term aj = bj by 2k in each level towards the LSBs
and multiplied with the previous level’s results. The final slot output is multiplied
by the expression ai < bi resulting in a multiplicative depth of dlog2 ne+ 1 and a
total of dlog
2
ne+2 multiplications (extra AND gate in the ‘<’ term) (O. Kocabaş
& Soyata, 2015). Calculating a final sum of products using a binary tree structure,
requires an additional dlog
2
ne shifts and homomorphic additions to reveal the
comp output. Comparison logic furthermore needs to address signed numbers in
two’s complement encoding. In particular, the inverse of the comp output should
be returned when the signs di↵er between the two real numbers being compared.
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The final output therefore should be modified to, comp(~a,~b)  an 1   bn 1 (not
accounted for in Table 3.1).
Comparisons based on the binary addition circuit use subtraction to compare
two real numbers followed by testing of the sign bit of the result (Ö. Kocabaş, 2016).
In a less-than comparison, the following relationship holds: comp(~a,~b) = (~a ~b)n 1.
Subtraction can be readily implemented using the KSA described earlier.
At first glance, it might appear that the logical comparison circuit, despite
having a greater multiplicative depth by 1, is overall more e cient due to its
lower cost of dlog
2
ne + 2 multiplications compared to 2 · dlog
2
ne for the KSA
comparator. However, the logical comparison algorithm has greater complexity
around slot set-up and selection mask usage to perform sign correction. Such
additional costs are not factored into the final parameter estimations presented in
Table 3.1. Ultimately, the multiplication costs become comparable between both
circuits (when n 6 64 bits), while all other cost parameters are exceeded for the
logical comparator. Alternative comparison circuits reporting a much higher total
number of homomorphic multiplications, albeit of similar multiplicative depth,
appear in Cheon, Kim, and Kim (2016), Togan, Morogan, and Plesca (2015).
Once c = comp(~a,~b) and e = equal(~a,~b) have been determined, all remaining
comparison relationships can be derived using binary logic and at little additional
cost as follows: ~a 6 ~b = c + e; ~a > ~b = c + e; and ~a > ~b = c.
3.2 Multi-Operand Binary Packing
From the group of primitive binary circuits reviewed in Table 3.1, the packed
versions of the KSA (for ’+’, ’ ’ and ’<’ operations) and Equality (equal)
circuits appear the most competitive from an overall memory, computation cost
and multiplicative depth standpoint. Despite overall e ciency of these chosen
schemes, each ciphertext input still only encodes a single real number, leaving
many (potentially hundreds of) unused slots.
Fortunately, with very little modification to the basic circuits, they can be
made to work in parallel on packed binary real number operands, within a single
ciphertext using SIMD. Arranging both KSA and Equality circuits in parallel to
process multiple operands and accelerate HE computation on binary arithmetic
and logical circuits has not been previously described in the literature reviewed.
Analyses and computations that benefit from parallel execution of the candidate
sub-operations (+,  =, <,>,6,>), would have a significantly reduced amortised
running time.
The packing structure of the ciphertext inputs are similar for both accelerated
primitives, as illustrated in Fig. 3.2. Packed ciphertexts A and B contain multiple
operand pairs providing input to a corresponding array of candidate sub-operations
to be executed in parallel. A ciphertext consisting of s slots can pack bs/nc data
slots, each encoding an n-bit real number. The last (s mod n) slots are disregarded.
Function ParallelPacking (outlined in Alg. 1 and Fig. 3.2) pre-processes
packed ciphertext operands to prepare subsequent input to functions Paral-
lelAdderSubtractor (Alg. 2) and ParallelEquality (Alg. 3). Three
outputs resulting from the pre-processing stage are P , G and CT . All three
ciphertexts are required for input to Alg. 2 whereas only CT is required for Alg.
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Figure 3.2: Example ciphertext packing structure and preprocessing of inputs
according to Alg. 1. Each ciphertext can fit 4 x 4-bit plaintext elements into 16
available slots. The greyed out area indicates variables not relevant to an ’equal’
operation (as input to Alg. 3).
3. Importantly, Alg. 2 also requires that the MSB for each data slot to be zero in
order to work correctly, leaving the remaining (n   1) bits to encode signed or
unsigned real numbers. Masking of the MSBs is shown in Fig. 3.2 (and represented
in Alg. 1, lines 4, 15) as a constant multiplication by maskArray[] applied to all
packed propagate and generate data slots (resp. P and G). Subsequently, both
ciphertexts are right shifted by one bit (line 16) to move the zeroed bit to the
LSB of the adjacent right data slot (in G the LSB represents cin).
All sub-operations except addition require corresponding inputs to be prepared
for KSA subtraction. Fig. 3.2 demonstrates this as a constant add by xorArray[]
(Alg. 1, lines 6, 13) to obtain the inverse of relevant sub-inputs of Ciphertext B,
in addition to setting the cin bit to 1 via a constant add by c0Array[] (lines 7, 17)
to the relevant data slots of G.
The final outputs of ParallelAdderSubtractor and ParallelEquality
are contained in respective ciphertexts of CT . Both CT outputs are homomor-
phically combined in a trivial post-processing stage to derive the final encrypted
evaluations of all parallel sub-operations. The circuit block of parallel primitives
illustrated in Fig. 3.2 from now will be referred to as PPCs.
Both ParallelAdderSubtractor and ParallelEquality can flexibly
process any n-bit number groups, not just powers of 2. The latter case however
makes most e cient use of available slot resources. As a further optimisation, if the
maximum bit length of numbers in all data slots is l < n, then this knowledge can
reduce the multiplicative depth and computational cost of both parallel functions
(eg. depth of dlog
2
le instead of dlog
2
ne). This property is used to significantly
reduce the parameter costs of an accumulator function discussed in Section 3.3.3.
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Algorithm 1 Preprocessing packed inputs to ParallelAdderSubtractor
(Alg. 2) and ParallelEquality (Alg. 3)
INPUT: A, B, s, n and Op[], where A and B are packed ciphertexts with s
slots and each encoding an (n  1)-bit real number in each of its bs/nc data
slots. Op[] is an unencrypted array of strings of size bs/nc specifying the
sub-operation types to occur in corresponding data slots between A and B
(eg. ‘add’, ‘subtr’, ‘eq’, etc.).
OUTPUT: CT , G and P : packed ciphertexts providing input to Algs. 2 (all 3
parameters) and 3 (only CT required).
1: function ParallelPacking(A,B, n,Op[])
2: xorArray[s],maskArray[s], c0Array[s]
3: for i 0 to bs/nc do . for each data slot
4: maskArray.insert((n  1) · [1] + [0]) . MSB = 0
5: if Op[i] 6= ‘add’ then
6: xorArray.insert(n · [1])
7: c0Array.insert([1] + (n  1) · [0]) . LSB = 1
8: else
9: xorArray.insert(n · [0])
10: c0Array.insert(n · [0])
11: end if
12: end for
13: B = B   xorArray[]
14: G A · B ; P  A  B; CT  P
15: G = G ·maskArray[]; P = P ·maskArray[]
16: G  1; P   1
17: G = G  c0Array[]
18: return CT , G, P
19: end function
3.2.1 Correctness
There are two aspects to establishing correctness for ParallelAdderSubtrac-
tor and ParallelEquality algorithms. Firstly, that the correct binary logic
occurs within all n-bits of an individual data slot and secondly, interactions be-
tween adjacent packed data slots still maintain correctness. Focus is given to the
latter aspect as formal proofs for the algorithms are already well-established. In-
puts into Alg. 1 are real numbers represented over GF(2) with a maximum degree
of one less than the slot degree d, and k-bits of precision. Noise within packed
ciphertext inputs should be at a level which still allows for correct evaluation of
the arithmetic circuits by a SWHE scheme without requiring bootstrapping.
Alg. 2 replicates the KSA circuit logic described in Section 3.1.2. Mathematical
modelling and a formal proof of the algorithm are provided in F. Liu, Tan, and
Chen, 2010. What may be less apparent is how adjacent KSA circuits interact
when utilised for batch processing such as occurs in the PPCs.
Let (Gki , P
k
i ) represent respectively, the group-generated and group-propagated
carry after the kth iteration up to dlog
2
(i+ 1)e, then the formal expression for
computing ci from the Kogge-Stone tree, according to F. Liu et al., 2010 is as
follows:
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Algorithm 2 Parallel Kogge-Stone Adder-Subtractor
INPUT: G, P , CT and l, where G, P , CT are packed ciphertexts with s slots
and bs/nc data slots, packed according to Algorithm 1. l is the maximum
input bit length contained in all n-bit data slots (l 6 n).
OUTPUT: CT : a ciphertext with component-wise addition or subtraction
performed on every data slot pair.
1: function ParallelAdderSubtractor(G,P,CT , l)
. G, P , CT - ciphertext memory objects 1,2,3
2: for i 0 to dlog
2
le do
3: tmp G . ciphertext memory object 4
4: tmp = P · (tmp  2i)
5: G = G  tmp
6: if i 6= dlog
2
le   1 then
7: tmp P
8: P = P · (tmp  2i)
9: end if
10: end for













where (G00, P 00)   (G0, P 0) = (G00   P 00 · G0, P 00 · P 0) represents the binary
fundamental carry operation.
For any i and 1 6 k, if k 6 dlog
2
(i+ 1)e, the flattened representation of Eq.
3.2 has been formally proven by F. Liu et al., 2010 as:
(Gki , P
k
i ) = (Gi, Pi)   (Gi 1, Pi 1)   · · ·
· · ·   (Gi (2k 1), Pi (2k 1)) (3.3)
According to Eq. 3.3, it can be seen that whenever i < 2k  1, the final output
will contain cross-contaminant bits from an adjacent Kogge-Stone tree circuit
(where i < 0), which can be represented by the modified expression:
(Gki , P
k
i ) = (Gi, Pi)   (Gi 1, Pi 1)   · · ·   (G0, P0)   · · ·
· · ·   (Gi (2k 1), Pi (2k 1))
As a result of Alg. 1, G0 = cin and P0 = 0, therefore if j = i  (2k   1), the
equation can be condensed using group logic to form:
(Gki , P
k
i ) = (Gi:1, Pi:1)   (cin, 0)   (Gi 1:j, Pi 1:j)
= (Gi:1, Pi:1)   (cin, 0)
Due to the idempotent property (ie. identical result despite multiple operations)
of (cin, 0) with respect to the fundamental carry operator, any (G,P ) terms where
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Algorithm 3 Parallel Equality
INPUT: CT and l, where CT is a packed ciphertext with s slots and bs/nc data
slots, packed according to Algorithm 1. l is the maximum input bit length
contained in all n-bit data slots (l 6 n).
OUTPUT: CT : a ciphertext with component-wise equality performed on every
data slot pair. Results are located in the MSB of each data slot of CT .
1: function ParallelEquality(CT , l)
. CT - ciphertext memory object 1
2: for i 0 to dlog
2
le do
3: if i = dlog
2
le   1 and (l mod 2i) 6= 0 then
4: shiftamt = l mod 2i
5: else
6: shiftamt = 2i
7: end if
8: tmp CT . ciphertext memory object 2




i < 0 will associate with (cin, 0) and simply disappear. Whenever i > 2k   1,
according to Eq. 3.3, ci is wholly determined by bits contained within its own
data slot. In both cases, it is demonstrated that bit information associated
with adjacent KSA circuits will not interact. In conclusion, when G0 = cin and
P0 = 0 occur at the LSB of each data slot, parallel KSA circuits will compute
independently using SIMD.
By the same token, letting P̄i = ai   bi   1 and j = i  (2k   1), the flattened
formal expression for the n-bit equality circuit, for any i and 1 6 k 6 dlog
2
(i+1)e





Since only the MSB is required to determine equality, at P̄ kn , the value j =
n  (2k   1) is equal to 0 at k = dlog
2
(n+ 1)e, or greater for lower k. Therefore,
P̄ kn is wholly determined by bits contained within its own data slot and parallel
equality circuits can likewise compute independently using SIMD. ⇤
Base cases for both algorithms, involving two-bit data slots are illustrated in
Fig. 3.3.
3.2.2 Accuracy and Precision
There are accuracy issues relating to performing homomorphic arithmetic on
real numbers with fixed precision. One needs to ensure there is adequate binary
fractional representation of inputs according to the encoding method and allowable
error range. The particular HE scheme and homomorphic circuits themselves are
less of a factor, since the medium of information is binary (the alternative is a
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Figure 3.3: Demonstrating data slot bit cross-contamination and correctness in
base cases for (a) Alg. 2 and (b) Alg. 3. Packed ciphertexts G, P and CT are
first prepared according to Alg. 1. In (a), the packing of G uses the LSB, Cin
within each data slot to indicate KSA addition or subtraction, therefore only one
bit of two contains actual binary number data. For (b), bit information in CT
contains the inverted form of P . Identical binary logic results in corresponding
bits in (a) and in the MSBs in (b) between data slots.
decryption error) and the level of precision is maintained throughout. Using a
similar approach to Bai and Lan, 2017, we empirically evaluate the accuracy of
Algs. 2 and 3 over a fixed point, power of two, scaled-to-integer encoding; the
results of which are shown in Table 3.2. Four di↵erent operations are evaluated,
each involving 100,000 trials of randomly generated inputs at 2, 3 and 4 decimals
of precision. Their outputs are evaluated for correctness at the same precision-level
while varying k of the binary encoding.
The first operation evaluates the impact of k on single data (sd.) error by
encoding and decoding a real number and then comparing the result with the
original number. A second operation compares the ability of Alg. 3 to discern
the equality (=) of two numbers that di↵er by 0.01, 0.001 and 0.0001 respectively.
The final two operations assess the impact of k on the sum and minus (+/-) error,
when the output of Alg. 2 is compared against two real number inputs which
are added and subtracted together respectively. The values displayed in Table
3.2 reflect the minimum k guaranteeing 100% accuracy of output after 100,000
trials, for the given level of decimal precision. In fact for sd./ =, min(k) evaluates
to dprec ⇤ log
2
10e, where prec is the decimal precision level; while for +/  it
is min(k) + 1. One should ensure that the indicated value of k at least is set
when including the particular homomorphic circuits in larger composite circuits,
according to the allowable error range.
Table 3.2: Minimum level of k for fixed-point binary encoding of inputs into four
operations guaranteeing 100% accuracy of output after analysis of 100,000 trials,
against three decimal precision levels. sd. - single data
Operation 2-decimal 3-decimal 4-decimal
sd. / = 7 10 14
+ / – 8 11 15
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3.3 Case Study Applications
The following section demonstrates the impact of using the aforementioned PPCs
to accelerate various sample privacy-preserving computations and applications.
There are many HE scenarios that could potentially benefit from block execution
of multiple binary operations. The focus of this section is to demonstrate broad
utility, versatility and performance of binary multi-operand batching. To emphasise
general applicability of the solution, two very di↵erent case study examples are
considered: Firstly as a warm-up, a toy HE computation scenario demonstrates
basic PPC parallel processing. Secondly, an application that is able to sort and
find the min-max from a group of encrypted real numbers will be discussed.
3.3.1 A Basic Computation Example
The following case study illustrates computing a conditional expression involving
binary arithmetic in a privacy-preserving way. This represents a common compu-
tational scenario where basic PPC integration can be broadly useful. Encrypted
n-bit variables A, B, C and D contain real numbers where the following conditions






C +D, if A < B
C, if A = B
C  D if A > B
(3.5)
One HE approach to computing the function utilises N = 6 data slots of
two packed ciphertexts with the variables arranged as shown in step (a) of Fig.
3.4. The first three n-bit data slots contain copies of the conditional variables on
each ciphertext, while the final three data slots contain copies of the statement
variables. Ciphertexts are prepared according to Alg. 1, which provides similar
input to Algs. 2 and 3 (steps (b) and (c) respectively).
In Alg. 2, ‘less than’ comparisons together with binary addition and subtraction
are performed in parallel on all data slots expect for slot 1. Alg. 3 computes
‘equal’ comparisons on data slots 1 and 2. Note the output after computing the
conditional variables is contained in the MSB of each data slot. Masks are applied
(using a constant multiplication on the MSB) to select the relevant conditional
variable output and exclude statement variables, resulting in two ciphertexts
providing input to step (d) in Fig. 3.4. Homomorphic addition of the aligned
ciphertexts together with a selective constant addition of ‘1’ on data slot 2, returns
the correct switch statement logic contained in the MSB of data slots 0-2 (ie.
<,=, > respectively). Replicating MSB information to the entire n-bit data slot
requires dlog2ne levels of slot shifts towards the MSB by 2k in each level k, followed
by addition with output of the previous level. In step (e), a copy of Alg. 2’s output
shifted to the left by 3 data slots now correctly aligns with the corresponding
switch statement logic. Homomorphic multiplication is subsequently used to select
the appropriate binary arithmetic operation on the statement variables. A series
of dlog2Ne levels of data slot shifts to the left followed by addition with output of
the previous level ensures the correct final result is contained in data slot 0.
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Figure 3.4: Steps (a)-(e) involved in HE computation of a conditional expression
involving binary arithmetic representing the function in Eq. 3.5. N = 6 squares
represent data slots containing n-bit real numbers A to D within each of two
packed ciphertexts. Numbers 0, 1 not contained in data slots are unencrypted.
Numbers marked by an asterix are guaranteed in the MSB only. Conditional
statement A < B provides the correct output of C +D to the function in this
example.
Algs. 2 and 3 are both combined with Alg. 1 and a mask, which adds to
their circuit depth by 2 constant multiplications each (2 CMult). Therefore, the
circuit outputs of steps (b) (= B) and (c) (= C) both have a circuit depth of
dlog2ne+2 CMult. Subsequent computation of the final output is captured by the
formula B · (B + C), so that the minimum overall circuit depth for this example
is dlog2ne+ 1 + 2 CMult.
3.3.2 Sorting and Min-Max Examples
The aim of these case studies is to evaluate the practical e↵ect of batching using
PPCs. The degree of acceleration achieved yields very competitive performances on
sorting and min-max compared to more specialised privacy-preserving applications
of the same type reviewed in the literature. The existing sorting solution by Çetin
et al. (2015) is selected as a baseline for comparing PPC batching. Performance
characteristics will be limited to multiplicative depth and parallel sorting times
under a SWHE scheme, leaving analysis of recryptions and comparisons of larger
number groups under a FHE scheme as future work.
3.3.3 Sorting
The following demonstrators will look at accelerating sorting methods including
the odd-even transposition sort and the Direct Sorting algorithm of Çetin’s work
(Çetin et al., 2015). Both are ideal candidates for the parallel primitive algorithms
described in this paper.
Odd-Even Transposition Sort
This simple bubble sort variant alternately compares odd and even pairs in an
array of numbers in parallel. The steps for sorting 4 numbers is illustrated in Fig.
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Figure 3.5: Demonstrator algorithms for sorting and finding the maximum of
numbers [4,3,2,1]. Squares represent data slots. (a) Odd-Even Sort: Four stages
of swapping alternate even and odd pairs which are not correctly ordered,
resulting in final sorted array. (b) Maximum: Two stages comparing two
identically packed ciphertexts where the bottom one is shifted by one then two
data slots towards the right. The larger data slot values are chosen as input for
the next iteration and the rightmost slot contains the maximum. (c) Depth
Optimised Sort and Maximum: Stage 0 comparison matrix; Stage 1 performing
transform; Stage 2 add or multiply matrix columns to compute sorting indices
and index of maximum value respectively.
3.5(a). The algorithm is guaranteed to terminate after N parallel comparison
steps. Normally the N   1 comparisons in each iteration are performed in parallel
so the overall complexity is O(N). The algorithm is readily implemented using
a block of PPCs with all sub-operations set to ‘less than’ for each comparison
iteration. Numbers are compared to their neighbours by shifting one of two
identical ciphertexts packed with (n-bit) real numbers, by n bits relative to the
other ciphertext. Subsequently, the parallel comparison operators are applied
using SIMD. Overall this requires N applications of the parallel KSA subtractor
algorithm (circuit depth of dlog
2
ne) to sort an array of N numbers. Each iteration
however would require preprocessing of inputs according to Alg. 1, in addition
to selection and swapping of alternate odd and even pairs within the packed
ciphertext, which adds a total constant circuit depth of approximately 5 per
iteration. Altogether a naive approach to sorting N ⇥ n-bit real numbers in one
packed ciphertext has a minimum circuit depth of [N · (dlog
2
ne+ 5)]. Such an
unoptimised sorting method would require recryption to sort a single packed
ciphertext block due to the high circuit depth. Furthermore, sorting large number
sets will further add to the circuit depth, which involves computing parallel (SIMD)
odd-even transposition sort spanning across multi-threaded packed ciphertext
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blocks. This particular sorting method will not be further considered in this paper.
Matrix Comparison Sort
Çetin et al.’s work reviewed in Section 2.6.2, implemented two shallow circuit
sorting algorithms, Direct and Greedy Sort, which both initially make use of a





explained earlier, Çetin et al.’s sorting approach relies on processing only one
ciphertext per bit. This would be a very wasteful use of ciphertext space and
computationally ine cient if only a single or few lists were required for sorting.
The approach becomes e cient only when trivial SIMD processing is used to sort
multiple similar-sized lists in parallel, filling up available empty ciphertext slots.
However, it takes the same inordinate amount of time to sort one list compared
to multiple lists in parallel (ie. latency is constant irrespective of the number of
lists sorted), despite a reduction in amortised running time per sort in the latter
case (ie. throughput is reduced with increasing number of lists sorted).
A computationally distinct solution using PPCs is sought to reduce Çetin et
al.’s constant depth-optimised sorting time by maximising packing of available
ciphertext slots to sort a single list. There is a break-even sorting point in terms
of similar-sized lists numbers, below which it is more e cient to process lists
individually using the PPC approach, otherwise trivial batch processing of all lists
in parallel should be considered.
Only Çetin et al.’s depth-optimised Direct Sorting approach will be considered
for PPC integration evaluation. The comparison matrix, m( )ij for a given encrypted









mij = 1 if Xi < Xj.
mij = 0 else,
(3.6)
where i, j < N , i < j, and mii = 0 (the diagonal elements). The lower
triangular part of the matrix, j < i is computed as m( )ji = (Xi > Xj) = m
( )
ij   1.
The Direct Sort algorithm relies on calculating the sum of all elements within
each matrix column, which returns the index of each Xj in the sorted array. For
further details see Çetin et al. (2015).
The parallel version replicates the comparison matrix by splaying out its rows
across blocks of packed ciphertexts, which are readily processing by the PPCs.
Two rows of ciphertexts per block contain the input combinations required to
compute only the upper triangular part of the matrix, while the corresponding
inputs for the lower triangular part are all 0. The comparison matrix’s diagonal
elements are removed, thereby reducing the number of comparisons required to
N · (N   1) instead of N2. These steps are represented in Fig. 3.5(c). As shown,
sorting an array of four numbers requires setting up all relevant input combinations
across twelve n-bit data slots. In this case, all number combinations are contained
in two input ciphertexts within one block. Parallel ‘less than’ sub-operations are
performed on all input data slots by applying the PPCs to compute the upper
triangular portion of the matrix. Remaining values are calculated by adding 1
(XOR) to the partial matrix and transforming the relevant data slots to complete
the lower triangular portion of the matrix. Transposing half the comparison matrix
in this way involves N   1 stages of slot shifts and insertions of XORed values
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at periodic intervals from the partial to completed matrix, represented by data
slots within packed ciphertexts A and B respectively (as shown in Fig. 3.5(c)).
The shift amount of ciphertext A and the periodic slot insertions to ciphertext B
required at each stage are represented in Table 3.3. The steps in each stage are
performed in parallel using SIMD and the algorithm can work to transform data
slots across multiple ciphertext blocks. The algorithm has an overall circuit depth
of one constant multiplication per stage due to the mask operation on ciphertext
B.
Table 3.3: Algorithm to transpose upper triangular portion of matrix encoded in
Ciphertext A to form comparison matrix in Ciphertext B
Stage
Ciphertext A Mask to Ciphertext B
Shift Start Period Times
0  1 0 N + 1 N   1
1 N   2 N N + 1 N   2
2 2N   3 2N N + 1 N   3
[i] [iN   i  1] [iN ] [N + 1] [N   i  1]
N   2 (N(N   3) + 1) N(N   2)   1
Computing the index of every encrypted element in the sorted array requires
adding the comparison matrix columns as shown in Fig. 3.5(c), Stage 2 - (A+B+
C). The corresponding columns are aligned with N   2 shifts of the data slots by
N · n each shift. Elements in aligned columns require binary addition to compute
the sorted indices. This accumulator operation (counting of elements) can be
performed in parallel with an application of the PPCs, with all sub-operations set
to ‘add’. Since the highest index count resulting from the accumulator is expected







n (note l < n in Alg. 2). The accumulator function is applied N 2





This circuit depth is relatively high. We consider instead using Çetin’s approach
to calculate the Hamming distance of the matrix columns by replacing the KSA
with a Wallace Tree Adder (WTA) (Wallace, 1964) to perform the accumulation.
The latter adder itself is not computed in parallel using SIMD, but since it is
applied n times - once for each matrix column, this part can be multi-threaded.
The WTA has an overall minimal circuit depth of log
2
(N/2).
Finally, the computed sorted index values need to be converted into an actual
sorted array, which requires comparing each sorted index value,  ( )i with an
ascending list of all indices in the interval [0, N   1]. This function returns the












i for j 2 [N ]. (3.7)
The equality expression in equation 3.7 can be computed in parallel with a
second application of the PPCs, where all sub-operations are set to ‘equal’. Similar










Overall, there are two separate applications of the PPCs to compute a sorted
array. Multiple PPCs processed in ciphertext blocks (or simply blocks) are required
to span the entire comparison matrix. Computations occur in groups of N data
slots within blocks, called segments. For instance, to sort N = 8 ⇥ 32-bit real
numbers using ciphertexts with 630 slots and b630/32c = 19 available data slots,
will result in a maximum of b19/8c = 2 segments per block. Thus, sorting 8
numbers requires a comparison matrix spanning N   1 or 7 segments across
d7/2e = 4 blocks. By the same logic, sorting 16⇥32-bit numbers uses b19/16c = 1
segment per block, therefore d15/1e = 15 blocks (ciphertexts with 630 slots each)
are required. Similarly, multiple blocks are required to process the equality circuit
in addition to the comparison matrix. As blocks are processed independently, there




To simplify analysis of a depth unoptimised min-max circuit, we initially look
at processing encrypted real numbers encoded within one ciphertext block. In
this case, two ciphertexts are packed with identical data slot inputs. As shown in
Fig. 3.5(b), slots of the lower ciphertext are progressively shifted by 2k in each
stage towards the MSB. ‘Less than’ comparison sub-operations are computed in
parallel from the previous stage’s output using a single application of the PPCs
per stage. In each stage, the PPCs’ output is used as a selection mask to choose
data slots from either upper or lower ciphertext inputs depending on whether the
final desired output is a minimum or maximum value, respectively. Each stage
therefore has a minimum circuit depth of dlog
2
ne + 1. The MSB will contain
the final min-max output after dlog
2
Ne stages, resulting in an overall minimum





To determine the min-max value over large number sets, the ‘less than’ PPCs
are first repeatedly applied across B multiple ciphertext blocks using a log
2
B
stage binary tree similar to (Ö. Kocabaş, 2016). This process has a minimum




ne+ 1). Output from this stage is subsequently
reduced onto one ciphertext block which can be processed finally by the single-







ne+ 1). Despite the relative lower complexity of
depth unoptimised min-max compared to the corresponding sorting algorithm,
recryption would likely be required to process one ciphertext block of inputs. We
therefore turn our attention to the depth optimised min-max algorithm and do
not further consider the unoptimised version in this paper.
Matrix Comparison Min-Max
The depth optimised version of min-max is a derivation of Çetin et al.’s Direct
Sort algorithm. All steps are identical to matrix comparison sorting described in
Section 3.3.3, except during the final stage where all matrix columns are multiplied
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instead of added, as shown in Fig. 3.5(c), Stage 2 - (A · B · C). Multiplication
generates a mask pointing to the index of the maximum value for the number
array input. If the comparison matrix is inverted beforehand (all data slots in
ciphertext B are XORed), the output of multiplication points to the minimum
value. Multiplication can be performed firstly across blocks using a binary tree
structure, then across segments within blocks using SIMD, resulting in a minimum
circuit depth of dlog
2
(B ·N)e in the final stage. This stage replaces the combined
accumulator and equality circuit stages present in sorting, resulting in an overall
reduced circuit depth for the optimised version of min-max compared to sorting.
Multi-threading could also assist in this process.
3.4 Evaluation
We evaluate performance of the accelerated matrix comparison sort against Çetin’s
standard open source implementation1, in addition to evaluating the depth opti-
mised version of min-max. Our implementations are in C++ and use the HElib
library for homomorphic operations with multi-threading turned on, and compiled
using the NTL library version 10.5.0 and GMP version 6.1.2. All simulations
are conducted using a m2.4xlarge AWS EC22 execution environment, which is
reported to use an Intel Xeon E5-2686 v4 processor with 8 vCPU cores at 2.30GHz
and 32GB RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS. As shown in Table 3.4, parameters
are derived to ensure that the security of HElib’s BGV-based SWHE scheme is
conservatively higher than that of the NTRU-based LTV-SWHE scheme used in
Çetin’s work. It should be noted that matching the security of di↵ering SWHE
schemes is a tricky problem (Ana Costache & Smart, 2016), including having
potential issues surrounding NTRU’s security assumptions (M. Albrecht et al.,
2016; Hovd, 2017). The security level of all conducted tests are upwards from
108-bit, estimated according to Gentry et al. (2015). HElib defaults are used for
parameters not listed in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Selected HElib parameters for evaluation: m - cyclotomic ring,  (m) -
lattice dimension,   - security level, L - levels, s - number of slots.
m  (m)   L Plaintext Space s
15709 15004 108.5 15 GF(222) 682
23311 23310 172.5-134.1 17-20 GF(245) 518
Table 3.5 displays sorting and min-max performance statistics on 4, 8 and
16 elements encoding 31-bit real numbers (1 bit less due to ciphertext packing
structure). Average execution times are shown for each algorithm, where 20 runs
are conducted for each array size test. This amount is adequate given the low
coe cient of variance shown for executions times within each test (normally <
0.01). Depth optimised algorithms are accelerated using multi-threaded operations
across blocks involving PPCs, the impact of which is explicitly demonstrated
(multi-threading ‘o↵’ vs ‘on’ in Table 3.5). Although WTA accumulator multi-




of the matrix columns, this was not done to allow focus on parallel e↵ects of the
PPCs alone. For comparison purposes, Çetin’s sorting code is run within the same
execution environment as the PPC implementation.
Table 3.5 demonstrates a significant speed up of sorting performance by a
factor of approximately 25-30 times as a result of batched PPC binary operations.
Performance comparisons are based on time to sort a single list, which is equal
to its network latency. The break-even sorting number (Section 3.3.3) is shown
ranging between 26-30 lists. This suggests the most e cient multi-list sorting
approach uses PPC batching with low latency to sort below this number of lists
individually, otherwise the high throughput approach of sorting multiple lists
in parallel using trivial SIMD batching is preferable. Since latency of the latter
sorting method is a constant, the break-even number is estimated by dividing this
constant by the latency of the corresponding PPCs-based sorting approach.
The circuit depth associated with each array size input is higher in the PPC
version due to overheads associated with processing packed ciphertexts. Ciphertext
sizes are also compared for each array size. In the case of Çetin’s matrix sort,
despite being 1
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the size comparatively, one ciphertext is generated per bit of
input, therefore N · n ciphertexts are processed initially during input (⇠ 335MB
for N=16, 32-bit numbers). In the PPC matrix sort, only 2 ciphertexts per block,
B are necessary to process inputs according to Alg. 1 (⇠ 180MB for N=16, 32-bit
numbers). Subsequently, only 4 ·B and 2 ·B ciphertexts are required to compute
Algs. 2 and 3 respectively. Processing fewer packed ciphertexts e↵ectively reduces
memory and communication costs associated with a homomorphic application.
3.4.1 Comparison With Other Solutions
In this section we compare our results with other state-of-the-art privacy-preserving
sorting and min-max approaches previously reviewed in Section 2.6.2. Comparison
results are summarised in Table 3.6.
Some results from the previous work reviewed are di cult to compare directly
with the developed sorting and min-max solutions. These are indicated as ‘n/a’
performance times in Table 3.6. For instance, in the work of Dai and Sunar (2015),
it is di cult to discern running times for sorting small sets of numbers for compar-
ison purposes. The authors consider bootstrapping e ciency by demonstrating
fewer recryptions are necessary compared to Çetin et al.’s approach if the latter
was scaled to sorting larger sets of numbers. The bitonic method is an example
of a highly specialised protocol for sorting encrypted packed binary numbers.
Additionally, the work of O. Kocabaş and Soyata (2015) packs n-bit integers in
each ciphertext and uses a binary tree for comparing values component-wise across
N ciphertexts; finding the min-max component-wise only. Their performance
results are not directly comparable to solutions finding min-max values from a set
of numbers.
Although it is di cult to take into account all factors (computing power,
crypto-security levels, etc.) to make a fair comparison, our solution remains
very competitive compared to other SWHE-based sorting and min-max schemes.
The quickest sorting solution appears to be from Dai and Sunar (2015), with a
GPU accelerated version of Çetin et al.’s implementation. The bitonic sorting
solution P. Kim et al. (2016) in considering recryption operations, is the only
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Table 3.5: Performance results for depth-optimised sorting (comparison with
Çetin results) and min-max using 31-bit real number array inputs.
blk - block, seg - segment, mthr - multi-threading, #lists - number of lists
Algorithm Array Size 4 8 16
Matrix Sort -
PPCs
level 17 19 20
blk x seg/blk 1 x 4 4 x 2 15 x 1
time - mthr o↵ 12s 55s 4m 8s
time - mthr on 11s 49s 3m 40s
ciph. size (MB) 5.3 6.0 6.0
Matrix Sort -
Çetin
level 11 12 13
time 5m 10s 24m 34s 1h 50m
ciph. size (MB) 0.565 0.610 0.655
Break-even
sorting no.
#lists - mthr o↵ 26 27 27
#lists - mthr on 28 30 30
Min-Max -
PPCs
level 15 15 15
blk x seg/blk 1 x 4 4 x 2 15 x 1
time - mthr o↵ 2s 10s 42s
time - mthr on 3s 8s 33s
ciph. size (MB) 3 3 3
scalable scheme demonstrating sorting beyond a few numbers. A direct comparison
however has been made between Çetin et al.’s Direct Sort algorithm and the PPC
sorting method by testing both software implementations on the same server.
Direct assessment can therefore be made about the impact of PPC batching on
significantly decreasing sorting latency, albeit at the expense of throughput. In
practical terms this means single or fewer similar-sized lists can be sorted much
more quickly, up until the break-even sorting point.
Separate to all other schemes however, our work can compute on real numbers.
It is also emphasised that the technique of PPC batching is for general application
and not merely for accelerating sorting or finding min-max, compared to all other
specialised privacy-preserving sorting and min-max schemes reviewed.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a simple to implement, primitive circuit design providing a
general solution for e ciently performing mixed combinations of parallel logical
(=, <,>,6,>) and numerical (+, ) binary operations on real numbers. The
PPCs aggregate parallel KSA and equality circuits that operate on almost fully
packed ciphertexts (ie. less one bit per data slot). The general applicability
and versatility of the design is demonstrated through its application to problems
such as homomorphic sorting and min-max. In matrix comparison sorting, two
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Table 3.6: Comparison of HE sorting and min-max methods. Lists of size N
contain 32-bit integers, unless otherwise declared.
Type Ref (1st auth.) Solution N Time
Sort
Basilakis HElib, SIMD, PPCs, real nums. 16 3m 40s
AguilarM, (2013) BGV, bubble, 8-bit 10 18s
Chaterjee, (2013) hcrypt, bubble-insert 40 23m 19s
Emmadi, (2015) hcrypt, odd-even 16 4m 57s
Dai, (2015) cuHE, Çetin, (2015) + 3 GPUs 16 1m 8s
Kim, (2016) HElib, bitonic, recrypt n/a n/a
Min-
Max
Basilakis HElib, SIMD, PPCs 16 33s
Togan, (2014) HElib, no SIMD, 8-bit 16 21m
Kocabaş, (2015) HElib, SIMD, slot-wise n/a n/a
separate applications of the PPCs involved are comparison (<) and equality (=),
whereas only the former is used in the depth optimised min-max algorithm. For
the first time, input elements are real numbers and a competitive speed-up is
achieved compared to more specialised existing schemes through flexible primitive
circuit design, SIMD batching of densely packed ciphertexts, and a potential
for multi-threading operations across ciphertext blocks. Data slot arrangements
involved in parallel design normally result in higher multiplicative circuit depths
compared to more memory-intensive, non-batched implementations. The circuit
depth, multiplication cost and memory footprint of the PPCs were minimised as
much as possible by analysing several primitive circuit designs before selecting a
final combination. The challenge of developing e cient FHE applications that
optimise computational resource and communication requirements is underpinned
by primitive circuit combinations that balance e↵ective parallel design with a




To facilitate a number of homomorphic encryption application areas, such as
privacy-preserving ML analysis, a general solution is sought that overcomes
existing specific intractable problems a↵ecting the scalability, sustainability and
practical application of FHE-based computations. In addition to typically very
long execution times for recryption, two other issues are particularly problematic:
The first issue is that operations executed over binary or integer-based message
domains are di cult to combine given their very di↵erent algebras, so that only
either logical or numerical primitives are respectively favoured. Only one type
of plaintext message domain can be chosen for any particular cryptographic
environment, therefore very ine cient workarounds are necessary to achieve a
full scope of basic operations. The second problematic issue relates solely to the
integer-based message domain, where an upper computational bound results from
modulo-wrapping of accumulated integer-based elements. These values accumulate
indefinitely since there is no interaction of carry operations across individual
elements over this message domain (termed lazy carrying), with processing of
accumulated elements deferred only until after decryption.
This chapter examines a proposed technology platform that leverages a SWHE
scheme with data obfuscation methods in order to resolve the aforementioned
intractable issues preventing sustainable cloud-based homomorphic computation.
Interactions between client and server are necessary to achieve these aims, whereby
noise resetting; plaintext message space swapping; and reduction of encodings from
integer-based elements to an embedded binary (or canonical) form, all require
intermediate data to be decrypted on the client. Data perturbation is used to
obfuscate the intermediate decrypted data, so it appears unintelligible to the
client.
The platform is known as the HEB since it uses a consistent communication ap-
proach across a potential multitude of virtual nodes containing packed ciphertexts
over binary and integer-based plaintext message spaces. Ciphertexts do not require
unpacking in order to operate within a cloud node, but instead compute similar
to arithmetic registers that contain encoded data types such as real numbers. The
HEB platform is uniquely designed to enable mainstream HE application over
the cloud. Similar existing platforms based on SMC typically use mixed partial
homomorphic encryption techniques requiring high levels of (client-server) network
interactions that are tightly coupled to specific computational tasks. Although
they may be more e cient in particular settings, these latter techniques are much
less flexible in general privacy-preserving cloud-based application scenarios.
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The chapter examines design and performance of five HEB interaction types
within a two-party client-server interaction setting. Three of these interactions:
binary noise resetting (F2 ! F2), integer noise resetting (Fp ! Fp) and binary-
to-integer message domain swap and noise resetting (F2 ! F2,p), all demonstrate
strong (information theoretic) security at almost no multiplicative depth cost,
making them very e cient. The remaining two interaction protocols: integer-to-
base canonical integer noise resetting (Fp ! F2,p) and integer-to-binary message
domain swap and noise resetting (Fp ! F2), both necessitate the use of innovative
data perturbation methods that exploit HE techniques. These two interactions
vary in timing and depth costs depending on the number of perturbation methods
that are combined to strengthen weaker privacy protection guarantees against the
client in this limited interaction setting only.
Development of the HEB follows on from key foundational work described
in Chapter 3 that provides critical technology underpinning subsequent HEB
platform development. The foundational work includes approaches in binary
for encoding real numbers; computing numerical and logical operations such as
comparisons; and implementing more complex algorithms such as min-max and
sorting. In particular, the paper also describes how to perform mixed binary
homomorphic operations in parallel using PPCs, which are critical for accelerating
binary operations on packed ciphertexts required for proper functioning of the
HEB.
In addition to e cient noise resetting, HEB interactions also achieve plaintext
(binary to integer-based and vice versa) message space swapping, and conversion
of accumulated integer-based encodings to a reduced embedded binary form. Ear-
lier literature review (see Section 2.8) examined instances where conversion to
e cient HE-based ML systems employ data perturbation strategies and interac-
tions involving client-based decryptions for noise resetting in two- or multi-party
interaction settings. It appears that data perturbation methods used are either
basic, highly tailored to the analytical approach or non-existent. In addition,
interacting ciphertexts are not typically preserved in their packed state during
homomorphic operations within computational nodes. Finally, to the authors’
best knowledge, there appears to be little existing literature that examines in-
teractions involving plaintext message swapping or embedded binary reduction
of integer-based encodings as a means of broadening homomorphic encryption
processing/analytical capabilities and practical application over the cloud.
Flexibly managing combinations of basic operations using the HEB will be
demonstrated. Interaction performance statistics and circuit depth will be com-
pared through simple equation evaluation and against standard recryption.
4.1 Design Principles
4.1.1 Integer-based Real Number Encoding
While a fixed point, scaled-to-integer, modified Jäschke (power of two) approach
to binary encoding has been selected for representing real numbers over a binary
field (see Section 3.1.1), a similar encoding method is considered to perform
computations over an integer-based message space. Under this scheme, any base
(b > 2) can be chosen to represent a real number (whether balanced or not),
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similar to fractional encoding. A base-2 encoding however is still chosen as a
straightforward approach to integer-based numeric operations encountered in
this section, although sizes of the coe cients may increase due to lazy carrying.
Addition and multiplication work as expected, taking into consideration lazy
carrying and overflow over Zp[X]/ m(X) or Zp[X]/hFi(X)i. Negative numbers
are represented by swapping coe cient signs. Decoding involves evaluating a
polynomial to the relevant base value, p(b) (see Section 2.5.5).
Since a fractional encoding scheme (see Section 2.5.5) does not su↵er from
wrap-around modulo Xd+1 with operations involving p, it would appear to be the
logical choice for integer-based encoding. The problem with fractional encoding is
that it does not seem compatible with SIMD operations, as plaintext slots are
expressed as finite field extensions over irreducible modulus factors, Fi(X), which
is not the case with a modulus of Xd + 1. In scaled-to-integer encoding, wrapping
around slot values modulo Fi(X) will yield unexpected results, placing a lower
bound on the ring degree of polynomials involved in operations. In practice, this
usually means ensuring that the combined degrees of both polynomial operands
involved in multiplication are less than the overall degree d of the plaintext slot,
in order to prevent wrap-around. A power of two encoding is helpful under
these circumstances, since truncation of the last k bits in order to correct for
precision in multiplication has the e↵ect of lowering the polynomial product degree.
Multiplication thus can continue indefinitely in this way, although size of the
whole number result and its precision is limited to d, in addition to ciphertext
noise limits.
4.1.2 Swapping Plaintext Message Domains
It has already been reasoned in Section 2.5.6 that making most e cient use of
binary and integer-based message domains would require performing computations
within the respective crytographic (hence algebraic) contexts. This is in preference
to the alternatives of either performing all computations within a constant larger
plaintext space, or through FHE-based domain swapping using bootstrapping
techniques.
The remaining option relies on incorporating a decryption and subsequent
re-encryption step within an interactive protocol to swap between the di↵er-
ent contexts, which is the preferred design approach selected for this work. A
decrytion-encryption operation under these circumstances can be cross-purposed
with resetting of the ciphertext noise, instead of relying on the ine cient boot-
strapping method. The client-based procedure that decrypts and subsequently
re-encrypts intermediate data received from the server, for the purpose of returning
to initial ciphertext noise levels, from now on will simply be referred to as noise
resetting. This is distinct from the term noise reduction, which refers to the
recryption operation in bootstrapping.
Based on the literature reviewed in Section 2.8, intermittent interactions
alternating between decryption-encryption and cryptographic processing stages
across two or more parties is fairly common practice in PPCC. When cryptographic
processing involves a SWHE scheme as part of a non-SMC setting, the interaction
is predominantly used for noise resetting, although it can also be used to perform
HE-incompatible computations in the decrypted state. In SMC, the interaction has
109
been used for changing encryption schemes in combination with data perturbation
methods (see next Section 4.1.4). All SWHE-based PPCC examples involved
in NN or CNN training exclusively use the encryption-decryption procedure for
noise resetting. This is out of necessity due to the deep circuits involved as
bootstrapping is considered too ine cient. In all NN and CNN classification
examples, the focus is on SWHE computation alone, without resorting to noise
resetting.
The client-based encryption-decryption approach never appears to be used
as a means for swapping plaintext message domains (in addition to basic noise
resetting). In this way, all FHE-based PPCC involving ML or statistical analyses
so far appear limited to working under a fixed algebraic context (ie. either
F2 or Fp alone) throughout the entire analytical process. In contrast, SMC
permits multiple interchanges between various message domains depending on the
underlying cryptographic tool used.
Designing a platform with the ability to switch back and forth between plaintext
message domains, may provide greater flexibility and e ciency in HE-based ML
computational analyses.
4.1.3 Reducing Integer Values over Fp
An important scalability issue with respect to sustainable HE operations and
practical FHE application, is the requirement for reducing or resetting the sizes
of ring polynomial coe cient values over Fp, which are accumulated during lazy
carrying. These integer values, representing encoded real numbers, should all
individually remain within the interval ( p/2, p/2], otherwise real numbers will
not decode correctly. This is yet another limitation of FHE-based operations,
where surprisingly there are no o↵ered solutions to the problem in literature (as
far as the author is aware). This is where noise resetting has a clear advantage
over noise reduction, since the recyption procedure is not able to reduce the size
of these integer values in order for lazy carrying to continue indefinitely.
In noise resetting, a procedure can be incorporated at the client-end to compute,
within the decrypted state, a canonical integer-based real number encoding where
the coe cient values are in their most reduced possible form (ie. represented
by 0 or 1 over Fp). This procedure would be relevant in the case where noise
resetting is required between integer-based plaintext message domains. It may
also be relevant during a swap from binary to an integer-based message space,
since one would need to ensure the domain conversion also results in the most
reduced possible form over Fp.
4.1.4 Data Perturbation
In the literature reviewed (see Section 2.8), data perturbation methods are a
common way to protect data confidentiality, appearing within various PPDM
platforms and in combination with di↵erential privacy, SMC, and cryptographic
approaches. In all reviewed PPDM examples where data perturbation is employed,
obfuscation methods are consistently tailored against particular properties of the
ML implementation, limiting their general applicability to other analysis scenarios.
The use of fake neurons or scrambling neuron order in private NN analysis; or
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generating random shares for securing scalar products, illustrate these types of
tailored obfuscation scenarios.
A natural place to consider data perturbation in SWHE would be during the
decryption-encryption phase between a client-server interaction used in noise-
resetting or during plaintext message swapping. The purpose would be to protect
any intermediate transfer of data which would be available in the clear on the
client end, thus protecting resources belonging to the service-provider (eg. ML
classification model) or data from other parties in a multi-party interaction setting.
Despite data perturbation being a common approach in PPDM, the only
instances of its use described in the literature reviewed on FHE-based schemes,
is in relation to two specific multi-party interactive protocols: one where noise
resetting is designed to replace bootstrapping in SWHE (Choudhury et al., 2013),
and the other is within an encryption exchange scheme employed as a building
block for constructing ML classifiers based on SMC (Bost et al., 2014). In both
instances, random noise is added to ciphertexts to obfuscate data in decrypted form.
None of the previously mentioned NN or CNN training examples using SWHE
together with noise resetting utilise any form of data obfuscation. Additionally,
there are no instances of data perturbation used in message domain swapping,
since as mentioned earlier, there are no examples of this interaction type used in
the SWHE setting.
Application of data perturbation in HE-based domain swapping and noise
resetting would be applied in the most general way possible, since the technique
is orthogonal to (and independent of) the underlying computation or type of ML
analysis. The same method of obfuscation would be applied irrespective of the
interaction purpose, and hence could be reused in various analysis settings.
In principle, design of the particular data obfuscation approach in any two-party
interaction...
1. should be HE-compatible within the respective algebraic context underlying
the encrypted data in the first party (server), and is e cient in terms of
memory, cost of multiplication and circuit depth,
2. should be performed in a way that still allows obfuscated data, which
is decrypted once received by the second party (client), to be computed
correctly without allowing the raw unobfuscated data to be known,
3. can be reversed in a HE-compatible and e cient way within the new respec-
tive algebraic context, once the encrypted output is returned to the first
party,
4. should be secure.
In noise resetting, there is essentially no computation involved of the type
specified in Item 2, because the client-based decryption-encryption process alone
is enough to reset the noise. Similarly, the algebraic contexts between Items 1
and 3 should be the same.
When data perturbation occurs together with message domain swapping,
exchanging integer-based values to binary ones or vice versa should be evaluated
correctly in Item 2. In this case, the obfuscation method and its reversal should
both work under their respective swapped algebraic contexts. Di↵erences in slot
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properties, size of the characteristic, polynomial degree, in addition to di↵erences
in algebra should all be taken into account under the di↵erent contexts.
The process of converting from an integer-based real number encoding to its
most reduced (base) canonical state using 0’s and 1’s, should also be evaluated
correctly when employing data perturbation techniques during noise resetting
(over Fp) and message domain swapping (from F2 to Fp).
In terms of Item 4, it should be noted that it is preferable to choose crypto-
graphic over data perturbation methods due to their better security guarantees.
In the former case however, it would require working within the FHE constraints,
such as:
• experiencing long execution times during recryption,
• having to choose only one plaintext message space for the entire ML analysis
(either F2 or Fp) or using a scheme switching approach,
• having a threshold placed on number of operations due to modulo-wrapping
of accumulating integers encoding real numbers over Fp.
A compromise could be reached, whereby an approach for solving noise re-
setting, plaintext message swapping and conversion to a base canonical integer
encoding can all be implemented in one step, in order to achieve better e ciency,
flexibility and general applicability of the FHE scheme. This approach should
greatly improve its overall practical application and appeal, however it would be
at the expense of weakening the security protocol at one known point of an overall
highly secure cryptographic scheme. Focus can subsequently be given to securing
this point according to our security assumptions. Section 4.3 will examine the
security of data obfuscation in the two-party setting under these circumstances,
in addition to assessing vulnerability against known data perturbation attacks,
called sensitivity attacks.
4.1.5 Slot Properties and Polynomial Degrees
Di↵erences in plaintext slot numbers and the ring polynomial degree d, within
each slot should be taken into account when swapping between two di↵erent
message domains, ensuring that no loss of information occurs during the transfer
of data. The process of obfuscation should also operate correctly over di↵erent
extension fields F2 or Fpd within each slot and across the vector of slots.
A vector of n-bit real numbers in binary is organised within a packed ciphertext
structure where one bit occupies a single slot. If there are sbin available slots within
a ciphertext, there will be a vector of Nbin = bsbin/nc data slots representing a
vector of n-bit real numbers. This is the ideal packing structure over F2, allowing
binary circuit operations using basic homomorphic addition and multiplication.
It is used as the underlying packing structure for all binary circuit operations
performed in Chapter 3. The size of dbin is 1 (or greater), since only one bit value
is ever contained in each slot.
In contrast, each n-bit real number is contained within a single slot over an
integer-based message space, resulting in usually higher capacity of a Nint = sint
vector of n-bit real numbers that can be packed within one ciphertext. Each (data)
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slot value is represented by elements of the extension field Fpd , which contains
the real number encoding. This is the ideal packing structure over Fp, allowing
multiplication and addition to compute naturally in parallel using corresponding
homomorphic operations. The ring polynomial degree dint of each data slot should
be at least equal to n to contain the base canonical integer encoding of the real
number using a binary representation. However, in order for two n-bit numbers
to multiply correctly and prevent wrap around modulo Fi(X), the overall data
slot degree dint should be at least 2n.
If only one ciphertext for each side of an interaction is utilised during a message
domain swap, the number of data slots available between them is the minimum of
Nbin and Nint (= Nmin), in order to prevent information loss during data transfer.
4.2 Overall Design
The typical two-party interaction scenario considered for this section is one where
a server (service provider) performs the main ML analysis using HE operations
on behalf of a client (service consumer). Other distributed arrangements are
variations of this basic interaction scenario, which need no further consideration
for the purposes of this section. Instead, they are considered in greater detail in
Sections 2.7.3 Use Cases and 2.7.4 Multi-party HE. For simplicity of the described
model, MKHE scenarios are also not examined, which would require taking into
account the considerations described in Section 2.7.4, to convert the overall design
into a multi-key setting.
In our setting, the client generates a secret key for the SWHE scheme and
distributes the public key and details about the encryption context to the server.
Initial encrypted data input is provided by the client, and after analysis has
completed, receives the final encrypted output from the server. As owner of the
secret key, a client is the only party with knowledge of the plaintext data and the
final output.
For noise resetting, the client periodically receives encrypted intermediate data
from the server which requires a decryption plus re-encryption step, before sending
back to the server. Any sensitive intermediate server-based information would
be available in the clear to the client after decryption. Therefore, to hide this
information, the encrypted data would be first obfuscated by the server before
sending to the client. Subsequently, the process of obfuscation would be reversed
by the server on receiving the re-encrypted information back from the client.
If noise resetting occurs over Fp, an added conversion to form the base canonical
(embedded binary) integer encoding is applied within the decryption and re-
encryption phases at the client end. If a swap of the plaintext message domain is
performed in addition to noise resetting, a further conversion step is added to swap
between the two message fields in the decrypted state. In this case also, the SWHE
scheme would be required to handle two di↵erent encryption contexts based on
the underlying message domain involved in the interaction. This situation means
that two di↵erent secret keys would need to be generated, and two public keys
together with their corresponding contexts would be distributed by the client
during initial system configuration.
The method of data obfuscation would vary depending on the underlying
plaintext message domain(s) encountered and whether noise resetting was being
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performed alone or in addition to plaintext message swapping. There are five
cases to take into account, which will be examined below in order from easiest to
di cult in terms of construction.
Notation: A plaintext slot holds an element in the finite field F2 over a bi-
nary setting, or Fpd over an integer-based message domain (ignoring embedded
sub-fields). A ciphertext with s available slots, encrypts a vector of plaintext
messages m0,m1, ...,ms 1 2 Fsp, where mi 2 Fp for p > 2, or b0, b1, ..., bs 1 2 Fs2
where bi 2 {0, 1} according to the slot arrangements mentioned earlier for each
respective message domain. Note that ciphertexts themselves are represented
using a calligraphic font, c 2 Aq.
For p > 2, data slots are distinguishable as s-vectors where each is defined
by mi(X), where s = Nint and i = {0, 1, ..., Nint   1}. In this case, mi represents
an integer polynomial of degree dint with coe cients hmi[0],mi[1], ...,mi[d]i
def
=
mi 2 Fp,d (to represent mi(Xj)), and where d > 2n for a n-binary base canonical
representation of a real number, whose polynomial coe cients are 0/1. mi 2 F2,d
specifically indicates this base canonical version, where the underlying plaintext
space F2 is in the embedded plaintext of Fp.
For p = 2, data slots are somewhat arbitrarily defined according to Nbin =
bsbin/nc multiples of n-bit real number binary encodings that can be packed
within a ciphertext, occupying one bit per slot. This can be represented as
hbi,0, bi,1, ..., bi,n 1i
def
= b 2 {0, 1}Nbin⇥n 2 F2. This is similar to a two-dimensional
matrix representation, however the rows i = {0, 1, ..., Nbin   1} which represent
data slots, are packed end-to-end within a ciphertext over one long row.
Further new notation will be uncovered as required under each of the five data
obfuscation cases.
The multiplicative cost and circuit depth will be estimated for each of the
five cases. These factors need to be considered from the sending and receiving
view-points of the algebraic contexts on the server. In order to minimise the
protocol’s impact on e ciency and circuit depth of the intended computational
tasks, these two properties should be rigorously minimised. The cost of client-
side computations involve decryption and re-encryption operations, and in some
cases encoding and decoding of clear plaintext values and transformation of slot
properties. Client-side costs are relatively constant and much less significant
compared to server-side homomorphic operations. Therefore, client-side cost
comparisons across the five cases are not considered relevant for this section.
Bandwidth communication costs between the server-client-server interactions
in some cases vary only in simple multiples of a ciphertext but are otherwise
relatively invariant with respect to protocol operations. A detailed comparison
of communication costs across cases is also not relevant for the purposes of this
section. Client-based and bandwidth costs however are important to consider in
general for performance reasons and will be evaluated in subsequent sections.
4.2.1 Binary Noise Resetting (F2 ! F2)
This is the easiest case to consider and is a recognised general cryptographic
technique in literature. During the data obfuscation process in a two party
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interaction, the server first generates uniformly random plaintext bit data ri,
for i = {0, ..., (m)   1}. This is constant-XORed (batch s-cAddpk() over F2)
with the encrypted intermediate input b. In this case however, we only need
to deal with the aggregate plaintext message space. This space is natively en-
crypted in the cryptosystem, encoding the s-vector over the embedded plaintext











= b0 2 {0, 1} (m). b0 is related to b by applying the CRT; we
write b0 = CRT2(b).
Noise resetting involves simple decryption and re-encryption of this masked
data at the client end without any further computation. The data is unmasked
when it is returned to the server by a second constant-XOR application of r
to recover the original encrypted input b
0
(or b through CRT). The two-party
interaction protocol between the Server (S) and the Client (C) is represented in
Alg. 4.
In the case of binary noise resetting, Alg. 4 involves only one constant (short
for constant-ciphertext) addition on either (sending and receiving) sides of the
server interaction, therefore the cost and depth of this protocol is very minimal.
Only one ciphertext is communicated between each server to client and subsequent
return interaction.
Algorithm 4 Binary Noise Resetting
INPUT S: b 2 F2 (encrypted)
OUTPUT S: b 2 F2 (encrypted)
1: S: cb0  Encpk(CRT2(b)) . b0 2 A (m)2
2: S: generate random r {0, 1} (m) . r 2 A (m)
2
3: S: cb0 r  s-cAddpk(cb0 , r)
4: =) S sends cb0 r to C
5: C: cb0 r  Encpk(Decsk(cb0 r)) . noise resetting ; blind b
6: =) C sends cb0 r to S
7: S: cb0  cAddpk(cb0 r, r)
8: S: Encpk(CRT2(b)) cb0
4.2.2 Integer Noise Resetting (Fp ! Fp)
For integer-based noise resetting, if there is no requirement for conversion to a
base canonical encoding over Fp, the integer-based plaintext message output would
be identical to the input. This interaction could be used to improve e ciency of
noise resetting over Fp where modulo p wrapping is not subsequently predicted
to occur. The protocol is readily implementable in the same way as F2 noise
resetting outlined in Section 4.2.1 above. The only di↵erence is that the server
initially generates uniformly random plaintext data ri, within the range [0, p) for
i = {0, ..., (m)  1} rather than bit data, which is constant-added in batch across
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all slots over Fp with the encrypted intermediate input. The interaction protocol
is illustrated in Alg. 5.
The cost and depth of this protocol, similar to binary noise resetting, is minimal
at one constant addition on both sender and receiving ends of the interaction.
Only one ciphertext is similarly communicated between server to client during
interaction.
Algorithm 5 Integer Noise Resetting
INPUT S: m 2 Fp (encrypted)
OUTPUT S: m 2 Fp (encrypted)
1: S: cm0  Encpk(CRTp(m)) . m0 2 A (m)p
2: S: generate random r [0, p) (m) . r 2 A (m)p
3: S: cm0+r  s-cAddpk(cm0 , r)
4: =) S sends cm0+r to C
5: C: cm0+r  Encpk(Decsk(cm0+r)) . noise resetting ; blind m
6: =) C sends cm0+r to S
7: S: cm0  cAddpk(cm0+r, r)
8: S: Encpk(CRTp(m)) cm0
4.2.3 Binary to Integer Message Domain Swap and Noise
Resetting (F2 ! F2,p)
The intuition behind this protocol, which is outlined in Alg. 6, is to blind the
transferred data in much the same way as the interaction specified in Alg. 4. The
data obfuscation process on the sending part of the server interaction (from now
on to be known as Phase 1 ) involving binary computation is similar to Alg. 4
in that random binary noise is constant-XORed with the encrypted intermediate
input b. However, there are a couple of deviations from the previous protocol.
Firstly, random noise is added to the embedded plaintext over F2, rather than
the aggregate plaintext message space. This is because randomisation requires
direct binary slot interactions over plaintext values for correctly computing the
algorithm as a result of the second protocol deviation. In the latter case, a
real negative number in two’s complement encoding over F2 is required to be
converted into a negative real number encoding over Fp. Specifically, a MSB of
1, representing a two’s complement negative number, requires conversion of the
MSB to  1 over Fp. This is achieved by converting the MSB to its complement
during the sending server phase over F2, and subsequently adding p   1 to the
corresponding element in the receiving phase on the server over Fp (see below).
The overall data obfuscation process during Phase 1 occurs together with MSB
conversion and involves a constant-XOR operation between the encrypted input
together with uniformly randomised bit data (line 7 in Alg. 6).
On the client side, noise resetting includes transfer of plaintext bit values
across slot properties from a binary to integer-based message domain. In this case,
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single bits per slot representing the binary message domain are transposed to
polynomial coe cients over Fp (line 12). A total of Nmin polynomials are available,
each representing separate data slots in base canonical form. Note the secret key
of the binary context (sk1) and the public key of the subsequent integer-based
context (pk2) are respectively involved in the decryption and encryption stages of
noise resetting.
To remove random noise on the receiving end (Phase 2 ) of the server interaction
over an integer-based message domain, we need to emulate binary XOR using
the arithmetic relationship a   b = a + b   2ab. Random values generated in
the earlier server phase are required to be first transposed into the polynomial-
based slot arrangement over Fp (line 19). Calculating the emulated binary XOR
operation over Fp is complicated by the ab term within the arithmetic relationship,
as this requires coe cient-wise multiplication between encrypted and random
bit values, which is not a natural operation supported by the message domain.
In computing such an intra-slot function over Fp, a type of homomorphic inner-
product computation is sought between encryptedmi 2 Fp,d and plaintext ai 2 Fp,d





where hmi, aii =
Pd
j=0(mi[j] · ai[j]) for each i slot up to s, 0 6 i < Nint and
0 6 j < d. This function is applied in line 22 of Alg. 6, although the specific
implementation will be discussed in Section 4.4. A homomorphic constant multi-
plication is further applied to the result to compute  2ab within the arithmetic
relationship (line 23) and two subsequent constant addition operations are used
to compute the arithmetic relationship a+ b  2ab (lines 33-34), resulting in an
equivalent XOR operation. The MSB at each data slot is corrected for its sign by
a constant addition of p  1 (in an earlier combined constant addition operation
in line 33), thereby recovering the original binary input, but which has now been
converted to a base binary canonical form over Fp.
Correctness of the MSB sign conversion ‘trick’ is required to be established,
represented by:
mmsb = (bmsb   1) + (p  1).
When bmsb = 0 over F2, indicating a positive two’s complement encoding:
mmsb = (0  1) + (p  1)
= p
= 0 (2 Fp)
If bmsb = 1, indicating a negative two’s complement bit value over F2:
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mmsb = (1  1) + (p  1)
= p  1
=  1 (2 Fp)
Having 0 in place of a two’s complement MSB bit value of 0 and  1 in place
of a MSB bit value of 1, achieves an equivalent real number conversion from F2 to
Fp respectively, together with the correct sign as intended.
Similar to Alg. 4, Phase 1 of the server interaction only requires one constant
addition to compute a binary XOR operation, so the cost and circuit depth is
minimal. In Phase 2 of the server interaction, the main cost involves computation
of the intra-slot inner product (line 22) together with one further constant multi-
plication applied directly afterwards (line 23). Accounting for costs involved in
the former function (described in Section 4.4), the total cost of Phase 2 is d  1
automorphisms and d+ 1 constant multiplications, and consumes a depth of two
constant multiplications.
In contrast to the previous interactions where the addition of random noise is
the exclusive data perturbation measure, for the remaining interactions, merely
adding random noise to data is no longer an adequately secure obfuscation measure
alone. In the remaining interaction scenarios, a combination of data perturbation
methods are employed, taking advantage of homomorphic data properties and
slot permutation features in order to obfuscate intermediate data in a way that
is consistent with the principles outlined in Section 4.1.4. In addition to adding
noise, other perturbation techniques employed include random sign flipping,
randomly permuting slots across a ciphertext and/or sub-blocks within a slot.
Each technique is associated with additional performance and resource costs that
should be balanced against security requirements.
The following two protocols use the same techniques for data obfuscation
during Phase 1 of the server interaction, which are grouped into a function called
ServerIntBlind(). The function’s methods are displayed in Alg. 7 and are only
referred to by the function name in Alg. 8.
4.2.4 Integer to Base Canonical Integer Noise Resetting
(Fp ! F2,p)
In the case of integer-based noise resetting to a base canonical binary encoding
over Fp (represented as F2,p), since the algebraic contexts of both server interaction
phases are over Fp, we have access to the maximal number of available slots Nint
and polynomial coe cients dint within each slot during the interaction. Not all
slots may be occupied during every two-party interaction, depending on the overall
homomorphic computational analysis facilitated by the platform, therefore the
term Nused (6 Nmin) is used to represent the number of slots occupied during
interaction.
Data perturbation methods involved in Phase 1 are represented by the function
ServerIntBlind(). As a first data obfuscation step, random noise is initially
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Algorithm 6 Binary to Integer Message Domain Swap and Noise Resetting
INPUT S: b 2 F2 2 {0, 1}Nbin⇥n (encrypted)
OUTPUT S: m 2 F2,d (encrypted)
1: S: cb  Encpk1(b)
2: S: random r {0, 1}Nbin⇥n . r 2 F2
3: S: set rb {0}Nbin⇥n
4: for i 1 to Nmin do . Nmin = min(bsbin/nc, Nint)
5: S: rb(i⇤n 1)  1 . set rb to 1 at each data slot MSB
6: end for
7: S: cb0 r  s-cAddpk1(cb, r  rb) . b0 = b  1msb, for i < Nmin
8: =) S sends cb0 r to C
9: C: b0   r Decsk1(cb0 r) . blind b0
10: for i 0 to Nmin   1 do . data tf. based on slot arrangements
11: for j  0 to n  1 do
12: C: (m0   r)i[j] (b0   r)i,j . m0i = mi   1i,msb; for i < Nmin
13: end for ... mi 2 F2,d
14: end for
15: C: cm0 r  Encpk2(m0   r)
16: =) C sends cm r to S
17: for i 0 to Nmin   1 do . data tf. based on slot arrangements
18: for j  0 to n  1 do
19: S: ri[j] ri,j . ri 2 F2,d; unallocated values = 0
20: end for
21: end for
22: S: c(m0 r)r  s-cDotPpk2(cm0 r, r) . intra-slot inner product
23: S: c 2(m0 r)r  s-cMultpk2(s-Negpk2(c(m0 r)r), 2)
24: for i 0 to Nmin   1 do
25: for j  0 to d do
26: if j = n  1 then
27: S: r0i[j] ri[j] + (p  1) . r
0
i = ri + (p  1)i,msb; for i < Nmin
28: else






33: S: c(m0 r)+r0  s-cAddpk2(cm0 r, r0)
34: S: c(m0 r)+r0 2(m0 r)r  s-Addpk2(c(m0 r)+r0 , c 2(m0 r)r)
35: S: c(m0 r) r+(p 1)msb = c(m0 r)+r 2(m0 r)r+(p 1)msb . a  b = a+ b  2ab
36: S: cm 1msb+(p 1)msb = cm0+(p 1)msb . correcting sign - see Sec 4.2.3
37: S: Encpk2(m) cm . m 2 F2,d
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added to all polynomials (up to Nint) and their coe cients (up to d). To prevent
decoding errors due to a modulo p reduction, the combined message and random
input for each integer-based value over Fp should remain within the interval
( p/2, p/2]. Therefore, the plaintext message space is shared between the data
input and the random noise, and a balance is struck between maximising noise
for improved security and having adequate space available for encoding any
intermediate data. Note that the addition of random noise reduces the capacity of
an encoding to accumulate integer-based values due to lazy carrying, rather than a
reduction of the n-bit base canonical representation of a real number. Overall the
e↵ect would be a decrease in performance as either a greater p value is required
or more frequent noise resetting is necessary to prevent mod p reduction.
Normally having an approximately equal share between the message input
and noise spaces is reasonable (see Section 4.3.3). However, in this case uniformly





c] = ±rrng are used to generate
random noise. It must be ensured that for any computational analysis requiring
two-party noise resetting over Fp, any individual intermediate data encodings that
accumulate due to lazy carrying should be strictly bounded before interaction
within the range [ (bp 1
2
c   rrng), (b
p 1
2
c   rrng)], otherwise decryption errors
may occur during the interaction. Whilst integer-based noise limits of individual
elements are maintained, capacity of the random message space overall is separately
limited by rejecting any decoded random values above 2(d k 1), as shown in line 5
of Alg. 7. This represents the upper bound capacity of accumulated integer-based
values due to lazy carrying. The value of  1 in the equation represents a reduction
in capacity of the input message space as a result of an equal share taken up by
the added random noise.
Random noise is applied on all slots, whether used or not, however additional
separate uniform random noise is added to mask empty slots based on the allowable
range of the message input space mentioned above. Both types of random noise
are combined with the intermediate input through a constant addition operation
(line 14).
A subsequent data perturbation step involves random permutation of roughly
equal size blocks of polynomial coe cients contained in a slot over Fp. There are
l such intra-slot blocks per slot, each represented by bd/lc adjacent coe cients,
except for the most significant group, which is made up of bd/lc + d mod l
elements. The coe cient blocks are each placed in corresponding slots within l
separate ciphertexts, with remaining coe cients outside the selected blocks in
a slot being set to zero. There are in fact two combined permutations involved
in this procedure. One is a random permutation of intra-slot blocks split across
l separate ciphertexts. The other is a permutation that simulates a left-shift
operation of each block to the LSB position of a corresponding slot. Despite the
function being applied in batch mode, each slot separately randomly permutes
and left-shifts their intra-slot blocks across corresponding plaintext slots over l
di↵erent ciphertexts. It would be very di cult to otherwise achieve equivalent
functionality through batch masking/shifting in a way that varies randomly across
all slots, hence the requirement for permutation operations.
In this regard, we define another intra-slot function over Fp, which is a left-
shift intra-slot permutation of plaintext value blocks randomly permuted across
corresponding slots over l ciphertexts and each is shifted to the LSB position of a
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slot, in batch across all slots. The function is represented as:
s-ShL⇡l(Encpk(mi[j])),
where m 2 Fsp,d, ⇡l is a random permutation over the set of l intra-slot blocks,
each block is made up of bd/lc± d mod l adjacent coe cient elements indexed by
j, and the function is applied in batch across all s slots.
For a given slot i 2 {0, 1, ...s   1} and random permutation ⇡t over t 2
{0, 1, ...l  1}, while iterating over contiguous elements k ⇢ j from 0! (bd/lc± d
mod l) for each intra-slot block, the permutation relationship of element mi[j]
and the new left-shifted element position ⇡g of slot i in ciphertext c(t) can be
mathematically represented as: ⇡g++(t) = ⇡t ⇥ bd/lc + k. Application of the
left-shift intra-slot permutation (in line 19), results in generating l ciphertexts
from one to contain all split-up blocks.
As an additional obfuscation measure, slots from each ciphertext can be
individually randomly flipped so that the intra-slot blocks may have their plaintext
value sign changed. This e↵ect is achieved by a single batch constant multiplication
s-cMultpk() applied to each ciphertext, resulting in all slots being randomly
multiplied by either 1 or  1 (line 20).
A final perturbation measure involves randomly permuting slots within each
ciphertext. A random permutation ⇡i, is performed over all slot elements i 2
{0, 1, ..., s  1} for each ciphertext, represented by the function s-Perm⇡i(), which
is applied in line 21 of Alg. 7. Essentially, the i-th slot becomes ⇡i.
The aforementioned data perturbation techniques, which are represented by
the function ServerIntBlind(), generate l ciphertexts containing obfuscated
data from server interaction Phase 1. An example where l = 3 intra-slot blocks
are used to obfuscate data slots within a ciphertext using ServerIntBlind() is
illustrated in Fig. 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Process of obfuscation for interactions Fp ! F2,p and Fp ! F2
performed by ServerIntBlind(): In this instance, l = 3 intra-slot block
(b = A,B,C) permutations (⇡) with random sign flipping (±) are performed on a
ciphertext with random noise added, cm+r. Three ciphertexts c(t), t 2 {0, 1...l}
are generated, where blocks are permuted both across corresponding slots
between l ciphertexts ⇡t[i] and across slots for each ciphertext ⇡i[t], i 2 {0, 1...s}.
After Phase 1, l ciphertexts are sent to the client, where they individually
undergo noise resetting involving encryption/decryption operations across the
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same cryptographic context. In the decrypted state, the obfuscated plaintext
values are converted to a binary base canonical state over Fp. This is achieved by
decoding the integer-based plaintext input into a blinded real number, which is
subsequently re-encoded to a binary representation over Fp (line 27). The encoding
function enc2() normally encodes to a base canonical state and represents negative
values by flipping all coe cients of value 1 to  1, in a non-balanced encoding.
After the re-encoded data is encrypted, all l ciphertexts are sent back to the
server for Phase 2 processing. Each ciphertext undergoes reversal of the data
perturbation measures previously encountered in ServerIntBlind(), although
they are applied in reverse successive order. This initially includes reversal of
the random slot permutations ⇡ 1i , (line 33), followed by swapping signs of the
randomly flipped intra-slot blocks (line 34). The reverse function, right shift
by permutation is subsequently applied which essentially reverses the left shift
procedure by an inverse permutation ⇡ 1g (t). This also depends on an inverse
random permutation ⇡ 1l , to identify the original positions occupied by individual
intra-slot blocks in a slot, within their respective l ciphertexts (in line 35). The
function is represented as:
s-ShR⇡ 1l (Encpk(mi[j])).
The separate ciphertexts are reconstituted back into one ciphertext by l   1
iterative batch addition operations over Fp (line 39). The combined uniform
random noise applied across all slots together with empty slots, is first converted
to a base binary canonical representation over Fp (line 43) employing the same
decoding/re-encoding (enc2(decp())) procedure previously used in the client phase.
Finally, random noise is subtracted from the ciphertext using a constant addition
operation over Fp, to recover the original message input in encrypted form (line
45).
In Phase 1 of the server interaction, cost of the perturbation procedure includes
computing the intra-slot permutation (line 19), which has similar computational
cost to the intra-slot inner product used in Alg. 6, since their underlying tech-
nologies are identical (see Section 4.4). Additionally, the intra-slot permutation
procedure can also incorporate the constant multiplication operation required for
subsequently flipping slot signs, so this latter perturbation measure can be com-
puted for free. Intra-slot permutation are performed using linear transformations
(see Section 4.4), which has a cost of N additions, constant multiplications, and
rotations. A rotation, implemented as an automorphism, requires a key-switching
operation which is comparatively more expensive than addition and constant
multiplication, hence the complexity is asymptotically O(N) rotations (Xiaoqian
Jiang et al., 2018).
The cost and depth of computing permutations is not as simple to define since
there are multiple implementations for achieving equivalent permutations. Finding
the cheapest shift network to perform a given permutation as implemented in
HElib is discussed in Halevi and Shoup (2014). The cost of applying an overall
permutation ⇡ to a given set of N vectors requiring a sequence of shift columns,
involving w sub-permutations of reduced cost c, will require c multiplicative masks,
c rotations and O(c) additions, and has a depth of w multiplicative masking
operations, w rotations, and O(w) additions. An underlying Benes Network is
used to implement an e cient permutation algorithm in HElib which has a network
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depth of w = 2dlog
2
Ne   1 = O(logN) and cost at most c = 2w = O(logN)
(Halevi & Shoup, 2014). Note that intra-slot and slot permutations are applied l
times for each ciphertext (line 21). These costs are identical to the second server
interaction phase, which essentially consist of similar functions applied in reverse
to those encountered in Phase 1.
It should be noted that l ciphertexts are involved between server-client-server
interactions rather than one, therefore additional network bandwidth and/or
communication costs occur in this protocol compared to earlier protocols. In
addition to noise resetting, the protocol also achieves a reduction in size of the
integer-based plaintext values accumulated due to lazy carrying, although not
completely down to the coe cients 0/1. This is due to Phase 2 addition operations
over Fp involving lazy carrying, required to reverse the perturbation e↵ects from
Phase 1. Specifically, there are l   1 iterative batch additions (although the
polynomial operands involved have sparsely overlapping integer-based coe cients)
and one further addition to remove the final random noise. Therefore, the
maximum size of any plaintext element is ±l. Without intra-slot obfuscation,
a true binary base canonical form is achieved from the remaining perturbation
measures. The overall protocol is schematically illustrated in Figure 4.2.
4.2.5 Integer to Binary Message Domain Swap and Noise
Resetting (Fp ! F2)
Swapping from an integer-based to a binary plaintext message domain is the most
complex and costly of the five interaction protocols, although the steps involved
are very similar to Alg. 7. The variation is due to some client-based and Phase 2
server functions that accommodate changing to a binary cryptographic context.
In Phase 1, the ServerIntBlind() function is similar to Alg. 7, although the
number of data slots that are available between the two algebraic contexts is Nmin
rather than Nint, and only n coe cients are occupied over Fp instead of dint to
match with binary slot arrangements in Phase 2. The remaining unused elements
between coe cients n to dint in the binary case are available during multiplication
over Fp in arbitrary computations (ideally dint = 2n), to prevent wrapping around
of the output slot values modulo Fi(X) limited by the overall degree dint of the
plaintext slot. Permutations are also performed across Nmin rather than Nint data
slots. These di↵erences in properties of the ServerIntBlind() function in Phase
1 between Alg. 7 and Alg. 8 are configurable as function parameters.
The ServerIntBlind() function outputs l ciphertexts containing obfuscated
data resulting from the following measures: addition of random noise (for all slots
up to Nmin with additional noise for unused slots < Nmin); random intra-slot
block permutations with split-up blocks across l ciphertexts; random flipping of
slot signs; and finally shu✏ing of slots randomly within each ciphertext. These
measures are similar to those described for Alg. 7.
The l ciphertexts are received by the client, where they each undergo suc-
cessive decryption/encryption operations to reset noise. The integer-based and
binary cryptographic contexts, which are set up during initialisation phase of the
interaction, are exchanged in the process. A secret key and public key for the
respective contexts are required for the decryption/encryption steps involved in
the exchange (lines 4 and 9 in Alg. 8).
123
Figure 4.2: Algorithms 7 and 8
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Algorithm 7 Integer to Base Canonical Integer Noise Resetting
INPUT S: m 2 Fp (encrypted)
OUTPUT S: m 2 Fp (encrypted)
function ServerIntBlind(m, pk, d, l, s = Nint, w = dint, Nused, x, y) {
1: S: cm  Encpk(m)
2: for i 0 to s  1 do
3: while true do
4: S: random ri  ( a, a]w . ri 2 Fp,d; a = bp 14 c






11: for i Nused to s  1 do . Nused = used slots; Nused 6 Nmin
12: S: random rei  ( b, b]w . rei 2 Fp,d; b = (bp 12 c   a)
13: end for ... for masking remaining empty slots
14: S: cm+r0  s-cAddpk(cm, r+ re) . adding noise to m
15: S: random ⇡t[i] over the set t 2 {0, 1, ..., l   1} for each i slot
16: for t 0 to l   1 do . l intra-slot groups
... of size bw/lc± w mod l each
17: S: random flt  { 1, 1}s . fl { 1, 1}t⇥s
18: S: random ⇡i[t] over the set i 2 {0, 1, ..., s  1} for each c(t)
19: S: c(m+r0)sh(t) s-ShL⇡t(cm+r0) . csh(t) - ciphertext with one random
... intra-slot block only, for every slot
20: S: c±(m+r0)sh(t) s-cMultpk(c(m+r0)sh(t),flt) . randomly flipped (±) slots




23: =) S sends c±(m+r0)sh,⇡(t) where t 2 {0, 1, ..., l   1} to C
24: for t 0 to l   1 do
25: C: ±(m+ r0)sh,⇡(t) Decsk(c±(m+r0)sh,⇡(t)) . mi(t) 2 Fp,d; m blind
26: for i 0 to Nint   1 do
27: C: ±(m+ r0)0sh,⇡(t) enc2(decp(±(m+ r
0)sh,⇡(t)))
28: end for . mi(t) 2 F2,d; base canonical enc.
29: C: c±(m+r0)0sh,⇡(t) Encpk(±(m+ r
0)0sh,⇡(t))
30: end for
31: =) C sends c±(m+r0)0sh,⇡(t) where t 2 {0, 1, ..., l   1} to S
32: for t 0 to l   1 do
33: S: c±(m+r0)0sh(t) s-Perm⇡ 1i (c±(m+r
0)0sh,⇡
(t)) . ⇡ 1i = i; reverse slot perm.
34: S: c(m+r0)0sh(t) s-cMultpk(c±(m+r0)0sh(t),flt) . unflip slots
35: S: c
(m+r0)0 (t) s-ShR⇡ 1t (c(m+r0)
0
sh
(t)) . R shift reverse block perm.
36: if t = 0 then . Adding all intra-slot blocks into
37: S: ctmp  c(m+r0)0 (0) ... plaintext slots of one ciphertext
38: end if
39: S: ctmp  s-Addpk(c(m+r0)0 (t), ctmp)
40: end for
41: S: cm+r0 = ctmp . mi 2 Fp,d
42: for i 0 to Nint   1 do
43: S:  r0i  enc2( decp(ri + rei)) . r
0
i 2 F2,d; base canonical encoding
44: end for
45: S: cm  s-cAddpk(cm+r0 , r0) . removing noise
46: S: Encpk(m) cm
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A check is made immediately after decryption of the obfuscated data at
the client (line 6) to ensure that decoded real value outputs in each slot are
all less than 2n, otherwise an overflow situation would arise given the limited
n-bit binary slot allocation that would result in data loss. The client achieves
conversion of the decrypted integer-based output to binary plaintext values through
a decoding/encoding procedure encbin(decp()), in addition to ensuring that binary
slot arrangements are respected (line 7). Note that the encoding function encbin()
di↵ers from that used to generate the canonical binary version enc2() demonstrated
in Alg. 7, due to the way that negative real values are represented. A two’s
complement representation is used in the former case, whereas negative coe cients
are used in the latter case, as described in the previous section.
The l encrypted ciphertexts over a binary cryptographic context are received
by the server to begin Phase 2. Here, reversal of the data perturbation measures
from Phase 1 are applied over binary circuits. Note, due to organisation of binary
encodings into one bit per slot rather than multiple 1/0 coe cients within a
plaintext slot over Fp, bit values within di↵erent data slots are accessible at the
same flat level (ie. an intra-slot concept does not exist and data slots are more
abstract defined concepts). This suggests that the same technology can be used to
permute elements both within and across data slots, opening the opportunity to
improve cost and e ciency of homomorphic operations by combining permutation
operations.
Firstly, we need to homomorphically select bits corresponding to intra-slot
blocks within their respective ciphertexts. The encbin() function previously en-
countered at the client will encode negative real numbers to occupy the entire
data slot due to sign extension. Normally elements outside a block within slots are
set to 0, so a masking step will correct this and eventually allow split-up blocks
to be correctly reconstituted into a single data slot. Note this masking step is
not required for encodings over Fp (during the equivalent obfuscation reversal
procedure in Alg. 7), since sign extension is not a feature used to represent
negative numbers in this case.
The (‘intra-slot’) block selection operation is normally applied directly after
reversal of the randomly permuted data slots represented by ⇡ 1i . However, since
permutations performed homomorphically are to be combined into one step for
e ciency reasons, the masking operation needs to be applied beforehand. In this
case, the plaintext masks need to be first permuted according to ⇡i in order to work
correctly. The mask values themselves are easily set directly by allocating bd/lc±d
mod l blocks of bits starting at the binary slot indexed by i⇥ n (representing the
LSB data slot position) for ciphertext ⇡t[i] of data slot i 2 {0, 1, ..., Nmin   1}
(line 13).
Permutations previously defined over an integer-based message domain, are
required to be first transformed into a bit-per-slot binary arrangement in order
to work correctly over F2. The function stfbin() represents the mapping FNminp,d 7!
FNmin⇥n
2
that adjusts for changes in slot arrangements. For instance, transformation
of the random slot permutation ⇡i, into a binary context can be represented
as ⇡i,j (line 14). The notation indicates a requirement to explicitly represent
permutations of polynomial coe cients mi[j] over Fp using binary values now
indexed as b[i⇥n+ j]. The transformed permutation is then used to permute the
selection mask in the plaintext permutation function, s-pPerm(). Subsequently,
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the mask is applied to each ciphertext via a constant multiplication operation
(line 15).
The same stfbin() transformation function is applied to the inverse random
slot permutation ⇡ 1i (line 16), and to the inverse intra-slot permutation ⇡
 1
t (line
17), converting to ⇡ 1i,j and ⇡
 1
t,j respectively. Subsequently, the combination of
these permutations, ⇡ 1i,j [⇡
 1
t,j [i]] form a single combined permutation ⇡
 1
comb, used
to e↵ectively reverse-permute blocks to both their original slot and right-shifted
positions in one step (line 19), represented by:
s-ShR⇡ 1comb(Encpk(bi,j))
The l ciphertexts are ready to be reconstituted back into one ciphertext by
l   1 iterative batch addition operations, similar to the corresponding procedure
described for integer noise resetting (Alg. 7 line 39). This time however, addition
is performed in batch over binary circuits and requires use of the PPCs previously
developed in Section 3.2, thereby adding ‘intra-slot’ blocks together in batch mode
across all slots up to Nmin.
Reversal of two remaining data perturbation measures are additionally incor-
porated into PPC actions during this process. First is random noise removal,
which has been previously added over Fp within function ServerIntBlind() in
Phase 1. Noise is first required to be converted into a binary representation of
opposite sign (within the appropriate slot arrangement) via the decoding/encoding
procedure encbin(decp()), in order to be eventually removed (line 22). Second
is reversal of random sign flipping of blocks before adding them together into
one ciphertext. This is achieved by flagging to individual primitives within the
PPCs that a block which has previously undergone sign change in Phase 1, should
have binary subtraction performed during block aggregation into one ciphertext,
otherwise binary addition is used instead. Lines 28-35 of Alg. 8 preconfigure key
variables c0Array and xorIn to indicate whether a PPC sub-operation performs
binary addition or subtraction according to the sign flag flt[i], for each slot i
and ciphertext t. As previously described in Section 3.2, a cin value of 1 and
setting the complement of all data slot bits for the second operand, represented
by variables c0Array and xorIn respectively, indicate a binary subtraction PPC
sub-operation for the corresponding data slot.
Output of the batch binary PPC addition function, represented by s-BinAdd(),
results in generating a single ciphertext with all block components aggregated
within individual slots (line 36). Additionally, all data perturbation measures are
reversed including removal of random noise and reverting to original block signs
whose values previously were randomly flipped. The initial integer-based inputs
to this protocol are finally recovered with the noise reset and in binary format,
ready for ongoing processing.
Cost of the perturbation procedure in Phase 1 is similar to Alg. 7 since
both involve the same function. Network bandwidth and/or communications
costs are also similar, transmitting l ciphertexts within the server-client-server
interaction. In Phase 2, di↵erences in costs and multiplicative depth are a result of
binary circuit operations. For each ciphertext (ie. applied l times), one constant
multiplication is required to initially select blocks, followed by a cost of O(logN)
to execute the combined permutations and 2dlog2ne for the PPC function. Circuit
depth becomes log2n plus one constant multiplication, both applied l times.
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Algorithm 8 Integer to Binary Message Domain Swap and Noise Resetting
INPUT S: m 2 Fp (encrypted)
OUTPUT S: b 2 F2 2 {0, 1}Nbin⇥n (encrypted)
1: function ServerIntBlind(m, pk1, d, l, s = Nmin, w = n,Nused, x, y)
. from Alg. 7
2: =) S sends c±(m+r0)sh,⇡(t) where t 2 {0, 1, ..., l   1} to C
3: for t 0 to l   1 do
4: C: ±(m+ r0)sh,⇡(t) Decsk1(c±(m+r0)sh,⇡(t)) . mi(t) 2 Fp,d; m blind
5: for i 0 to Nmin   1 do
6: C: assert(decp(±(m+ r0)sh,⇡(t)) < 2n) . otherwise data loss
7: C: ±(b+ r0)sh,⇡(t) encbin(decp(±(m+ r0)sh,⇡(t)))
8: end for . bi(t) 2 F2; b blind
9: C: c±(b+r0)sh,⇡(t) Encpk2(±(b+ r
0)sh,⇡(t))
10: end for
11: =) C sends c±(b+r0)sh,⇡(t) where t 2 {0, 1, ..., l   1} to S
12: for t 0 to l   1 do
13: S: µi,j[t] {0, 1}Nmin⇥n . µ[t] 2 F2; mask that selects intra-slot
... blocks according to ⇡t[i]




... perm. to binary slot arrangement
15: S: c±(b+r0)0⇡(t) s-cMultpk2(c±(b+r0)0⇡(t), s-pPerm⇡i,j(µ[t])) . apply mask
16: S: ⇡ 1i,j [t] stfbin(⇡
 1
i [t]) . transform inverse slot perm.
17: S: ⇡ 1t,j [i] stfbin(⇡
 1
t [i]) . transform inverse intra-slot perm.




t,j [i]] . combine perms. i 2 {0, ..., Nmin}
19: S: c±(b+r0)(t) s-ShR⇡ 1comb(c±(b+r
0)sh,⇡(t)) . Combined reverse R shift
20: if t = 0 then ... block and slot perm.
21: for i 0 to Nmin   1 do
22: S:  r0i  encbin( decp(ri + rei)) . r
0
i 2 F2; binary encoding
23: end for
24: S: ctmp  Encpk2( r0) . for removing noise
25: end if
26: S: set xorIn {0}Nmin⇥n . Binary +/  all intra-slot blocks into
27: S: set c0Array {0}Nmin⇥n ... plaintext slots of one ciphertext
28: for i 0 to Nmin   1 do
29: if flt[i] =  1 then
30: S: c0Array(i⇤n)  1 . c0Array and xorIn are flags setting
31: for j  0 to n  1 do ... ( ) per slot for the batch PPC




36: S: ctmp  s-BinAddpk2(c±(b+r0)(t), ctmp, c0Array,xorIn)
37: end for . batch binary PPC +/ 
38: S: cb = ctmp . bi 2 F2
39: S: Encpk2(b) cb
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4.3 Security Analysis
The following section attempts to reason about the security level guarantees that
can be made about each of the five interactive two-party protocols described in
the last section. The first three protocols, (F2 ! F2, F2 ! Fp and Fp ! Fp)
demonstrate information theoretic security, however such guarantees cannot be
provided for the last two protocols, (Fp ! F2,p and Fp ! F2).
Strong security guarantees have typically not been provided for any standard
data perturbation measures reviewed, except for those employing di↵erential
privacy techniques. It should be also kept in mind that some of the most preva-
lent symmetric-key encryption technologies that are based on repeated random
permutations and substitutions, including triple-Data Encryption Standard (DES)
and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), are not underpinned by any prov-
able security guarantees and instead rely on a pedigree of not having previously
demonstrated any unexpected security breaches. In order to give some measure
of assurance from a security stand-point, the last two protocols (Fp ! F2,p and
Fp ! F2), will be examined in the context of known sensitivity attacks against
similar data obfuscation techniques, under their proposed model of execution.
4.3.1 Threat Model
Within the health domain in general, a client connecting to a healthcare organisa-
tion tends to be known and trusted, so that the issue of data security involving
interactions is predominantly focussed on protecting sensitive information from
an honest-but curious observer, rather than from a determined adversary. The
threat is modelled as honest-but-curious (see Appendix A), where an adversary
follows instructed computations but is curious to information of the corrupt party.
We consider a two-party interaction model based on the use case referred
to in the overall HEB protocol design (Section 4.2). Under this scenario, a
client owns data that needs to be privately computed over circuits owned by
the server, and any secret keys are held by the client. Both privacy of the
client’s data and of the server’s computational circuit needs to be ensured, so
that the risk of information leak between either interacting parties are minimised.
Communication over the network is synchronous and subroutine invocations are
non-concurrent for any individual interaction, meaning subroutines are executed
sequentially. Communication channels are ideally authenticated, suggesting they
cannot be altered by an adversary. Our focus is restricted to addressing security
and privacy concerns associated with interacting participants only and not consider
outsider attacks. Ensuring secure channel communication (which should be used
to protect all HE-based protocols since they are vulnerable to malleability attacks
(Orlandi et al., 2007)) and preventing unauthorised system access are typical
measures protecting against outside interference, which are orthogonal to security
considerations for this section.
During interaction, the number of corrupt parties involved is fixed (there can
only be one), and is controlled by a non-adaptive adversary. This is because our
privacy considerations apply specifically to a potential client adversary who has
decrypted intermediate data available, that latter of which has been obfuscated. We
can assume the system’s server is secure against an honest-but-curious adversary
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since only encrypted data is ever handled by the server. Its security is therefore
determined entirely by semantic security of the underlying HE scheme.
So long as the channels of communication between client and server can be
made secure using standard cybersecurity measures such as TLS, weakening
semantic security guarantees during interaction for a client alone is a calculated
risk balanced against performance and flexibility of the overall HE platform. This
however does not apply to the server as a whole, and semantic security governs
the threat model for any other adversary. For instance, semantic security would
apply to an adversarial attack breaching the server or against an insider attack
(since there is no access to the private keys). Nevertheless, there may be instances
where a breach occurs in the client system for which protection is required, or the
client itself is a corrupted party. In both cases, an adversary would have access
to the private keys, so that the server or other multi-party data is protected by
the obfuscation measures. In the event of a client system breach, protection of
the specific client data or HE server computation output is really the client’s
responsibility.
4.3.2 Perfect Secrecy
We proceed to evaluate security of the two-party computation framework accord-
ing to the honest-but-curious model described in Goldreich (2009) and follow an
approach that is verbatim from Bost et al. (2014), which demonstrates security
of a two-party encryption exchange scheme over binary circuits. The arithmetic
pseudocode of Alg. 4 describing binary noise resetting serves to establish correct-
ness, assuming all HE computations evaluate correctly. The computed function f
is probabilistic defined by:
f(cb0 ,PK, SK) = (cb0 , ;)
The input and output ciphertexts in binary, cb0 are identical in both value and
method of encryption (hence one set of public and secret keys), but di↵er in terms
of their associated ciphertext noise, where the output is reset to level L.
According to Goldreich (2009), a two-party protocol ⇧ privately computes f
if it can be demonstrated that whatever can be obtained from server’s (S) view
of its interaction with client (C), could be obtained from its available input and
output.
Defintion 4.3.1 (Goldreich (2009), privacy with respect to semi-honest be-
haviour). Let f = (fS, fC) be a probabilistic polynomial function. Both parties
want to compute f(s, c), where fS(s, c) and fC(s, c) denote the first and second
element of f(s, c) respectively. Let ⇧ be a two-party protocol computing f using
the security parameter  . The view of party S during an execution of ⇧ on (s, c),





t ), where r represents the outcome
of S’s internal coin tosses, and mi represents the i-th message it has received. C’s
view is defined similarly. The output of parties S and C after an execution of ⇧ on
(s, c), denoted as output⇧S ( , s, c) and output
⇧
C( , s, c) respectively, are implicit
in each party’s own view of the execution, and the global output output⇧( , s, c)




We say that ⇧ privately computes f if there exists probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms, denoted SS and SC, such that for every possible input s, c of f ,
{SS(1
 
, s, fS(s, c)), f(s, c)} ⌘c {view
⇧








where ⌘c denotes computational indistinguishability against Probabilistic Polyno-
mial Time (PPT) adversaries with negligible advantage in the security parameter
  (see Appendix A).
In relation to Alg. 4, S’s view is view⇧S = (PK, cb0 ; r; cb00 ), where b
00
= b0   r.
S’s output is cb0 . We omit consideration in the security proof of the completely
independent randomness used for encryptions of r and b
00
in relation to other
simulation elements. The simulator SS(PK, cb0) runs as follows:
1. Picks uniformly at random r̃  M and b̃
00
 M; where M 2 {0, 1}.
2. Generates the encryption cb̃00 of b̃
00
under Encpk().
3. Outputs (PK, cb0 ; r̃; cb̃00 )
Since r and r̃ are taken from the same distribution, independently of any other
parameter,
{(PK, cb0 ; r̃; cb̃00 ); f(cb0 ,PK, SK)} = {(PK, cb0 ; r; cb̃00 ); f(cb0 ,PK, SK)}
By semantic security of Encpk(),
{(PK, cb0 ; r; cb̃00 ); f(cb0 ,PK, SK)} ⌘c {(PK, cb0 ; r; cb00 ); cb0}
and so,
{SS(PK, cb0), f(cb0 ,PK, SK)} ⌘c {view
⇧
S (cb0 ,PK, SK),output
⇧(cb0 ,PK, SK)}
C’s view is view⇧C = (SK; cb00 ). The simulator SC(SK):






3. Outputs (SK, cb̃0 )
The distribution of b̃
0
and b0   r are identical, therefore the real distribution
{(SK; cb00 ); cb0} and the ideal distribution {(SK; cr̃); f(cb0 ,PK, SK)} are computa-
tionally indistinguishable. ⇤
In fact, Alg. 4 hides intermediate data using a One Time Pad (OTP) through
the XOR operation, thereby achieving Shannon’s definition of perfect secrecy
(Shannon, 1949) (also see Def. 4.3.2 below).
Integer-based noise resetting (Fp ! Fp) could be made semantically secure if
the requirement for achieving a base canonical integer encoding over Fp can be
relaxed. In this case, the interaction can exploit the perfect secrecy properties
of a classical additive cipher, whereby the semantic security of an overarching
scheme could be subsequently demonstrated in the same way as shown for Alg. 4.
The notion of perfect secrecy relies on the fact that a plaintext is independent of
a corresponding ciphertext:
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Defintion 4.3.2 (Jarecki (2004), Perfect Secrecy (as formulated by Shannon
(1949)) ). An encryption scheme satisfies perfect secrecy if for all messages m1,m2
in message space M and all ciphertexts c 2 C, we have
Prob
K K
[Enc(K,m1) = c] = Prob
K K
[Enc(K,m2) = c]
where both probabilities are taken over the choice of K in K and over the coin
tosses of the (possibly) probabilistic algorithm Enc.
The perfectly secure properties of an additive cipher are examined by Jarecki
(2004) in the context of string messages although the same concept applies to any
plaintext message space over Fp:
M 2 Flp,where l is the message length.
K 2 Flp.
c = Enc(k, [m0, ...,ml 1]) s.t c = [c1, ..., cl 1] where ci = (mi + ri) mod p
for m = [m0, ...,ml 1] 2M and r = [r0, ..., rn 1] 2 K.
The XOR OTP used in binary noise resetting is just a specialised case (where
p = 2) of the above general additive cipher (where p > 2), therefore noise resetting
over Fp can be readily proved in the same way as for Alg. 4.
In Alg. 5, the integer-based plaintext message output is identical to the
input. Retaining identical inputs and outputs over Fp during noise resetting
limits continuous arbitrary computation due to modulo-wrapping of accumulated
integer-based elements. This setting could be used however, to improve e ciency
of noise resetting over Fp where modulo-wrapping is predicted not to occur, or
where conversion to a binary message space is required before wrapping occurs.
The probabilistic computed function for Alg. 6 is defined by:
f(cb,PK1,PK2, SK1, SK2) = (cm, ;)
In contrast to Alg. 4, the encryption context is exchanged (F2 ! Fp) during
interaction requiring two public and secret key inputs. The receiving context
emulates the homomorphic XOR operation over message space M = {0, 1}
and random noise is added to the embedded plaintext over F2, rather than the
aggregate plaintext message space. This is necessary because of the requirement
to convert a two’s complement negative real number encoding to an integer-based
representation (see Section 4.2.3).
The security proof for Alg. 6 follows the same proof outline as Alg. 4, since
proposed deviations from basic binary noise resetting do not violate any of the
OTP properties of the current interaction’s data perturbation approach. Adding
random bit noise to the embedded rather than aggregated plaintext message space
still adds an identical amount of bit information to the intermediate input, equal
in size of the message. Additionally, correcting the MSB negative sign from F2
to Fp is performed external to the obfuscation procedure. Any stated di↵erences
between the two protocols do not alter security considerations and Alg. 6 similarly
achieves perfect secrecy in an information-theoretic way.
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4.3.3 Not-so-perfect Secrecy
The same security guarantee with respect to semi-honest behaviour cannot be
made for Algs. 7 and 8 given the requirement for correctly converting to a binary
output, in either a canonical Fp or actual F2 representation, respectively.
Unfortunately, any form of conversion to binary over Fp or F2 from Fp breaks
the ci = (mi + ri) mod p relationship within individual integer-based elements,
so that an additive cipher can no longer be correctly evaluated. In order to
maintain correctness of plaintext message conversion during noise resetting, the
addition of any noise to a message is strictly bounded in total within the range
( p/2, p/2]. Perfect secrecy no longer applies when ci = (mi + ri) < p, so that
the addition of random noise will require further data perturbation measures
in order to maintain security. Any obfuscation approach however, will come
up short of a guarantee at the semantic security level. Intuitively, this comes
down to distribution di↵erences between the original data and the randomness
associated with some perturbation method (see below). Partial information about
the underlying data could be discovered as a result, thereby breaking the notion of
computational indistinguishability. Due to statistically weaker privacy protections,
a data perturbation technique can be resistant against a particular set of attacks,
but this does not guarantee security against other types of attack. Cryptographic
approaches make no such assumption about the type of attack methods used by
an adversary to break security.
Although semantic security guarantees at a cryptographic level cannot be
stated for Algs. 7 and 8, an argument of relative data obfuscation strength is
made in comparison to other typical PPDM perturbation methods reviewed (see
Section 2.8), and also when compared to any literature encountered regarding
sensitivity attacks within similar data perturbation contexts. The latter issue is
often ignored in privacy preserving computing literature (Orlandi et al., 2007).
Rigorous metrics have previously been used to quantifying privacy based on simple
perturbation measures, including di↵erential entropy (Aggarwal & Philip, 2008;
Agrawal & Aggarwal, 2001) and ✏-privacy breach probability (K. Liu et al., 2008).
An example by Chidambaram and Srinivasagan (2017) uses normalised estimation
error for privacy performance metrics of a combined additive and multiplicative
perturbation scheme. A systematic review of privacy metrics is provided by
Wagner and Eckho↵ (2018).
In our setting, any notion of relative privacy strength will be discussed in terms
of more qualitative measures rather than performing a detailed privacy analysis.
This is due to the complexity of combining data perturbation measures, which
despite allowing construction of more robust privacy-preservation techniques,
makes formal analysis much more di cult; and with very little precedence in the
literature to assist (Aggarwal & Philip, 2008). Other factors such as real number
encoding involved in data obfuscation further adds to complexity of our hybrid
perturbation approach (see below). Security analysis based on a simple comparison
of the probability space size created by obfuscation (without taking into account
the underlying information context) will be examined below (see Section 4.3.4),
in order to give some indication of relative obfuscation strength across di↵erent
perturbation measures. Analysing combined obfuscation techniques is a key
research direction to be considered in future work.
Qualitatively, a rationale of relative high data obfuscation strength for our
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collective perturbation techniques comes down to the fact that:
1. A combination of methods are used to achieve extensive data obfuscation
(more than previously typically encountered in literature).
2. HE properties are exploited to achieve data obfuscation complexity.
3. Data obfuscation properties are orthogonal to the overall computational
task.
4. All data obfuscation measures are reversed after interaction to recover
original input data.
The third item relates to the property that obfuscation is performed in a
way that still allows data conversion to either a binary form (for Fp ! F2)
or a base canonical version of it (for Fp ! F2,p), which is unrelated to the
overarching analytical or computational task(s). Resetting of ciphertext noise is
also achieved regardless of any computation performed in a decrypted state. In
comparison, standard PPDM techniques preserve some information after data
perturbation specific to the mining task or model of analysis (K. Chen & Liu,
2005). Uncoupling data perturbation from the analytical tasks provides a more
consistent and generally applicable approach to obfuscation. In this regard,
separate consideration of data perturbation properties are not required each time
a di↵erent type of computation is performed.
Relating to the last item above, the algorithms proposed for data obfuscation
are not required to consider aspects of privacy vs. information loss trade-o↵s
(Aggarwal & Philip, 2008; K. Chen & Liu, 2005). This is because unlike the
majority of typical perturbation techniques employed in PPDM, all algorithmic
obfuscation measures are reversed at the server after interaction, resulting in
recovery of the original homomorphically-encrypted real number values. This
confers added flexibility to complexity of the perturbation approach and enables
separation between obfuscation and analytical concerns, since privacy alone is
optimised.
Focussing on the remaining first two items above, outside attacks are not
considered in Algs. 7 and 8, which can be somewhat prevented by secure channel
communication and by blocking unauthorised system access (similar to the security
considerations of Algs. 4 and 6 described in Section 4.3.1). In addition, as server-
side data is entirely protected by semantic security of the HE scheme, our privacy
considerations apply specifically to a potential client adversary who has decrypted
intermediate data available, which has been obfuscated.
If partial information can be obtained by the client during a two-party interac-
tion, the internal workings of a server algorithm or computation could be revealed
eventually by processing a large amount of data. This is known as a sensitivity
attack. Similarly, specific data from another party or system could be obtained
by an active adversary in a multi-party scenario. If intermediate results during
an interaction are not revealed, then a sensitivity attack can still be performed
by a determined client adversary at the whole network level based on its final
system outputs. In this case, composite functions or complex algorithms would be
more di cult to invert if the system as a whole is considered a single black-box.
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Limiting the number of system queries coming from a client could be used to
reduce this type of attack (Orlandi et al., 2007).
The data perturbation techniques applied to Algs. 7 and 8, which are illustrated
within the steps (1-9) shown in Fig. 4.2, can be outlined as follows:
1. Step 2 - Adding uniform random noise to empty data slots.
2. Step 2 - Adding uniform random noise to integer-based values within all






3. Step 3-4 - Creation of l intra-slot blocks per data slot which are randomly
permuted across corresponding data slots of l ciphertexts (⇡t[i]).
4. Step 4 - Randomly flipping the sign of each data slot (now representing a
single intra-slot block) across all l ciphertexts, according to flt.
5. Step 4 - Randomly permuting data slots within each of the l ciphertexts
(⇡i[t]).
The encrypted intermediate data is now distributed across l ciphertexts and
sent to the client, where all data is decrypted and made available in clear plaintext.
The aim is to homomorphically obfuscate all intermediate data whilst previously
encrypted, to such an extent that any partial information would be extremely
di cult to discover by a client adversary during decryption; yet the operations
of noise resetting, plaintext message swapping (freely between F2 and Fp) and
the reduction of accumulated integer-based values for elements over Fp, can all
be computed correctly. Data is subsequently re-encrypted by the client back
into l ciphertexts and sent back to the server, where the obfuscation process is
homomorphically undone in approximate reverse order to the steps listed above
(Fig. 4.2, Steps 6-9). The ciphertext noise is reset in both algorithms, while the
underlying plaintext data contains the original real number values restored, albeit
within similar (Alg. 7) or new binary (Alg. 8) cryptographic contexts, and with a
close-to-base canonical integer encoding in Alg. 7.
Knowledge about data perturbation sensitivity attacks (see Section 2.9) is
instructive for developing protective measures against potential vulnerabilities
within our overall obfuscation approach. In general, the random addition of
noise prevents identifying individual records and masking zero-valued or empty
slots. Uniform random noise is generated to mask both real number values
and empty slots since it has been shown that uniform random noise has an
e↵ectiveness compared to Gaussian noise which is both similar, and significantly
more, when the original distribution is Gaussian and uniform respectively (Agrawal
& Aggarwal, 2001). It has also been shown to be experimentally more e↵ective in
lower dimension cases (Aggarwal & Philip, 2008), which is a more likely scenario
in general purpose computational settings facilitated by the HEB (although a
switch to Gaussian noise can be made for high dimension data). It has also been
demonstrated that a greater level of perturbation (variance) in random noise,
the less likely data distributions can be reconstructed accurately (Agrawal &
Aggarwal, 2001; Huang et al., 2005), with a signal-to-noise ratio of less than one
being significantly erroneous (Kargupta et al., 2003). In our approach, any added
uniform random noise is equal in range to the original data (ie. p/2 ).
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The work of Huang et al. (2005) has shown that higher correlations in the
original data allow it to be more easily reconstructed. Note that, the e↵ect of having
potentially multiple di↵erent uses for data slots in the HEB or adding separate
random noise to empty slots is a way of disrupting structure in the data, making
the exploitation of correlations in the private data even more di cult. Huang et al.
(2005) in considering additive noise optimisation to improve privacy preservation,
have also demonstrated that generating noise with a similar correlation structure
to the original data will make eigen-analysis di cult. Homomorphically generating
noise along eigenvectors of the original data to improve privacy-preservation is a
challenge for consideration in future work (noting that covariance can be relatively
easily determined homomorphically).
It should be noted that all literature reviewed examining sensitivity attacks
consider real numbers to be represented as whole values to which random noise is
added. In our approach, the addition of uniform noise is instead independently
made to individual elements which encode real numbers over Fp. In this case,
typical assumptions on correlations and distributions from which the above data
recovery techniques are derived cannot easily be applied to randomised encoded
elements. The latter perturbed encodings are only partly related to the whole
real number and their combined noise is not simply an addition of the individual
component elements. Therefore, integer-based encodings further complicate data
recovery measures. The extent of additional privacy preservation o↵ered by
encoding in additive perturbation is however unclear, and with little supportive
literature evidence (as far as the author is aware), to assist.
The additive perturbation techniques taken above consider sensitivity attacks
against one type of obfuscation measure only. The next level of perturbation
includes multiplication on whole or partial intra-slot data blocks by { 1,+1}. This
data obfuscation approach di↵ers from the multiplicative perturbation measures
discussed in Section 2.9, since sign flipping is randomly applied independently
over each element group rather than multiplying with distance-preserving random
matrices. In our case, roughly equal groups of integer-based elements which are
components to whole real numbers are disguised to their cumulative or subtractive
e↵ects. If flipping is applied to the data slot as a whole (ie. l = 1), then flipping
disguises the real number’s sign represented by the encoding. Random sign flipping
has been observed in secure threshold evaluation for privacy-preserving neural
network computation by Orlandi et al. (2007). Also, the technique of randomly
flipping data blocks is reminiscent of a special case of matrix multiplicative
perturbation known as sketching, where vector components come from { 1,+1}
and is used in perturbing text or binary data (Aggarwal & Philip, 2008; Shusen
Wang, 2015).
The permutation of (intra-) data slots is a third successive level of obfuscation.
Permutations are performed over two orthogonal axes: (1) across columns of
corresponding data slots over l ciphertexts (⇡t[i] in Fig. 4.2), (2) across rows
of data slots within each ciphertext (⇡i[t] in Fig. 4.2). In column permutation,
randomly flipped element groups which are components to whole real numbers,
have their magnitude of contribution disguised due to permutation and left-shifting
(towards LSB) of corresponding intra-slot blocks. In row permutation, data slots
across potentially unrelated and empty slots are inter-mixed. In the latter case,
permuting data slots can disrupt aggregate distributions when mixed with dummy
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or unrelated data, or when correlation patterns related to ordering are important
in data reconstruction; for instance in time series and text information. Random
data permutation has been observed in the privacy-preserving neural network
setting, such as (Orlandi et al., 2007), where the order of neurons in a layer are
randomly permuted. It has also been used to reversibly permute data sets prior
to publishing (C. Li, Palanisamy, & Krishnamurthy, 2018).
Combined data perturbation techniques are not commonly observed within
either privacy-preserving data mining or collaborative computing literature. In
the former case, geometric perturbation has been described as a combination of
matrix rotation, translation and addition of random noise that preserves cluster
membership and class boundary for specific classification tasks. Here, there is
some understanding behind the mechanism of a potential adversarial attack, given
some prior record knowledge (see Section 2.9). In neural network collaborative
computing, a combination of perturbation measures are used on specific algorith-
mic components. This includes sign flipping and scalar product multiplication
for secure threshold and sigmoid evaluation respectively. Additionally, random
ordering of the neural layer and insertion of dummy neurons are used to further
obfuscate the network topology (Orlandi et al., 2007). The attack mechanisms
against this combination are only described in qualitative terms. The obfuscation
technique is also highly tailored to the privacy-preserving neural network setting.
Overall, based on the reviewed literature on PPDM, existing data perturbation
methods are either basic, highly tailored to the analytical approach or non-
existent. Our combined collaborative data obfuscation approach is useful for
general and multi-purpose parallel computational settings over packed ciphertexts.
The obfuscation methods are combined more extensively than any of the techniques
described in literature, and include: masking empty slots and combining disparate
data; adding random noise, including over an Fp encoding rather than whole
data; randomly flipping (intra-)data slots; and random 2D permutation both
within and across data slots. The perturbation methods are fully reversible and
privacy-focussed (not concerned with information loss); orthogonal to the overall
computational or analysis task; and are applied by exploiting HE techniques.
Despite this, the original encoded data over Fp is recoverable after interactive
obfuscation and can be converted to either a binary encoding over F2 or a close-
to-base canonical integer encoding over Fp, as per our requirements.
Attack mechanisms against combined perturbations are much less clear com-
pared to the typical single-mode sensitivity attacks previously outlined. However,
having knowledge about some of these attacks allows us to better reason about
the resource cost vs security gain for each perturbation measure, particularly if a
multi-level privacy approach is to be taken. The aforementioned theoretical cost
involved with each measure will be empirically demonstrated in Section 4.5.
4.3.4 Comparison of Obfuscation Probability Space Sizes
In an e↵ort to gauge relative obfuscation strength, we examine each perturbation
measure’s potential to hide identifiable data based on an increase in size of the
probability space provided by obfuscation. The latter would result in the specific
data becoming hidden as one of several possibilities and a larger probability
space would notionally make it more di cult to locate specific data. Note
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that this approach does not take into account the information context of the
underlying hidden data sets, which could reveal information based on particular
data distributions or dependencies (see Section 2.9) despite size of the probability
space. In this case, entropy-based or similar privacy metrics could be more relevant
(Wagner & Eckho↵, 2018). Nevertheless, size of the probability space created by
obfuscation could logically be used as a simple metric for easily comparing the
relative strength of individual perturbation measures.
Consider the case of obfuscating a single data value that is encoded within
one plaintext slot over Fp, with dint elements, in a ciphertext that contains N
slots in total. Random noise is added to all slots including empty ones. In
the case of perturbation by addition of uniform random noise, since the noise
and original data divide the plaintext message space equally, the increase in
probability space of finding a single data value amongst the noise is given by
(p/2)dint . If l intra-slot blocks are created to obfuscate the data, then a value is
one of l! combinations which increases to 2(l!) with random sign flipping of each
intra-slot block. If plaintext slot permutation contributes to data obfuscation
across a ciphertext, then the single data value is now hidden amongst one of N
possibilities. Combining di↵erent obfuscation approaches results in multiplication
of their individual probability spaces. If more than a single data value is required
to be determined, then this further compounds the probability space for finding
the combined values. For instance, if all data points permuted within plaintext
slots are required to be recovered in their correct order, then there are N ! possible
choices.
4.4 Implementation
The following section describes some key implementation issues relating to design
of the HEB in order to understand its fundamental capabilities.
Set-up and execution phases
The client-server platform is arranged so that the server first initiates two crypto-
graphic contexts (over F2 and Fp), which are subsequently shared with the client.
A set of public and private keys are then generated for each context on the client
side, with the public keys being sent back to the server. After completing the
set-up phase, the respective cryptographic contexts and key information are saved
on the server and client. Therefore, this phase only needs to be run once unless
any of the configuration parameters for the pair of contexts are changed. This
set-up phase is represented in Fig. 4.3 (A and B).
During commencement of the execution phase of the HEB platform, where
actual interactive homomorphic computation occurs, the server and client inde-
pendently execute once-o↵ start-up procedures. This phase is illustrated in C and
D of Fig. 4.3, reaching a point where new server sessions can be created and the
client can initiate connections to the server. During start-up, the corresponding
cryptographic environments are initialised while the public (and additionally for
the client, private) keys are read into memory from the saved key files. There may
be a need to additionally send client-generated private keys to the server, since
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this is the only way to validate server-side computations during system testing,
however this facility would strictly be removed in production.
Once start-up is complete, server sessions are created to service multiple client
connections in order to perform two-party interaction-based HE computations
over both F2 and Fp.
Figure 4.3: Set-up and execution phases of the HEB platform. bin/int - binary
and integer-based plaintext message spaces; [ ] - enabling server-based decryption
using private keys for testing purposes but never in a production environment.
Coding implementation
The HEB platform implementation is based on the open source ML-SMC frame-
work by Bost et al. (2014) called Ciphermed1. Implementation is in C++, and
uses the HElib library (pre-1.0.0-beta0 release) for homomorphic operations with
multi-threading turned on. It is compiled with GMP2; NTL3; relies on Boost4
external libraries for socket communication and Google’s protocol bu↵ers5 for
serialization. In the latter case, protocol bu↵ers were not designed to handle large
messages (developers.google, 2019) and there is a hard size limit of 2GB, which is
inadequate for transmitting large public and private keys. To remain under the
limit, Ciphermed’s source code is modified so that keys can be split into one or
two smaller chunks before transmission, which are later reconstituted back to the
original keys at the receiving end.
Slot permutations
A key function underpinning the HEB is the ability to perform arbitrary slot







(ie. applying rotations, masking and addition of vectors) involving Benes-like
networks within predictable depth bounds and at reduced cost. See Halevi and
Shoup (2014) for full details of the approach, and also Section 4.2.4. A basic
example demonstrating permutations is available in HElib6.
Linear transformations and usage
An equally important HEB function is one which enables intra-slot linear opera-
tions between encrypted and plaintext values. This is required for implementing
precision control after homomorphic multiplication involving real numbers; left-
and right-shift intra-slot permutations (s-ShL⇡l() and s-ShR⇡ 1l () respectively de-
scribed in Section 4.2.4); and finally for coe cient-wise multiplication within slots
(s-cDotPpk() in Section 4.2.3). All these capabilities are realised through the use of
linearised polynomials, where either the same or di↵erent fixed Zpr -linear maps can
be applied to each slot (over Zpr [X]/(G)). E↵ectively this means that the same
or di↵erent linear transformations can be applied to slots. See Halevi and Shoup
(2015, 2018) for further details, and also Section 4.2.4. Key functions for apply-
ing linearised polynomials, applyLinPoly1() and applyLinPolyMany(), are also
available in HElib7. These functions first require computing a coe cient vector C
corresponding to the linear map(s) through the function buildLinPolyCoeffs().
As an example, the encrypted four bit real number encoding represented
by elements
⇥⇥
a b c d
⇤⇤
, can have its precision reduced by 2 bits using the
transform
⇥
[0] [0] [1] [0 1]
⇤
applied to one slot in the following way:
⇥⇥
























The same or di↵erent reduction in precision can be applied on each slot in
parallel depending on a same or di↵erent application of the transform using
applyLinPoly1() or applyLinPolyMany() respectively. It is important to note
that correctly reducing the precision control using linearised transformations first
requires a real number encoding to be in the base canonical form (F2,p) before the
precision correction is applied.
Implementing coe cient-wise multiplication between encrypted and plaintext
intra-slot elements can be similarly achieved in batch mode. Values of both
operand types can be di↵erent for each slot. The following example demonstrates
the coe cient-wise constant-multiplication of encrypted elements
⇥⇥



































Likewise, random intra-slot permutation of encrypted elements can be achieved
by generating multiple randomised transforms, which can be applied across all
slots in parallel. This is required for functions such as left- and right-shift intra-slot
permutations (s-ShL⇡l() and s-ShR⇡ 1l () respectively described in Section 4.2.4).
On a final implementation note, it is necessary to use high precision floating-
point arithmetic through mathematical libraries like NTL when encoding/decoding
real numbers as encrypted polynomials, whose degrees could be larger than 53
bits. The 16 digit default precision for double or long double types in C++ is
inadequate in these settings.
4.4.1 Cloud-based HE Computation Architecture
The aforementioned complement of five (two-party) interaction types which make
up the HEB, could be combined to sustainably execute HE computations on the
cloud in a variety of ways. The potential arrangement during the execution phase
is represented by the schematic shown in Fig. 4.4.
The HEB platform is uniquely designed to enable mainstream HE application
over the cloud and to facilitate the general computational requirements of a CDS
system. The software is designed so that the same application can be used by the
client and server, although di↵erent methods are called to initialise the relevant
application depending on the role. Separate methods are also called on each
system depending on whether set-up or execution phases are running. The impact
of this combined software design is that a single image is only required to be
replicated over the cloud.
Suitability of the HEB platform design for cloud deployment relies on enabling
a consistent communication approach across a potential multitude of virtual
nodes containing packed ciphertexts over binary and integer-based plaintext
message spaces. Ciphertexts do not require unpacking/packing in order to operate
within a cloud node, but instead compute similar to arithmetic registers that
contain encoded data types such as real numbers. Multiple virtual nodes can
be generated in order to speed up HE operations that are conducted in parallel,
for instance in HE computation on large matrices. Despite the requirement for
servers to intermittently communicate with client(s) over a reduced interaction
model, much fewer client numbers or even one may su ce to service multiple
server virtual requests, since the latter perform all the computationally expensive
HE operations. Client functions are instead limited to comparatively e cient
decryption/encryption and plaintext operations.
The HEB platform at this stage implements only low-level operations that
would potentially underpin higher-level code abstractions and optimise coordi-
nated computation across virtual nodes. An intermediate execution layer would
necessarily sit between the front-interfacing high-level code and existing low-level
back-end HEB operations. This layer would determine the best approach for
splitting computation between binary and integer-based cryptographic contexts,
in addition to optimising executions depending on requirements for noise reset-
ting and binary canonical reduction (over Fp). More general coordination of
virtual node activities, such as load balancing, optimising parallel execution and
recruitment of additional nodes for scalability, could also be abstracted within
intermediate execution layers. Examples of similar front-end compiler or code
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abstraction techniques in non-cloud HE applications are described in Section 2.7.5
on (category one) general HE frameworks.
Virtual nodes can ideally be deployed as containerised applications eg. using
Docker containers or Kubernetes, which can be orchestrated using tools including
Docker Swarm as (micro-)services within distributed environments. The advantage
of containerisation compared to launching an entire VM, is e ciency for memory
CPU and storage without the overhead requirements of a VM. Containers are
also portable across di↵erent systems and in any cloud without requiring code
changes. The drawback of containers though is their lack of isolation from the OS
system kernel which may make them easier to access in the event of a compromise
in the kernel (De Lucia, 2017). In this regard of course, there is much less concern
in using HEB-based containerised services with respect to semantic security, since
servers do not have access to the private keys. Multi-cloud solutions therefore can
be freely explored despite the sensitivity surrounding information that is to be
computed or analysed.
Figure 4.4: HEB arrangement in the cloud for sustainable HE computation.
4.5 Evaluation
The timing and multiplicative circuit depth cost performance of the HEB platform
is evaluated empirically in this section. Comparisons are made between interactions
involving various perturbation combinations; against no obfuscation altogether;
and to recryption without any interaction. The results are important whenever a
two-party multi-level privacy approach is considered, requiring knowledge about
the balance of resource costs vs. security gain against each technique.
The main computational simulations are conducted using a c5.4xlarge AWS
EC28 execution environment, which reportedly uses an Intel Xeon Platinum 8000
series processor with 16 vCPU cores of up to 3.4GHz and 32GB RAM, running
Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. However, the set-up involving key generation described above
requires 64GB RAM compared to the remaining execution environment. Note that
8www.aws.amazon.com/ec2
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Table 4.1: Selected HElib parameters for evaluation: m - cyclotomic ring,  (m) -
lattice dimension,   - security level, L - levels, s - number of slots.
Field p m  (m)   L d s
F2 2 35333 34849 104.92 35 44 792
Fpr 27 = 128 27311 26401 89.69 30 55 480
equivalent timings are obtained when the interacting client and server are located
on separate virtual instances within the same availability zone, or when both
parties are located on the same virtual instance. In both cases, the bandwidth
timing is minimised.
Table 4.1 shows ideal HElib configuration parameters selected for evaluation
purposes. HElib defaults are used for remaining parameters not listed. Both
cryptographic contexts are set at a security level of greater than 80. The platform
is very robust and flexible with respect to the number of n-bits chosen to represent
real numbers. In this instance n = 32 with k = 16 bits (or > 4 decimal places - see
Table 3.2, or otherwise approximately 4 log
2
10) of precision is chosen. According
to aforementioned slot arrangements, there are b792/32c = 24 slots available over
the binary context, and 480 slots each with dint = 55 integer elements over Fp. The
value of dbin should be low, while Nbin is concomitantly as large as possible since
only one bit per binary slot is utilised, therefore the remaining dbin coe cients are
e↵ectively wasted space. Each plaintext element over Fp has size p of 128 (= 27).
At these settings, the initial (once-o↵) set-up phase takes approximately 400s and
8 interactions to exchange keys and to initiate the cryptographic contexts. Both
public and private key sizes are large at approximately 2.5-3.1 GB each.
Before commencement of the execution phase of the HEB platform, where
actual interactive homomorphic computation occurs, the server and client inde-
pendently execute once-o↵ start-up procedures taking approximately 125s and
250s respectively. During this time, the corresponding cryptographic environments
are initialised while the public (and additionally for the client, private) keys are
read into memory from the saved key files. During the execution phase, the
sizes of exchanged messages between client and server are significantly smaller at
approximately 11.3-26.4 MB per ciphertext in all cases, which takes on average
approximately 0.6s per ciphertext to transmit in the minimised bandwidth timing
environment.
In order to examine performance of plaintext message swapping (in addition to
noise resetting) during homomorphic computation, the equation A < (A B) ⇤A
is evaluated for any two given real numbers A and B. Finding the solution
homomorphically, even for such a simple equation would be very ine cient in
either a pure binary or integer-based context (largely due to the combination of
the multiplication and comparison operation respectively). For this demonstration,
in order to examine message domain swapping both ways, the A  B portion of
the equation is first computed homomorphically over F2, subsequently (A B)⇤A
is evaluated over Fp, before returning to the binary context to homomorphically
compute the comparison operation and complete the evaluation. Note, the equation
could be more e ciently evaluated by computing the whole right hand-side of the
equation over Fp alone.
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Table 4.2: Parallel homomorphic operation performance in equation evaluation.
Timing values measure latency.
Operation ‘  ’/F2 ‘ ⇤ ’/Fp ‘ > ’/F2
Time (s) 7.9 13.3 5.9
Depth 8 3 7
Table 4.3: Comparing interactions displaying perfect secrecy or FHE properties:
r() - recrypt; ‘depth’ displayed either as b/a - circuit depth consumed
before/after interaction, or (t) total circuit depth consumed (with no interaction).
Interactn. F2 ! F2 r(F2) Fp ! Fp r(Fp) F2 ! Fp
Time (s) 1.1 306.2 2.1 544.1 11.8
Depth 0/0 (11) 0/0 (27) 0/1
Table 4.2 demonstrates performance of the above equation’s three homomorphic
operations. These are relatively high timings since the levels L > 30 over both
cryptographic contexts are much higher than typically required for evaluating the
given equation. This is done however, to ensure adequate levels would normally
be available for performing additional HEB-based computations. Ensuring that L
is set at the lowest possible level for a given computational task has a significant
impact on reducing the HE operation performance shown in Table 4.2.
Note that all evaluated timings mentioned within this section indicate latency
averaged over 20 runs. This amount is considered adequate given the low coe cient
of variation value of 6 0.03 associated with overall execution times shown for
the various interaction groups. Note that for all interactions, throughput can
be reduced for similar equation evaluations computed in parallel (via SIMD)
by taking up all available slots on the ‘bus’, which for our set-up is Nmin = 24
slots. The parallel equation evaluations are not required to be identical since
input operands can vary through actions of the PPCs, which allow heterogeneous
combinations of the operations: +,  =, <,>,6,>.
All varieties of obfuscated interaction scenarios are visually compared and
also benchmarked against recryption in Fig. 4.5. The three interactions involving
a OTP and perfect secrecy are demonstrated in Table 4.3 and performance is
compared against recryption. In the latter case, the configuration parameters are
modified slightly to what was reported in Table 4.1, with m = 27311 over both F2
and Fp and pr = 24 = 16. These are more compatible settings for recryption and
give it a more favourable performance. Table 4.4 illustrates performance statistics
for the remaining interactions that do not involve perfect secrecy.
Overall, the three interactions demonstrating perfect secrecy shown in Table
4.3 are very e cient and consume almost no circuit depth. In Table 4.4, similar
e ciency and depth consumption are demonstrated in a Fp ! F2,p interaction
involving either no perturbation or the addition of random noise alone. With
further obfuscation employing slot and 2-, 3-block permutations with random sign
flipping, the interaction times concomitantly increase. The circuit depth consumed
before and after interaction however, remains consistent at four levels each. This
reflects the similar nature of the permutations involved in obfuscation, supported
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Figure 4.5: Timing and circuit depth consumed for obfuscated interaction
scenarios: noise - random noise; ⇡(s±) - random slot and ⇡(l ⇤ b±) - l random
block permutation with sign flipping; r() - recryption. Rounded boxes:
before/after (b/a) or total (t) circuit depth consumed. One Time Pad (OTP).
by natural arithmetic operations over Fp, on either side of the interaction.
Similar time increases are observed for the same successive series of perturba-
tions applied during a Fp ! F2 interaction. Circuit levels consumed are identical
for the sender-side part of both interactions (Fp ! F2 and Fp ! F2,p) due to
their common ServerIntBlind() function. In contrast, levels consumed on the
receiving end of a Fp ! F2 interaction quickly escalate due to binary addition/sub-
traction operations required to reverse data perturbations. Despite relatively high
circuit levels being consumed after interactions involving block permutations over
F2, the receiving server can easily bring the circuit depth back up to maximum
levels once again by an additional e cient F2 ! F2 interaction.
All perturbed interactions are much more e cient than their recryption coun-
terparts (which do not involve plaintext message swapping). Indeed, recryption
over Fp consuming 27 levels for a mere message space size of p = 24 = 16 appears
impractical in most situations. It should be noted however, that recent enhance-
ments to HElib that have yet to be incorporated into the HEB platform, state
improvements to bootstrapping e ciency due to faster linear transforms (Halevi
& Shoup, 2018). This may also significantly improve perturbation and intra-slot
operation performance on the HEB. E↵ects of faster linear transforms on overall
e ciency between the two approaches will be evaluated as future work.
Additionally, there is the potential for improving ciphertext packing of binary
slots, essentially making use of wasted dbin coe cients. The solution would employ
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Table 4.4: Comparison of interactions not displaying perfect secrecy properties
a↵ected by various perturbation combinations, averaged over 20 runs each.
Timing values measure latency. Perturbations listed column-wise incorporate all
perturbations to the left: no pert. - no permutation; noise - random noise; ⇡(s±)
- random slot and ⇡(l ⇤ b±) - l random block permutation with sign flipping; b/a -
circuit depth consumed before/after interaction; Interactions - number of
interactions required to evaluate overall equation; Ciph. nos. - maximum number
of ciphertexts involved in transmission.
no pert. + noise + ⇡(s±), + ⇡(l ⇤ b±)
Interaction l = 2 l = 3
Fp ! F2,p Time (s) 2.0 2.9 14.9 80.4 119.1
Depth (b/a) 0/0 0/0 4/4 4/4 4/4
Fp ! F2 Time (s) 2.1 8.7 27.8 71.4 102.1
Depth (b/a) 0/0 0/8 4/10 4/17 4/24
Overall Time (s) 44.8 50.6 70.1 111.9 141.9
Interactions 6 6 6 8 10
Ciph. nos. 1 1 1 2 3
more intra-slot operations utilising linearised polynomial techniques, so that slot
arrangements over F2 and Fp would be consistent. Nbin slot sizes would become
equal to Nint, thereby accommodating a significantly greater bandwidth capacity
and number of parallel computations.
4.6 Conclusion
Performance of HEB interactions has shown that the platform can o↵er a viable
approach to cloud-based privacy-preserving system integration that can have
broader HE processing capabilities, which could be relevant to the computation re-
quirements of a CDS system. The HEB platform displays reasonable performance
statistics for the five relevant interaction types. Three interactions that display
perfect secrecy, demonstrate significantly better performance at almost no multi-
plicative depth in comparison to their recryption counterparts. The remaining
two interactions also demonstrate significant improvements in timing and depth
costs compared to recryption. These costs however increase depending on the
number of perturbation measures that are combined. In this case, consideration
needs to be given to the balance between time and depth costs relative to the
degree of security from data obfuscation complexity. Integration of the HEB






With the HEB and its foundational work now in place, performance of the platform
remains to be demonstrated in potential ML application areas, which will be the
subject of this chapter. As a warm-up, the areas of decision tree and multiple
linear regression classification will be discussed in order to demonstrate how the
two di↵erent plaintext message spaces (F2 and Fp respectively) could be utilised
for di↵erent classification tasks. The centrepiece demonstration will leverage the
HEB platform to facilitate privacy-preserving NN training.
5.1 Privacy-Preserving Classification
5.1.1 Decision-Tree Classification
A decision tree is a well-known supervisory ML method that has a tree- or flow-
chart like structure, where internal tree-nodes indicate attribute tests, edges are the
outcomes of these tests, and leaf nodes represent class labels. The feature vector
space is partitioned successively with each node, and overall feature classification is
achieved by traversing the tree starting at the root node (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009).
For this example, the approach to privacy-preserving decision tree classification
is adopted from Bost et al. (2014), which involves converting a binary tree into
a polynomial with threshold coe cients wi, and evaluating it homomorphically
to privately predict the class for x. The original implementation employs SWHE
techniques with SIMD in order to e ciently privately evaluate the polynomial
in binary while threshold comparisons against respective features are performed
using SMC. Our modified example replaces the latter interactive approach to
perform all comparisons between wi and xi using PPCs in one step, with no
client-server interaction involved overall. A client’s input x while traversing the
tree and its overall classification outcome cannot be ascertained, while the client
does not learn about the tree structure model and its thresholds.
Details about constructing the polynomial form of a binary decision tree
can be obtained from Bost et al. (2014). Briefly, a recursive procedure is used
to construct a polynomial P , where a boolean term assigned to each node bi
represents a right decision tree branch when xi < wi is true (= 1), and a left
branch when the comparison is false (or 0) otherwise. The resulting P is a sum
of terms representing separate tree paths from root to leaf, where each path is
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a multiplication of the boolean variables on that path together with the leaf
node class. An example of a simple binary tree is shown in Fig. 5.1, where P is
P (b0, b1, b2, b3) = (1 b0)c0+b0(1 b1)c4+b0b1(1 b2)c3+b0b1b2(1 b3)c2+b0b1b2b3c4.
However, to represent each class over F2, l polynomials are constructed depending
on the number of bits required to encode all classes, where l = dlog2ke and k is
the number of classes. Each l = Pj represents the j-th bit of the output class. In
Fig. 5.1, P0 = b0b1[1  b2 + b2b3], P1 = b0b1(1  b2b3) and P2 = b0(1  b1).
Figure 5.1: A binary decision tree. Circles represent nodes and squares are the
output classes. bi represents xi < wi, which is the boolean variable resulting from
a comparison between the corresponding input vector and threshold value
respectively.
E cient homomorphic evaluation of the polynomial P is performed by mul-
tiplying sequences of terms in pairs so that the overall multiplicative depth is
log2hmax where hmax is the maximum decision tree height. Furthermore, SIMD is
used to evaluate all Pj’s in parallel within a single ciphertext. In modifying this
example for our implementation, bi can be evaluated in one step across all deci-
sion tree nodes using PPCs and SIMD, thereby obviating all multiple SMC-style
interactions present in the original version.
To evaluate performance we use a c5.4xlarge AWS EC2 instance, similar to the
setup in Chapter 4 which uses an Intel Xeon Platinum 8000 series processor with
16 vCPU cores of up to 3.4GHz and 32GB RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. The
platform implementation is in C++, using the HElib library for homomorphic
operations, complied using NTL, GMP, and with multi-threading turned on. In
this case however, there is no multi-threading implementation during private
decision tree classification. Any two-party interactions between client and server
(located on the same virtual instance) are limited to sending and receiving the
encrypted input x and the overall privately predicted class output, occurring
before and after the homomorphic decision tree evaluation respectively. There are
no interactions involved within the private classification task itself. Note that 20
runs are conducted for each test when determining average execution times due
to the low coe cient of variation ( 0.07) associated with the overall timing of
each test.
We evaluate performance of the classifier on two datasets from the UCI
machine learning repository (Dua & Gra↵, 2017), the Nursery1 and Wisconsin
1archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Nursery
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Breast Cancer (Original)2 datasets. The Nursery database was originally used to
assess enrolment applications to nursery schools and is based on 8 multivariate
features that can take on between 2-5 values including: parent occupation, the
child’s nursery, family structure, socio-economic status and family health. There
are 12960 instances within the dataset and 5 output classes that can be predicted.
The Breast Cancer database examines whether 9 particular morphological cell
features (each scaled 1-10) from 699 breast tissue samples can predict whether the
specimens are either benign or malignant. These two datasets represent binary
decision tree classification models that are respectively small and large, after being
trained non-privately using the Python scikit-learn ML toolkit in Python. The
resulting 4- and 26-node decision trees modelling the Nursery and Wisconsin
Breast Cancer datasets are depicted in Figs. 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. The Nursery
decision tree model, which has a similar structure to the example shown in Fig.
5.1, has an equivalent polynomial form P with five terms. P representing the

















value = [0, 1, 255, 3452, 0]
gini = 0.0
samples = 3217




value = [0, 1, 255, 0, 0]
gini = 0.0
samples = 3452
value = [0, 0, 0, 3452, 0]
gini = 0.0
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value = [0, 1, 0, 0, 0]
gini = 0.0
samples = 255
value = [0, 0, 255, 0, 0]
Figure 5.2: Binary decision tree classification model for the Nursery dataset
generated using scikit-learn.
The HElib parameters used to configure levelled HE over F2 alone are shown
in Table 5.1, and result in an overall security level of 108.54. Based on the small
range of possible values for all inputs xi in both databases and the fact that all
thresholds wi for both decision tree models can be represented within one decimal
place, each xi and wi can be encoded in 10 bits, which includes a precision k of
4 bits. This means b682/10c = 68 boolean terms or tree-nodes are available for
parallel comparison and polynomial evaluation within one ciphertext.
Performance results for privacy-preserving decision tree classification of both
databases are shown in Table 5.2. Please note that timing is in addition to client
and server start-up, that includes exchanging the initiated cryptographic context
and public key, which takes around 15 seconds in total. The public and private
key sizes of the cryptographic context over F2 are 437 and 439 MB respectively.
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value = [2, 0]
Figure 5.3: Binary decision tree classification model for the Wisconsin Breast
Cancer (Original) generated using scikit-learn.
while the overall classification result sent back to the client has a message size of
7.3 and 12.2 MB for the nursery and breast cancer classifier models respectively.
The overall classifier evaluation performance is 3.3 and 37.1 seconds respectively
for the nursery and breast cancer decision tree models. The former dataset is
much larger than the latter (12960 cf. 699 instances), indicating somewhat
counter-intuitively that performance is related to the model which is trained on
unencrypted data, rather than on the database size. Classifier timing increases
with model size as a result of an increase in both the threshold and polynomial
evaluation timing. The higher runtime in the former case is due to pre- and
post-processing of data related to the comparison operation, rather than to the
PPC actions itself, which is performed in a single step. An increase in the
evaluation time related to model size could potentially leak information about size
of the decision tree. If considered sensitive, padding of the overall computation
to a consistent time could be performed to mask this type of information. A
multiplicative depth of 6 for the comparison evaluation is consistent across the
two models, whereas it slightly increases from 4 to 6 with an increase in model
size.
Bost et al. (2014) report on timing for the nursery classifier, taking about 1.5
seconds for SMC-based comparison which is approximately half the time required
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Table 5.1: Selected HElib parameters for evaluation: m - cyclotomic ring,  (m) -
lattice dimension,   - security level, L - levels, s - number of slots.
Field p m  (m)   L d s
F2 2 15709 15005 108.54 15 22 682
Table 5.2: Classification performance results averaged over 20 runs, for two
trained decision tree models.
Dataset Threshold Eval. Polynomial Eval. Total
Nursery Time (s) 2.9 0.2 3.3
(P = 5 terms) Depth 6 4 10
Breast cancer Time (s) 17.4 19.5 37.1
(P = 115 terms) Depth 6 6 12
for comparing real numbers using PPCs, although the overall timing between both
methods are comparable at around 3 seconds. In the former case there are 30
interactions involved overall compared to 2 for our implementation (in our case,
the interactions are to send the initial input and return final class output). There
is no timing reported on the breast cancer classifier model by Bost et al. (2014).
It should be noted that the original implementation takes only integer inputs
and thresholds are converted to real numbers in a way that is specific to the
application. In our implementation there is a consistent approach comparing
inputs and thresholds using real numbers configured at a specific bit size and
precision for both. Combining PPCs with standard homomorphic operations
could also more easily facilitate other more complex comparisons, such as those
involving combinations of boolean logic or equality. Both latter functions are
important in converting from binary to multiple decision node branch states,
in addition to enabling nominal, ordinal or range-value branch-node options for
traversing the decision tree. For example, a three-branch tree node is equivalent
to two concatenated binary tree nodes, where the three separate branch states
are uniquely identified after combining two boolean bit variables from each binary
node.
Together with decision trees, Bost et al. (2014) argue that other common
classifiers including hyperplane (covering Perceptron, Least Squares, Fischer
Linear Discriminant, Support Vector Machine), Naive Bayes (and additionally
combining these with a general classifier using AdaBoost), can all be converted
into privacy-preserving versions by implementing a set of core operations over
encrypted data. These basic components include private comparison, private
computation of dot products, argmax computation over encrypted data and the
ability to change encryption schemes. The latter-most component is relevant to
a SMC setting as it enables composition of various building blocks constructed
using di↵erent underlying encryption techniques.
The notion of using basic building blocks to compose secure constructions of
the most common classifiers is also relevant to the HEB platform. Comparisons,
dot products and argmax operations have all been previously implemented using
the HEB (argmax is only a slight variation of min-max demonstrated in Section
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3.3.4). Due to a more uniform approach for constructing basic building blocks via
the HEB, encryption scheme changes are limited to mere swapping of F2 and Fp
plaintext message spaces, which is adequate for our equivalent construction. In
this way, we can achieve secure HEB-based implementations of the most common
supervised ML classifiers similar to the SMC-based ones, although with reduced
2-party interactions, as demonstrated in conversion of the decision-tree example
above.
5.1.2 Multiple Linear Regression
The previous example that combines a comparison and polynomial evaluation over
F2 is not the only approach to private decision-tree classification, and one could
perform the polynomial evaluation over Fp after swapping the plaintext message
space from F2 following the threshold comparison operation. Implementing integer-
based polynomial evaluation could support more flexible and native decision tree
navigation combined with more complex predicate logic (refer to the PPC-based
private conditional expression example in Section 3.3.1 illustrating the basic idea).
Such functionality would be useful in more general computational scenarios, for
example navigating workflow in business applications.
In this section MLR prediction, in contrast to the previous example, demon-
strates polynomial evaluation over Fp rather than F2 without involving any
client-server interactions. MLR is a more statistical-based analytical tool that
expresses the linear relationship between a dependent variable y with more than
one (k) independent predictor variables xi, represented by the ‘line of best fit’
equation:
y0 =  0 +  1x1 +  2x2 + · · ·+  kxk + ✏ (5.1)
The regression coe cients  0,  1,  2, . . . ,  k are estimated by minimising the
sum of squares of each data point from their vertical deviation to the line. Predic-
tions fitted by the equation for each observation are denoted ŷi, while the residuals
✏ represent di↵erences between observed and fitted values (yi   ŷi), which are nor-
mally distributed about a zero mean and variance   (the same standard deviation
assumed for all observed values varying independently about their means).
We use MLR to predict malignancy in the Wisconsin Breast Cancer (Original)
dataset, used in the previous section; in addition to a more complex version,
the Wisconsin Diagnostic Breast Cancer dataset3. The Diagnostic version has
a slightly less number of entries compared to the Original version (569 vs. 699
respectively) although it has more multivariate histological attributes (32 vs. 10)
in order to demonstrate evaluation of a more complex regression model. Strictly
speaking, binary logistic regression may be a more accurate analytical tool when
the dependent outcome is binary (discrete) such as ‘benign’ or ‘malignant’ as is
the case for both databases. MLR however can be used in this setting (Pohlman
& Leitner, 2003) and for implementation purposes, both models involve private
polynomial evaluation of regression coe cients with observed values.
The regression coe cients are estimated non-privately using the scikit-learn
Python library to develop both MLR models. Observed values are standardised
to a mean of zero and unit variance before processing.
3archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Breast+Cancer+Wisconsin+(Diagnostic)
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Following toolkit analysis, the original breast cancer dataset displays the
following coe cients:
y0 =  0.0837 + 0.0349x1 + 0.0236x2 + 0.0139x3 + 0.0024x4 + 0.0102x5
+ 0.0445x6 + 0.0221x7 + 0.0210x8   0.0031x9
The model has a R2 score of 0.85 (percentage of explained variance by the
model) and a Mean Squared Error (MSE) of 0.03 (average set of squared errors of
distance between data points and regression line). The diagnostic breast cancer
dataset has a R2 score of 0.64 and MSE of 0.09 with 31 terms in the regression
line (model not shown for simplicity).
Regression equations can be privately evaluated relatively simply over Fp by
multiplying encrypted observed values with the corresponding plaintext coe -
cients and then homomorphically adding together all resulting products. The
homomorphic constant multiplication, CMult (plus linear transformation to cor-
rect precision) have a multiplicative depth of (n+ 1) CMult plus n additions and
rotations, where n is the number of slots. The TotalSum operation requires log(k)
shifts and additions, where k is the number of terms in the regression equation.
According to size and precision of the scaled observed values and regression
coe cients, a degree of 25 with a precision of 20 was adequate for analysis
purposes. Private MLR computation employed the same AWS EC2 instance and
computational environment used previously in decision tree classification. The
HElib parameters chosen for generating the cryptographic context over Fp are
shown in Table 5.3. In this case there were 150 available slots per ciphertext,
each of degree 50 which is double the size required for encoding the regression
coe cients and observed values, ensuring that multiplication occurs correctly with
no wrapping modulo d.
Table 5.3: Selected HElib parameters for evaluation: m - cyclotomic ring,  (m) -
lattice dimension,   - security level, L - levels, s - number of slots.
Field p m  (m)   L d s
Fp 27(= 128) 7781 7501 86.58 7 50 150
The public and private key sizes generated for the cryptographic context were
117.3 MB and 118.0 MB respectively for both regression models. Start-up of the
server and client cryptographic environments and exchange of the public key took
less than 13 seconds. Again, the only two interactions involved during private
evaluation were to send the xi input to the server and return the result, both of
which were encrypted and with message sizes of 0.75 MB and 1.35 MB respectively
for both models. Comparison of private MLR prediction performance results of
both data sets after 20 runs each (coe cient of variation results for overall timings
were < 0.02), are shown in Table 5.4.
As can be seen, private MLR performance and multiplicative depth is relatively
minimally a↵ected by size of the regression model, since the CMult operation
between observed values and coe cients is performed in parallel and TotalSum
depends on the logarithm of the regression model size. Accuracy of the homomor-
phic evaluation is depicted by the average error (‘Avg. Error’ in Table 5.4), which
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Table 5.4: Prediction performance results averaged over 20 runs for both MLR
prediction models. BC - Breast Cancer Dataset; Avg. Error - average absolute
di↵erence between the encrypted and plaintext predictions.
Dataset Total Evaluation
BC (Original) Time (s) 3.8
(P = 10 terms) Depth 3
Avg. Error 1.6⇥ 10 5
BC (Diagnostic) Time (s) 3.9
(P = 31 terms) Depth 4
Avg. Error 1.8⇥ 10 5
is the average absolute di↵erence between the encrypted and plaintext predictions.
The high resulting accuracy is in line with the selected precision for encoding
regression and observed terms.
5.2 Private Neural Network Training
In order to examine the full complement of available two-party interaction scenarios
underpinning the HEB (plaintext message swapping, resetting of ciphertext noise,
and base canonical integer encoding), we look towards implementing ML training.
This mode is more challenging with respect to e ciency, multiplicative depth and
range of homomorphically supported computations, compared to classification. In
particular, we evaluate training in NNs which is normally considered to be too
slow to be practical using FHE-based tools, due to the requirement for multiple
recryption operations and matrix multiplications combined with conditionals,
repeated over several epochs.
Private NN training was demonstrated by Nandakumar et al. (2019), which is
claimed to be one of the first works dealing in this area:
“...implementation of the proposed system is based on HElib, authored by
inventors of the FHE and the entire system was carefully developed after in-depth
consultation with the pioneers of FHE technology. Because of these reasons, the
system is likely to serve as a credible baseline for the research community to
calibrate their related contributions.”
In that respect, we are using the aforementioned work to compare HEB
performance although the dataset used for benchmarking is based on the well-
known standard MNIST handwritten digit database4 rather than a healthcare
related one. The principles however are applicable to private digital image analysis,
such as in X-ray or retinal imaging (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). The
work by Nandakumar et al. (2019) however is more theoretical than practical as
performance is based on toy security parameters only (which is extrapolated to
standard security levels by comparing processing performance of one perceptron)
and NN training is performed stochastically on one mini-batched epoch. For our
purposes, a comparison is similarly made over a single NN training batch (both
4yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
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forward and backward propagation) although standard security is used throughout
the demonstration. Authors of the original work examined a full and reduced
3-layer NN model using the complete (28 x 28 pixels) and compressed (8 x 8
pixels) handwritten image dimensions, respectively, as input to the network. Since
performance statistics of the original work is focused on the smaller network, this
section will exclusively examine the reduced model.
Normally, to fully train a NN even under unencrypted conditions is particularly
computationally expensive and quite time-consuming. The aim for this section
is not to demonstrate practical application of encrypted NN training but stress-
testing the HEB platform to highlight implementation considerations, strengths
and limitations, while comparing to similar implementations in the literature. If
such an implementation can be reasonably achieved, then the notion is that other
tasks involving only a fraction of the computation in comparison, such as NN
classification and even arbitrary computational tasks would be much more trivial to
implement. Relevance of this technology in practical healthcare settings, including
in NN training will be discussed in the final Chapter 6 on ‘Discussion/Future
Work’.
5.2.1 Preliminaries
The smallest working component of a NN is the perceptron (or network node),
which is the mathematical equivalent of a biological neuron (or nerve cell). These
are arranged into layers of interconnected nodes. Input and output layers provide
external connection to the network in order to receive input features xi and
return the analysis/prediction solution respectively yi, while remaining nodes form
hidden layers. Interconnections between nodes are combined with sets of weights
in order to vary input according to the learning task at hand. Each perceptron
computes a weighted sum of it inputs and applies a non-linear activation function
determining its (binary) output. A perceptron and its typical network arrangement
are depicted in Figs. 5.4 and 5.5 respectively. The output vector al of perceptron
layer l (l = 1, 2, 3, · · · , L) can be mathematically represented as:
Figure 5.4: Schematic representation of a perceptron (AI Wiki, 2019).
al = f(Wlal 1), (5.2)
where f is the activation function and Wl is the weight matrix of layer l
(Shokri & Shmatikov, 2015). Given a training dataset under supervised learning,
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Figure 5.5: A typical Neural Network with two hidden layers. xi - inputs; yi -
outputs; Wl - weight matrices; black circles represent bias nodes (Nandakumar,
Ratha, Pankanti, & Halevi, 2019).
the goal is to update an initially randomised set of weight variables so that a pre-
defined loss function L, which penalises miss-match, is minimised (cross-entropy
or squared error cost functions are examples). This is often computed by the
Gradient Descent (GD) algorithm, which can be performed over all data elements
in batches or only over a small randomly sampled (mini-batch) subset of elements.
These approaches are respectively referred to as Batch Gradient Descent (BGD)
and SGD, where gradients are averaged over batches in both cases. As these
algorithms are repeatedly applied, the weight parameters are updated to decrease
the gradient, until ideally a local optimum is achieved. The update process goes
through alternate feed-forward and back-propagation stages. The former computes
network output and calculates the error by comparing to the input, while the
latter stage propagates the error backwards through the network, updating weights
based on each neuron’s contribution to the error. Back-propagation computes the
partial derivative of L with respect to each weight and updates each parameter to
reduce the gradient. Based on the weight matrix Wl, the relation is expressed as:




where LB is the loss function computed over the batch and ↵ is the learning
rate (Shokri & Shmatikov, 2015).
The aforementioned classical NNs are densely connected networks where each
layer node is FC to all nodes within a previous layer. As previously stated, this
is computed as a matrix-vector multiplication between Wl and al 1. This forms
the foundation of DNNs which have many FC hidden layers between inputs and
outputs. This is distinct from CNNs that have additional convolutional layers on
top of FC networks that perform better where there are strong local dependency
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patterns (eg. in visual data) rather than generic datasets. In this case, a spatial
convolution to matrix A has a filter W applied to contiguous sub-regions in A,
which can be expressed as a matrix multiplication with appropriate vectorisation,
similar to a FC network (Ibarrondo & Önen, 2018).
Both DNN and CNN networks can be arranged into stacks to form various DL
architectures, where raw features are gradually mapped to higher-level abstractions
(extracting more complex features) as they move initially from the input layer,
and progressively through the hidden layers. The highest level of acquired data
abstractions are used in prediction by the output layer (Rouhani et al., 2018).
5.2.2 Background
The work by Nandakumar et al. (2019) performs NN training entirely over F2,
which presents significant challenges in facilitating e cient multiplication of weight
matrices over binary circuits. In general, the particular ciphertext packing method
chosen to enable sequential matrix multiplication without requiring expensive
reordering of elements, is key to e cient private NN training.
The overall ciphertext packing strategy for matrix multiplication in the original
work has individual inputs/weights replicated for all slots on separate ciphertexts
(one ciphertext per input/weight) for the first matrix A, and a ciphertext per
row packing arrangement for the second matrix B. The product C = A · B
results in a packing layout of one ciphertext per row of matrix C, requiring
expensive reordering of elements in C to continue along the matrix multiplication
sequence. The overall approach (not including reordering of elements) requires
r⇥c ciphertext multiplications, where r and c are respectively the row and column
dimensions of A.
The original work compares näıve and optimised variations of the ciphertext
packing technique, where (respectively) the input samples/weight vector are
packed into separate ciphertexts, or multiple inputs are combined into a single
ciphertext and replicate each weight parameter into all slots of a weight vector.
Refer to Nandakumar et al. (2019) for further technical details. It is unclear how
matrix multiplication requiring transposition of one matrix operand is supported
by the overall ciphertext packing approach, as it is not discussed in the paper.
All operations in the original work are applied to integers encoded in binary,
which is not ideal. Inputs to the network are represented by 8-bit signed integers
and elements in the weight matrices are represented as 16-bit signed integers. A
2s complement encoding is used for representing negative integers. Accuracy of
the reduced private NN training model is 96.4%, which is similar to the accuracy
when training is performed over the plaintext domain.
In general, there are more e cient approaches for matrix-vector multiplication
operating instead over Fp. A few methods have been proposed including by Halevi
and Shoup (2014) who map each diagonal decomposition part of a square matrix
to a single ciphertext, thereby requiring d ciphertexts to encode a matrix of size
d⇥ d. A matrix-vector multiplication takes O(d2) complexity and a multiplicative
depth of one. A number of ciphertext packing and matrix-vector multiplication
approaches were explored in the context of DL classification by Juvekar et al.
(2018) including extending the method by Halevi and Shoup (2014) to include
multiplication by rectangular matrices.
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Xiaoqian Jiang et al. (2018) devised an e cient general approach to perform
operations on encrypted matrices using HE-friendly techniques on packed cipher-
texts. The authors demonstrate encrypted matrix operations in their E2DM
framework to support CNN classification of handwritten MNIST images. An en-
tire matrix could be encoded within a single ciphertext with d2 plaintext slots and
can be extended to support operations on multiple smaller encrypted matrices in
parallel. Secure computation on larger matrices are also supported naturally using
standard block-wise techniques on partitioned sub-matrices. Each sub-matrix
block of size d2 can be encoded onto a single ciphertext. Rectangular matrices
and transposition are also supported.
The overall idea of the approach is to express the matrix product into terms
that are more compatible with HE operations. Such an expression for a matrix of
size d⇥ d encoded onto a vector of dimension n = d2 is: A · B =
Pi=0
d 1 Ai   Bi,
where   is the component-wise product between matrices Ai and Bi obtained from
A and B by taking specific permutations. In fact, the initial matrices A0 and B0
can be computed in O(d) rotations and the remaining matrices Ai and Bi where
1  i < d can be computed by O(1) rotations from the initial matrices (Xiaoqian
Jiang et al., 2018). Implementing transformations follow similar permutation
principles.
In general, permutations are achieved by successive application of arbitrary
linear transformations (discussed previously in Section 4.4), to enable the required
shifts and matrix-vector multiplications. A number of optimisations are proposed
to reduce complexity of the matrix multiplication implementation (eg. baby-step /
giant-step algorithm); to improve e ciency of the rectangular matrix multiplication
(rather than using zero-padding of square matrices); and pre-computing in the
clear some operations involved in the linear transformations to reduce the overhead
of rotation. For secure d⇥ d matrix multiplication, the technique has complexity
O(d) and a multiplicative depth of 1 Mult + 2 CMult. It has been stated to take
approximately 0.6 and 0.09 seconds respectively, to compute the product and
transposition on matrices of size 64⇥ 64.
Secure DL prediction of 28⇥ 28 greyscale (0 to 255) images from the MNIST
dataset has been demonstrated using the above matrix multiplication technique
in the same work by Xiaoqian Jiang et al. (2018). A private CNN implementation
consists of one convolutional layer, two FC layers with square activation and
a final softmax function, returning the encrypted argmax values of 10 outputs,
predicting a batch of 64 images simultaneously using SIMD. The weight ⇥ input
matrix network arrangement of the FC-1 layer is R64⇥256 ⇥ R256⇥64 ! R64⇥64 and
for the FC-2 layer is R10⇥64 ⇥ R64⇥64 ! R10⇥64. The implementation employs
Microsoft SEAL’s version of the CKKS scheme, whereby 4096 plaintext slots are
made available to encode an entire 64⇥ 64 matrix per ciphertext. These can form
blocks (sub-matrices) of much larger partitioned matrices (eg. a 64⇥ 256 matrix
can be formed by four square matrices of size 64 ⇥ 64). All real number input
and weight values are set at 30 bits of precision and accuracy of the homomorphic
prediction model is 98.1%, which is the same accuracy as for evaluation of the
model in the clear.
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5.2.3 Design and Implementation
Due to e ciency and ease-of-use of the secure matrix multiplication technique
developed in the context of DL classification by Xiaoqian Jiang et al. (2018), we
adapt it for our HEB-based private NN training demonstration and compare its
performance to that of the NN learning model implemented by Nandakumar et al.
(2019). As previously indicated, we implement the reduced network version of the
NN training model for comparison purposes, which consists of 32 and 16 neurons
in two FC hidden layers. The original full 784-dimensional (28 ⇥ 28) MNIST
image input is reduced by cropping the central 24⇥ 24 pixels of each image and
rescaling by 1
3
using bi-cubic interpolation, obtaining a 8⇥ 8 pixel representation.
Weights are initialised randomly from a standard normal distribution and zero
mean. The learning rate ↵, is set to 1. The batch size is slightly varied from 60
to 64 training samples in order to accommodate square matrices, and BGD is the
chosen mode of training rather than SGD. Since the execution time for one only
batch of training is being compared, there is no real di↵erence in computational
complexity between both networks.
For our demonstration, the overall input ⇥ weight matrix network arrangement
of the FC-1 layer is R64⇥64 ⇥ R64⇥32 ! R64⇥32 and for the FC-2 layer is R64⇥32 ⇥
R32⇥16 ! R64⇥16. The output layer (layer 3), represented by R64⇥16 ⇥ R16⇥10 !
R64⇥10 for a batch of 64 samples, results in a 10-dimensional output vector yi
for predicting the input, which is one of 10 possible digits [0   9]. Similar to
Nandakumar et al. (2019), a quadratic loss function is used at the output during
training ie. L = kaL yik2. We choose however to employ the very e↵ective ReLU
activation function ((x > 0) ⇤ x) at the FC layers in order to take advantage of
plaintext message swapping and ease of ReLU implementation over F2. This is in
replacement of the sigmoid activation function implemented by Nandakumar et al.
(2019) using table lookup over F2. Without message swapping, approximation
functions would typically be used to enable non-linear ReLU and sigmoid activation
over Fp. Derivatives of the ReLU (x > 0) and quadratic loss functions (aL   yi)
are easily computed.
In order to facilitate matrix multiplication, the choice of 16⇥ 16 blocks sizes
is ideal for supporting the variety of matrices required for a reduced network
training model. Blocks can easily be encoded on 256-slot ciphertexts over Fp. A
64⇥ 64 matrix, which is the largest size required for the NN, can be formed by
partitioning into four 16⇥ 16 blocks. The overall computation involved in private
NN training is schematically represented in Fig. 5.6, which includes visualisation
of the matrices involved into block partitions.
The basic NN architecture is implemented in Python code shown in Appendix
C.1, which is a modification of the basic code found in Trask (2019). As a proof-
of-concept, in order to accommodate HE-compatible block-wise operations, the
NN implemented in Python code is modified in Appendix C.2 into a version where
partitioned matrices compute in the plaintext domain, using array sizes of 256
to encode sub-matrices. The implementation depends on our modification to a
hefunct library as shown in Appendix C.3, which is a Python implementation of
the HE-friendly vector-matrix multiplication routines described by Xiaoqian Jiang
et al. (2018) in the plaintext domain, for which there is an available open-source
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C++ implementation based on the HEAAN HE library called HEMat5.
Figure 5.6: Process for privately training on MNIST images (8⇥ 8 pixels in size)
in batches of 64 using a reduced Neural Network architecture. Image inputs
(entered at step 1) and weights are both encrypted. Numbers illustrate order of
the network computations. Boxes indicate partitioning of larger matrices into
blocks of size 16⇥ 16 that can each be encoded on ciphertexts with 256 available
plaintext slots. Matrix rows or columns of size 10 are shaded in black indicating
padding with zero to 16, in order to construct square sub-matrices.
Based on both basic and modified Python implementations, network training
accuracy on the MNIST database (using a separate testing sample of 10000
images) is 96.6%. This is similar to the 96.4% accuracy achieved for a trained
reduced network (NN2), as stated in the work by Nandakumar et al. (2019).
Real numbers however are computed in their natural plaintext rather than a
(fixed-precision) state encoded over a finite field. The mpmath library is used
to modify the basic NN Python code, in order to establish training accuracy
of the network over fixed encoded real numbers. The library allows all weight
and input/output internal variables to be set at a fixed arbitrary precision-level
throughout the computation. After ensuring consistency of weight initialisation
and input samples, it can be established that training accuracy of the encoded
form at a particular (to be determined later) precision level is acceptably similar
to the higher-precision floating-point computation. Since fixed-precision encodings
are identical in both encrypted and plaintext domains, this can be used to establish
accuracy in encrypted NN training.
A di↵erent aspect to our private NN design examines issues relating to the
underlying HEB platform. In this case, all five HEB-based interaction types will
be used to support private network training. Consistent with the findings by
Hesamifard, Takabi, Ghasemi, and Wright (2018), we elect to use a smaller value of
L for the levelled scheme over Fp during encrypted matrix computation, resulting
in a more e cient training time for a given network topology. Improved e ciency
is due to smaller ciphertext, network and data transfer sizes, however it will be at
5github.com/K-miran/HEMat
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the expense of an increase in number of interactions required for resetting noise
(Fp ! Fp). The level L should be large enough to allow all matrix operations
to be performed without requiring a noise reset interaction, therefore the size
of p for integer based encodings should be increased in order to accommodate
the accumulation of elements within sub-matrices when they are added together
to form a whole matrix; the largest being matrices of size 64 ⇥ 64 requiring
accommodation.
For e ciency reasons, it is also decided not to involve intra-slot permutations
in the data perturbation strategy during interactions, since in the context of NN,
it should be su cient from a security perspective to add random noise to weights
and randomly permute their order within layers. Since the size of p is being
increased as explained above (note that a doubling of this value p is required to
accommodate added random noise), the larger partitioned matrices that happen
to be more proximal to the raw input data, will contain aggregated encodings of
individual inputs/weights from sub-matrices (each with their own individually
added random noise), that will further obfuscate data that is sent to the client.
This works in our favour as an added security measure.
The overall pattern of interaction involved in NN training underpinned by the
HEB is illustrated in Fig. 5.7. It is a slightly modified version of the network model
shown in Fig. 5.6. In particular, the ReLU activation function is now separated
from the input-weight matrix multiplication to emphasize plaintext message
swapping interactions (2 and 4 in Fig 5.7) used to support ReLU computation
over F2. The set of interactions include resetting integer-based noise; converting
to a binary message domain; (computing ReLU), followed by a return to the
integer-based plaintext space. This is represented by the sequence Fp ! Fp/Fp !
F2/F2 ! Fp. Note that, due to the smaller amount of available data slots in the
binary message space, more ciphertexts encoding plaintext values over F2 are
required to participate in Fp $ F2 interactions compared those encoded over Fp.
The ReLU logic simply determines which of the layer 1 and 2 output values
are greater than 0. The set of results is returned from the binary message
domain, and multiplied again by the actual layer 1 and 2 values to complete
computation of the activation function. In order to avoid any precision correction
after multiplication, the packed encrypted boolean values returned are placed in the
LSB of each corresponding data slot, resulting in a straight-forward homomorphic
multiplication. The output of ReLU logic can also be reused in the derivative
functions to calculate the layer 1 and 2 delta layers (paths 9 and 12 in 5.7),
therefore no further interactions are required in this case.
Homomorphic multiplication operations resulting from the product of matrices
will subsequently require an interaction to achieve canonical base encoding (Fp !
F2,p) of the output followed by precision correction. Together with an initial noise
reset, the interaction sequence involved for all encrypted matrix multiplications
can be represented by Fp ! Fp/Fp ! F2,p/precision correction. Finally, a number
of integer-based noise reset interactions Fp ! Fp are required in between the
computation of layers and after matrix translocation operations, in order to remain
within bounds of the levelled encryption scheme.
The overall threat model is interpreted on the basis of IND-CPA security of the
underlying HE scheme together with data obfuscation measures of weaker security
for interactions not involved in perfect secrecy (ie. Fp ! F2,p and Fp ! F2).
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Figure 5.7: Overall interaction pattern involved in private NN training
underpinned by the HEB platform, for cases where permutations are involved in
data obfuscation. Sets of interactions are represented in the key on the bottom
right. Letters represent the order of matrix operations and associated
interactions, while numbers indicate ordering of intervening interactions. prec. -
precision correction operation.
Computations in the public cloud are entirely encrypted and the weaker security
methods apply to minimal computations involved in the specific interactions on
the client, which are orthogonal to the main analysis task. A preliminary security
survey was performed on the data obfuscation approach previously in Section
4.3. It is on this basis we can have some assurance of confidentiality although the
security is weaker against what is required for computational indistinguishability
under a semi-honest adversary. The compromise in security is arguably necessary
to make FHE-based computation more practically e cient.
5.2.4 Evaluation
A similar cloud computing environment used in earlier classification demonstrations
is also utilised for the current evaluation of private NN training. That is, a
c5.4xlarge AWS EC2 instance with 16 vCPU cores of up to 3.4GHz and 32GB
RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS is used. The platform implementation is in C++,
using the HElib library for homomorphic operations, compiled using NTL, GMP,
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Table 5.5: Selected HElib parameters for evaluation: m - cyclotomic ring,  (m) -
lattice dimension,   - security level, L - levels, s - number of slots.
Field p m  (m)   L d s
F2 2 15709 15005 181.43 12 22 682
Fpr 212 = 4096 28815 14337 89.75 16 56 256
and with multi-threading turned on. Two-party client and server interactions
are performed on the same virtual instance, which has a similar performance in
comparison to client-server interactions across di↵erent instances within the same
availability zone. In both cases, bandwidth timing is minimised.
HE parameters are selected from a limited set to ensure a security level
of at least 80 and an exact number of 256 slots over Fp. A plaintext size of
p
r = 212(= 4096) to compute over Fp is considered adequate to accommodate
accumulated elements after aggregating blocks in partitioned matrices, as described
earlier above. The final parameters selected are indicated in Table 5.5.
All input and weight values are 28-bits in size and set at a precision level
of 24 bits, based on the expected range of values observed during NN training
in the clear. A size of 28 bits is chosen to encode real numbers as this is half
the polynomial degree dint = 56 for each slot over Fp, ensuring homomorphic
multiplication between polynomials is supported without wrapping modulo dint.
At the given level of precision, accuracy of overall NN training in the clear for
the MNIST dataset becomes 96.6%, as established by the mpmath Python library
described earlier. This is the same computed accuracy while using standard
floating-point calculations during NN training. For higher levels of precision, one
could choose larger parameters (eg. m = 30005 and m = 31611 both generate 256
slots with dint = 88 and 80 respectively), at the expense of a decrease in overall
training performance.
As only one bit per slot is used to encode real numbers in binary, the aim
for HE parameter selection is to minimise dbin as much as possible, since the
remaining coe cients within each slot are e↵ectively wasted space. The bit-size
for real numbers encoded in binary is also set to 28 bits. Therefore, the number
of available slots over the binary context comes to b682/28c = 24. As a result
of di↵erences in slot arrangements between the two plaintext message domains,
during any Fp $ F2 interactions (2 and 4 in Fig. 5.7), precisely d256/24e = 11
ciphertexts computing over F2 are required for every ciphertext over Fp.
At the given aforementioned parameter settings, initial (once-o↵) initiation of
the cryptographic contexts, generation and exchange of keys takes approximately
91 seconds and 12 interactions. Public/private key sizes for both binary and
integer-based contexts are approximately 330-394 MB each in size. The keys are
much smaller than those generated previously in Chapter 4, which were GBs
in size, since the levels L chosen were higher at 30-35 rather than the current
range of between 12-16. During the execution phase, the server and client initially
independently execute once-o↵ start-up procedures both taking approximately 38
seconds each to complete.
Overall NN training performance statistics over one iteration of a complete
batch of 64 encrypted image samples, based on a reduced network, and utilising
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the HEB platform are shown in Table 5.6. Average execution times are shown
after 3 runs for each testing scenario, which is considered adequate given that
the coe cient of variation value for the overall timing of all NN training tests
comes to < 0.04. Graphical representations of the timing and multiplicative depth
resulting from private NN training are shown in Figs. 5.8 and 5.9 respectively.
Figure 5.8: Overall NN timings at di↵erent processing stages based on results
from Table 5.6. R() - ReLU() operation; rst - noise rest interaction; Regarding
testing scenarios: n - random noise added, p - permutation added, n  or p  -
absence of noise or perturbation, [t ] and [t] - multithreading turned o↵ and on.
Exchanged message sizes during execution always fall between 2.3-4.9 MB
per ciphertext. The total number of interactions and overall size of messages
exchanged during training of an entire batch of 64 images depends on whether
permutation is involved in data obfuscation. The latter requires more noise reset
interactions over Fp to permute ciphertext slots within bounds of the levelled
scheme. There are 724 interactions and 2.5 GB exchanged in total when no
permutation is involved, which increases to 842 interactions and 3.0 GB with
perturbation. A comparison of multiplicative depth on various operations involved
in NN training depending on whether permutation is involved (p) or not (p )
during interactions is shown within the ‘Depth’ columns in Table 5.6. Specifically,
if no permutation is involved during data obfuscation, the Fp ! Fp noise reset
interactions indicated in Fig. 5.7 for all events between A to K (inclusive) can
be removed, along with interaction number 7. It appears that the addition of
random noise as an obfuscation technique does not change the overall pattern of
interactions as homomorphic addition has minimal e↵ect on multiplicative depth.
From Table 5.6 it can be seen that NN training of one complete batch of 64
images takes approximately 115 mins (1 hr 55 min ) with multithreading turned
o↵ (np[t ]), which decreases to 74 mins on a 16 vCPU core machine when turned
on (np[t+]). The baseline case where no data obfuscation is involved (n p [t+])
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Table 5.6: Overall NN (reduced model) performance statistics utilising the HEB
platform. Training performed on one iteration of an encrypted batch of 64
MNIST image samples, averaged over 3 runs. Loc. - location of events in relation
to elements indicated in Fig. 5.7; R() - ReLU() operation; rst - noise rest
interaction; Regarding testing scenarios: n - random noise added, p - permutation
added, n  or p  - absence of noise or perturbation, [t ] and [t] - multithreading
turned o↵ and on; Error - average absolute maximum di↵erence between
encrypted and plaintext computed matrix elements.
Time (s) Depth Error
Loc. Event np[t ] np[t+] np [t+] n p [t+] p p  (⇥10 8)
A l1 1237 533 455 410 15-8 15-13 78
2+B R(l1) 1507 1458 962 872 8-9 13-9 78
3 R(l1) rst 6 6 6 6 9-14 9-14
C l2 361 183 138 116 14-8 14-13 40
4 R(l2) 753 732 480 437 8-9 13-9 40
5 R(l2) rst 3 3 3 3 9-14 9-14
E l3 224 140 100 77 14-8 14-13 6.6
F l3  92 88 48 25 8-8 13-13 6.5
7 l3  rst 3 3 0 0 8-14 13-13
8 wT
2 3
9 8 8 8 14-8 14-8
8+G l2  236 153 109 86 14-7 14-9 5.7
10 l2  rst 3 3 3 3 7-14 9-14
11 wT
1 2
17 11 11 10 14-8 14-8
11+H l1  472 281 196 152 14-7 14-9 6.2
13 l1  rst 6 6 6 6 7-14 9-14
14 lT
2
35 15 15 15 14-8 14-8
14+I w2 3 194 91 80 74 14-8 14-13 5.9
16 lT
1
70 28 27 27 14-8 14-8
16+J w1 2 384 166 140 130 14-8 14-13 12
18 lT
0
140 54 54 53 14-8 14-8
18+K w0 1 1394 579 497 452 14-8 14-13 30
– Total 6877 4428 3227 2854 – –
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Figure 5.9: Multiplicative depth levels at di↵erent processing stages of NN
execution with perturbation (p) and no perturbation (p ) occurring during
interactions. Based on results from Table 5.6.
has a training performance of 48 mins, which in comparison to np[t+] = 74 mins
gives an indication of the overall cost of securing the HE-based HEB platform
using data obfuscation techniques within a multithreaded environment.
Matrix multiplication performance is proportional to the size of matrices
involved. The timing also includes subsequent interactions for resetting both noise
and accumulated integer-based elements over Fp and to correct for precision. This
has a less significant impact to the overall performance compared to the time
required to evaluate an encrypted matrix product. Multiplication between 16⇥ 16
sub-matrices (blocks) takes constant time, irrespective of the larger partitioned
matrix dimensions involved in the product. For partitioned matrices A and B
consisting of r⇥ l and l⇥ c blocks respectively, the product A ·B requires r⇥ l⇥ c
constant block multiplications (each of depth 1 Mult + 2 CMult as per Xiaoqian
Jiang et al. (2018)) and l   1 ciphertext additions. This broadly puts matrix
multiplication into the three categories of large (64⇥ 64⇥ 32 : l0, w0 1), medium
(64⇥ 32⇥ 16 : l2, l1 , w1 2), and small (64⇥ 16⇥ 16 : l3, l2 , w2 3) product sizes.
For testing scenario np [t+], the performance range of each group is respectively
[579  553], [281  166] and [153  91] seconds. Additional performance di↵erences
within each group is accounted for by the subsequent associated interaction
(Fp ! Fp/Fp ! F2,p/precision correction), which corresponds directly to the
number of blocks in the matrix product result requiring the interaction.
During matrix transposition, performance is similarly directly related to the
number of sub-matrices contained in the larger transposed partitioned matrix.
This is due to the constant time involved in transposing a 16 ⇥ 16 sub-matrix
(of multiplicative depth 3
p
16 = 12 automorphisms) together with its subsequent
Fp ! Fp interaction. Transposing a 16 ⇥ 16 dimension matrix (w2 3) takes 8
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Table 5.7: Comparison of performance between three private NN training
implementations.
Nandakumar Basilakis Hesamifard
Database MNIST MNIST MNIST
HE library HElib HElib HElib
RAM (GB) 250 32 48
CPU (cores) 32 16 12
Encoding Integer Real Integer
Security Toy > 80 80
Field F2 F2/Fp Fp
Level (L) ? 16/12 20
Topology [64 32 16 10] [64 32 16 10] [93 16 16 10]
Comparisons 2778 2778 1946
Batch size 60 64 192
Accuracy (%) 96.4 96.6 95.2
Recrypt/Reset Recrypt Reset obfusc. Reset clear
Time (s) 2400 4428 4470
Interactions 0 842 874
seconds, whereas a 64 ⇥ 64 size matrix (lT
0
) takes 54 seconds under the np[t+]
testing scenario.
In contrast, execution times for computing the ReLU() activation function
over F2 is minor compared to performance of the associated interactions (Fp !
Fp/Fp ! F2/F2 ! Fp). In fact, approximately half (49%) of the overall NN
training time alone is taken up to compute the two existing ReLU functions (B
and D in Fig. 5.7) within the network. This is a result of interactions involving
message swapping (Fp $ F2) requiring 11 packed ciphertexts over F2 for every
1 packed ciphertext over Fp, due to di↵erences in plaintext slot arrangements
between the two message domains, mentioned previously. For ReLU(l1), which
initially requires conversion of 8 ciphertexts (one per block) to binary before
computation of the activation function, this comes to 8⇥ 11 = 88 interactions of
the type Fp ! F2, which is very costly. The same high number of interactions
is required for conversion back to Fp although the F2 ! Fp interaction is much
more e cient. In the case of ReLU(l2), 44 such interactions are required. There is
further scope to improve interaction e ciency if performed in parallel, rather than
serially as is currently the case. This issue is further discussed in the following
chapter.
The ‘Error’ column in Table 5.6 indicates the average maximal error (over 3
runs) when all decrypted elements of a particular privately computed matrix are
compared against the corresponding (floating-point) plaintext matrix elements
evaluated in the clear, thereby determining the maximal di↵erence. It can be seen
that accuracy is maintained throughout all stages of the NN computation, which
is consistent with a set precision of 20 bits for all relevant inputs and weights.
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5.2.5 Comparison with Previous Work
In the original FHE NN training implementation by Nandakumar et al. (2019),
performance of the similarly (reduced) network with optimised ciphertext packing
on a single threaded machine takes about 9 hrs and 20 mins, despite using only
toy parameters (and more powerful hardware). It was observed by the authors
that when standard security parameters were used, operations slowed down by
approximately 40-60 times. In comparison, our work uses a standard security
level of greater than 80 for the HE component, however client-server interactions
involving data obfuscation are used in place of recryption. As a result of the
compromise, NN training performance on a single threaded machine is significantly
more e cient at 1 hr 55 mins for secure rather than toy HE parameters. Our work
also encodes real numbers instead of integers with a larger bit capacity/precision for
all input values and weights. Higher e ciency gains are achieved in multithreaded
settings for both cases due to the highly parallel nature of matrix operations
within the network.
For the remaining two existing FHE-based examples examined in the literature
that perform private NN training, both rely on utilising a client for decryption/en-
cryption of intermediate results. In both cases however, data within the client
are in the clear without being subjected to perturbation methods. Results from
the work by Q. Zhang et al. (2016) (and similar work by Bu et al. (2015)) are
di cult to make a direct comparison of performance due to the di↵erent network
architectures used (including use of a tensor auto-encoder stack) while trained
on larger non-image datasets with fewer feature sets and overall less prediction
accuracy. Performances however are based on complete rather than partial training
on datasets and these works do demonstrate the important concept of improved
e ciency by employing more cloud servers to privately process increasing data set
sizes.
Su cient detail on the second private NN training implementation by Hesam-
ifard, Takabi, Ghasemi, and Wright (2018) is available for comparison. Their
claim was to have the first HE-based solution for training NN models at the time,
although it also relies on decrypting/encrypting intermediate results on a client in
the clear. An encrypted MNIST dataset is used to train a reduced FC network
topology, one example of which has 93 input nodes, 2 hidden layers consisting of
16 nodes each, and 10 output nodes. Consequently, the number of parameters to
be learned for the topology are 1946 (= (16⇥ 94) + (16⇥ 17) + (10⇥ 17)). The
HElib application is similarly employed to support HE, with the level parameter
L set at 20 in this instance. Computation is performed using encrypted integers
over Fp with activation functions relying on low degree polynomial approximations
of the sigmoid function. A single ciphertext is allocated for each variable weight
and output, using SIMD for input batch processing of size 192. Time to process
one batch of images comes to 4470 seconds, 874 interactions and with a predicted
accuracy of 95.2%, while computing on a virtual machine with 48GB RAM and
12 CPU cores.
Results from the work by Hesamifard, Takabi, Ghasemi, and Wright (2018)
appear comparable to the overall NN MNIST training performance of 4428
seconds achieved in our work. This is despite the added overhead of obfuscating
intermediate results sent to a client for our more secure HEB-based implementation.
However, the conditions for comparison are not exact. There are more parameters
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to learn for our network (2778 cf. 1946) although a smaller batch size is used (64
cf. 192). Additionally, there are some di↵erences in CPU cores, RAM memory
and configuration of L to take into account. Full details of performance measures
between our work and two other private NN training approaches previously
described are listed in Table 5.7.
A final comparison can also be made against the work by Lou et al. (2019) that
employs the relative recently developed scheme switching technique. The authors
demonstrate performance of this scheme through an application called Glyph,
which is also compared with the FHE NN training reference implementation by
Nandakumar et al. (2019). The work has been previously described in Section
2.7.5. Glyph is able to switch between the BGV and TFHE cryptosystems, which
perform large vectorial arithmetic on SIMD slots and combinatorial operations on
individual slots respectively. Both schemes use bootstrapping to reset noise. TFHE
is used to homomorphically implement ReLU and a softmax activation through
multiplexers, although the quadratic loss derivative is used to back-propagate the
softmax loss using BGV. Both activation units are computed homomorphically
faster than the respective table lookup versions in the reference implementation.
Unfortunately Glyph only implements the full and not the reduced NN architecture
for comparison purposes. Therefore, an extrapolation of performance with some
assumptions can only be attained when comparing to the HEB-based solution.
A side-by-side comparison of MLP performance between Glyph and the refer-
ence implementation demonstrates a reduction in the mini-batch training latency
by 97.4% (approx. 50mins vs. 33hrs respectively) while maintaining the same test
accuracy. The first assumption is that the timing proportion between the full and
reduced NN versions in the reference implementation (33hrs vs. 9hrs 24mins for
optimised single thread testing) also applies to Glyph’s NN implementation. An
extrapolation of the timing Glyph would have taken for the reduced network is
therefore proportionally decreased to 50⇤564/1980 = 14mins. The paper on Glyph
incorrectly states that their implemented homomorphic NN has a security level
of > 80, when in fact the same toy parameters as the reference implementation
(m = 210   1 = 1023) are actually used. Nandakumar et al. (2019) observe that
when using parameters corresponding to 80 bits of security (m = 215  1 = 32767),
all operations slowed down by approximately 40-60 times on a single threaded
machine. The second assumption is that the same slow down applies also to Glyph
when configured at the same security level. In this case, complete mini-batch
homomorphic NN training of a reduced network model by Glyph at security level
of 80 bits would increase to 14 ⇤ 50 = 700mins or approximately 11hrs and 40mins,
on a single threaded machine. This is in comparison to the timing of 1hr 55mins
achieved for the HEB-based single-threaded implementation on a similar network,
which is a factor of over six times faster. It should also be noted that Glyph was
executed on a machine with di↵erent specifications (2.2GHz CPU with 256GB
RAM) compared to the HEB-based implementation (3.4GHz CPU with 32GB
RAM).
5.3 Conclusion
Overall it would appear that the HEB design can provide a flexible and e cient
platform to support the given private ML classification and training examples
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within this chapter. As the HE-based platform is supported by obfuscated
interactions that are not specific to any particular analysis, basic privacy-preserving
component techniques such as those discussed with respect to classification and
others like matrix multiplication, are broadly applicable to a range of other private
ML algorithms, and indeed to privacy-preserving computation in general. The
NN training example demonstrates the significant e ciency advantage o↵ered by
the HEB platform when compared against the high cost of achieving full security
using FHE as a result of the ‘baseline’ work by Nandakumar et al. (2019), and
also through the extrapolated results of Lou et al. (2019). Performance is also
comparable to less secure HE-based implementations where intermediate results
are visible to a client. The HEB has also been su ciently stressed during private
NN training to demonstrate the application range and limitations of the platform.
Despite private NN training having some way to go before being considered
practical for mainstream healthcare use, less computationally intensive tasks such
as NN classification and even arbitrary computational tasks are considered more
practical. Further opportunities to overcome certain HEB limitations uncovered
during its evaluation and other improvements to the basic HEB platform design
will be explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Discussion, Future Work and
Conclusion
In this final chapter we discuss how the previous HEB-based demonstrations relate
to the overall thesis aims and their limitations. We also explore further potential
healthcare application areas of the HEB that will help inform the discussion on
future work and approach to significantly improve the platform’s application.
The three examples in the last chapter serve to demonstrate early steps
towards o↵ering a potential solution to achieve the ‘holy grail’ of rigorous and
transparent security of identifiable healthcare information use while enabling ease
of data access for collaboration, analysis or computation purposes. Healthcare
is ideal for considering these issues as a result of the domain’s high sensitivity
surrounding use of identifiable information, which normally underpins a wide
variety of systems providing CDS to both healthcare providers and consumers.
The industry is characterised by limited sharing of data across multidisciplinary
healthcare institutions, resulting in a lack of innovation and safety in clinical care.
The area of ML is a chosen use-case for exploring development of a potential
privacy-preserving application due to its computational complexity, requirement for
data sharing and direct relevance to CDS. Privacy issues are intrinsically complex,
therefore the challenge is to find a solution that can be easily understood in
order to reassure privacy concerns across multiple disciplines, including engineers,
sociologists, legal experts, policy-makers etc. Currently, cryptographic techniques
are the easiest to comprehend application-wise as a result of their widespread use
and for assuring strong privacy guarantees. SMC and HE schemes can compute
on encrypted datasets, in contrast to standard encryption techniques, although
they have high communication or computation costs respectively, in addition
to a significant degree of complexity or inflexibility (respectively) in situations
requiring practical application. Data perturbation and PPCC techniques provide
statistically weaker privacy protection guarantees but are more e cient.
Employing a combination of cryptographic and perturbation methods in the
HEB platform provides a necessary compromise between e ciency and privacy,
enabling a step closer to practical application. HE schemes are chosen over SMC
ones since a lot more homomorphic computation can be contained on a single
server and client-server interactions are only limited to key functions required
to overcome the limitations of FHE schemes. Focus therefore can be directed at
securing the limited interactions (albeit weak), which are orthogonal to the overall
computational task, rather than having to re-examine security for each type of
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analysis use-case. This situation simplifies understanding of privacy-preserving
application integration, in addition to allowing more consistency in the way that
cloud-based computing nodes interact for scalability.
The key limitations of all existing secure FHE schemes identified are bootstrap-
ping ine ciency, plaintext data-type overflow and di cult to bridge cryptographic
contexts (operating over either F2 or Fp alone). After examination of the literature,
it is not surprising that there are limited HE-based examples that are implemented
beyond their original institutional development for wider commercial adoption.
SMC schemes as a result have appeared more viable from a commercialisation
perspective. In an e↵ort to improve ease of privacy integration and scalability
over the cloud, a solution has been sought to overcome these FHE limitations.
The HEB platform can resolve all the three key FHE limitations during one
single client-server interaction. A suite of five di↵erent interactions are necessary
to cover all possible interaction combinations, which are all implemented in
the NN training example. Two interactions involving reduction of plaintext
integer elements to binary (Fp ! F2 and Fp ! F2,p) provide weaker guarantees
compared to standard semantic security, while remaining interactions demonstrate
perfect secrecy. HE-properties themselves can be exploited to combine a variety
of reversible complex obfuscation measures, in order to strengthen security of
the two weaker interactions. Sensitivity analysis based on past evidence of
vulnerabilities surrounding typically basic perturbation measures shows that the
extent of obfuscation complexity is yet to be encountered in literature. Note that
any privacy concerns regarding weaker interactions are limited to information
leakage within a potentially trusted client alone (where decryption of intermediate
results occurs), rather than involving the total system which is secured semantically
within an overall threat model. These factors combined give some assurance of
security although more work can be done in this regard.
Practicality of the solution arises from flexibility and e ciency of composable
elements within the HEB. This results from improvement to parallel binary (basic
and higher-order eg. sorting) operations developed in Chapter 3; in addition to
interaction-based improvements relating to e cient noise resetting and plaintext
message swapping as demonstrated in Chapter 4. As a result, the ‘bus’ concept
is bourne reflecting the consistent nature of the communication approach that
supports computation over F2 and Fp. Actions of the PPCs in binary also facilitate
ciphertexts computing in packed form together with parallel computation over Fp,
so that ciphertexts participate in parallel operations similar to arithmetic registers
without requiring unpacking. This is an important step potentially enabling
quick integration of multiple virtual nodes on the cloud with privacy-preserving
capabilities.
Composable elements are combined to support a range of privacy-preserving
ML settings in Chapter 5. All necessary core operations over encrypted data are
available, including comparison, argmax and dot product computations, to support
the most common classification protocols. Other components such as navigation of
decision trees are demonstrated, where di↵erent implementations are available over
the two plaintext domains. Examples and alternative suggestions have been given
to express more complex conditional logic that can potentially benefit private
arbitrary computational tasks, such as enabling workflow integration together
with ML output to action private alerts and recommendations in a secure CDS
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application.
In the final NN training demonstration it was shown how matrix multiplication
and transposition could be e ciently implemented, including the approach to
ciphertext packing and organisation of ciphertexts into partitioned matrix blocks to
prevent expensive re-ordering of elements during sequences of operations involving
matrices. This was based on the recent work by Xiaoqian Jiang et al. (2018)
which was particularity suitable for our NN training implementation since each
interacting ciphertext directly maps onto an individual matrix block. This greatly
simplifies the overall view of interactions required for matrix manipulations,
compared to the more complex prospect of encoding row/column or single value
matrix elements onto separate ciphertexts.
Although private NN training was used to stress test the HEB platform,
at this stage it is not o↵ered as a practical application use-case for healthcare.
Despite the stated e ciency gains, the implementation would still be considered
impractically slow if it was to complete all required training iterations/epochs.
Even under normal plaintext conditions, to fully train a NN using real-live data is
computationally expensive. Small increases in computing overhead required for
security can have a massive impact on the overall execution time. Fortunately,
promising frameworks based on recently developed private federated ML (see
Section 2.4.3) are available to provide extensive and pervasive private AI training
in healthcare. Such frameworks also include smartphones, wearables and other
edge devices for contributing to federated learning.
Beyond private NN training and statistical techniques that deal with aggregated
data, there is a gap in identifiable healthcare data utilisation for CDS purposes. An
example would be actioning alerts or recommendations on trained model outputs
based on longitudinal individual patient record features. This tasks may require
aggregation of a distributed health record for an individual patient across several
institutions. A number of data-driven or knowledge-based (eg rule-based) expert
systems may be consulted along the way. Data aggregation and CDS actions
may delegate activities amongst di↵erent people and healthcare software-agents.
According to the literature reviewed, HE-based applications are predominantly
focussed on micro-benchmarks or are otherwise very limited in scope principally
as a result of FHE limitations.
This is where a private service bus such as the HEB platform can fill in the
gap beyond episodic SWHE tasks, contributing to continuous processing across
multiple machines longitudinally over long periods on the cloud. In this scenario,
one or more client(s) will be able to submit sensitive data to a private CDS service
and receive a set of outcomes according to the three use cases described in Section
2.7.3. Access to private services and results will depend on private/public/multi-
key arrangements with the central (trusted/untrusted) healthcare institution and
third parties. In the most private configuration, only the patient (client) will
have access to the final CDS results with the service owner being excluded from
accessing patient data and clinical outcome results.
In the future, it is envisioned that a practical HEB platform could fulfil
the arbitrary computation requirements of a CDS system used for mainstream
clinical care. Ideally, such a platform could potentially cross-connect between
di↵erent cryptography schemes (SMC, BGV CKKS, TFHE), in multi-party, MKHE
interaction settings, using a consistent communication protocol and internal HE
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processing across computing nodes on the cloud. Interactions require a client to be
online at the time of any CDS computation, but there is some degree of flexibility
to limit online processing as much as possible (depending on cryptographic
parameter choices) to critical or convenient times. For any fully or partial o✏ine
mode processing, a concomitant increase to the overall private CDS execution
time will likely result due to relevant interactions being replaced by recryption.
During any online mode processing involving client interactions, it is important to
obfuscate intermediate data received by the client during interactions, which may
leak collaborative data from other parties or perhaps the service owner’s expert
models or knowledge databases.
The overall envisioned architecture has multiple complex challenges, but the
thesis outlays some important initial steps. The research innovation is such that,
as far as the author is aware, there are no existing examples in the literature where
distributed data perturbation methods are used to support using this particular
general HE-based approach. Usually obfuscation methods are customised according
to a specific class of statistical or ML problem. There also appears to be little
existing literature that examines techniques such as plaintext message swapping
and data-type overflow resetting as a means of overcoming HE-based limitations
to broaden HE processing capabilities and practical application over the cloud.
Given the aforementioned vision, the following discussion outlines some identi-
fied limitations of the HEB platform uncovered during earlier performance and
application demonstrations. This is combined together with discussion on future
work that can be undertaken to improve the existing system, which is broken
down into major challenge categories:
6.1 Performance bottle-necks and slot numbers
A major limitation to the HEB-based NN training demonstration is that the
interaction between Fp $ F2 is a major bottleneck, accounting for almost 50% of
the total NN execution time when utilised to compute the normally e cient ReLU
activation function. One cause are di↵erences in ciphertext packing between F2
and Fp, requiring eleven ciphertexts of the former message domain to compute
only one ciphertext of the latter. This increases the number of activation function
calls that are serially processed in binary, which comes to a total of 132 times for
both ReLU(l1) and ReLU(l2).
One approach to improve the bottleneck is e ciently packing binary data
so that there is a one-to-one relationship between interacting ciphertexts during
plaintext message swapping. This means a number-per-slot packing arrangement
over binary rather than the current one bit per slot arrangement. A basic way to
achieve this would be to perform packing/unpacking of ciphertexts after interaction
and before computing over binary circuits. This would reduce the number Fp $ F2
interactions required from 132 to 12 for our NN training demonstration and the
ReLU function could undergo multi-threaded processing on unpacked ciphertexts.
Another approach would be to convert the basic KSA binary circuit to support
intra-slot operations so that a number-per-slot packing arrangement over F2 is
intrinsically supported. If possible, SIMD-based binary parallel processing of the
ReLU activation could be performed to the same extent already achievable over
Fp. Whether this approach can be made more e cient compared to computing
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over a more natural binary bit-per-slot packing arrangement, remains to be seen.
Greater e ciency of matrix multiplication could also be gained if more plaintext
slots were available on ciphertexts to wholly contain larger matrix partitions. For
instance, in the work by Xiaoqian Jiang et al. (2018) which uses CKKS, 4096
slots can be generated per ciphertext, which in our case would allow an entire
64 ⇥ 64 matrix to be encoded onto one ciphertext, or 16 sub-matrix blocks of
dimension 16 ⇥ 16 could be computed in parallel per ciphertext. The work by
Xiaoqian Jiang et al. (2018) indeed shows impressive private CNN classification
speeds on the order of seconds. The number of available slots per ciphertext is
lower for our approach predominantly due to the requirement for dint to be twice
the n-bit value allocated for encoding real numbers over Fp, thereby preventing
wrapping modulo dint during homomorphic multiplication. A CKKS scheme
also implicitly incorporates precision control during the modular reduction step
to represent real numbers in their natural state over R, and is not required to
consider plaintext data-type overflow. Despite this, there is no known FHE-based
implementation of NN training so far based on CKKS due to the limitation of
dealing with approximate numbers, which would also have an impact on other
complex arbitrary computations. In the HEB-based ML approach, precision of
encoded real numbers can be tightly and flexibly controlled at the expense of
reduced slot availability. See Section 6.4 below on combining schemes such as
CKKS and BGV, for optimising cryptographic choices depending on the application
task.
6.2 Scalability and the cloud environment
A major improvement to the overall existing HEB implementation would involve
enhancing the underlying platform interactions. A subsequent stage of research
for this work would be to investigate interactions between virtual computing
nodes in the cloud to consider platform scalability. For instance, processing of the
ReLU activation function in the NN training demonstration could be accelerated
by parallel processing of cloud nodes. Multiple VM instances or containerised
applications (eg. Docker, Kubernetes) could be recruited to participate in servicing
interactions. Currently though, only serial processing of interactions is achievable
on the HEB platform and interactions cannot be split across di↵erent virtual
computing nodes in a way that can be automatically managed. This is because
the existing underlying socket implementation is not currently configured to
support multiple connections and the Google Protocol Bu↵ers framework used to
serialise data relies on predictable connections between the interacting parties. Re-
engineering the HEB platform to support automatic scaling and connections across
multiple cloud computing nodes will require adopting a suitable cloud management
platform or microservices architecture, supported by e cient push-style and data
serialisation technology to facilitate the basic private interactions-types between
computing nodes.
At a HE processing level, mapping these low level tasks using a front-end
high level programming language will automatically optimise decisions such as
choice of encoding and message domain; determine the most e cient specific
set of interactions to decide, for instance, when to reset noise; in addition to
integrating more complex algorithms. Optimisations based on the forward view
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of the HE computation and taking into account multiplicative depth and levels, is
necessary to support transparent interaction processing that is abstracted away
from analytical tasks. This will further significantly support cloud scalability of the
HEB platform. For now, based on our research, the specific interaction approach
and consistency of the HEB platform across computing nodes appropriate to the
cloud, means that the platform can readily facilitate the aforementioned changes
required for a scalable privacy-preserving cloud solution.
It is worthwhile examining HEB interactions in the context of resource sensitive
platforms eg. mobile, edge and IoT devices, in order to include these resources in
multi-party interactions and increase cloud reach. This requires interconnecting
the HEB platform with various SMC schemes, which is something that can be
readily supported. An open-source application based on Microsoft SEAL called
AsureRun1 may be instructive to developing this type of interaction scenario. The
application runs on an Android smartphone to secure a user’s running (location,
accelerometer, and gyroscope) data using HE, which is uploaded to the cloud and
subsequently employs ML to determine exercise intensity on the cloud.
Implementing multiparty and MKHE interactions will further support a wider
range of use-cases and general applicability of HE computation in the cloud.
Investigating GPU acceleration and applications such as OpenMP2 will provide
alternative opportunities for accelerating HE computation.
6.3 Strengthening interaction security
This relates to applying empirical sensitivity analysis techniques and/or more
rigorous privacy metrics to the obfuscated HEB interactions. It would be worth-
while examining in more detail the obfuscation aspect of the HEB platform by
subjecting less secure interactions to the mathematical analysis of sensitivity
attacks, for example by performing distribution/spectrum analyses on perturbed
intermediate results. Additionally, a number of more rigorous privacy metrics
including cryptographic methods could be applied to the obfuscation approach
(Wagner & Eckho↵, 2018). For instance, principles of di↵erential privacy perhaps
could be applied to the specific problem of changing plaintext message spaces to
determine the amount of random noise that can be added to make an interaction
cryptographically secure (a form of plausible deniability).
6.4 Supporting Scheme Switching
It would be of significant interest to integrate scheme switching within the HEB-
based implementation as potentially great synergies could be attained by having an
increased range of interconnected cryptographic schemes under a hybrid framework.
For instance, combining CKKS with the BGV-based HEB platform would enable
secure message swapping between complex/natural numbers (C/R) with fixed-
point/finite-field encodings Fp or F2). In relation to CDS-related tasks for example,
it may be that numbers are better processed over R while text is preferably




Algorithm 9 Blinding in Division
INPUT: A,B 2 Fp (encrypted)
OUTPUT: A/B 2 Fp (encrypted)
1: S: cA  Encpk(A); cB  Encpk(B)
2: S: generate random: x, i R; y = xi
3: S: cA0 = cMultpk(cA, x) . Blind dividend
4: S: cB0 = cMultpk(cB, y) . Blind divisor
5: =) S sends cA0 , cB0 to C
6: C: A0  Decsk(cA0);B0  Decsk(cB0)
7: C: C 0 = A0/B0
8: C: cC0  Encpk(C 0)
9: =) C sends cC0 to S






x ] . Unblind quotient
11: S: Encpk(A/B) cA/B
connections between schemes to be bypassed with simple-to-implement HEB-based
client interactions, particularly ones displaying perfect secrecy (at initial glance,
there may be good synergy in this area since di cult scheme-switching bridges
appear to coincide with perfectly secret interactions). A hybrid arrangement
would also allow more ine cient bootstrapping operations in scheme switching to
be replaced with more e cient noise resetting client interactions (which display
perfect secrecy). The combination of cryptographic schemes under a hybrid
framework would enable best-of-breed choices to be made appropriate to the
given task. Selecting the best option would require balancing factors such as
precision control mechanisms (CKKS vs. BGV) or optimising the extent of
parallel combinatorial (TFHE vs. PPC-based) logic required for di↵erent tasks.
Connecting to SMC schemes is also relevant here (see Section 6.2).
6.5 Additional functionality
There is further scope to extend the HEB platform and integrate functions
amenable to obfuscated interactions in order to overcome other computational
limitations of FHE schemes, such as solving division and logarithm functions.
This relies on the same principle of using client-server interactions with homomor-
phic blinding of intermediate results that are unrecognisable to the client when
decrypted, but still allowing the function to be computed. When the encrypted
output is returned to the server and homomorphically unblinded, the correct
encrypted answer to the function is obtained to continue subsequent processing.
Some initial suggestions applicable to blinding division and logarithm functions
(similar to adding random noise in the existing HEB platform), are shown in Algs.
9 and 10. In both cases, simple homomorphic multiplication and subtraction
operations are used to blind and unblind intermediate client results at the server
end. More consideration on security, precision and bounds need to be given
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Algorithm 10 Blinding in Logarithm
INPUT: A 2 Fp (encrypted), b
OUTPUT: logb A 2 Fp (encrypted)
1: S: cA  Encpk(A)
2: S: generate random: x R
3: S: find: y = bx . Note: x = logby
4: S: cA0 = cMultpk(cA, y) . Blind
5: =) S sends cA0 , b to C
6: C: A0  Decsk(cA0)
7: C: C 0 = logbA0
8: C: cC0  Encpk(C 0)
9: =) C sends cC0 to S
10: S: clogb A = cSubtrpk(cC0 , x) [logb A = logbAy   logby] . Unblind
11: S: Encpk(logb A) clogb A
for these suggestions. Adding noise to empty slots and randomly permuting
slots can also be performed to enhance security. Intra-slot block permutation
can also be considered for functions that are able to be broken down into linear
sub-components, as occurs in interactions for swapping the plaintext message
space.
Various additions to the HEB platform can be made or implemented to improve
overall computational performance. This includes integrating recently available
features in newer HElib versions, such as faster linear transforms, optimised binary
multiplication, and ciphertext packing/unpacking functionality. It would also
be of interest to support more complex DL functions, such as max-pooling in
CNNs (using the min-max technique over binary) and other non-linear activation
functions which normally cannot easily be implemented with current privacy-
preserving methods. Finally, optimising low-level coding choices would be relevant
to further improving HEB performance and capability. This includes managing
ciphertext blocks more e ciently, particularly when processing across multiple
ciphertexts; optimising encoding methods, such as balanced or fractional encoding;
or determining ideal string encodings (most likely over Fp) and optimal algorithms
to enable string manipulations and searches. In this regard, optimisation may need
to consider the specific healthcare environment for performance enhancement eg.
implementing ciphertext packing and HE capabilities relevant to medical records
and health communication standards.
6.6 Trial in a healthcare setting
Enabling a clinical trial would be critical in order to establish the HEB platform’s
ability to secure a CDS application used in a real-world healthcare setting. It
would potentially validate a number of solution requirements: quick integration,
e cient performance, scalable, and acceptable to stakeholders (reassures privacy
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concerns); as well as determine the extent to which sensitive data remains private,
accessible, shareable and computable.
Performance of HEB interactions has demonstrated viability of the platform
as a uniform, flexible and general approach to cloud-based privacy-preserving
system integration. The platform has been shown to have broader HE processing
capabilities and practical application compared to existing FHE schemes. Benefits
over FHE is at the expense of requiring two-party interactions instead of having a
server-only solution and weakening of the cryptographic security guarantees due
to some interactions. Without these benefits however, homomorphic computation
on cloud environments could not easily be sustainable nor practical. A reasonable
compromise is reached by employing minimised client-server interactions that
exploit HE properties to achieve security through data obfuscation complexity.
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The section below provides supplementary reading material aimed at readers with
little background in cryptography. A brief review of general cryptography concepts
is given, including formal security definitions and cryptographic proofs.
The most familiar property of computer encryption is the ability to maintain
confidentiality of information by converting clear text or plaintext into ciphertext
in a process that relies on a secret key. Computer encryption is also important in
the process of maintaining information integrity, controlling access to data, as well
as in the repudiation of information involved in a transaction. While the keys that
encrypt and decrypt text are kept secret, the encryption algorithms are public
and well known. Encryption can be achieved through various substitutions and
transformations on the plaintext or is based on some security parameter problem
that is hard to solve unless some privileged information is known (Stallings, 2011).
Shannon (1949) first formalized the concepts of computer encryption and took
the rigorous approach to cryptography, relying on precise definitions and proofs.
He introduced the terms confusion and di↵usion as two basic techniques that
make up any cryptographic system, and which are used to frustrate attempts
at cryptanalysis. Di↵usion involves the dissipation of the plaintext information
evenly along the ciphertext in a statistical sense, whereas confusion is the process
of making any relationship between the ciphertext and key as complex as possible
statistically to prevent any attempt at discovering the key (Katz & Lindell, 2008).
Goldwasser and Micali (1982) who initiated the science of modern cryptography
(based on mathematical theory), defined what constituted strong security, and
also incorporated assumptions on computational limitations. They introduced
the notion of semantic security, which in general terms relates to the fact that
an adversary should not be able to discover any partial information from a
ciphertext. They demonstrated its equivalence to the concept of computational
indistinguishability, which is simpler to work with in formal proofs (see below)
(Katz & Lindell, 2008).
The aforementioned computational security model of cryptography, which is
based on assumptions of finite time and space resources of an adversary (within
polynomial-time) and the hardness of solving a problem, is distinct from the
information theoretic model, whose security is unconditional against unlimited
resources (computationally unbounded) and is usually based on schemes that
share secret tokens (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009). Shannon’s work focused on the
latter and first introduced the notion of perfect secrecy (Katz & Lindell, 2008). In
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fact, in order for an encryption scheme to be perfectly secret, the key space must
be as large as the message space and can only used once, which are significant
limitations on any encryption scheme (Katz & Lindell, 2008). The one-time pad
patented by Vernam (1926) is such an encryption scheme, and is the only one
proven to be perfectly secure (Sen, 2013).
Prior to the 1970s, symmetric encryption was the only type of encryption used.
This scheme uses the same key in both encryption and decryption. It is still by far
the most commonly used encryption scheme but at the time it had the limitation
that two people must have pre-exchanged the key directly in order to communicate
securely, and a di↵erent key was required for each exchange (Stallings, 2011).
Di e and Hellman (1976) revolutionised cryptography when they introduced their
work on asymmetric (public-key) encryption, which was responsible for pushing
cryptography into the public domain. In such a scheme, an individual has two
keys: a private and a public key. As suggested by their names, the public key is
widely available while only the target individual has access to the private key. In
order to send an individual a message, the public key is used for encryption while
the private key can only be used for decryption. In this way, two people do not
need to have prior agreement on a key to establish secure communication and
anyone can use the same public key to send an encrypted message to the target
individual.
Symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes are fundamentally di↵erent
in the way that they encrypt data. Symmetric encryption schemes typically
rely on permutations and substitutions, resulting in very fast encryption and
decryption times. Their security strength however cannot be formally determined
very easily and thus depend on an established track record of being unbroken over
a long period of time. Some common symmetric encryption schemes include the
56-bit key DES, the more secure triple-DES (112-bit), and the AES, which is now
adopted by the US government and is superseding DES (Stallings, 2011).
Asymmetric encryption schemes on the other hand are based on well-known
intractable mathematical problems. The best known of this type, RSA, named
after its inventors, and is based on the di cult problem of factoring the product of
two large prime integers. Another popular scheme of this type is the Di e-Hellman
(DH) scheme, which is based on the di culty of solving discrete logarithms over
finite groups (Stallings, 2011). The well-defined structure of asymmetric encryption
schemes makes them very amenable to estimating their security strength in a
formal way (Sen, 2013). Asymmetric schemes are also relatively slow compared to
symmetric schemes. DES is about 1000 times faster than RSA encryption, and
AES is typically 100 times faster in encryption and 1000 times faster in decryption
(Stallings, 2011). For this reason, hybrid systems are often employed where an
asymmetric key is used for distribution of the symmetric key, which is in turn
used for the bulk encryption of data.
In developing cryptography protocols, formal proofs are essential for sub-
stantiating any claims about a particular level of security. Formal proofs are
strongly recommended over a hit-and-miss strategy, which all too often reveal
vulnerabilities, due to subtle flaws in the encryption scheme, later down the
track. Typically, the consequential loss of confidentiality is not something that
can be easy recovered (Lagendijk et al., 2013; Lindell & Pinkas, 2009). When
evaluating the security strength of cryptography systems, it is important to take
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into consideration the information to be kept secret by particular parties; the
intentions and power of the adversary (whether they are participating or outsiders);
and the context of allowable behaviour (Lagendijk et al., 2013). The type of
attacking behaviour from the adversary includes: ciphertext-only, known-plaintext,
chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext. In ‘ciphertext-only’ attacks, the adversary
only has access to some ciphertexts (like occurs most commonly in real life), while
in ‘known-plaintext’ attacks the adversary has access to some plaintext-ciphertext
pairs. In ‘chosen’ schemes the adversary can choose which plaintext or ciphertext
to encrypt or decrypt respectively as often as they wish (Fontaine & Galand, 2007;
Sen, 2013).
Other adversarial properties to consider is how parties can be corrupted as
well as the allowable action corrupt parties can take. In the first instance, a
corruption process can be static where the numbers of corrupt and honest parties
is fixed, or adaptive which can vary during the encryption protocol depending on
information received. Secondly, the corrupt action can be modelled as semi-honest
(honest-but-curious or passive) where the adversary follows the protocol but has
access to the information of all corrupt parties; or as malicious (active) where
corrupt parties are free to deviate from the protocol (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009).
In asymmetric key encryption, since a public key is performing encryption, the
amount of ciphertext material mapped to plaintext that is available to an adversary
is unlimited. In this setting, discussion of security guarantees against adversarial
capability and strategy is reduced to the following notions, from strongest to
weakest: IND-CPA, IND-CCA1 and IND-CCA2, where ‘IND’ indicates indistin-
guishability, ‘CPA’ stands for chosen-plaintext attack, ‘CCA’ chosen-ciphertext
attack, and CCA1 and CCA2 represents non-adaptive and adaptive behaviours
respectively by the malicious adversary (Fontaine & Galand, 2007; Sen, 2013).
It should be noted that deterministic asymmetric schemes are not semantically
secure since it is trivial to generate the same ciphertext for a chosen plaintext
and thus fails the hypothetical indistinguishability test. In this way, probabilistic
encryption schemes are preferable in practice (Fontaine & Galand, 2007).
The categories above are defined in terms of a variety of hypothetical security
games between an attacker and challenger both modelled as probabilistic processes.
If the challenger wins, the cryptographic scheme is secure. Indistinguishability
informally represents the specific challenge where an adversary supplies two
plaintexts, one of which is then randomly chosen, encrypted, and then handed
back to the adversary to determine which of the two plaintexts was chosen.
With the adversary’s computational powers limited to running in PPT, the
probability of choosing the correct plaintext should not be better than 1
2
(plus
a negligible factor) (Fontaine & Galand, 2007). IND-CPA, represents the basic
public key encryption attack, where the adversary can encrypt any plaintext
message of choice in order to attempt to distinguish between the two plaintexts.
The security strength demonstrated in this case is equivalent to the notion of
semantic security. In IND-CCA, the attacker has access to a decryption oracle
that decrypts ciphertexts (except for the ciphertext being challenged) to return
the plaintexts, thereby representing a stronger form of attack (for example an
attacker with greater privileged access). The di↵erence between IND-CCA1
and IND-CCA2 reflects the adversary’s access to the plaintexts from the oracle,
either restricted to before receiving the challenge (non-adaptive) or is unlimited
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(adaptive) respectively. IND-CPA security is not adequate in the presence of
an active attacker, who could for instance, change rather than merely intercept
messages from within a network (based on the allowable adversary behaviour for
the security guarantee). Secure interactions within a network require IND-CCA
defences against an adversary (Fontaine & Galand, 2007). Although it can be
shown that any IND-CPA security guarantee can be converted to IND-CCA,
securing against the malicious adversarial model may be unrealistically aggressive
and di cult to achieve in reality. The covert adversary model is one instance of a
compromise scenario where the adversary can deviate from the protocol, but in a
way so as not to be ‘caught’ cheating (Lagendijk et al., 2013; Lindell & Pinkas,
2009).
The aforementioned description on attacker modes depicts a game-based ap-
proach for understanding security (Goldreich, Micali, & Wigderson, 1987). In
general, there are several ways encountered in the literature for providing evidence
of security, although none of them actually guarantee security. Rather, proofs
rely on demonstrating a reduction from the security of a complex model to the
security of a simpler one that can be studied, or to some underlying primitive.
Breaking a scheme would suggest that the underlying primitive is weak however
the assumption is that the problem is hard, hence the scheme is reasoned to be
secure (Bellare, 1997; Micali & Rogaway, 1991).
In concrete or exact security, explicit boundaries on the adversary’s probability
of success relative to computational e↵ort is provided. This contrasts with
asymptotic approaches to security which are less ‘exact’ in terms of relying on
reductions relative to computational assumptions that are bounded by PPT
algorithms in the size of the security input (Baigneres, 2007; Bellare, 1997). In the
former case, the traditional provable security approach achieves practical security
since it results in concrete parameters that practitioners can work with. This
approach, however, is ine cient and has had a very small impact on security
protocols used in practice (Bellare, 1997). The latter e cient computational
complexity-theoretic approach, loosely captures security parameters in ‘polynomial’
and ‘negligible probability’ concepts, albeit providing less rigorous security proofs
in practice (Bellare, 1997). Idealised models have been introduced to reconcile
this gap, by providing all parties with access to an ideal public function in order
to give some formal notion of security, which is later replaced with a standard
cryptographic construction in practice (Baigneres, 2007; Canetti, 2013). For
instance, the random oracle model is used to replace an ideal truly random
function with a hash function used in the real world. In the ideal world, the public
function is trusted (incorruptible) therefore its interactions with the parties are
limited to sending and receiving messages. For the adversary, interactions are
limited to choosing the corrupted parties’ inputs. This model is consistent with the
security properties of the overall scheme. Since in the real world there is no such
trusted external party, the proof is formulated by saying that a successful attack in
the real world by an adversary would mean there exists a similar successful attack
in the ideal world. This cannot occur therefore it is reasoned that an attack in
the real world could not occur (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009). The security guarantees
using this type approach is not as strong compared to exact security practices,
however proofs can now be performed in a more realistic model called the standard
model. This situation is much better compared to the alternative of not providing
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any formal security modelling. (Baigneres, 2007; Bellare, 1997; Sen, 2013). There
has been some controversy regarding the gap in practical security between the
ideal and standard models (Canetti, Goldreich, & Halevi, 2004), however it would
be di cult to get around this problem and any counter-argument has, so far, been
fairly contrived (Baigneres, 2007; Bellare, 1997). Idealised models have allowed for
the practical security analysis of numerous cryptographic schemes eg. employing
the random oracle model in the analysis of asymmetric cyphers (Bellare, 1997;
Sen, 2013).
In computational security, structuring convincing proofs for a newly developed
cryptographic protocol can often be quite a challenging and confusing task. As
proofs are not formal objects, time is often required for their acceptance. One
game-based approach to structuring security proofs relies on organising successive
games into a sequence. Successive games are constructed to have small changes
between them in order to simplify the analysis of the overall scheme (Baigneres,
2007; Shoup, 2004).
An alternative approach to structuring security proofs relies on Simulation-
based security models that utilise the ideal vs real world paradigm (Lindell, 2016).
The Universally Composable (UC) security framework by Canetti (2013) extends
this paradigm to allow building larger cryptographic protocols from smaller ones
while maintaining security. The set up for the framework is depicted in Figure
A.1 from Geisler (2010). The idea of the framework is to define a scenario that
includes an ideal functionality, F , to do the computation of an ideal process, which
is defined to be secure. The same protocol in the real world, ⇡, is executed by all
parties, which also includes an adversary, A, who can act in a passive or malicious
way. An environment, Z, acts as an observer and interacts with all parties in
both worlds. In the real world ((a) in Fig. A.1), Z interacts with A. In the ideal
world ((b) in Fig. A.1), Z instead interacts with a simulator, S, whose role is to
pretend to be the ‘ideal’ adversary. In the overall UC security framework, it is
up to Z to decide in which world they are operating in. If Z cannot tell (with
negligible probabilty) whether it is interacting with ⇡ and A or with S and the
ideal process for F , then ⇡ securely realises F (or ⇡ UC-realises F). Since F is
by definition secure, and by construction ⇡ must be at least secure as F , then ⇡
is also secure as a result (Canetti, 2013).
Figure A.1: Schematic representation of the Universally Composable framework:
Z - environment, A - adversary, S - simulator, F - ideal functionality, Pn -
interacting parties (Geisler, 2010)
As the environment and the adversary can freely interact in a variety of ways,
the UC framework is able to capture many types of arbitrary protocol compositions
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into larger systems, which remain UC-secure. Synchronous and asynchronous
network interactions can be represented as well as other interactions with varying
parties, inputs and programs. The compositions are formalised by the use of a
hybrid world where protocol participants interact in the real world (using standard
messages) but can make calls to an ideal functionality (using ideal messages). ⇡ is
a F -hybrid protocol that makes call to F . Further details can be found in Canetti
(2013), Geisler (2010).
By analysing the security of large protocols in the idealised hybrid model, this
framework allows for the simplification of proofs of security, compared to the
method of proving reductions to sub-protocols (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009). It has







The following SageMath code demonstrates homomorphic addition and multipli-
cation using plaintext slots and fixed encoding of real numbers developed by the
thesis’ author (and based a lot on HElib code). Demonstration is also included on
(unencrypted) slot manipulation operations based on theory found in Craig Gentry
et al. (2012).
Program B.1: Sage Code
1 #-----------Utility Methods ------------------
2 def prnt_test(disp):
3 print ’******************************** ’




8 def int_base_pad(L, i):
9 if i == len(L):
10 return L
11 else:
12 return L + [0 for _ in range(i-len(L))]
13
14
15 #-----------Encoding methods -------------
16 def conv_int_base(ptxt , base , bal):
17 bitstring = []
18 neg = 1
19
20 if (not(bal) and ptxt < 0):
21 neg = -1
22 ptxt = -ptxt
23
24 while (ptxt != 0):
25 bit = ptxt % base
26 if (bal):
27 if (bit > base //2):
28 bit -= base
29 bitstring.append(neg*bit)





35 def conv_frac_base(ptxt , base , max_dec , bal):
36 bitstring = []
37 count = 0
38
39 if (bal):
40 init_int = round(ptxt)
41 ptxt = ptxt - init_int
42 else:
43 init_int = 0
44
45 while (ptxt != 0):
46 if (count >= max_dec):
47 break
48 bit = ptxt*base
49 if (bal):
50 neg = 1 if bit >= 0 else -1
51 int_bit = neg*ceil(abs(bit) - 0.5)
52 else:
53 int_bit = int(bit)
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54 bitstring.append(int_bit)
55 ptxt = bit - int_bit
56 count += 1
57
58 return (bitstring , init_int)
59
60
61 def recov_num_fixed(poly , n, frac_s , rd, base):
62 J.<z> = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
63
64 lenp = len(poly)
65 frac_l = n-frac_s
66
67 ans = J(poly [0:lenp -frac_l ]) + J([c for c in reversed(poly[-frac_l :])])*z^-frac_l
68 ans = J(poly[frac_l -lenp :]) + J(poly [0: frac_l ])*z^-frac_l
69
70 return round(RR(ans(base)), rd)
71
72
73 def f_encode_fixed(ptxt , n, frac_s , base , bal):
74
75 ptxt = RR(ptxt) #for consistency with rationals eg. int(ptxt)
76
77 frac_l = n-frac_s
78
79 (conv_frac_w , init_int) = conv_frac_base(ptxt - int(ptxt), base , frac_l , bal)
80 conv_int_w = conv_int_base(int(ptxt + init_int), base , bal)
81
82 frac_w = [0 for _ in range(frac_l - len(conv_frac_w))] + [c for c in reversed(conv_frac_w)]
83 int_w = frac_w + conv_int_w + [0 for _ in range(frac_s - len(conv_int_w))]
84
85 return (int_w , recov_num_fixed(int_w , n, frac_s , 10, base))
86
87
88 def f_decode_fixed(res , q, n, frac_s , base):
89 T.<y> = PolynomialRing(IntegerModRing(q))
90 U.<b> = T.quotient(y^n + 1)
91 J.<z> = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
92
93 res_m = U(res.list())
94 res_z = J(res_m.list())
95
96 red = [i-q if i >= q//2 else i for i in res_z]
97
98 return (recov_num_fixed(red , n, frac_s , 10, base), red)
99
100
101 def f_encode_mod_fixed(num , q, n, frac_s , base , bal):
102 R.<x> = PolynomialRing(IntegerModRing(q))
103
104 f = x^n + 1
105
106 S.<a> = R.quotient(f)
107
108 (f_e , rn) = f_encode_fixed(num , n, frac_s , base , bal)
109
110 return(S(f_e), f_e , rn)
111
112
113 #---------Slot Encoding Methods -------
114 def absCmp(a, b):




119 largest = 0
120 index = 0
121
122 for i in range(len(orders)):
123 if absCmp(orders[i], largest):
124 largest = orders[i]
125 index = i
126
127 return (largest , index)
128
129
130 def conjClasses(classes , g, m):
131 for i in range(len(classes)):
132 if classes[i] == 0:
133 continue
134
135 if classes[i] < i:
136 classes[i] = classes[classes[i]]
137 continue
138
139 j = mod(i*g, m)
140
141 while not(classes[j] == i):
142 classes[classes[j]] = i
143 j = mod(j*g, m)
144
145
146 def compOrder(orders , classes , m):
147 for i in range(len(classes)):
148 if i == 0:
149 continue
150 if i == 1:
151 orders[i] = 1
152 continue
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153 if classes[i] == 0:
154 continue
155 if classes[i] == 1:
156 orders[i] = 1
157 continue
158
159 ord = 2
160
161 j = mod(i*i, m)
162
163 while(not(classes[j] == 1)):
164 j = mod(j*i, m)
165 ord += 1
166
167 #When we get here we have classes[j]==1, so if j!=1 it means that the
168 #order of i in the quotient group is smaller than its order in the
169 #entire group Z_m^* and then we store orders[i] = -ord.
170 if not(j == 1):
171 ord = -ord
172
173 orders[i] = ord
174
175
176 def findGenerators(m, p):
177 gens = []
178 ords = []
179
180 classes = [i if gcd(i, m) == 1 else 0 for i in range(m)]
181 orders = [0 for _ in range(m)]
182
183 #add p as a generator , thus computing the equivalence classes of (Z/mZ)^* /<p>
184 conjClasses(classes , p, m)
185
186 ordP = classes.count (1)
187
188 count = 0
189
190 while true:
191 compOrder(orders , classes , m)
192 (largest , gen) = getAbsMax(orders)
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200 conjClasses(classes , gen , m)
201
202 return (ordP , gens , ords)
203
204
205 def incr(ords , ind , ptr):
206 ind[ptr] = mod(ind[ptr] + 1, ords[ptr])
207
208 if ind[ptr] == 0:
209 incr(ords , ind , ptr -1)
210
211
212 def genT(m, p):
213 (ordP , gens , ords) = findGenerators(m, p)
214
215 ords = [abs(o) for o in ords]
216
217 T = []
218
219 nSlots = 1
220
221 for o in ords:
222 nSlots = o*nSlots
223
224 ind = [0 for _ in range(len(ords))]
225
226 ptr = len(ords) - 1
227
228 for i in range(nSlots):
229 t = 1
230
231 for j in range(len(ind)):
232 g = mod(gens[j]^ZZ(ind[j]), m)




237 incr(ords , ind , ptr)
238
239 return (T, ordP)
240
241
242 #the min_element NTL method
243 def min_element_cmp(eq1 , eq2):
244 eq1L = eq1.list()
245 eq2L = eq2.list()
246
247 min_deg = min(eq1.degree (), eq2.degree ())
248
249 for i in range(min_deg +1):
250 if eq1L[i] < eq2L[i]:
251 return True
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252 elif eq1L[i] > eq2L[i]:
253 return False
254






261 def minList(lst , swap):
262 min = lst [0]
263
264 count = 1
265 index = 0
266
267 for l in lst [1:]:
268 if min_element_cmp(l, min):
269 min = l
270 index = count
271 count += 1
272
273 if swap:
274 #return the list with smallest element in front
275 if not(index == 0):
276 tmp = lst [0]
277 lst [0] = lst[index]








286 def orderFactors(f_cycl_li , m, p, T, cycl):
287 #closely reflects PAlgebraModDerived <type >:: PAlgebraModDerived(const PAlgebra& _zMStar , long _r)
288 #from HElib PAlgebra.cpp
289
290 K = IntegerModRing(p)
291 R.<x> = PolynomialRing(K)
292
293 #not really necessary as factors lstf_cycl_li are already in order when factor in sage
294 f_cycl_li = minList(f_cycl_li , True)
295
296 F1 = f_cycl_li [0]
297
298 S = R.quotient(F1, ’a’)
299 a = S.gen()
300
301 for i in range(1, len(T)):
302 tInv = ZZ(T[i]).inverse_mod(m)
303 f_cycl_li[i] = (a^tInv).minpoly ()
304
305 #sanity check:
306 # we should have Ft= GCD(F1(X^t) mod Phi_m(X),Phi_m(X))
307 U = R.quotient(cycl , ’b’)
308 b = U.gen()
309
310 for i in range(1, len(T)):
311 t = T[i]
312 X2t = b^t
313 cm = F1(X2t)
314 Ft = cm.lift().gcd(cycl)





320 def maptoFt(lf , T, G, p):
321 R.<x> = GF(p)[]
322 mappingData_maps = []
323
324 for i in range(len(T)):
325 S.<b> = GF(p^lf[i]. degree (), modulus=lf[i])
326
327 #mapping from base -G to base -F1
328 #w in R[X]/F1(X) represents the same as X in R[X]/G(X)
329 if i == 0:
330 #special cases
331 if G == lf[i]:
332 mappingData_maps.append(x)
333 elif G.degree () == 1:
334 mappingData_maps.append(-(G.constant_coefficient ()))
335 else:
336 #work with the extension field GF_p[X]/Ft(X)
337 #G as a polynomial over the extension field
338 J.<x> = S[]
339
340 #sanity check
341 # check roots in G
342 for r in J(G).roots ():
343 assert(G(r[0]) ==0)
344
345 rL = [R(r[0]) for r in J(G).roots ()]
346 mappingData_maps.append(minList(rL, False))
347 else:
348 rF1 = mappingData_maps [0]
349
350 if rF1 == 0:
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351 w = 0
352 else:
353 #w = rF1(X^t) mod Ft(X)
354 X2t = b^T[i]
355 w = rF1(X2t)
356
357 #sanity check
358 # G(w)=0 in the extension field (Z/pZ)[X]/Ft(X)
359 # ie. w is root of G mod Ft







367 def rMaps(lf, m, p, T, G, mappingData_maps):
368 R.<x> = GF(p)[]
369 S.<a> = GF(p^G.degree (), modulus=G)
370 J.<x> = S[]
371
372 mappingData_rmaps = []
373
374 if G.degree () == 1:
375 return mappingData_rmaps;
376
377 if G == lf[0]:
378 #an important special case
379
380 for i in range(len(T)):
381 tInv = ZZ(T[i]).inverse_mod(m)
382 ct_rep = a^tInv
383
384 mappingData_rmaps.append(J([-ct_rep , 1])) # = Qi
385
386 #also can do:
387 #mappingData_rmaps.append(ct_rep)
388
389 #then to reduce CRTcomps[i](Y) mod Qi(Y), over (Z_p[X]/G(X))
390 #ppRR = [S(r(rm)) for (r, rm) in zip(ppR , mappingData_rmaps)]
391 else:
392 FRts = []
393
394 for i in range(len(T)):
395 #We need to lift Fi from R[Y] to (R[X]/G(X))[Y]
396 if i == 0:
397 Qi = J(lf[i])
398
399 #factor Fi over GF(p)[X]/G(X)
400 #FrobeniusMap: Frb = power_mod(J(x), p^lf.degree (), Qi)
401 #FRts = EDF(Qi , Frb , power_mod(J(x), p, Qi), lf.degree ()/G.degree ())
402 QiF = Qi.factor ()
403 FRts = [a for (a,b) in QiF]
404 else:
405 tInv = ZZ(T[i]).inverse_mod(m)
406
407 #need to choose the right factor , the one that gives us back X
408 for j in range(len(FRts)):
409 #lift maps[i] to (R[X]/G(X))[Y] and reduce mod j’th factor of Fi
410 if i == 0:
411 FRtsj = FRts[j]
412 else:
413 M.<s> = J.quotient(FRts[j])
414 #M.<s> = GF(p^FRts[j]. degree (), modulus=FRts[j]) - probably works (try)‘
415 # below not required as calculated from field defined above
416 #X2tInv = power_mod(J(x), tInv , FRts[j])
417 FRtsj = (s^tInv).minpoly ()
418
419 #FRtsj is the jth factor of factors[i] over the extension field.
420 #For j > 0, we save some time by computing it from the jth factor
421 #of factors [0] via a minimal polynomial computation.
422 GRti = J(mappingData_maps[i]) % FRtsj
423
424 #is GRti == X?, If so, we found the right factor , otherwise move to the next factor of Fi
425 #(might be able to optimise this more since the right factor appears to come at the same
426 # position for each j)
427 if GRti.constant_coefficient () == S([0, 1]):






434 def crtCalc(alpha , maps , lf, p):
435 K = IntegerModRing(p)
436 R.<x> = PolynomialRing(K)
437
438 S = R.quotient(lf, ’x’)





444 def crtCalcList(f_cycl_li , ptxt , mappingData_maps , p):
445 crtL = []
446
447 for i in range(len(f_cycl_li)):






453 def CRTcombine(ptxt , f_cycl_li , mappingData_maps , p, cycl):
454 K = IntegerModRing(p)
455 R.<x> = PolynomialRing(K)
456 R_p = K[’x’]. quotient(cycl , ’x’)
457
458 crtL = crtCalcList(f_cycl_li , ptxt , mappingData_maps , p)
459
460 #combine slots into one ploynomial





466 def decode(ptxt , f_cycl_li , mappingData_rmaps , p, G):
467 K = IntegerModRing(p)
468 R.<x> = PolynomialRing(K)
469
470 #lift i’th CRT componnet (ppR) to mod G(X) (?)
471 ppR = [ptxt.mod(fc) for fc in f_cycl_li]
472
473 #usual case where have free terms (integers) only
474 if G.degree () == 1:
475 return ppR
476
477 #reduce CRTcomps[i](Y) mod Qi(Y), over (Z_2[X]/G(X))
478 #the free term (no Y component) should be the answer (as a poly(X))





484 def fillIndivSlots(blst , f_cycl_li , p):
485 K = IntegerModRing(p)
486 R.<x> = PolynomialRing(K)
487
488 ptxt = []
489
490 for i in range(len(f_cycl_li)):








499 def fillSlots(blst , f_cycl_li , p):
500 K = IntegerModRing(p)
501 R.<x> = PolynomialRing(K)
502
503 ptxt = []
504






511 #-----------LPR methods -------------
512 def Gaussian(stddev):
513 bignum = int(hex(0 xfffffff), 16)
514
515 r1 = RR(1 + randint(0,bignum -1))/( bignum +1)
516 r2 = RR(1 + randint(0,bignum -1))/( bignum +1)
517
518 theta = 2*pi.n()*r1
519 rr = sqrt ( -2.0* log(r2))*stddev
520
521 return (theta , rr)
522
523
524 def sampleGaussian(N, stddev):
525 #Box -Muller method to get two Normal(0, stdev ^2) variables
526 tailcut =5
527 upper_bound = ZZ(round(stddev*tailcut))
528
529 n = ZZ(euler_phi(N))
530
531 P = ZZ[’x’]
532
533 coeff = []
534
535 for i in range(0, n, 2):
536
537 (theta , rr) = Gaussian(stddev)
538 x1 = floor(rr*cos(theta)+0.5)
539 x2 = floor(rr*sin(theta)+0.5)
540
541 while (abs(x1) or abs(x2)) > upper_bound:
542 (theta , rr) = Gaussian(stddev)
543 x1 = floor(rr*cos(theta)+0.5)
544 x2 = floor(rr*sin(theta)+0.5)
545










555 def chooseQ(q, p):
556 max_prime_rng =10000
557
558 for i in range(max_prime_rng):
559 q = ZZ(next_prime(q))
560
561 if mod(q, p) == 1:
562 return q
563
564 raise TypeError("Max ’q’ search reached.")
565
566
567 def LPR_PubKeyGen(N, p, q, poly , stddev , s):
568
569 K = IntegerModRing(q)
570 R_q = K[’x’]. quotient(poly , ’x’)
571
572 e = sampleGaussian(N, stddev)
573 a1 = R_q.random_element ()
574
575 return (-(a1*s + p*e), a1)
576
577
578 def LPR_Encrypt(b, N, p, q, poly , (a0, a1), stddev):
579 K = IntegerModRing(q)
580 R_q = K[’x’]. quotient(poly , ’x’)
581
582 u = sampleGaussian(N, stddev)
583 g = sampleGaussian(N, stddev)
584 h = sampleGaussian(N, stddev)
585
586 c0 = R_q(a0)*u + p*g + R_q(b)
587 c1 = R_q(a1)*u + p*h
588
589 return (c0 , c1)
590
591
592 def LPR_Decrypt(N, p, q, (c0 , c1), s):
593 dec = c0 + c1*s
594
595 # based on encoding method
596 K2 = IntegerModRing(p)
597 R_p = K2[’x’]
598
599 q2 = q//2
600
601 S = dec.lift().change_ring(ZZ).list()
602
603 reduce_S = [e if e <= q2 else e-q for e in S]
604
605 decRes = R_p(reduce_S).list()
606
607 #correct for short polynomials
608 if len(decRes) < euler_phi(N):
609 decRes = decRes + [0 for _ in range(euler_phi(N) - len(decRes))]
610
611 return (R_p(reduce_S), decRes)
612
613
614 #-----------Key Switching Methods ---------
615 def LPR_BaseDecomp_Ring(N, p, q, poly , c, i):
616 K = IntegerModRing(q)
617 R_q = K[’x’]. quotient(poly , ’x’)
618
619 bd_poly = [R_q([ int_base_pad(conv_int_base(ZZ(d), p, false), i)[l_sh] for d in c.list()]) for l_sh in
,! range(i)]
620
621 MR_q = MatrixSpace(R_q , 1, i)





627 def LPR_PowersofP_Ring(p, s, i):
628 e = [p^x for x in range(i)]
629
630 return [s*l for l in e]
631
632
633 def LPR_KS_KeyGen(N, p, q, poly , stddev , s1, s2 , i):
634 K = IntegerModRing(q)
635 R_q = K[’x’]. quotient(poly , ’x’)
636
637 L = [LPR_PubKeyGen(N, p, q, poly , stddev , s2) for _ in range(i)]
638 Ai = [x[1] for x in L]
639 Pi = [x[0] for x in L]
640
641 M1R_q = MatrixSpace(R_q , i, 1)
642
643 aR_q = [R_q(list(arq)) for arq in Ai]
644 pR_q = [R_q(list(prq)) for prq in Pi]
645
646 AR_qi = M1R_q.matrix(aR_q)
219
647 PR_qi = M1R_q.matrix(pR_q)
648
649 PofP = LPR_PowersofP_Ring(p, s1 , i)
650 PofP_R_q = [R_q(prq) for prq in PofP]
651 PP_R_q = M1R_q.matrix(PofP_R_q)
652
653 PR_qi = PR_qi + PP_R_q
654
655 return (AR_qi , PR_qi)
656
657
658 def LPR_reLin_KS(N, p, q, poly , stddev , s1, s2, c0_str , c1_str , c2_str):
659 K = IntegerModRing(q)
660 R_q = K[’x’]. quotient(poly , ’x’)
661
662 i = ceil(log(q, p))
663
664 BD_ciph = LPR_BaseDecomp_Ring(N, p, q, poly , c2_str , i)
665
666 #Hi is the relinearisation key
667 if not(c1_str == 0): #key -switching for multiplication
668 assert(s2 == 0)
669 Hi = LPR_KS_KeyGen(N, p, q, poly , stddev , s1*s1, s1 , i)
670 else: #key -switching
671 Hi = LPR_KS_KeyGen(N, p, q, poly , stddev , s1, s2, i)
672
673 #note: BD_ciph*PowerofP == c2_str
674 ciph2_0 = (BD_ciph*Hi[1] + c0_str)[0][0]
675 ciph2_1 = (BD_ciph*Hi[0] + c1_str)[0][0]
676
677 return (ciph2_0 , ciph2_1)
678
679
680 #-----------Modulus Switching Methods ---------
681 def rtMod(c, i, p):
682
683 """
684 #for p = 2 only
685 if floor(c)&1 == mod(i, p):
686 return round(c - 0.5)
687 else:
688 return round(c + 0.5)
689 """
690
691 diff = ZZ(i)%p - c%p
692
693 if abs(diff) <= p/2:
694 return round(diff + c)
695 else:
696 return round(diff - p + c)
697
698
699 def Scale(ciph1 , q1 , q2 , p, poly):
700
701 K = IntegerModRing(q2)
702 R_q2 = K[’x’]. quotient(poly , ’x’)
703
704 qdiv = q2/q1
705
706 #need to adjust precision for very large q’s else mod won’t work
707 prec = round(log(q1 , 2))
708
709 return (R_q2([ rtMod(i.n(prec)*qdiv , i, p) for i in (ciph1 [0]).list()]), R_q2([ rtMod(i.n(prec)*qdiv , i,
,! p) for i in (ciph1 [1]).list()]))
710
711
712 #-----------Display Interface ---------
713 def LPR_HE_Frac_Slot_Disp_Fixed(test=false , ms=false , f=’mult’, G=x^32+44 , num_list =[3.25 , 1.5, 2.6]):
714 # this is p cut -off at p^40; otherwise try modulus switching
715
716 N = 512
717 p = 241
718 n = euler_phi(N)
719
720 #parameters for each slot
721 nS = 32 #nS = 16 - similar to EncodingSlots () in HElib
722 base = 3; bal = true
723 frac_l = 9
724 frac_s = nS - frac_l
725
726 stddev = 3.19
727 q = chooseQ (2^60, p)
728 q1 = q
729
730 K = IntegerModRing(p)
731 R.<x> = PolynomialRing(K)
732 poly = R(cyclotomic_polynomial(N, ’x’))
733 R_p = K[’x’]. quotient(poly , ’x’)
734
735 s = sampleGaussian(N, stddev)
736 pubKey = LPR_PubKeyGen(N, p, q, poly , stddev , s)
737
738 (T, ordP) = genT(N, p)
739
740 f_cycl_li = [l for (l, _) in list(poly.factor ())]
741 f_cycl_li = orderFactors(f_cycl_li , N, p, T, poly)
742
743 assert(len(T) == len(f_cycl_li))




747 G = R(G)
748 S.<a> = GF(p^G.degree (), modulus=G)
749
750 mappingData_maps = maptoFt(f_cycl_li , T, G, p)
751 mappingData_rmaps = rMaps(f_cycl_li , N, p, T, G, mappingData_maps)
752
753 flag = false
754 flag_mod = false
755 count = 0
756 level = len(num_list) -2
757
758 for nl in num_list:
759 (enc , encL , _) = f_encode_mod_fixed(nl, p, nS, frac_s , base , bal)
760
761 assert(len(encL) <= G.degree ())
762
763 ptxt = fillSlots(encL , f_cycl_li , p)
764 pp = CRTcombine(ptxt , f_cycl_li , mappingData_maps , p, poly)
765
766 ciph = LPR_Encrypt(pp, N, p, q1, poly , pubKey , stddev)
767
768 count += 1
769
770 if flag_mod:
771 ciph = Scale(ciph , q1, q, p, poly)
772
773 if not(flag):
774 ptxt_tot = nl
775 ciph_tot = (ciph[0], ciph [1])
776 flag = true
777 elif f == ’add’:
778 ptxt_tot += nl
779 ciph_tot = (ciph_tot [0] + ciph[0], ciph_tot [1] + ciph [1])
780 else:
781 print ’Level: ’ + str(level) + ’, q= ’ + str(q)
782 ptxt_tot *= nl
783 c0_str = ciph_tot [0]* ciph [0]
784 c1_str = ciph_tot [0]* ciph [1] + ciph_tot [1]* ciph [0]
785 c2_str = ciph_tot [1]* ciph [1]
786
787 # key switching. Can generate the KS matrices earlier to remove the requirement for using s here
788 ciph_tot = LPR_reLin_KS(N, p, q, poly , stddev , s, 0, c0_str , c1_str , c2_str)
789
790 #modulus switching
791 if ms and level > 0:
792 q1 = q
793 q2 = chooseQ(q//2, p)
794 ciph_tot = Scale(ciph_tot , q1 , q2, p, poly)
795 #pubKey = LPR_PubKeyGen(N, p, q2, poly , stddev , s)
796 q = q2
797 flag_mod = true
798 level -= 1
799
800 (dec , decL) = LPR_Decrypt(N, p, q, ciph_tot , s)
801
802 ppRR = decode(dec , f_cycl_li , mappingData_rmaps , p, G)
803
804 fdL = []
805 fdLL = []
806
807 if not(f == ’add’):
808 frac_s = nS - frac_l*count
809
810 for pR in ppRR:




815 print ’Direct ’ + str(f) + ’:’
816 print round(ptxt_tot , 10)





822 if f == ’add’:
823 for fi in fdL:
824 assert(round(ptxt_tot , 2) == round(fi , 2))
825 else:
826 for fi in fdL [1:]:
827 assert(round(ptxt_tot , 2) == round(fi , 2))
828 prnt_test(’LPR_HE_Frac_Slot_Disp_Fixed(’ + f + ’)’)
829
830
831 def Slot_Encoder_AutoMorph(test , b_list , m, p, k=None , G=None , verbose=False):
832 n = euler_phi(m)
833
834 K = IntegerModRing(p)
835 R.<x> = PolynomialRing(K)
836 cycl = R(cyclotomic_polynomial(m, ’x’))
837 R_p = K[’x’]. quotient(cycl , ’x’)
838
839 #classes () method to find generators
840 (T, ordP) = genT(m, p)
841
842 print ’m: ’ + str(m) + ’; p: ’ + str(p) + ’; ordP: ’ + str(ordP)
843
221
844 f_cycl_li = [l for (l, _) in list(cycl.factor ())]
845 f_cycl_li = orderFactors(f_cycl_li , m, p, T, cycl)
846
847 assert(len(T) == len(f_cycl_li))
848 assert(ordP == f_cycl_li [0]. degree ())
849
850 #irreducible poly
851 if G == None:
852 G = R.irreducible_element(ordP)
853 else:
854 G = R(G)
855
856 if (verbose):
857 print ’cyclotomic polynomial: ’
858 print cycl
859
860 print ’f_cycl_li: ’
861 print f_cycl_li
862
863 print ’irreducible poly: ’ + str(G)
864
865 S.<a> = GF(p^G.degree (), modulus=G)
866 J.<x> = S[]
867
868 mappingData_maps = maptoFt(f_cycl_li , T, G, p)
869 mappingData_rmaps = rMaps(f_cycl_li , m, p, T, G, mappingData_maps)
870
871 for bl in b_list:
872 assert ((0 if type(bl) == Integer else len(bl)) <= G.degree ())
873
874 ptxt = fillIndivSlots(b_list , f_cycl_li , p)
875 pp = CRTcombine(ptxt , f_cycl_li , mappingData_maps , p, cycl)
876
877 if k == None:
878 automorph = pp
879 else:
880 automorph = R(pp(R(k)))
881
882 ppRR = decode(automorph , f_cycl_li , mappingData_rmaps , p, G)
883
884 print ’Slot encoded with automorphism: ’ + str(k)
885 print ppRR
886
887 print ’********* ’
888
889 if (test):
890 if type(ppRR [0]) == sage.rings.polynomial.polynomial_zmod_flint.Polynomial_zmod_flint:
891 for bl in b_list:
892 assert(bl[0] in ppRR)
893 else:
894 max = 0
895 for bl in b_list:
896 if max < len(bl):
897 max = len(bl)
898
899 b_list = [int_base_pad(bl, max) for bl in b_list]
900 ppRR = [int_base_pad(pr , max) if len(pr) > 0 else [] for pr in ppRR]
901 for bl in b_list:




906 #slot encoding without encryption; illustrating examples in ’2012 c_BGV_FHE_polylog_best_slots ’
907
908 #Slot_Encoder_AutoMorph(test , b_list , m, p, G, k)
909 Slot_Encoder_AutoMorph(test , [[1], [2], [3]], 11, 23, G=x)
910 Slot_Encoder_AutoMorph(test , [[1], [2], [3]], 11, 23, k=x^3, G=x)
911 Slot_Encoder_AutoMorph(test , [[1], [0, 1], [0, 0, 1]], 31, 2)
912 Slot_Encoder_AutoMorph(test , [[1], [0, 1], [0, 0, 1]], 31, 2, k=x^6)
913 Slot_Encoder_AutoMorph(test , [[1], [0, 1], [0, 0, 1]], 31, 2, k=x^26)
914 Slot_Encoder_AutoMorph(test , [[1], [0, 1], [0, 0, 1]], 257, 2)
915 #below should fail if test == true
916 if not(test):
917 Slot_Encoder_AutoMorph(test , [[1], [0, 1], [0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 0,
,! 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 0,0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0,
,! 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
,! 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1],
,! [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
,! 0, 1]], 257, 2, k=x^3)
918 #Slot_Encoder_AutoMorph(test , [[1], [0, 1], [0, 0, 1], [], [], [], [], [], [], [], [], [], [], [],
,! [], [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]], 257, 2, k=x^3)








927 print ’------------Start Testing ---------------’
928 print
929
930 #change modulus irreducible polynomial & slot encoding
931 # +/- frac encoding +/- mod switching
932 LPR_HE_Frac_Slot_Disp_Fixed(test , false , f=’add’, G=x^32+7)
933 LPR_HE_Frac_Slot_Disp_Fixed(test , true , f=’mult’, G=x^32+7)













6Encrypted add and decrypt with slots:




11Level: 1, q= 1152921504606851557
12Level: 0, q= 576460752303425779
13Direct mult:
1412.675
15Encrypted mult and decrypt with slots:





20m: 11; p: 23; ordP: 1
21Slot encoded with automorphism: None
22[1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
23*********
24m: 11; p: 23; ordP: 1
25Slot encoded with automorphism: x^3
26[3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2]
27*********
28m: 31; p: 2; ordP: 5
29Slot encoded with automorphism: None
30[[1], [0, 1], [0, 0, 1], [], [], []]
31*********
32m: 31; p: 2; ordP: 5
33Slot encoded with automorphism: x^6
34[[], [1], [0, 1], [0, 0, 1], [], []]
35*********
36m: 31; p: 2; ordP: 5
37Slot encoded with automorphism: x^26
38[[0, 1], [0, 0, 1], [], [], [], [1]]
39*********
40m: 257; p: 2; ordP: 16
41Slot encoded with automorphism: None
42[[1], [0, 1], [0, 0, 1], [], [], [], [], [], [], [], [], [], [], [], [], []]
43*********
44********************************







C.1 Basic Neural Network Architecture
The following 2-FC NN architecture with BGD implemented in Python is a
modification of the basic code found in Trask (2019). The code is a prototype
implementation of the basic network design used to test NN training performance
on the MNIST handwriting database discussed in Section 5.2.3.
Program C.1: Basic NN Prototype Code
1 #!/usr/bin/env python3
2
3 import numpy as np , sys
4 import tensorflow as tf
5 import matplotlib.pyplot as plt





11 from keras.datasets import mnist
12





18 x_train_crop = x_train[:, 2:-2, 2:-2]
19 x_test_crop = x_test[:, 2:-2, 2:-2]
20
21 reshape_x_train = x_train_crop.reshape ([-1,24,24,1])
22 reshape_x_test = x_test_crop.reshape ([-1,24,24,1])
23
24 resized_x_train = tf.image.resize(reshape_x_train , size=[8, 8], method=tf.image.ResizeMethod.BICUBIC ,
,! preserve_aspect_ratio=True , antialias=True)
25 resized_x_test = tf.image.resize(reshape_x_test , size=[8, 8], method=tf.image.ResizeMethod.BICUBIC ,
,! preserve_aspect_ratio=True , antialias=True)
26
27 resized_x_train = np.float64(tf.reshape(resized_x_train , [-1,8,8]))
28 resized_x_test = np.float64(tf.reshape(resized_x_test , [-1,8,8]))
29
30 images , labels = (resized_x_train.reshape (60000 ,8*8) / 255, y_train [0:60000])
31 test_images = resized_x_test.reshape(len(resized_x_test) ,8*8) / 255
32
33 alpha , iterations , hidden_size1 , hidden_size2 = (1, 50, 32, 16)
34 pixels_per_image , num_labels = (64, 10)
35
36 one_hot_labels = np.zeros ((len(labels) ,10))
37 for i,l in enumerate(labels):
38 one_hot_labels[i][l] = 1
39 labels = one_hot_labels
40
41 test_labels = np.zeros ((len(y_test) ,10))
42 for i,l in enumerate(y_test):
43 test_labels[i][l] = 1
44
45 def relu(*args):
46 return (args [0] > 0) * args [0]
47
48 def relu2deriv (*args):
49 return args [0] > 0
50
51 batch_size = 64
52
53 weights_0_1 = 0.2*np.random.random (( pixels_per_image ,hidden_size1)) -0.1
224
54 weights_1_2 = 0.2*np.random.random (( hidden_size1 ,hidden_size2)) - 0.1
55 weights_2_3 = 0.02*np.random.random (( hidden_size2 ,num_labels)) - 0.01
56
57 for j in range(iterations):
58 correct_cnt = 0
59 for i in range(int(len(images) / batch_size)):
60 batch_start , batch_end =((i * batch_size) ,((i+1)*batch_size))
61 layer_0 = images[batch_start:batch_end]
62 layer_1 = relu(np.dot(layer_0 ,weights_0_1))
63 layer_2 = relu(np.dot(layer_1 ,weights_1_2))
64 layer_3 = np.dot(layer_2 ,weights_2_3)
65
66 for k in range(batch_size):
67 correct_cnt += int(np.argmax(layer_3[k:k+1]) == np.argmax(labels[batch_start+k:batch_start+k
,! +1]))
68
69 layer_3_delta = (2/( batch_size *10)) * (labels[batch_start:batch_end] - layer_3)
70 layer_2_delta = layer_3_delta.dot(weights_2_3.T) * relu2deriv(layer_2)
71 layer_1_delta = layer_2_delta.dot(weights_1_2.T) * relu2deriv(layer_1)
72
73 weights_2_3 += alpha * layer_2.T.dot(layer_3_delta)
74 weights_1_2 += alpha * layer_1.T.dot(layer_2_delta)
75 weights_0_1 += alpha * layer_0.T.dot(layer_1_delta)
76
77 test_correct_cnt = 0
78
79 for i in range(len(test_images)):
80
81 layer_0 = test_images[i:i+1]
82 layer_1 = relu(np.dot(layer_0 ,weights_0_1))
83 layer_2 = relu(np.dot(layer_1 ,weights_1_2))
84 layer_3 = np.dot(layer_2 ,weights_2_3)
85
86 test_correct_cnt += int(np.argmax(layer_3) == np.argmax(test_labels[i:i+1]))
87
88 if(j % 10 == 0):
89 sys.stdout.write("\n"+ \
90 "I:" + str(j) + \
91 " Test -Acc:"+str(test_correct_cnt/float(len(test_images)))+\
92 " Train -Acc:" + str(correct_cnt/float(len(images))))
C.2 Modified Neural Network Architecture
The following prototype code is a modification of the basic NN architecture
code from the previous Section C.1. It accommodates HE-compatible block-wise
operations to be eventually implemented in C++ for the HEB-based NN training
demonstration in Section 5.2.3. This code requires the hefunct library found in
the next section below.
Program C.2: Block-wise NN Prototype Code
1 #!/usr/bin/env python3
2
3 import numpy as np , sys
4 import tensorflow as tf
5 import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
6





12 from keras.datasets import mnist
13
14 activation = None
15 activ2deriv = None
16 outputactivation = None
17 outputactiv2deriv = None
18
19 (x_train , y_train), (x_test , y_test) = mnist.load_data ()
20
21 x_train_crop = x_train[:, 2:-2, 2:-2]
22 x_test_crop = x_test[:, 2:-2, 2:-2]
23
24 reshape_x_train = x_train_crop.reshape ([-1,24,24,1])
25 reshape_x_test = x_test_crop.reshape ([-1,24,24,1])
26
27 resized_x_train = tf.image.resize(reshape_x_train , size=[8, 8], method=tf.image.ResizeMethod.BICUBIC ,
,! preserve_aspect_ratio=True , antialias=True)
28 resized_x_test = tf.image.resize(reshape_x_test , size=[8, 8], method=tf.image.ResizeMethod.BICUBIC ,
,! preserve_aspect_ratio=True , antialias=True)
29
30 resized_x_train = np.float64(tf.reshape(resized_x_train , [-1,8,8]))
31 resized_x_test = np.float64(tf.reshape(resized_x_test , [-1,8,8]))
32
33 images , labels = (resized_x_train.reshape (60000 ,8*8) / 255, y_train [0:60000])
34
35 one_hot_labels = np.zeros ((len(labels) ,10))
36 for i,l in enumerate(labels):
225
37 one_hot_labels[i][l] = 1
38 labels = one_hot_labels
39
40 test_images = resized_x_test.reshape(len(resized_x_test) ,8*8) / 255
41 test_labels = np.zeros ((len(y_test) ,10))
42 for i,l in enumerate(y_test):
43 test_labels[i][l] = 1
44
45 def relu(*args):
46 return (args [0] > 0) * args [0]
47
48 def relu2deriv (*args):
49 return args [0] > 0
50
51
52 alpha , iterations , hidden_size1 , hidden_size2 = (1, 1, 32, 16)
53 pixels_per_image , num_labels = (64, 10)
54
55 batch_size = 64
56
57 dim = 16
58 check = True
59
60 weights_0_1 = 0.2*np.random.random (( pixels_per_image ,hidden_size1)) -0.1
61 weights_1_2 = 0.2*np.random.random (( hidden_size1 ,hidden_size2)) - 0.1
62 weights_2_3 = 0.02*np.random.random (( hidden_size2 ,num_labels)) - 0.01
63
64 #unencrypted -> encrypt:
65 weights_0_1_blks = sepBlocks(list(weights_0_1.reshape (-1)), dim , 32)
66 weights_1_2_blks = sepBlocks(list(weights_1_2.reshape (-1)), dim , 16)
67 weights_2_3_h0 = list(np.hstack (( weights_2_3 , np.zeros ((16 ,6)))).reshape(-1, dim*dim))
68
69 for j in range(iterations):
70 correct_cnt = 0
71 #for i in range(int(len(images) / batch_size)):
72 for i in range (1):
73 batch_start , batch_end =((i * batch_size) ,((i+1)*batch_size))
74
75 layer_0_blks = sepBlocks(images[batch_start:batch_end ]. reshape (-1), dim , 64) #unencrypted ->
,! encrypt
76
77 layer_1_blks = blockMulti_calc(layer_0_blks , weights_0_1_blks , dim , 64, 64, 32)
78 layer_1_blks = relu(np.array(layer_1_blks).reshape(-1, dim*dim))
79
80 layer_2_blks = blockMulti_calc(layer_1_blks , weights_1_2_blks , dim , 64, 32, 16)
81 layer_2_blks = relu(np.array(layer_2_blks).reshape(-1, dim*dim))
82
83 labels_h0 = np.hstack (( labels[batch_start:batch_end], np.zeros ((64 ,6)))) #unencrypted -> encrypt
84 labels_h0_blks = sepBlocks(list(labels_h0.reshape (-1)), dim , 16)
85
86 layer_3_h0_blks = blockMulti_calc(layer_2_blks , weights_2_3_h0 , dim , 64, 16, 16)
87 layer_3_h0_blks = np.array(layer_3_h0_blks)
88
89 #decrypt
90 layer_3_h0 = np.array(combBlocks(layer_3_h0_blks , dim , 16)).reshape (64, 16)
91 layer_3_ = np.delete(layer_3_h0 ,np.s_[10:] , axis =1)
92
93 for k in range(batch_size):




97 layer_3_delta_h0_blks = (2/( batch_size *10)) * (labels_h0_blks - layer_3_h0_blks)
98
99 weights_2_3_h0_trans = blockTrans_calc(weights_2_3_h0 , dim , 16, 16)
100 layer_2_delta_blks = blockMulti_calc(layer_3_delta_h0_blks , weights_2_3_h0_trans , dim , 64, 16, 16)
,! * relu2deriv(layer_2_blks)
101
102 weights_1_2_blks_trans = blockTrans_calc(weights_1_2_blks , dim , 32, 16)
103 layer_1_delta_blks = blockMulti_calc(layer_2_delta_blks , weights_1_2_blks_trans , dim , 64, 16, 32) *
,! relu2deriv(layer_1_blks)
104
105 layer_2_blks_trans = blockTrans_calc(layer_2_blks , dim , 64, 16)
106 weights_2_3_h0 += alpha * np.array(blockMulti_calc(layer_2_blks_trans , layer_3_delta_h0_blks , dim ,
,! 16, 64, 16))
107
108 layer_1_blks_trans = blockTrans_calc(layer_1_blks , dim , 64, 32)
109 weights_1_2_blks += alpha * np.array(blockMulti_calc(layer_1_blks_trans , layer_2_delta_blks , dim ,
,! 32, 64, 16))
110
111 layer_0_blks_trans = blockTrans_calc(layer_0_blks , dim , 64, 64)
112 weights_0_1_blks += alpha * np.array(blockMulti_calc(layer_0_blks_trans , layer_1_delta_blks , dim ,




116 layer_0 = images[batch_start:batch_end]
117 layer_1 = relu(np.dot(layer_0 ,weights_0_1))
118 layer_2 = relu(np.dot(layer_1 ,weights_1_2))
119 layer_3 = np.dot(layer_2 ,weights_2_3)
120
121 layer_3_delta = (2/( batch_size *10))*( labels[batch_start:batch_end] - layer_3)
122 layer_2_delta = layer_3_delta.dot(weights_2_3.T) * relu2deriv(layer_2)
123 layer_1_delta = layer_2_delta.dot(weights_1_2.T) * relu2deriv(layer_1)
124 #end code
125
126 assert(np.allclose(layer_3 , layer_3_))
127




131 layer_3_delta_h0 = np.array(combBlocks(layer_3_delta_h0_blks , dim , 16)).reshape (64, 16)
132 layer_3_delta_ = np.delete(layer_3_delta_h0 ,np.s_[10:] , axis =1)
133 assert(np.allclose(layer_3_delta , layer_3_delta_))
134
135 layer_1_delta_ = np.array(combBlocks(layer_1_delta_blks , dim , 32)).reshape (64, 32)
136 assert(np.allclose(layer_1_delta , layer_1_delta_))
137
138 #code
139 weights_2_3 += alpha * layer_2.T.dot(layer_3_delta)
140 weights_1_2 += alpha * layer_1.T.dot(layer_2_delta)
141 weights_0_1 += alpha * layer_0.T.dot(layer_1_delta)
142 #end code
143
144 weights_0_1_ = np.array(combBlocks(weights_0_1_blks , dim , 32)).reshape (64, 32)
145 assert(np.allclose(weights_0_1 , weights_0_1_))
146
147 weights_1_2_ = np.array(combBlocks(weights_1_2_blks , dim , 16)).reshape (32, 16)
148 assert(np.allclose(weights_1_2 , weights_1_2_))
149
150 weights_2_3_ = np.array(weights_2_3_h0).reshape (16, 16)[:, :-6]
151 assert(np.allclose(weights_2_3 , weights_2_3_))
152
153 #decrypt:
154 weights_0_1_ = np.array(combBlocks(weights_0_1_blks , dim , 32)).reshape (64, 32)
155 weights_1_2_ = np.array(combBlocks(weights_1_2_blks , dim , 16)).reshape (32, 16)
156 weights_2_3_ = np.array(weights_2_3_h0).reshape (16, 16)[:, :-6]
157
158 test_correct_cnt = 0
159
160 for i in range(len(test_images)):
161 layer_0_ = test_images[i:i+1]
162 layer_1_ = relu(np.dot(layer_0_ ,weights_0_1_))
163 layer_2_ = relu(np.dot(layer_1_ ,weights_1_2_))
164 layer_3_ = np.dot(layer_2_ ,weights_2_3_)
165
166 if check:
167 layer_0 = test_images[i:i+1]
168 layer_1 = relu(np.dot(layer_0 ,weights_0_1))
169 layer_2 = relu(np.dot(layer_1 ,weights_1_2))
170 layer_3 = np.dot(layer_2 ,weights_2_3)
171
172 assert(np.allclose(layer_3 , layer_3_))
173
174 test_correct_cnt += int(np.argmax(layer_3_) == np.argmax(test_labels[i:i+1]))
175
176 if(j % 10 == 0):
177 sys.stdout.write("\n"+ \
178 "I:" + str(j) + \
179 " Test -Acc:"+str(test_correct_cnt/float(len(test_images)))+\
180 " Train -Acc:" + str(correct_cnt/float(len(images))))
C.3 hefunct library
The hefunct library is a Python implementation of the HE-friendly vector-matrix
multiplication routines described by Xiaoqian Jiang et al. (2018) in the plaintext
domain, for which there is an available open-source C++ implementation based
on the HEAAN HE library called HEMat (see Section 5.2.3). The contained
operations enable the basic routines required by the modified NN code found in
Section C.2 above.
Program C.3: hefunct library Code
1 #!/usr/bin/env python3
2





8 def convTrans(M, y, z):




13 def sepBlocks(P, dim , y):
14 n = len(P)
15 blks_n = int(n/(dim **2))
16
17 dimM = int(y / dim)
18
19 res = [0 for _ in range(blks_n)]
20
21 for i in range(blks_n):
22 res[i] = [0 for _ in range(dim **2)]
23 for j in range(dim **2):






29 def combBlocks(P, dim , y):
30 n = len(P[0])
31 blks_n = len(P)
32
33 dimM = int(y / dim)
34
35 res = [0 for _ in range(n*blks_n)]
36
37 for i in range(blks_n):
38 for j in range(n):





44 def leftRotate(cipher , rotSlots):
45 nslots = len(cipher)
46 remrotSlots = int(rotSlots) % nslots
47 res = [0 for _ in range(nslots)]
48
49 for i in range(nslots):




54 def rightRotate(cipher , rotSlots):
55 nslots = len(cipher)
56 remrotSlots = int(rotSlots) % nslots
57 res = [0 for _ in range(nslots)]
58
59 for i in range(nslots):





65 def msgleftRotate(vals , nrot , nslots):
66 res = [0 for _ in range(nslots)]
67
68 nshift = nrot % nslots
69 k = nslots - nshift
70
71 for j in range(k):
72 res[j] = vals[j + nshift]
73
74 for j in range(k, nslots):





80 def msgrightRotate(vals , nrot , nslots):
81 res = [0 for _ in range(nslots)]
82
83 nshift = nrot % nslots
84 k = nslots - nrot
85
86 for j in range(k):
87 res[nshift + j] = vals[j]
88
89 for j in range(k, nslots):





95 def Hadamard_MultPoly_calc(Actxts , Bctxts , num):
96 num1 = num - 1
97
98 res = multByPoly_calc(Actxts [0], Bctxts [0])
99
100 for i in range(num1):
101 i1 = (i + 1)
102 Actxts[i1] = multByPoly_calc(Actxts[i1], Bctxts[i1])
103
104 for i in range(1, num):




109 def subPoly_calc(cipher1 , cipher2):
110 assert(len(cipher1) == len(cipher2))
111





117 def shiftBycols_calc(cipher , k, shiftpoly):
118 dim = int(np.sqrt(len(cipher)))
119
120 ctemp = multByPoly_calc(cipher , shiftpoly[k-1])
121 res = subPoly_calc(cipher , ctemp)
122 ctemp = rightRotate(ctemp , dim - k)
123 res = leftRotate(res , k)
228




128 def addPoly_calc(cipher1 , cipher2):
129 assert(len(cipher1) == len(cipher2))
130





136 def multByPoly_calc(cipher , poly):
137 assert(len(cipher) == len(poly))
138





144 def genInitCtxt_calc(M, N, Initpoly , verbose):
145
146 dim = int(np.sqrt(len(M)))
147 dim1 = dim - 1
148 sqrdim = int(np.sqrt(dim))
149 nslots = dim **2
150
151 ibound = math.ceil(dim/sqrdim)
152
153 Actemp1 = [[0 for j in range(sqrdim)] for i in range(sqrdim)]
154 Actemp2 = [[0 for j in range(sqrdim)] for i in range(sqrdim)]
155 Bctemp = [[0 for j in range(sqrdim)] for i in range(sqrdim)]
156
157 Actxts1 = [0 for j in range(dim)]
158 Actxts2 = [0 for j in range(dim)]
159 Bctxts = [0 for j in range(dim)]
160
161 BaByctxt1 = []
162 BaByctxt2 = []






169 resA = multByPoly_calc(BaByctxt1 [0], Initpoly [0][0])
170 resB = multByPoly_calc(BaByctxtB [0], Initpoly [2][0])
171
172 for j in range(sqrdim - 1):
173 j1 = (j + 1)
174





180 Actemp1 [0][j1] = multByPoly_calc(BaByctxt1[j1], Initpoly [0][j1])
181 Actemp2 [0][j1] = multByPoly_calc(BaByctxt2[j1], Initpoly [1][j1])
182 Bctemp [0][j1] = multByPoly_calc(BaByctxtB[j1], Initpoly [2][j1])
183
184 Actemp1 [0][j1] = addPoly_calc(Actemp1 [0][j1], Actemp2 [0][j1])
185
186 for j in range (1, sqrdim):
187 resA = addPoly_calc(resA , Actemp1 [0][j])
188 resB = addPoly_calc(resB , Bctemp [0][j])
189
190 for k in range(dim - sqrdim):
191 k1 = (k + sqrdim)
192 j = int(k1) % sqrdim
193
194 Actxts1[k1] = multByPoly_calc(BaByctxt1[j], Initpoly [0][k1])
195 Actxts2[k1] = multByPoly_calc(BaByctxt2[j], Initpoly [1][k1])
196 Bctxts[k1] = multByPoly_calc(BaByctxtB[j], Initpoly [2][k1])
197
198 for k in range(ibound - 1):
199 k1 = (k+1) * sqrdim
200
201 for j in range(1, sqrdim):
202 Actxts1[k1] = addPoly_calc(Actxts1[k1], Actxts1[k1+j])
203 Actxts2[k1] = addPoly_calc(Actxts2[k1], Actxts2[k1+j])
204 Bctxts[k1] = addPoly_calc(Bctxts[k1], Bctxts[k1+j])
205
206 k2 = (k1 - (k1 % sqrdim))
207
208 Actxts1[k1] = leftRotate(Actxts1[k1], k2)
209 Actxts2[k1] = rightRotate(Actxts2[k1], k2)
210 Bctxts[k1] = leftRotate(Bctxts[k1], k2*dim)
211
212 Actxts1[k1] = addPoly_calc(Actxts1[k1], Actxts2[k1])
213
214 for k in range(1, ibound):
215 k1 = k * sqrdim
216
217 resA = addPoly_calc(resA , Actxts1[k1])
218 resB = addPoly_calc(resB , Bctxts[k1])
219




223 def HEmatmul_calc(M, N, Initpoly , shiftpoly , verbose):
224 dim = int(np.sqrt(len(M)))
225 dim1 = dim - 1
226 sqrdim = int(np.sqrt(dim))
227 nslots = dim **2
228
229 Actxts = []
230 Bctxts = []
231





237 for i in range(dim1):
238 i1 = (i + 1)
239 #careful with indexing in general case
240 Actxts.append(shiftBycols_calc(Actxts [0], i1, shiftpoly))
241 Bctxts.append(leftRotate(Bctxts [0], dim * i1))
242





248 def genShiftPoly_calc(M, N, verbose):
249 dim = int(np.sqrt(len(M)))
250 dim1 = dim - 1
251 sqrdim = np.sqrt(dim)
252 nslots = dim **2
253
254 shiftpoly = []
255
256 vals = [[0 for j in range(nslots)] for i in range(dim1)]
257
258 for i in range(dim1):
259 for j in range(dim):
260 for k in range(i+1):







268 def genMultPoly_calc(M, N, verbose):
269 dim = int(np.sqrt(len(M)))
270 sqrdim = int(np.sqrt(dim))
271 nslots = dim **2
272
273 ibound = math.ceil(dim/sqrdim)
274 jbound = sqrdim
275
276 Initpoly = []
277
278 fvals1 = [[0 for j in range(nslots)] for i in range(dim)]
279 fvals2 = [0 for i in range(dim)]
280 bvals = [[0 for j in range(nslots)] for i in range(dim)]
281
282 for i in range(ibound):
283 for j in range(jbound):
284 k = i * sqrdim + j;
285
286 for l in range(dim - k):
287 fvals1[k][k * dim + l] = 1
288
289 fvals2[k] = msgleftRotate(fvals1[k], int(k*(2* dim - 1)), nslots)
290
291 fvals1[k] = msgrightRotate(fvals1[k], int(i*sqrdim), nslots)
292 fvals2[k] = msgleftRotate(fvals2[k], int(i*sqrdim), nslots)
293
294 for l in range(dim):
295 bvals[k][l * dim + k] = 1
296









306 def matrix_mult_alt_calc(M, N, verbose):
307
308 Initpoly = genMultPoly_calc(M, N, verbose)
309 shiftpoly = genShiftPoly_calc(M, N, verbose)
310





316 def blockMulti_calc(A, B, dim , x, y, z, verbose=True):
317 dx = int(x / dim)
318 dy = int(y / dim)
319 dz = int(z / dim)
320
321 idxA = [i for i in range(len(A))]
230
322 idxB = [i for i in range(len(B))]
323 idxB1 = convTrans(idxB , dy, dz)
324 res = []
325
326 for r in range (dx):
327 for s in range(dz):
328 tmp = []
329 for t in range(dy):
330 if t == 0:
331 tmp = matrix_mult_alt_calc(A[idxA[r*dy+t]], B[idxB1[s*dy+t]], verbose)
332 else:







339 def HEmattrans_calc(M, Transpoly , verbose):
340 dim = int(np.sqrt(len(M)))
341 dim1 = dim - 1
342 sqrdim = int(np.sqrt(dim))
343 nslots = dim **2
344
345 dimsqrdim = sqrdim * (dim - 1)
346
347 ibound = math.ceil(dim/sqrdim)
348
349 ltemp = [[0 for j in range(sqrdim)] for i in range(sqrdim)]
350 rtemp = [[0 for j in range(sqrdim)] for i in range(sqrdim)]
351
352 res = multByPoly_calc(M, Transpoly [0])
353
354 BaByctxt1 = []





360 for j in range(sqrdim - 1):
361 j1 = (j + 1)
362




367 ltemp [0][j1] = multByPoly_calc(BaByctxt1[j1], Transpoly[j1])
368 rtemp [0][j1] = multByPoly_calc(BaByctxt2[j1], Transpoly[j1 + dim])
369
370 ltemp [0][j1] = addPoly_calc(ltemp [0][j1], rtemp [0][j1])
371
372 for j in range (1, sqrdim):
373 res = addPoly_calc(res , ltemp [0][j])
374
375 for i in range(ibound - 1):
376 jbound = sqrdim
377 i1 = i + 1
378 k = (i1) * sqrdim
379
380 for j in range(jbound):
381 ltemp[i1][j] = multByPoly_calc(BaByctxt1[j], Transpoly[k + j])
382 rtemp[i1][j] = multByPoly_calc(BaByctxt2[j], Transpoly[k + j + dim])
383
384 for j in range(1, jbound):
385 ltemp[i1][0] = addPoly_calc(ltemp[i1][0], ltemp[i1][j])
386 rtemp[i1][0] = addPoly_calc(rtemp[i1][0], rtemp[i1][j])
387
388
389 ltemp[i1][0] = leftRotate(ltemp[i1][0], i1 * dimsqrdim)
390 rtemp[i1][0] = rightRotate(rtemp[i1][0], i1 * dimsqrdim)
391
392 ltemp[i1][0] = addPoly_calc(ltemp[i1][0], rtemp[i1 ][0])
393
394 for i in range(1, ibound):





400 def genTransPoly_calc(M, verbose):
401 dim = int(np.sqrt(len(M)))
402 sqrdim = int(np.sqrt(dim))
403 nslots = dim **2
404
405 dsqr = nslots - 1
406 dimsqrdim = sqrdim * (dim - 1)
407
408 ibound = math.ceil(dim/sqrdim)
409 jbound = sqrdim
410
411 Transpoly = [0 for _ in range(2 * dim)]
412
413 lvals = [[0 for j in range(nslots)] for i in range(dim)]
414 rvals = [[0 for j in range(nslots)] for i in range(dim)]
415
416 for i in range(ibound):
417 for j in range(jbound):
418 k = i * sqrdim + j;
419
231
420 for l in range(dim - k):
421 dtemp = l * (dim + 1) + k
422 lvals[k][ dtemp] = 1
423 rvals[k][dsqr - dtemp] = 1
424
425 lvals[k] = msgrightRotate(lvals[k], int(i*dimsqrdim), nslots)
426 rvals[k] = msgleftRotate(rvals[k], int(i*dimsqrdim), nslots)
427
428 Transpoly[k] = lvals[k]





434 def matrix_trans_calc(M, verbose):
435 Transpoly = genTransPoly_calc(M, verbose)





441 def blockTrans_calc(A, dim , x, y, verbose=True):
442 dx = int(x / dim)
443 dy = int(y / dim)
444
445 dimM = dx * dy
446
447 idxA = [i for i in range(dimM)]
448 idxA1 = convTrans(idxA , dx, dy)
449 res = []
450






457 def blockTransMatrix_calc(dim=16, x=16, y=16, verbose=True):
458
459 A = np.random.rand(x, y)
460 A1 = A.T
461
462 resA = sepBlocks(list(A.reshape (-1)), dim , y)
463 res = blockTrans_calc(resA , dim , x, y)
464 M = combBlocks(res , dim , x) #note
465
466 M = np.array(M).reshape(y, x)
467 A1 = np.array(A1).reshape(y, x)
468





474 def blockMatrix_calc(dim=16, x=16, y=16, z=16, zlim=0, verbose=True):
475 A = np.random.rand(x, y)
476 B = np.random.rand(y, z)
477
478 if (zlim > 0):
479 B1 = B[:, :zlim]
480 C1 = np.dot(A, B1)
481 for i in range(len(B)):
482 for j in range(len(B[i])):
483 if j % z >= zlim:
484 B[i][j] = 0
485
486 C = np.dot(A, B)
487
488 resA =sepBlocks (list(A.reshape (-1)), dim , y)
489 resB = sepBlocks(list(B.reshape (-1)), dim , z)
490 res = blockMulti_calc(resA , resB , dim , x, y, z)
491 M = combBlocks(res , dim , z)




496 if (zlim > 0):
497 M1 = M[:, :zlim]
498 assert(np.allclose(C1 , M1))
499
500 return M
501
502 #blockMatrix_calc ()
503 #blockTransMatrix_calc ()
232
